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Abstract 
This research aims to explore and identify empirically the perceptions of Libyan 
Commercial Banks’ (LCBs) stakeholders about earnings management and its impact 
on the quality of financial reporting. The study examines the occurrence of earnings 
management and the techniques that are used to manage LCBs’ earnings by first 
investigating the understanding of LCBs’ stakeholders about the term earnings 
management. The study also examines perceptions of the motivations behind LCBs’ 
managers being engaged in earnings management, as well as the perceived conditions 
that enable LCBs’ managers to manage their earnings. Finally the study examines 
stakeholders’ perceptions about the controls by which earnings management may be 
mitigated. The results of the study are interpreted through an accountability 
perspective. The study uses semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey 
with wide groups of stakeholders’ LCBs. The findings of this study reveal a range of 
views regarding the quality of financial reporting between different stakeholders 
groups, and also within the individual groups. This finding may refer to a serious 
problem within the accountability relationship of the LCBs. The results findings also 
reveal that the term ‘earnings management’ is not understood consistently by different 
stakeholders in Libya. The findings also suggest the existence of earnings 
management in LCBs’ financial reporting using various techniques e.g. especially the 
loan loss provision. The motivations of earnings management practices as revealed by 
the study findings are consistent with those reported in the literature. Earnings 
management is perceived as an unethical practice by most of the LCBs’ stakeholders 
but there are exceptions to this view. Earnings management could be reduced, 
according to the perceptions of LCBs’ stakeholders, by adopting IFRS, applying 
better corporate governance, and enhancing the role of the external auditor. 
1 
Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
1.1 Financial Reporting Quality and Earnings Management 
The accounting issue generally referred to as ‘financial reporting quality’ has received 
considerable attention in recent years. Useful information is relevant and reliable 
information; being reliable means information is complete, neutral, and free from error. A 
fundamental responsibility of management is to provide high quality financial reporting 
(Atik and Ismail, 2011). In other words, in order to be accountable, management has to 
provide quality information and act ethically, or, in the words of Cotter (2012, p. 48), to 
“discharge its responsibilities honestly”. Financial information of quality may also be 
characterised as information that is useful for the decision-making process. 
The quality of financial information can be assessed by, amongst other things, the 
incidence of earnings management (Elias, 2012). Barth et al. (2008), Chen et al. (2011), 
Zeghal et al. (2012) and Ahmed et al. (2013), for example, used earnings management as a 
proxy to test for accounting quality. Thus the link between financial reporting quality and 
earnings management can be clearly stated as the less earnings management, there is the 
higher the quality of financial reporting. The financial reporting quality issue has received 
repeated scrutiny in the wake of recent financial scandals and the collapse of high-profile 
institutions like Enron and WorldCom (Hong and Anderson, 2011). Due to these recent 
financial crises, as well as the audit failure in not detecting and preventing such behaviour, 
the accounting profession, according to Krishnan (2005), “is facing a credibility crisis” (p. 
209). The collapses of well-respected companies, according to Leventis and Dimitropoulos 
(2012) resulted in investors losing confidence in both corporate disclosure and capital 
market efficiency as they have "raised many concerns about the reliability of financial 
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reporting and the efficiency of existing monitoring mechanisms" (Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos, 2012, p. 161). 
The recent corporate scandals have also highlighted the incidence of unethical practices 
conducted by business organizations (Cacioppe et al., 2008). These unethical practices that 
are referred to in the literature as creative accounting include earnings management, and 
have, according to Beaudoin et al. (2013), been the cause of the collapse of some high-
profile companies and reduced confidence in financial reporting. 
The issue of earnings management has continued to be problematic in the financial 
reporting context throughout recent decades (Heinz et al., 2013) and an important topic 
that concerns a wide range of stakeholders including regulators, investors and managers 
(Achilles et al., 2013). Its importance, according to Man and Wong (2013), stems from its 
negative effects on the financial statements as it “may undermine the credibility of 
financial statements” (p. 400). It involves deliberate management intervention in the 
financial reporting process to misstate reported earnings in order to achieve certain rewards 
(Foster and Shastri, 2013). This opportunistic managerial behaviour, according to Aerts et 
al. (2013) is mainly incurred for “the benefit of insiders” by consciously acting to “mislead 
outsiders’ perceptions” about the firm’s financial performance (p. 94). Although earnings 
management might arguably be used to make information more informative for outsiders 
given the deep knowledge that managers would have about their activities, however it is 
still questionable. Aerts et al. (2013) revealed that: 
“Management’s motives for earnings management are, however, not 
transparent from reported numbers, both manipulative [opportunistic] and 
communicative [informative] earnings management are likely to feed ex ante 
uncertainty of users with regard to earnings management consequences” (p. 
94). 
In addition, opportunistic earnings management, according to Habbash et al. (2013), 
reduces the quality of reported income as it produces less reliable reported earnings that do 
3 
not reveal the true financial performance of the firm. In the words of Ascioglu et al. 
(2012), earnings management clearly "degrades the quality" of reported income as well as 
disclosure in general (p. 258). 
Earnings management may have an adverse consequence on accountability relationships. 
Accountability or being accountable refers to the process whereby managers provide 
useful, unbiased, and reliable information to the firm’s stakeholders. Aerts et al. (2013) 
outlined that earnings management could reveal an accountability breach, when they 
indicated: 
“Given users’ ex-ante uncertainty with regard to management’s earnings 
management motives, indications of earnings management may be perceived 
as a significant accountability predicament, and bring management to offer 
more explanations on performance-related matters…” (p. 95).  
Thus, the existence of earnings management, through its adverse effect on financial 
reporting quality, also constitutes a serious breach of the accountability process. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 presents the research problem 
and motivations. Section 1.3 discusses the study’s objectives and methodology. Section 1.4 
lists the main and subsidiary research questions. 
1.2 Research Problem and Motivations 
Regardless of the regulatory efforts that have been made to preclude earnings management, 
this managerial behaviour, according to Beaudoin et al. (2013), still exists and continues to 
concern related parties; practitioners, regulators and standard setters. Therefore, it is of 
great importance to understand this behaviour and highlight some means of minimizing its 
damaging consequences. According to Krishnan and Visvanathan (2011), ”earnings 
management is believed to be widespread and a matter of concern to regulators and users 
of financial statements” (p. 133).  
 4 
For Cotter (2012), the existence of such a practice is due to the fact that we live in a world 
that falls some way short of the perfect world. He outlines: 
“In a perfect world every business would discharge its responsibilities 
honestly, and there would be no suspicion of wrongdoing. In such a world it 
would not be necessary to monitor activities or to have penalties to punish 
fraudulent behaviour. There would still be a need for rules, of course, but 
only to ensure that business transactions were recorded consistently across 
firms. The world in which we live falls some way short of the one outlined 
above” (p. 48). 
The first motivation of this study stems basically from the need to focus on the importance 
of accountability through high quality financial information and threats to this 
accountability by focusing on the issue of earnings management. 
The literature provides ample evidence of earnings management in developed countries. 
However, very little research has been conducted for developing countries in general and 
for Libya in particular. The research findings from developed countries are not necessarily 
applicable to developing countries due to the different environmental factors which may be 
present. Companies operating in developing countries are unlike those of developed 
countries in many respects: according to Baralexis (2004), they suffer from poor 
management, being unlisted, and having unsophisticated users of financial information. 
Therefore, earnings management perceptions in developing countries might be different 
from those in developed countries. In addition, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
this study in focusing on listed commercial banks is the first of its kind in Libya
1
. 
Therefore, the current study may help in filling the gap by illustrating results from the 
Libyan banking sector which plays a key economic role in a specific developing country. 
Financial crises have emphasized the importance of ethical behavior within the financial 
reporting context (Frecka, 2008) and it has been concluded that “the standard of ethical 
behavior is higher than a standard of just meeting the rules of financial reporting” (Frecka, 
                                                 
1
 The researcher is aware of only one study about earnings management by Libyan corporations conducted in 
2011 and which was only available in 2013. That thesis is different from the current one in that it was 
undertaken to study Libyan companies that are not listed. 
5 
2008, p. 55). The accounting profession has for long been concerned about the ethics of 
financial reporting (Grasso et al., 2009).  
Perceptions regarding the acceptability of earnings management are different. Some 
perceive it as ethical while others view it as unethical behavior; the overall assessment, 
according to Beaudoin et al. (2013), may depend on the underlying perceptions of its 
purpose. Prior research has stressed the importance of evaluating perceptions of earnings 
management to provide an overall assessment of the climate surrounding earnings 
management. According to Geiger and Smith (2010), “it is critically important to examine 
the perceptions of individuals from different countries in an attempt to evaluate the climate 
for earnings management that may exist…” (p. 21). 
This study explores stakeholders’ views regarding the practices and ethics of earnings 
management within Libyan Commercial Banks (LCBs). 
Financial reporting regulations have an important role to play in this area. The IASB as a 
regulator body, for example, affirms that the main objective of financial statements is the 
provision of useful financial information and it is making every effort to reduce flexibility 
to restrict earnings management practices (Cotter, 2012). Accounting standards, according 
to Zhang et al. (2013), affect the level of earnings management e.g. they will determine the 
degree of managerial discretion with regard to revenue and loss recognition. International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been mainly developed in order to converge 
accounting information globally. However, the introduction of IFRS is attracting scholars 
to investigate their effect on accounting quality and therefore earnings management (Zhang 
et al., 2013). This thesis investigates stakeholders' views in regard to the influence of IFRS 
on LCBs' financial reporting quality. 
Corporate governance, defined as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” (Cadbury, 1992), also has a key role to play in establishing the culture within 
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which financial reporting takes place. Prior research indicates that good corporate 
governance could have an influential impact on earnings management; audit committees, 
for example, “can oversee internal control for financial reporting and the quality of 
financial information” (Man and Wong, 2013, p. 409). Good corporate governance, in 
general, can reduce the adverse effect of earnings management on the quality of financial 
reporting which helps in improving investors’ confidence (Uadiale, 2012). More clearly, in 
the U.S. for example, good corporate governance means the “ability to mitigate listed 
companies earnings management activities” (Yang et al., 2012, p. 89). This study does not 
go in to depth in terms of corporate governance practices in Libya, it only investigates 
stakeholders’ perceptions towards the effect that good corporate governance would have 
on earnings management by banks. It is worth mentioning that a corporate governance 
code for the commercial banks has been issued by the Central Bank of Libya and all 
commercial banks operating in Libya have to adhere to this Code. This Code was issued in 
2006 based on OECD principles of corporate governance as well as the Basel Report on 
Banking Supervision for enhancing corporate governance for banking organisations with 
the aim to protect both shareholders and stakeholders (Zagoub, 2011). 
The external auditor plays a central role in the deterrence of earnings management 
behaviour (Cotter, 2012). Literature shows that a high quality external audit can have an 
influential role in reducing earnings management practices (Frankel et al., 2002). The 
quality of the external audit is unobservable, however it can arguably be measured to some 
extent by, inter alia, auditor tenure (Piot and Janin, 2007). In the Libyan Commercial banks 
context, the length of an auditor-bank relationship is restricted to only two years, which 
may ensure that a high audit quality being conducted (of course there is a counter argument 
that auditors’ knowledge of the business is a positive function of tenure). Moreover, only 
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specially listed
2
 auditors are allowed to perform a bank’s audit, which suggests that all 
listed auditors are industry specialists. According to Krishnan (2003), specialist auditors 
are more likely to detect earnings management than non-specialists; they have the required 
experience and resources and are armed with an incentive (to maintain their reputation) to 
constrain earnings management. Ultimately the earnings quality should therefore be 
enhanced. The effect of auditor industry specialization on earnings management was also 
acknowledged recently by Sun and Liu (2013).  
This research is also concerned with perceptions of external auditor effectiveness in 
deterring or preventing earnings management practices. 
To sum up, this study examines whether earnings management is perceived to affect the 
financial reporting quality of LCBs by investigating the perceptions of LCBs’ stakeholders 
regarding: the exercise of earnings management by LCBs; LCBs’ motivations to practice 
earnings management; techniques by which earnings management may be applied in 
LCBs; the acceptability of earnings management as a behaviour in terms of business 
ethics; and factors that may have enabled LCBs to manage their earnings.  
Although Cotter (2012) acknowledged that earnings management practices cannot be 
totally eliminated, he noted that the following approaches could potentially help in 
reducing this behaviour:  financial regulation, the external auditor, corporate governance, 
ethics, whistle-blowing, and corporate social reporting. Given the thesis scope, discussion 
will only be restricted to the first four of these approaches. This study also examines the 
perceptions of LCBs’ stakeholders in relation to earnings management constraints; more 
specifically, it addresses perceptions regarding: adopting international financial reporting 
standards (IFRS), applying good corporate governance, and the role of external auditors in 
                                                 
2
 The Central Bank of Libya requires an external auditor to prove relevant experience before being listed and, 
therefore, allowed for banks audit. 
 8 
deterring earnings management and hence enhancing the quality of financial reporting and 
ultimately the accountability process in LCBs. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Methodology 
This research aims to explore, and identify empirically, perceptions of earnings 
management and related issues as practiced by LCBs from the view point of its 
stakeholders. First, it provides a general understanding of the stakeholders’ mindfulness 
about the topic of earnings management, underlying motivations, and techniques, as well 
as how ethical it is perceived to be by different stakeholders. The research also examines 
stakeholders’ perceptions regarding earnings management constraints; specifically, it 
explores views about whether the application of International Accounting Standards 
(IFRS) can have any role in deterring such practices. Views about the potential benefit of 
adopting good corporate governance practices are also investigated. Finally, this study 
examines stakeholders’ perceptions about the role of the external auditor in respect of 
earnings management; in other words, perceptions are sought about to what extent the 
external auditor is effective in preventing such a practice. 
This study adopts the interpretive paradigm. Consciously acknowledging and reflecting on 
a paradigm, according to Saunders et al. (2012), can help the researcher to understand and 
explain the social phenomena that is being examined. The interpretive paradigm is a 
platform from which research tries to examine ways in which the world is understood. The 
main concern for the researcher in this paradigm would be to discover what may 
potentially be “irrationalities” (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 142). The findings of this research 
are interpreted from an accountability perspective. This thesis adopts the normative role of 
accountability theory where the findings are interpreted in terms of their influence over the 
accountability mechanism. The objective role of accounting theory, according to Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), is to “explain and predict accounting practice”. However, the role of 
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accounting theory can, and in the view of this author should, be more concerned about how 
accounting practice can be improved.  
This study used two research methods for data collection; semi-structured interviews and a 
questionnaire survey. 
1.4 Research Questions  
To fulfil the research objectives, the main research questions this thesis tries to answer can 
be determined as follows: 
1- To what extent is earnings management perceived to influence the quality of 
financial reporting in LCBs? 
 What do LCBs' stakeholders understand by the term 'earnings management'? 
 How are LCBs’ perceived as being able to manage their earnings? 
 What are the perceived motivations behind the earnings management practices in 
LCBs? 
 How do LCBs' stakeholders perceive earnings management in terms of business 
ethics? 
 What factors were perceived as enabling LCBs to manage earnings? 
2- To what extent, from an accountability perspective, could such perceptions be 
addressed? 
 What do LCBs' stakeholders perceives the implications of adopting IFRS in relation 
to earnings management? 
 How do LCBs' stakeholders perceive the role of the external auditor in relation to 
earnings management? 
 How do LCBs' stakeholders perceive the implications of good corporate 
governance in relation to earnings management? 
As discussed above, this study aims to investigate the earnings management issues in 
LCBs from a stakeholders’ view point. The notion behind selecting commercial banks for 
the study stems partially from the importance of such a sector and therefore its impact on 
the economy. Banks have a central function in the economy; keeping the savings of the 
public and financing the development of business and trade. This central role of banks 
justifies particular scrutiny over banks’ efficiency as it would affect the growth of the 
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economy. Moreover, given the crucial importance of the accountability system of banks, 
confidence in the financial reporting of banks is in the interests of a wide range of 
stakeholders e.g. regulators, customers, investors, and the society as a whole. The failure of 
banks “can result in systemic crises with adverse consequences for the economy as a 
whole” (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010, p. 189). This of course has been clearly seen in many 
countries as a result of the recent banking crisis. 
The collapse of a commercial bank would affect a wide range of stakeholders, not only 
shareholders. Moreover, most of the listed companies in the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) 
are commercial banks.  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The current chapter has provided an overview about 
the research topic: the study’s motivations, aim and objectives as well as the potential 
contributions have also been outlined. 
Chapter 2 provides the background of Libya; it tries to put the research into the Libyan 
context by studying the local environmental factors that may have influenced and continue 
to influence the accounting practices in Libya. 
The literature on the earnings management phenomenon is reviewed in Chapter 3. This 
provides various definitions for earnings management and discusses the underlying 
motivations that induce such a practice. The ethics of earnings management is also 
discussed in this chapter as well as earnings management practices in the banking sector. 
Chapter 4 reviews the accountability theory literature. The accountability concept is 
discussed and two notions of accountability are outlined.  
Chapter 5 outlines the methodology adopted in this thesis and highlights the research 
methods used.   
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Chapters 6 and 7 report the findings of the two pieces of empirical work that were 
employed to collect the data for this thesis, semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire 
survey respectively. 
Chapter 8 summarises and reports the major findings. It also outlines the main 
contributions of the study and the study limitations, and finally it suggests some future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
The Libyan Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the Libyan context by examining the national environment in which 
Libyan accounting practice has developed. This study is concerned with the topic of 
earnings management and its related issues within LCBs from an accountability 
perspective. Studying the environmental factors in Libya will provide a good 
understanding of the current accounting practices and reporting process in this country. It 
has been argued that accounting differs from one country to another and this is mainly due 
to different environmental factors that exist in each country. In this context, Adhikari and 
Tondkar (1992) suggest: 
“It is generally agreed that accounting diversity exists because accounting 
reporting and disclosure standards and practices do not develop in a vacuum 
but reflect the particular environment in which they are developed. Given that 
environments differ from country to country, accounting reporting and 
disclosure standards and practices would necessarily be expected to exhibit 
diversity” (p. 76). 
Accounting literature suggests that accounting research cannot be conducted without 
considering the context in which accounting is practiced. Libya, as a developing country, 
has its own history, politics, culture and regulatory regimes which have to be considered 
when conducting any accounting research. Wallace (1990) has claimed that the 
environment will have a strong impact on financial reporting in any developing country. 
He indicated: 
“Developing countries are not a homogeneous group. Each country is 
different in terms of GNP [Gross National Product], population, culture, 
degree of literacy, economic and political systems- factors which invariably 
have an impact on the nature and extent of financial reporting” (p. 3). 
This Chapter is divided into five sections. The next section provides a brief review of the 
Libyan background. Then the national environmental factors that are believed to have an 
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impact on accounting practices in Libya are briefly discussed; the economic system, the 
political system, the legal system, the education system and religion. Section 2.4 attempts 
to describe the current status of the accounting profession in Libya. Section 2.5 
summarises this Chapter. 
2.2 Background of Libya 
Libya is a developing country located in North Africa with a Mediterranean coastline of 
about 1,770 km that makes it the longest in North Africa. The nation shares borders with 
Egypt to the east; Tunis and Algeria to the west; Niger and Chad to the south. The country 
occupies a relatively a large area of landmass, about 1.76 million square kilometres, which 
makes it the fourth-largest country in Africa and almost half the size of Europe (Oxford 
Business Group, 2008; Pratten and Mashat, 2009). The majority of this area (about 90%) is 
desert or semi-desert (CIA, 2012).  
Economically Libya possesses a significant position globally being a major oil producer. 
According to Mashat (2005), Libya is:  
“… a developing country which has experienced dynamic changes over a 
short period of time. Its position as the second largest oil producer in Africa, 
one of Europe's biggest North African oil suppliers and an active member of 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC since 1962 that 
produces high-quality, low-sulphur, crude oil at very low cost might mean 
that this country possesses a significant world economic standing” (p. 11). 
Moreover, Libya holds oil reserves amounting to 47.1 billion barrels (as of Jan 
2012), these reserves are the largest in Africa and make Libya one of the big ten in 
the world. In addition to oil reserves, natural gas reserves are estimated to reach 
52.8 trillion cubic feet (as of Jan 2012), ranking the country as the fourth gas 
producer in Africa (EIA, 2012). 
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Figure 2.1: Libya Map 
 
The country’s official language is Arabic with English and Italian being understood in the 
major cities (FCO, 2012). Libyan culture is characterized by, in addition to its Arabic 
language, the Islamic religion. Unlike many other Arab countries that have more than one 
religion, the majority of Libya (97%) are Sunni Muslim of the Malikite rite (Mashat, 
2005). Another aspect of Libya’s culture is its focus on both privacy and family values 
(Oxford Business Group, 2008). Population as revealed in the 2006 census was 5,298,152. 
However, the estimated Libyan population in July 2012 is approximately 5.6 m people 
(CIA, 2012). The population density for the country is three people per square kilometre 
which puts the country as amongst the least densely populated in the world. However, the 
majority of the population (90%) lives around the coastline and this area represents only 
10% of the country’s total. A third of the entire population lives in the two major cities; 
Tripoli and Benghazi (Business Oxford Group, 2008). 
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2.3 The Environmental Factors in Libya 
A number of environmental factors
3
 which have been identified in the literature are 
suggested to have an influence over the accounting profession. For the purpose of this 
chapter, a number of environmental factors which are deemed most relevant for this 
chapter will be examined. This chapter draws on Iqbal’s (2002) classification of 
environmental factors that affect accounting practices and financial reporting in a 
particular country: (1) the economic system; (2) the political system; (3) the legal system; 
(4) the educational system and; (5) the religion. These factors, collectively, form the 
cultural values of a country which consequently affect, inter alia, the accounting practices 
and financial reporting procedures. In the following sections, brief discussions on how 
such factors may have an influence on the accounting system in Libya are provided. 
2.3.1 The Political System 
The accounting literature documents that political factors, among others, have an influence 
on accounting practices (Alhashim and Arpan, 1988). This section provides a brief 
historical background on the changes to the political system of Libya over the past six 
decades.  
Due to its location in the mid-Mediterranean part of North Africa, as a connection point 
between Europe and Central Africa, and between the Middle East and North West Africa, 
the country, for almost 3,000 years, has been a target for many military invasions and 
colonisations until it declared independence on 24
th
 of December 1951
4
 under the 
leadership of King Idris Al-Sanussi (Mahmud, 1997). During a period of 3,000 years of 
invasions, Libya was attacked by different nations, including the Phoenicians, the 
                                                 
3
 This chapter is restricted to examine the internal environmental factors. External factors as described by 
Doupnik and Salter (1995) are beyond the scope of this discussion. External factors, according to Doupnik 
and Salter (1995), “encompasses diverse influences” for example, the economic conditions, geography, 
colonization, climate, technology, disease, and relationships with other countries. (p. 194). 
4
 On 21 November 1949, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution stating that Libya should become 
independent before 1
st
 January 1952… When Libya declared its independence on December 24, 1951, it was 
the first country to do so through the United Nations (FCO, 2012). 
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Carthaginians, the Greeks, the Romans, Spaniards, Vandals, and the Byzantine Empire. 
Libya has also been occupied by Muslim Arabs, Ottoman Turks and a more recent military 
invasion by Italy in 1911 (Mahmud, 1997; Kribat, 2009). Table 2.3 shows the main 
historical events in Libya.  
Table 2.1 Main Historical Events of Libya 
Date Event 
Before 642 Libya was occupied by the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals and 
Byzantines. 
642-1510 Arab Islamic Rule: Libya conquered by Arab Islamic conquerors. In this period, 
Libya was ruled by several Islamic rulers (states). 
1510-1551 Tripoli was invaded by the Hapsburg Spain. 
1551-1911 Ottoman Empire: Libya was occupied by Ottoman Turks and it remained part of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
1911-1943 Italian Colony: the Italians supplanted the Ottoman Turks in the area around Tripoli in 
1911 and did not relinquish their hold until 1943 when defeated in World War II. 
 
1943-1951 British and French military administration: the Allied powers controlled Libya and 
then it passed to UN administration and achieved independence in 1951. 
1951-1969 Independence and the United Kingdom of Libya: Libyan gained its independence on 
24
th
 of December 1951, as a constitutional and hereditary monarchy under the King 
Idris Al-Sanuusi.  
1959 The discovery of significant oil reserves: enabling one of the world’s poorest nations 
to establish an extremely wealthy state, and become one of world’s leading oil 
producers. 
1969-1973 September military coup in 1969 (Libyan Arab Republic): the governing authority 
became the Revolution Command Council (RCC) led by Gaddafi. 
1973-1977 In 1973, Gaddafi declared the Cultural Revolution to encourage people to participate 
in political life by creation of the “People’s Committees” to administer local and 
regional administrations. This caused administrative chaos in the country by 
abolishing all laws; eliminating political parties which were intended as revolution’s 
enemies. 
1977-2011 “The People’s Authority” the RCC was replaced by the General People’s Congress 
(GPC) as a parliamentary body (the highest legislative authority) which established 
the new political regime for the country, ‘The People’s Authority’. 
Feb 2011 Anti-Gaddafi Uprising: on 15
th
 February a violent protest in Benghazi (in the east of 
Libya) was sparked in response to a human rights campaigner arrest. Uprising then 
becomes a people’ revolution and spread almost to all Libyan cities. 
Mar 2011 National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed in Benghazi to represent the rebels 
locally and internationally. The main objective for NTC was to get rid of the Gaddafi 
regime and guide the country toward democracy.  
Aug 2011 Country’s Capitol Liberty: in 20
th
 Aug, rebels entered Tripoli from three axes, three 
days later the capital was declared liberated. 
Oct 2011 Death of the Tyrant: on 20
th
 of Oct, rebels captured and killed Gaddafi in his birth 
town of Sirte. 
Aug 2012- Now General National Congress (GNC): NTC passed the power to GNC. GNC has elected 
Dr. Mohammed Magarief as its chairman, therefore, becoming the interim head of 
state.  
Adaptation from: Zagoub (2011, p. 13); BBC (2012a). 
From 1969 until February 2011, Libya was governed by the Gaddafi regime. In early 2011 
violent protests erupted in Benghazi and these were promptly followed in other cities 
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which quickly led to a public revolution which overthrew the Gaddafi regime
5
. Gaddafi 
had ruled the country since 1969 when he took power in a bloodless coup that overthrew 
King Idris; subsequently he ruled as a dictator. Since that time he ruled the country “with 
an iron fist” until the country “embarked on a radically new chapter in its history” 
following the revolution (BBC, 2012a, 2012b). Gaddafi’s life was full of controversy. At 
the beginning, Gaddafi was influenced by, and emulated, the Egyptian leader Jamal Abdel 
Nasser. However, he then ruled the country in ways which were “increasingly eccentric”. 
In 1975, he published his Green Book in which he put his ideas forth (the Third 
International Theory) as an alternative to both communism and capitalism. As a 
consequence of his book, Libya became known as ‘Jamahirya’ which loosely can be 
translated into the ‘state of masses’. According to the Green Book, Libya was governed by 
a direct democratic system by which peoples’ committees took power to rule the country. 
However, in fact the real power was only with Gaddafi (BBC, 2012a). The year 2011 has 
seen unprecedented developments in Libyan modern history. After 42 years of tyranny and 
repression, Libya embarked on a revolution to end decades of repression. Rebels then 
organised a leadership called the National Transitional Council (NTC) to organise the 
rebels’ efforts and represent them locally and later internationally (The World Bank, 2012). 
The NTC met for the first time in 5
th
 March 2011 in Benghazi, where it based, to declare 
itself the sole representative of Libya acting on behalf of the rebellion against the Gaddafi 
regime. The NTC has made it clear that it is only a transitional government and not an 
interim government; later on 15
th
 July 2011 the NTC was recognised as the only legitimate 
representative authority in Libya by the ‘Libya Contact Group6’ (FCO, 2012). 
                                                 
5
 “Libya’s long-time leader Col Muammar Gaddafi was killed [on 20th October, 2011] in his home town of 
Sirte, officials say, by forces who have been trying to topple him since February, with the backing of Western 
and Arab nations “ (BBC, 2012). 
6This groups was established mainly to support the NTC’ efforts in the London Conference on Libya that was 
held in 29
th
 March, 2011, by foreign ministers and organisations from over 40 countries (FCO, 2012). 
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2.3.2 The Economic System 
Prior research suggests that accounting developments in a specific country are basically 
influenced, among other things, by their economic environment (HassanElnaby et al., 
2003). Prior research also suggests that accounting development, to a large extent, depends 
on the economic stability of the country (Iqbal, 2002). This section sheds light on the 
Libyan economic environment both prior to and after the discovery of oil.  
Prior to the discovery of oil in Libya, Libya was considered as one of the poorest countries 
around the world with no natural resources, no skilled labour, severe weather conditions, 
and with no potential economic prospects. It was also described as a “hopeless case” 
(Higgins, 1968, p. 819). The economic condition at that time (prior to the oil discovery) 
can be seen through Higgins
7
 (1968) description of the Libyan economic situation as 
follows: 
“Its [Libya] great merit as a case study is as a prototype of a poor country. We 
need not construct abstract models of an economy where the bulk of the 
people live on a subsistence level, where per capita income is well below $50 
per year, where there are no sources of power and no mineral resources, 
where agricultural expansion is severely limited by climatic conditions, where 
capital formation is zero or less, where there is no skilled labor supply and no 
indigenous entrepreneurship. When Libya became an independent kingdom 
under United Nations auspices … it fulfilled all these conditions. Libya is at 
the bottom of the range in income and resources and so provides a reference 
point for comparison with all other countries” (p. 819). 
This situation remained until the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 1959
8
. The 
country then became one of the principal oil producers in the world which transformed the 
country from a poor to a wealthy nation (Zagoub, 2011). The petroleum sector then 
became the core sector in the Libyan economic system; it has become the main source of 
finance and significant economic growth took place
9
 for the first time. According to Chami 
et al (2012), oil revenues amount to about 90% of total revenues for the government. Table 
                                                 
7
 Higgins worked as an economic advisor to Libya in the early 1950s (Mahmud, 1997). 
8
 The export of crude oil started in 1961 (Zagoub, 2011). 
9
 Before oil discovery, Libyan economy was suffering from deficits and the main sources for public 
expenditures were domestic revenues and foreign aid (Mahmud, 1997). 
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2.1 illustrates the total revenues divided into oil and non-oil revenues for the years of 2008, 
2009, and 2010.  
Table 2.2: Libyan Total Revenues (LD
10 
million) 
Items 2008 2009 2010 
Oil revenues 64,417.0 35,347.0 55,713.0 
Non-oil revenues 8,324.2 64,38.0 5,790.1 
Total revenues 72,741.2 41,785.0 61,503.1 
Oil and natural gas % 88.5% 84.5% 90.5% 
Adaptation from: the Central Bank of Libya (2012). 
The rapid growth of the Libyan economy influenced by the oil discovery has been 
described by El-Mallakh (1969, cited in Mahumd, 1997) as follows: 
“If the economic growth occurring today in Libya were described  without 
identifying the country, it would be dismissed most likely as an extremely 
hypothetical case, too dramatic to be real” (p. 308). 
Being the main source of the country’s finance, the oil sales have played an important role 
in the country’s development and infrastructure. This makes the petroleum sector the prime 
sector in the Libyan economy. Oil revenues have been responsible for enabling the country 
to develop its infrastructure system (Zagoub, 2011). In its report on Libya, the Oxford 
Business Group (2008) commented on the Libyan natural resources as follows: 
“Hydrocarbons are by far the most important natural resources at the 
country’s disposal. Libya’s total proven oil reserves amount to approximately 
44bn barrels of crude oil. Currently 12 oil fields are in the process of being 
explored and around 25% of the country is covered by exploration 
agreements with oil companies, suggesting that the potential for the country’s 
energy industry is enormous” (p. 14). 
Hydrocarbon revenues amount to about 70% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and more than 95% of its exports (Chami et al., 2012). Table 2.2 shows the oil and 
non-oil revenues compared to the country’s GDP for 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
Table 2.3: Libya GDP (LD million) 
Economic Sector 2008 2009 2010 
Oil and natural gas extraction 81,149.8 47,087.1 60,814.5 
Other economic activities 35,489.8 39,201.9 41,723.8 
Total GDP 116,639.6 86,289.0 102,538.2 
Oil and natural gas % 69.5% 54.5% 59% 
Adaptation from: the Central Bank of Libya (2012). 
                                                 
10
 The conversion rate of Libyan Dinar to Pounds Sterling was approximately 2.06 as at 31/12/2013. 
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Libya has a significant position in the world’s energy market holding about 3.5% of the 
world’s proven crude oil reserves (Chami et al., 2012). Before the revolution of 17th Feb11, 
the Libyan economy was characterised by remarkable levels of growth. After that date, 
because of the revolution and the freezing of the country’s foreign assets by the UN the 
country’s economy was adversely effected. The African Economic Outlook (2012) has 
commented: 
“Libya’s economy, previously known for impressive levels of growth driven 
by its oil and gas industry, was seriously disrupted by the 2011 civil war. In 
addition to the impact that the freezing of the country’s assets had on 
liquidity, the economy was disrupted by the shutdown in oil production and 
exports, as well as the decline of productivity resulting from the loss of 
human capital and the destruction of infrastructure” (p. 4).  
 
Oil production dropped to its lowest level of 22,000 barrels per day
12
 due to the crisis 
which is a big hit for the economy bearing in mind that the production level before the 
crisis was 1.77 million barrels per day. However, the economy began to recover in early 
2012 when the crude oil production again exceeded 1 million barrels per day and it is 
expected to reach the pre-crisis level by 2014 (Chami et al., 2012). Figure 2.2 illustrates 
the crude oil production of the Libyan State during the period January 2000 until May 
2012. 
                                                 
11
 On 15
th
 Feb 2011 a public revolution to overthrow the regime had started to declare the country’s liberty 
on 23th Oct 2011 (BBC, 2012).  It was planned to start revolution on 17
th
 Feb, the date when a demonstration 
started in Benghazi in 2006 against the Italian ministry who appeared on TV showing the photo of who made 
the film that abusing our Prophet Mohamed, but the Libyan police by time arrested a human rights 
campaigner who used to guide demonstrations against the regime in Benghazi which provoked people against 
the regime and start the Revolution (BBC, 2012a). 
12
 The official production quota, according to OPEC, is 1.47 m barrels per day (AfDB et al., 2012). 
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Figure 2.2: The Oil Production Stream in Libya for the Period 2000-2012
 
Source: U.S Energy Information Administration.  
 
The modern development of Libya has been significantly influenced by the discovery of 
oil, the September military coup (Zagoub, 2011) and of course by the revolution of 17
th
 
Feb 2011. There is widespread agreement that an economic system of a country is, to large 
extent, influenced by its political system. Roberts et al. (2008) conclude that: 
"Differences in political systems will be reflected in differences in how the 
economy is organised and controlled. This will in turn influence the 
objectives or role of accounting" (p. 202). 
2.3.3 The Legal System  
Countries differ in terms of their legal systems. There is a great deal of agreement that two 
principal types of legal systems are identified in the literature: namely, code law and 
common law (Doupnik and Perera, 2007). Laws in code law countries, according to 
Roberts et al. (2008), tend to regulate and mandate acceptable behaviour; they consist of 
rules and procedures that have to be applied by all commercial organisations including 
those relating to accounting.  Accounting in code law countries is thus regulated by 
governments in order to control and ensure "orderly business conduct". They add that in 
such countries, the tax authority represents an often important user of accounting 
information; thus, accounting regulations are often set to ensure the need of tax authorities 
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given the fact that they are important users., Also most business organisations are not listed 
and thereby do not have many external shareholders (Roberts et al., 2008). Accounting 
regulations, in code law countries, are basically characterised as being "prescriptive, 
detailed and procedural" as they set forth in detail the disclosure requirements and book-
keeping rules and measurements that are to be employed (Roberts et al., 2008). 
In common law countries, laws tend to prevent unacceptable practices and behaviours 
rather than prescribing acceptable behaviour. This system originated in the UK and was 
exported later to the USA and Commonwealth countries in different forms. A considerable 
amount of the law is developed by judges and is court determined based on certain 
disputes; this makes common law less detailed than code law. However, common law is 
characterised as being more flexible than code law. In the UK, as a good example of a 
common law country, accounting is regulated by Companies Acts which are concerned 
with the protection of shareholders. They impose certain provisions to produce financial 
statements that represent a 'true and fair' view of the financial position. This view has been 
interpreted by courts by following and adopting accounting standards set by the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) a private professional body that is concerned with 
issuing accounting standards in the UK
13
. Unlike code law countries, the main user of 
financial information in common law countries is finance providers (Roberts et al., 2008). 
The legal system, generally, is enshrined in a country’s legislation. The following sub-
section examines the Libyan legislation that may have an impact on accounting practice 
and the financial reporting of the banking sector in Libya. This legislation can be 
summarised as follows; commercial law, income tax law, stock market law and banking 
law. 
                                                 
13
 IFRS have been considered instead of ASB from 2005 in judging listed companies; however common law 
principles still apply and informe judgments (Roberts et al., 2008). 
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2.3.3.1 The Commercial Law 
In January 2010 the Libyan government issued a new commercial law, No. 23 to regulate 
all economic activities
14
. This law organises all commercial transactions that are carried on 
by all business parties including some requirements that interact with accounting and 
reporting issues for companies including commercial banks. For example, Article 18 
requires that every company regulated by this law appoints a licensed auditor to undertake 
its accounts audit while Article 209 states that an auditor has to issue an audit report 
embodying his opinion on a company's accounting affairs; this report has to assert that the 
company's accounts are correct and comply with the law. The auditor's report also has to 
state that accounts have been prepared according to the approved accounting standards
15
. 
According to the law, the board of directors of the company have to prepare the financial 
statements of the company along with notes to them. The board is also required to submit a 
report highlighting the company's activity during the period (Article 226). Article 227 
stipulates the items to be included within the balance sheet stating that company's assets 
and liabilities have to be recorded and disclosed in separate disclosures with no set off 
between accounts. According to Article 227 the assets side should include the following 
accounts;  
1- Amounts due from shareholders. 
2- Properties. 
3- Plant and equipment. 
4- Patents. 
5- Trademarks and goodwill. 
6- Fixed assets. 
7- Raw material. 
8- Cash and cash equivalent. 
9- Bonds. 
10- Associates. 
11- Receivables and due from others. 
 
On the other hand, the following items should be disclosed in the liability side; 
                                                 
14
 The Libyan commercial law was first issued in 1953 to be revised many times until this latest update. 
15
 The Commercial Law has not defined what approved accounting standards are. 
 24 
1- Capital and ordinary shares. 
2- Legal reserves
16
. 
3- Any provision required by company's contract. 
4- Accumulated depreciation and impairment allowance. 
5- Compensation provision. 
6- Trade payables and other payables. 
7- Creditors. 
 
The Law has identified the valuation basis to account for balance sheet items; according to 
Article 228, property, plants and equipment should be accounted for using historical cost 
and be depreciated each accounting period. Raw material and goods shouldn't be 
recognised at over cost or market value which means to be recorded at the lower of cost or 
market value. Patents, copy right and trademarks also should be recognised by cost at 
purchase and be depreciated over their lifecycle. Investments in equity value is left to the 
board of directors to determine but they should pay special attention to those shares which 
are traded in the stock market when it comes to valuation at the end of the accounting 
period; the adopted valuation basis should be shared with the control committee
17
 of the 
company. Loans and receivables should be recognised based on the expected amount to be 
received. If a company's capital has declined by over one third as a result of a loss, the law 
requires that the board of directors will call an extraordinary meeting to discuss the issue. 
If the company has incurred a loss during the next period, which means that the total loss is 
over one third of the capital, capital has to be decreased by the loss amount otherwise 
shareholders will have to capitalise the company (Article 152). 
                                                 
16
 Article 231 of the law requires that 5% of profits to be deducted as a legal provision until it reaches 25% of 
the capital. This provision is called ‘legal provision’.  
17
 According to the law, each company has to appoint a control (watchdog) committee to monitor the 
company's management to ensure that all activities have been according to rules and regulations as well as 
maintain the accounting books that required by law. The committee also responsible for ensuring the 
accuracy of both balance sheet and profit and loss account. It is required that a control committee should 
include a member of accounting background as well as a legal member. It should consist of three principal 
members and two alternatives (Articles 196 and 200). 
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2.3.3.2 The Income Tax Law 
The taxation system has an influence on the financial reporting and accounting practices 
either directly or indirectly. Libya’s legal system was influenced by the Italian colonization 
that took place from 1911 until 1945, as the Italian income tax law was applied from 1923 
till 1968 when the first Libyan income tax legislation was issued (Mahmud, 1997; Mashat, 
2005). Currently, income tax in Libya is regulated by the Law No. 7 that was enacted in 
2010. This states in its first Article that all income that occurs within Libya as a result of 
assets either physical or intangible is subject to taxation according to this law. According 
to Article 71 of the Law, any company that is operating in Libya has to submit its financial 
statements within four months after its financial year-end and also every company's 
financial statements have to be signed by an external auditor who is a member of the 
Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association (LAAA). Accounting practices in Libya 
have been, to large extent, influenced by the income tax law (Mahmud, 1997). Kribat 
(2009) indicates that lack of external users of financial statements may have been 
significant for the role in tax law, it having a great impact on financial reporting in Libya. 
He states: 
"Given the statutory power of Libyan tax officers to require that financial 
statements are prepared in accordance to the Tax Law –and because of the 
generally low demand for financial statements from other parties- many 
Libyan companies adopted the income Tax Law requirements and guidelines 
as the basis of internal and external financial reporting practices" (p. 27). 
Some areas in the tax law which influenced accounting practices can be identified; fixed 
assets, for example, are recognised at historical cost and depreciated using the straight-line 
method with specified rates for different types of asset being given (Article 35 of the 
regulation of the law)
18
. Another example is setting-up costs which are allowed to be 
depreciated over five years using again the straight-line method. The tax law allows for 
goodwill depreciation over twenty years using the straight-line method; goodwill must be 
                                                 
18
 It is the regulation that explains how income tax law should be implemented. 
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purchased. Article 38 of the law states that donations of up to 2% of net income are 
allowed only if paid to charities recognised by the state. Losses can be carried forward for 
up to five years. 
2.3.3.3 Stock Market Law 
The Libyan Stock Market (LSM) was first established in 2006 by Law No. 134. It has been 
re-organised again by Law No. 11 which was enacted in 2010. The LSM requires listed 
companies to prepare their financial statements according to International Accounting 
Standards and requires that these statements have to be audited in accordance with 
International Auditing Standards (Kribat, 2009). The LSM also requires listed companies 
to submit to the LSM quarterly, semi-annual and annual reports and to publish a summary 
of the financial position of the company in two local newspapers, one of which, in Arabic, 
must appear within one week of being approved by a general meeting (Article 23). 
Although companies are encouraged to list on the LSM, only 13 companies are listed and 
traded in the LSM
19
 at the time of writing including seven commercial banks. Article 75 
grants listed companies that have at least 60 days of share trading during the year the 
following advantages: (i) tax relief from income tax for five years; afterwards 50% relief as 
long as company is still listed; and (ii) 50% relief on custom and stamp duties. 
2.3.3.4 Commercial Banks Law 
The current banking Law No. 1 was issued in 2005 to organise the business of the banking 
sector in Libya comprising the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), the commercial banks, and 
specialised banks. The CBL’s duties and responsibilities are articulated by Article 5 of the 
law. It is responsible, for example, for issuing the Libyan currency, managing the State’s 
reserves of gold and foreign exchange, regulating the monetary policy of the country, and 
regulating and supervising the credit and banking policy. Articles 24, 25, and 26 of the law 
deal with how the CBL’s financial statements should be prepared and audited. According 
                                                 
19
 Listed companies can be viewed at http://www.lsm.ly. 
27 
to Article 24, the CBL has to prepare and publish a statement of its assets and liabilities on 
a daily basis. This statement is to be sent to the government and published in the Register 
of Procedures. Article 25 requires that the CBL’s accounts are prepared and audited 
according to the International Accounting Standards (IAS/IFRS) and International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA). 
The CBL, according to Article 71, is responsible for monitoring and controlling all 
commercial banks that operate within the country. Moreover, interrelationships between 
commercial banks are also monitored by the CBL. A commercial bank, according to article 
No. 65 of the law, is defined as follows: 
"Any company that ordinarily accepts deposits in current demand account or 
time deposits, grants loans and credit facilities, and engages in other such 
banking activities according to the provisions of paragraph (II) of this article 
shall be considered a commercial bank". 
Commercial banks’ activities are also determined by the law. Paragraph (II) of Article 65 
lists the activities that a commercial bank is allowed to carry out as follows: 
1. The cashing of cheques made out to and by customers. 
2. Services relating to documentary credits, documents for collection, and letters of credit. 
3. Issuance and management of instruments of payment including monetary drawings, 
financial transfers, payment and credit cards, traveller’s checks, etc. 
4. Sale and purchase transactions involving monetary market instruments and capital 
market instrument to the credit of the bank or its customers. 
5. The purchase and sale of debt, with or without the right of recourse. 
6. Lease financing operations. 
7. Foreign exchange transactions in spot and forward exchange markets. 
8. The management, coverage, distribution, and transition of banknote issues. 
9. The provision of investment and other services for investment portfolios, and the 
provision of investment trustee services, including the management and investment of 
funds for a third party. 
10. Management and safekeeping of securities and valuables. 
11. Provision of trustee or financial investor services. 
12. Any other banking activities approved by the Central Bank of Libya.  
 
The law also has some articles that affect the accounting practices and financial reporting 
of the commercial banks. In its Article 73, for example, a commercial bank must retain a 
capital reserve in which no less than 25% of net profit has to be transferred to this reserve 
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until it reaches 50% of the capital; afterwards 10% of the net profit is transferred each year 
to the reserve. Every commercial bank has to appoint two external auditors for its financial 
year audit. These two auditors have to be registered
20
 with the Central Bank of Libya; the 
external auditor's duties are determined by paragraph (II) of Article 83 as follows: 
"(i) prepare a report on the bank's annual financial statements. The report 
should include the methods used to ascertain the existence of and to valuate 
assets, the method for appraising existing commitments, and the extent to 
which the audited transactions comply with the law; (ii) prepare a semi-
annual report monitoring the banks' financial and administrative performance 
and compliance with domestic and international banking criteria; and (iii) 
send a copy of the two reports mentioned in the previous two subparagraphs 
to the Central Bank of Libya within the period set by the governor". 
It is worth noting that Libyan Commercial Banks vary in terms of ownership that range 
from State owned to completely privately owned. Table 2.4 presents the ownership 
structure of the Libyan Commercial Banks. 
Table 2.4: The Libyan Commercial Banks Ownership Structure 
Bank name Listed 
Ownership structure 
Total 
  Assets 
 (bi LYD) 
Total  
Deposits 
 (bi LYD) 
Market 
 Share 
 (%) 
State- 
owned 
Mixed ownership 
Private  
banks 
State- 
owned 
Domestic 
 investors 
Foreign 
 investors 
Al-Gumhouria Bank L 100%     24.65 19.61 40.31 
National Commercial Bank L 100%     11.11 9.06 18.17 
Sahara Bank L  55% 26% 19%  10.15 8.12 16.59 
Al-Wahda Bank L  54% 27% 19%  8.39 7.24 13.72 
Commerce & Development 
Bank 
L     100% 2.27 1.97 3.71 
North Africa Bank  100%     1.78 1.01 2.91 
Al-Amman Bank   n/a 60% 40%  0.72 0.56 1.18 
Al-Waha Bank   45%  55%  0.60 0.43 0.98 
First Gulf Libyan Bank   50%  50%  0.42 0.15 0.68 
Alejmaa Alarabi Bank      100% 0.29 0.20 0.48 
United Bank    60% 40%  0.29 0.18 0.48 
Al-Wafa Bank   20% 80%   0.18 0.13 0.30 
Mediterranean Bank L     100% 0.12 0.08 0.20 
Arabic Commercial Bank      100% 0.09 0.07 0.15 
Alsaraya Bank L     100% 0.09 0.06 0.14 
The Libyan Qatari Bank   50%  50%  n/a n/a n/a 
 Total 61.16 48.85 100 
Adaptation from: Zagoub (2011, p. 30). 
2.3.4 The Educational System 
Literature suggests an influential role for the education system on accounting of a country. 
According to Iqbal (2002), both the education system and literacy levels in a country have 
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 Article 82 of the law requires the Central Bank of Libya to maintain a register of external auditors who are 
capable of auditing and inspecting banks’ accounts. 
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an impact on the accounting system of that country. He indicates that users of a good 
education system in a country can easily understand accounting information. On the other 
hand, the accountants of that country would also be skilled and trained. The accounting 
education system in a country is important as it represents the first stage on a student’s 
journey to becoming a professional accountant (Ahmed and Gao, 2004). The importance of 
an accounting education system being designed to meet national needs has been 
emphasised by Mahmud (1997).  
The formal accounting education system in Libya can be divided into two main levels: pre-
university level and university level. The pre-university level started in 1953 when the 
School of Public Administration was founded. The main objective of the School was to 
develop graduate clerks and book-keepers (Ahmed and Gao, 2004). The university level 
began in 1957 when the Accounting Department in the Faculty of Economics and 
Commerce at the University of Libya (currently the University of Benghazi) was founded
21
 
(Ahmed and Gao, 2004). During the period 1957-1976 the Libyan accounting education 
system was “British orientated” until 1976 when the system was converted to become 
“American oriented”22(Mahmud and Russell, 2003). The accounting education system has 
been influenced by a number of factors; these factors are summarised by Mahmud and 
Russell (2003) as follows: 
“(a) the structure and the content of the accounting courses of the College of 
Economics and Commerce; and (b) the education and background of its 
accounting academics which are mainly American or British oriented” (p. 
200). 
A major problem that the Libyan accounting system may have, according to Ahmed and 
Gao (2004), is the lack of PhD programmes in Libya since most of the academic staff that 
                                                 
21
 According to Mahmud and Russell (2003), it was the first time an accounting education program had been 
introduced. Since the School of Public Administration was founded before that time, they appear to have 
been referring to the university level programmes. 
22
 For the difference between the two systems, see (Mahmud, 1997). For more information about the models 
and syllabus taught in the University of Benghazi (Garyounis), as an example of a Libyan one, please refer to 
Ahmed and Gao (2003, p.378). 
 30 
hold PhDs are from either the UK or US. This is again an influence on the accounting 
education system as well as on the accounting profession; it has adopted a Western 
accounting focus that lacks some links to the Libyan environment as a Muslim country 
(Ahemd and Gao, 2004). The study by Mahumd and Russell (2003) revealed a number of 
factors that obstructed accounting education development in Libya but foremost the system 
was limited by two main factors; the “lack of active professional societies” and an 
“inadequate public understanding of the role of accounting” (p. 230). Although they were 
silent regarding who was to blame for these two factors, one could infer that both the 
accounting education system and the accounting profession represented by the LAAA may 
have been responsible largely for such a conclusion. 
2.3.5 Religion 
This factor is considered to be significant in Muslim countries. Iqbal (2002) suggests: 
“The degree of influence of religion, as an environmental factor, varies from 
country to country. In many parts of the world, especially in some Muslim 
countries, it is perhaps the most powerful of the environmental influences” (p. 
120). 
As discussed earlier, the Libyan accounting system, as well as the accounting profession, 
has been greatly impacted by Western accounting. However, in a Muslim country, like 
Libya, the philosophy and institutional framework that govern accounting and financial 
reporting are different from those applied in the West (Ahmed and Gao, 2004). One of the 
fundamental differences between the two is how the concept of accountability is perceived 
(Maali et al., 2006). In the West, the companies are only responsible and therefore 
accountable to their stakeholders and in particular to shareholders while in the Islamic 
world, firms as well as individuals are held accountable beyond that limit, to God. 
Therefore, each Muslim is explicitly held responsible and accountable to God for 
everything he/she did including commercial activities (Lewis, 2001; Maali et al., 2006). As 
a consequence, accounting and financial reporting in a Muslim country should consider 
31 
Islamic principles when accountability is discharged, given the fact that Islam is regulating 
every facet in a Muslim’s life. In Lewis (2001) words: 
“Just as Islam regulates and influences all other spheres of life, so it also 
governs the conduct of business and commerce. Muslims ought to conduct 
their business activities in accordance with the requirement of their religion to 
be fair, honest and just towards others” (p. 108). 
2.4 The Accounting Profession  
According to Markell (1985), the accounting profession in a developing country, as in the 
case of Libya, is largely dependent on its accounting educational system; for the profession 
to be developed it is also obvious that developing or creating the proper accounting 
education system would be of great assistance, he indicated: 
“For an accounting system to be implemented on a continuing basis, an 
accounting profession must exist. In a new or developing country, the 
accounting profession can be developed or created in one of two ways. It can 
develop appropriate educational institutions to prepare individuals to enter the 
accounting profession. Obviously, this approach would require much time to 
prepare individuals to the desired level of competence. The second and 
simpler alternative, especially in the early stages of a nation’s development, is 
to create an instant profession” (p. 99-100). 
Accounting practices in Libya have been influenced by a number of factors, one of which 
is the accounting education system (Mahmud and Russell, 2003).  It has been also 
influenced by Western accounting: “applied accounting principles and auditing standards 
in Libya follow those of the U.K. and the U.S” (Mahmud and Russell, 2003. p. 201)23. 
Another factor that may have had an influence over the accounting profession in Libya as 
identified by Ahmed and Gao (2004) is the oil discovery. Since the late 1950s, when oil 
was discovered, the development of economic activities in Libya has resulted in more 
reliable accounting information becoming required for many users including management, 
investors, and government (El-Firjani, 2010). 
                                                 
23
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the accounting education system was primarily based on UK and US 
systems; therefore, it is logical that the accounting profession is influenced by both UK and US practices. 
Practitioners are the products of the education system as emphasised by Ahmed and Gao (2004) who suggest 
that the educational system is the first stage in the qualifying accountants process. 
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According to Wallace (1990), accounting systems in developing countries, like Libya, are 
regarded as poor; he lists the shortfalls of the accounting systems of the developing 
countries as follows: 
“Many weaknesses have been noted in the financial accounting and reporting 
systems of developing countries – poor internal control, lack of management 
accounting concepts, incomplete, inaccurate and late reports as well as 
unauditable systems and shortage of staff, unreliability, inadequacy of 
financial accountancy, rudimentary and offering management little or no vital 
information, and irrelevant and deficient reporting” (pp. 38-39). 
The accounting profession in Libya was governed for the first time by Law No. 116 that 
was enacted in 1973
24
,
25
 by which the LAAA was established. The ability to supply audit 
services is restricted to LAAA members. Membership of the association requires that a 
candidate is a Libyan who has an accounting degree and who has experience of five years 
in an accountancy-related job after gaining their degree (Ahmed and Gao, 2004). This law 
covers many issues relating to the accounting practices in the country; the LAAA is the 
only responsible body to act with legal status in the area of auditing on behalf the State; 
moreover it “manages every facet of the auditing profession” (Ritchie and Khorwatt, 2007, 
p. 41). Ahmed and Gao (2004) summarised the objectives of the law as follows: 
“(i) to organise and improve the conditions of the accounting profession and 
to raise the standards of accountants and auditors professionally, 
academically, culturally and politically; (ii) to organise and participate in 
conferences and seminars related to accounting internally and externally and 
to keep in touch with new events, scientific periodicals, lectures and so on; 
(iii) to establish a retirement pension fund for its members; (v) to increase co-
operation between its members and to protect their rights; and (vi) to take 
action against members who violate the tradition and ethics of the profession” 
(p. 369). 
 
                                                 
24
 Before 1952 when Libya gained its independence, there was no national accounting body nor accounting 
firms, business firms at that time were served by foreign accounting firms from Italy and UK (Ahmed and 
Gao, 2004). 
25
 During the 1950s and 1960s, most of the accounting firms which worked in Libya were either British or 
American; Libyan accounting firms have existed only since 1970 (Mahmud and Russell, 2003). 
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Mahmud and Russell (2003) concluded that the LAAA had failed to achieve its objectives, 
for example, to establish or participate in research, conferences, and seminars or any 
activity that may have an influence over the profession’s development. It had, according to 
Mahmud and Russell (2003), failed even to regulate itself let alone pursue its responsibility 
towards the public interest. Another critique of the LAAA by Mahmud and Russell (2003) 
was that the LAAA did not yet have a code of ethics; they concluded: 
“Although, the LAAA was formed more than two decades ago it has done 
nothing to build any theoretical base for accounting to be a profession in 
Libya and it has not established a code of ethics for its members to abide by” 
(p. 201). 
In addition to the above critiques, Mahmud (1997) points out that the LAAA has failed to 
either organise or participate in any programmes that would develop the profession; in 
addition it was, at that time, unsuccessful in updating the profession about recent 
developments. He concludes based on the above, that the accounting profession in Libya 
was very weak
26
. In a recent study, El-Firjani (2010) concluded that the LAAA had no 
impact on the accounting profession in Libya. More particularly, the LAAA has failed to 
develop accounting practices. He added that accounting practices in Libya are mainly 
dependent on the laws and regulations. It is worth noting that the LAAA attempted in 2006 
to prepare national accounting standards by issuing for the first time the first Exposure 
Draft of a number of Libyan Accounting Standards (EDLASs). This draft consisted of 29 
accounting standards mainly based on IFRS/IAS. However, due to weakness in the 
enforcement system, this draft is still not mandatory (El-Firjani, 2010). The accounting 
profession, according to El-Firjani (2010), is still immature as it is:  
“still in its early stages of developing corporate accounting practices and it 
appears to play no important role in retaining external influences on the 
accounting practices” (p. 208). 
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 This situation is still remaining and may be even worse. The LAAA is still facing difficulties as, for 
example, the Benghazi branch is almost inactive due to its main location being occupied during the 
revolution by foreigners as the author is aware of. 
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided a background about Libya. Local environmental factors that are 
believed to impact accounting practices in Libya have been outlined so that empirical 
evidence can easily be contextualised. The political system in Libya has been discussed 
briefly to view the different stages that Libya has encountered. The legal system which 
embodies the local codes that have either direct or indirect impact on the accounting 
practices of the Libyan Commercial Banks have been outlined and discussed in a bit more 
detail. The accounting system educational process which unquestionably influences the 
accounting practices in Libya has been highlighted, as well as the role of religion in a 
Muslim country in terms of how accountability should be viewed. Then came a short 
overview of the accounting profession’s status in Libya which is organised by the LAAA 
body. Having discussed the environmental factors in Libya, the next chapter provides a 
literature review about the earnings management phenomenon. 
 
 
 
  
35 
Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 1, a broad overview of the thesis was provided. This chapter will review the 
literature to address the definition and practice of earnings management. Earnings 
management techniques as well as the relationship between earnings management and 
fraud will also be discussed. Managers' motivations to engage in earnings management will 
also be outlined. Two common forms of earnings management will be highlighted: income 
smoothing and big bath accounting. Then, major parties that are potentially influenced by 
earnings management decisions will be focused on. The ethics of earnings management is 
also discussed followed by an analysis of the approaches to detecting earnings 
management. Finally the question of earnings management in the banking industry will be 
considered. 
(IAS) 1 Presentation of Financial Statements (IASB, 2010a) prescribes the basis for the 
presentation of “general purpose financial statements” and sets out the financial statements 
that an entity should prepare and present, including a statement of comprehensive income 
for the period. The objective of financial statements, according to IAS 1, is to provide 
information about the financial position, cash flows and economic performance of the firm 
to a large range of users to help them in their economic decisions. This was made clear in 
the IASB’s Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (IASB, 2010b) which states: 
“The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial 
information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions about providing 
resources to the entity” (IASB, 2010b, para. OB2, p. A27). 
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Furthermore, financial statements reflect management’s stewardship of the resources 
entrusted to it. In order to achieve these objectives, financial statements should be prepared 
according to the accrual basis of accounting (IASB, 2010a).  
The IASB’s Conceptual Framework has also demonstrated how to record financial 
transactions under the accrual basis of accounting as follows: 
“Accrual accounting depicts the effects of transactions and other events and 
circumstances on a reporting entity’s economic resources and claims in the 
periods in which those effects occur, even if the resulting cash receipts and 
payments occur in a different period”.(IASB, 2010b, para. OB17, A29). 
 
In addition, the Conceptual Framework has outlined the significance of booking the 
financial transaction on an accrual basis for assessing the entity’s performance, it has 
stated: 
“This [accrual basis]  is important because information about a reporting 
entity’s economic resources and claims and changes in its economic resources 
and claims during a period provides a better basis for assessing the entity’s 
past and future performance than information solely about cash receipts and 
payments during that period” (IASB, 2010b, para. OB17, A29). 
 
The accrual basis of accounting has an important distinguishing characteristic, and that is 
subjectivity. For companies that comply with International Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) and that are a going concern, it is mandatory to record and report 
financial transactions according to the accrual basis of accounting so that financial 
statements should reflect a true ad fair view of the financial position of the firm.  
The US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has outlined the objective of 
accrual accounting; Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6 states: 
“Accrual accounting uses accrual, deferral, and allocation procedures whose 
goal is to relate revenues, expenses, gains, and losses to periods to reflect an 
entity’s performance during a period instead of merely listing its cash receipts 
and outlays. Thus, recognition of revenues, expenses, gains, and losses and 
the related increments or decrements in assets and liabilities –including 
matching of costs and revenues, allocation, and amortization- is the essence 
of using accrual accounting to measure performance of entities. The goal of 
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accrual accounting is to account in the periods in which they occur for the 
effects on an entity of transactions and other events and circumstances, to the 
extent that those financial effects are recognizable and measurable” (FASB, 
1985, para. 145, p. 35). 
The accrual accounting system requires managers to exercise discretion and judgment 
when they are preparing financial statements and such judgements will affect the reported 
income and valuation of an entity’s performance. Managers are expected to choose 
accounting rules that are appropriate for reflecting economic reality
27
 and to ensure that 
annual financial statements give a true and fair view. However, choosing accounting 
policies to fulfil other objectives constitutes “earnings management” (Mulford and 
Comiskey, 2002). 
Thus, the earnings figure depends, to some extent, on managers’ decisions and the 
decisions they made to reflect a company’s performance from its business activities 
(Mulford and Comiskey, 2002). The reported earnings figure is “widely used as a key 
performance indicator of business success” (Holland and Ramsay, 2003, p. 42), which 
according to McKee (2005, p. 1), represents “the single most important item in financial 
statements”; given that importance, managers may have some interest in manipulating this 
figure (Baralexis, 2004; McKee, 2005). 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) argue that earnings' importance stems partially from the 
importance of accounting information given that accounting information is traditionally 
viewed as having a dual role: informativeness and stewardship. They argue that the 
informativeness role of earnings is well documented by the literature which reveals a 
marked relationship between earnings and share price. On the other hand, the stewardship 
role of accounting that results from the separation between management and owners 
implies a potential conflict of interest between the two parties. In this regard, Watts and 
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 The argument that “in describing reality we construct reality” (Hines, 1988) is acknowledged but goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 38 
Zimmerman (1978, cited in Ronen and Yaari 2008, p. 7) suggest that “one function of 
financial reporting is to constrain management to act in the shareholders’ interest”.  
The subjectivity that is inherent in accruals accounting opens the door for managers to 
manipulate the reported earnings numbers (Razzaque et al., 2006). Such accounting 
manipulation has been practiced by mangers for a very long time, and this behaviour has 
been given various names in the literature
28
 e.g. creative accounting, earnings 
management, income smoothing, big bath accounting and window dressing. Accounting 
manipulation has a long history with references in the literature dating back to at least 
1893. Naser (1993, cited in Baralexis, 2004) states that creative accounting as a 
manipulative behaviour goes back to the 1920s. To Heinz et al. (2013) accounting 
manipulation is "a longstanding issue" that dates back to the beginning of accounting (p. 
299). However, such behaviour had been identified before as “income smoothing” and 
according to Buckmaster (2001) income smoothing was identified in the literature as early 
as 1893. 
Creative accounting comprises earnings manipulation and other forms of accounting 
manipulation that can be implemented within or outside of the procedures allowed by 
GAAP. Jones (2011) has in this respect stated that, the term “creative accounting” is 
interpreted differently in the UK and the US. According to Jones (2011), accounting 
manipulation within GAAP limits is known as “creative accounting”29 but when it is 
implemented outside of GAAP boundaries it is considered as accounting fraud. Creative 
accounting in the UK context thus can be defined as: 
                                                 
28
 The literature is constantly giving new names for this practice. It has been described as “Alice in 
Wonderland” accounting (Wilson, 2012).  
29
 Creative accounting and other related terms have been used interchangeably with the term earnings 
management (McKee, 2005, p.3). For some, earnings management and creative accounting are synonyms 
which are used depending on geographic location; creative accounting as a term is commonly used within 
Europe while earnings management has been used particularly in the American context (Amat and 
Growthorpe, 2004.). 
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“Using the flexibility in accounting within the regulatory framework to 
manage the measurement and presentation of the accounts so that they give 
primacy to the interest of the preparers not the users” (Jones, 2011, p. 6). 
Based on the definition above it can be seen that creative accounting can be regarded as 
lawful and legitimate as it works within the limitations of both law and accounting 
standards. However, creative accounting is undoubtedly in conflict with spirit of 
accounting standards; where the spirit of GAAP is to reflect the economic results of 
transactions to meet the needs of users; the purpose of creative accounting is to meet the 
needs of preparers (Jameson, 1990).  
In the US context, by contrast, Mulford and Comiskey (2002) offered a definition of 
creative accounting as follows: 
“Any and all steps used to play the financial numbers game, including the 
aggressive choice and application of accounting principles, both within and 
beyond the boundaries of generally accepted accounting principles, and 
fraudulent financial reporting” (p. 15). 
Mulford and Comiskey (2002), argue that the “financial numbers game” is played solely to 
change reported financial results and/or to modify the financial position so as to generate 
desired amounts and/or some desired direction and could be accomplished through 
available means of accounting choices, accounting policy application, transactions 
construction, or finally by absolute fraudulent reporting that is outside of GAAP and 
corporate law.  
Clearly therefore, a fundamental difference between the above two definitions of creative 
accounting is that while the UK definition considers creative accounting as legitimate and 
lawful i.e. practices that take place within the boundaries of GAAP, the US definition 
states that creative accounting includes accounting fraud which is beyond GAAP and the 
law. 
For the purpose of this thesis, unless stated otherwise, the term creative accounting will be 
used in accordance with UK usage i.e. to exclude fraud, see Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Accounting Manipulation 
 
Adaptation of a (UK context) categorisation of creative accounting terminology (Jones, 2011, p.9). (It 
should be noted that the categories are not mutually exclusive). 
 
An overview of the terminology used to describe accounting manipulation and creative 
accounting is given in Figure 3.1 According to Jones (2011) the term “aggressive 
accounting” is broadly seen to be synonymous with the general meaning of creative 
accounting. To Mulford and Comiskey (2002) aggressive accounting implies an 
accounting choice or application that has been deliberately adopted to realize higher 
earnings no matter whether this application is within or outside GAAP
30
. Although 
impression management might be considered an aspect of creative accounting, it is not 
normally associated with manipulating accounting rules; impression management is 
                                                 
30
 Another distinction between UK and US definitions. Aggressive accounting is lawful in the UK context 
while it could be out with the scope of GAAP within the US context. 
Accounting Manipulation 
Outside of GAAP 
Fraud 
Within GAAP 
Creative 
Accounting 
Aggressive 
accounting 
Impression 
management 
Earnings 
management 
Profit (income) 
smoothing 
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typically used to influence users of financial statements through presentational aspects of 
associated narrative reporting, graphs and photographs (Jones, 2011). In the words of 
Brennan et al. (2009), impression management is defined as “the process by which 
individuals attempt to control the impression of others” (p. 790). They also add that in the 
financial reporting context, impression management is taking place when “management 
select information to display and present that information in a manner that distorts readers’ 
perceptions of corporate achievements” (p. 790). Although Jones (2011) shows earnings 
management and profit smoothing separately, it is arguable that profit smoothing is a form 
of earnings management. This chapter will discuss the definition of, and incentives for, 
earnings management and two examples of earnings management; income smoothing and 
big bath accounting. 
3.2 Earnings Management Definition 
Financial reporting represents the means by which managers are able to communicate 
information about their firm’s performance to the users. In the preparation of financial 
reports, managers are given some room to exercise their own judgement to determine the 
amount of some figures e.g. the provision for bad debts (Holland and Ramsay, 2003). 
Although this flexibility provides managers with the opportunity to make accounting 
estimates based on their “knowledge of the business” which may increase the financial 
information’s usefulness, it also opens the door for earnings management (Holland and 
Ramsay, 2003, p. 42). 
According to Mohanram (2003) earnings management has become a significant issue in 
today’s stock markets; “[h]ardly a day goes by without mention of a large firm that misled 
investors through the intentional misstatement of the financial statements” (p.1). He also, 
added that it is of great importance for investors and other stakeholders to understand what 
earnings management is, what the consequences are and why it happens (Mohanram, 
2003). Nelson et al. (2003) suggest that a better understanding of earnings management 
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could: (a) help regulators and standards setters to identify weak areas that need to be 
tightened; (b) assist auditors in evaluating and reporting on earnings quality as well as 
training newly qualified auditors about earnings management; (c) enable CEOs, CFOs, 
audit committees, and investors to focus on areas of the financial statements where they 
should be most sceptical; (d) facilitate managers and audit committees anticipating areas 
that investors will put under scrutiny; (e) help educators teach the subject; and (f) 
encourage researchers to focus on understanding the reasons for and implications of 
earnings management. 
Earnings management has been recognised as an attempt by managers to influence 
financial statements by using specific accounting methods to achieve some self-interested 
goal (Akers et al. 2007). However, there is no clear agreement in the literature on how 
earnings management can be defined (Beniesh, 2001). Various authors use various 
definitions of earnings management and also different expressions to describe the same 
phenomenon, a phenomenon that is considered to be widespread in the financial statements 
(Levitt, 1998; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; McKee, 2005). Griffiths (1992) in his book 
entitled “Creative Accounting” started his first chapter by asserting that all UK companies 
have manipulated their accounts: 
“Every company in the country is fiddling its profits. Every set of published 
accounts is based on books which have been gently cooked or completely 
roasted. The figures which are fed twice a year to the investing public have all 
been changed in order to protect the guilty” (p. 1). 
As stated above, earnings management has been defined in different ways; for example a 
widely cited definition is given by Healy and Wahlan (1999): 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p. 368). 
Another definition was given by Davidson et al. (1987 cited in Schipper, 1989): 
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“The process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally 
accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported 
earnings” (p. 92). 
Schipper (1989) defined earning management as follows: 
“…a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with 
the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say, merely 
facilitating the neutral operation of the process)…” (Schipper, 1989, p. 92). 
Arther Levitt, the former SEC chairman in his 1998 speech “Numbers Game” (Levitt, 
1998) spoke emphatically about his concern over the observable fact that managers 
manipulate reported profits to meet analysts’ expectations. He added that flexibility in 
accounting permits it to keep up with business innovations. In what could be regarded as a 
definition of earnings management, Levitt describes: 
“…a gray area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are 
cutting corners; and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of management 
rather than the underlying financial performance of the company” (Levitt, 
1998. p. 14). 
Levitt believes that the motivation to meet Wall Street earnings expectations might be an 
overriding “common sense” business practice and that many corporate managers, auditors, 
and analysts have a role, in one way or another, in this game. Levitt made explicit his fears 
that the financial community is “witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings” which 
may lead to an erosion in the quality of financial reporting. Moreover, he argued that 
earnings management may open the door for manipulation, integrity may be losing out to 
illusion and that integrity in financial reporting is under stress.  
Earnings management according to Levitt is the exercise of accounting in the gray area 
between legitimacy and outright fraud; an area where accounting is being used to have 
financial reports represent management desires instead of the “real economic performance” 
of the firm. Levitt suggests that earnings management, as a problem of the financial 
community, could be solved by efforts of financial community members. These efforts, 
according to Levitt, include improving both accounting and disclosure rules, as well as 
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oversight and the function of external auditors and audit committees. In the view of Levitt, 
the failure to provide investors with unbiased disclosures about a firm’s performance will 
weaken the bond between shareholders and the firm. This will affect the basic element 
underpinning the effective operation of any stock market, and that is trust. 
According to Beneish (2001), earnings management has been implicitly considered as a 
central issue in accounting research; during the 1970s and early 1980s a great deal of 
research was conducted to investigate the determinants of accounting choices. Lo (2008) 
argues that the topic of earnings management might provoke interest as it is an accounting 
issue that implies “potential wrongdoing, mischief, conflict, cloak and dagger, and a sense 
of mystery” (Lo, 2008, p. 350). 
Clearly, a number of authors are of the view that preparers of financial statements practice 
earnings management by selecting favourable accounting policies and practices to report 
within, or even beyond, regulatory and contractual contexts. According to Beneish (2001) 
research on earnings management that has been carried out since the mid-1980s has mainly 
been concerned with investigating how accruals accounting can be used to manipulate 
financial statements. He also suggests that this focus on accruals accounting research is 
principally related to three factors. First, accrual accounting is a central characteristic of 
GAAP and management would prefer to manage earnings through accruals rather than 
cash flow elements of earnings. Second, studying accruals could lead to a reduction in the 
problems that relate to an “inability to measure the effect of various accounting choices on 
earnings”. Finally, given that earnings management is unobservable, it is unlikely that 
investors will be able to undo the managed reported earnings (Beneish, 2001, p. 3). 
According to the previous definitions, the practice of earnings management implies 
management’s intent to mislead some stakeholders about a company’s performance by 
using their knowledge of the accounting rules, or economic decisions so they can achieve 
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some self-interested benefit. In addition, the previous definitions imply that managers can 
use their judgement when choosing accounting methods to account for an event. 
Accounting choices e.g. depreciation methods, inventory valuation, etc. will affect the 
reported earnings of the company. Also, definitions explicitly emphasise that earnings 
management is practiced mainly to mislead stakeholders.  
Revisiting the definition of Healy and Wahlan (1999) it might be noted that they identify 
two broad kinds of earnings management namely accounting earnings management and 
economic or real earnings management. Accounting earnings management “uses 
judgement in financial reporting” which implies using the accounting choices so as to 
manage earnings; by contrast economic earnings management means “structuring 
transactions” which is achieved through real business decisions. In the words of Zhao et al. 
(2012), real earnings management is a departure from the normal operational practices by 
manipulating real activities in order to achieve a “primary objective” that is typically 
inflating near-term earnings. 
The significant difference between real earnings management and accrual-based earnings 
management, according to Cohen and Zarowin (2010), is the direct effect on cash flows 
that real earnings management entails. While accrual-based (accounting) earnings 
management, according to Zhao et al. (2012), “affects the output of the accounting system 
without no direct cash flow consequence” (p. 110). 
Whatever the way used to affect the reported earnings, all decisions that are taken by 
management for no other reason but to change the reported earnings can be considered as 
an earnings management practice (Mohanram, 2003). 
3.3 Earnings Management Techniques 
Earnings management techniques vary according to earnings management types; 
accounting earnings management clearly uses different methods from those used by 
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economic earnings management. Ortega and Grant (2003), classified the accounting 
earnings management techniques that can be used by firms as follows: (a) premature 
revenue recognition, where management could record revenues early in order to boost 
current earnings; (b) operating expense timing, where management may delay expenses to 
the next year if the company is experiencing low performance; and (c) unrealistic 
assumptions to estimate liabilities, for example if management manipulate their liabilities 
estimation on current year performance and if current year performance is low then 
management may make an unrealistically low estimate, say for the bad debt allowance, and 
by contrast when economic performance is doing well, management may tend to use high 
estimates for liabilities allowances. By contrast, economic earnings management uses real 
operating decisions, where business decisions are taken in the normal course of the 
business, for example, when sales are below average, management could decrease prices 
so as to raise sales volume in an attempt to reach the targeted earnings (Ortega and Grant, 
2003). Another example of economic earnings management is provided by Bartov (1993) 
who concludes that managers manipulate reported earnings through selling fixed assets and 
investments. In their study of more than 400 executives, Graham et al. (2005) concluded 
that economic or real earnings management is the preferred type by managers, as they 
point out that “most earnings management is achieved via real actions as opposed to 
accounting manipulation” (p. 66). However, such a practice could affect the “firm’s long-
term interest” and therefore, it might be costly (Man and Wong, 2013, p. 400). Real 
earnings management, according to, Zhao et al. (2012), “is more likely to entail substantial 
costs to shareholders” as it implies that the firm sacrificing its “longer-term cash flows” (p. 
112). 
Beneish (2001) has identified two perspectives on earnings management; these are the 
“opportunistic” and “informative” perspectives. An opportunistic perspective implies that 
managers are engaged in earnings management practices mainly to mislead investors by 
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pursuing their interests. This perspective was noted by Healy (1985) who has concluded 
that managers engage in accounting earnings management (through accruals) mainly to 
influence their compensation, he has indicated that management compensations “create 
incentives for managers to select accounting procedures and accruals to maximize the 
value of their bonus awards” (Healy, 1985, p. 106). 
An informative perspective, according to Beneish (2001), suggests that management, 
through income manipulation, release their own assessments of prospects for the future 
performance of the company to investors. Based on their perspectives, managers will 
reveal their personal beliefs regarding the firm’s future cash flows maximising the firm’s 
value. 
Based on the above discussion it could be noted that, notwithstanding the “informative 
perspective” earnings management typically has a negative connotation. When managing 
earnings, managers are exploiting their knowledge of GAAP as well as their firms and 
constructing business transactions or making accounting choices so that they can get some 
private benefit. According to Holland and Ramsay (2003), the negative connotation 
attached to the term earnings management stems basically from the implications of the 
term itself. They conclude that “the term earnings management implies management 
opportunism and/or an intention to mislead, giving the term negative connotations” (p. 42).  
In addition to the negative connotation, earnings management has been described by 
Nelson et al. (2002) as “non-neutral financial reporting” in which managers are 
deliberately altering the reported income to achieve some private gain. It has been also 
described as a “slippery slope that would lead to fraudulent financial reporting” (Ortega 
and Grant, 2003, p. 51). Abdelghany (2005) characterises earnings management as “minor 
accounting gimmicks becoming more and more aggressive until they create material 
misstatement in the financial statements” (p. 1002). The exercise of earnings management 
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may potentially lead to adverse consequences; according to Loomis (1999), earnings 
management may entail a legal penalty. He has described how earnings management may 
appear to be effective: 
“Until it is uncovered. The company’s stock will drop then, by a big 
percentage. Class-action lawyers will leap. The Security and Exchange 
Commission will file unpleasant enforcement actions, levy fines, and leave 
the bad guys looking for another line of work. Eventually someone may go to 
jail” (p. ). 
Beaudoin et al. (2013) acknowledge the conflict of views regarding the acceptability of 
earnings management. They indicate that some scholars view it as an unethical practice 
that lead to negative consequences, it is also suggested by others as an inherent result of 
the financial reporting process and that is does not affect the usefulness of accounting 
information. 
Looking at earnings management from a preparer’s position might lead to a different 
perspective. Parfet (2000) differentiates between two types of earnings management; bad 
earnings management or improper earnings management and good earnings management 
or operational earnings management. Bad earnings management is where a manager uses 
accounting earnings management to hide real operating performance, while good earnings 
management is where a manager constructs actions to improve their firm’s financial 
performance. Parfet defended this type of earnings management and described it by saying 
“this is just the business of business” (p. 485). 
3.4 Earnings Management and Fraud 
When accounting numbers are manipulated, or in other words a financial game is played, 
either by choosing from a range of accounting choices or by stretching the application of 
these choices to use them in an aggressive manner, then this can be called “aggressive 
accounting”. If this aggressive manner is carried out beyond the limits of GAAP, a 
financial fraud is committed and then the financial statements do not present a fair view of 
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the financial position and performance of the reporting entity. Although, this will be 
known only in “hindsight”, however, there will be a necessity for adjustments (Mulford 
and Comiskey, 2002). Fraudulent financial reporting has an extra aura of disgrace and is 
regarded as outright dishonesty rather than aggressive accounting. It is not easy to 
determine the point at which aggressive accounting becomes fraudulent. However, 
aggressive application of accounting choices when it is practiced for an extended period 
and involves substantial sums may end up becoming fraudulent financial reporting. 
Although identifying fraudulent financial reporting is guided by the extent to which 
aggressive accounting is exercised and the supposed intent of the management, 
determining what is the point after which aggressive accounting becomes fraudulent is 
more art than science (Mulford and Comiskey, 2002). The aggressive practice of earnings 
management, according to Chen et al. (2012), may lead to fraud. They indicate that 
“financial statement fraud often originates from a slippery slope of increasingly aggressive 
earnings management” (p. 95). 
According to Griffiths (1986), it is not easy for financial statements users to distinguish 
between creativity and fraud as there is a very thin line separating them and stating 
whether a practice is creative accounting or fraud ultimately is a matter for the courts to 
decide (Brown 1999, cited in Al-khabash and Al-Thuneibat, 2009). 
Fraud is a “wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain” 
(Online Oxford Dictionary). Also fraud can be defined according to the National 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (cited in Ortega and Grant, 2003), as: 
“The intentional misstatement or omission of material fact, or accounting 
data, which is misleading and, when considered with all the information made 
available, would cause the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or 
decision” (p. 52). 
As discussed above, earnings management practice, within GAAP is lawful and allowed 
by accounting standards and corporate laws; it has to be distinguished from fraud in the 
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financial statements. However, despite the fact that earnings management may be 
legitimate, it may be rather destructive, as according to the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (cited in Merchant and Rockness, 1994. p. 80), earnings 
management actions can deceive users’ of financial statements and moreover, they could 
be “pre-cursors” of financial fraud. Although earnings management and financial fraud are 
different things, in terms or legality, they share the same starting point. Magrath and Weld 
(2002) reveal that: 
“… the accounting irregularities at Lucent, Cendant, and MicroStrategy were 
primarily abusive earnings management schemes or outright fraud, all three 
companies began their abusive and fraudulent practices by engaging in 
earnings management schemes designed primarily to smooth earnings to meet 
internally or externally imposed earnings forecasts and analysts’ 
expectations”. (p. 51). 
Earnings management might be used by companies that are facing difficulties in order to 
promote their financial situations. However, this may not succeed and moreover could lead 
to the committing of fraud. Griffiths (1992) argues: 
“All that it [earnings management] can do is to defer and mitigate the bad 
news until there is a revival in trading fortunes. It cannot make bad news look 
good in perpetuity without resorting to out-and-our fraud” (p. 5). 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) distinguished between fraud and earnings management and 
provided the illustration below (see Figure 3.2): 
Figure 3.2: The Distinction between Fraud and Earnings Management 
 Within GAAP 
“Conservative” 
Accounting 
- Overly aggressive recognition of provisions or reserves. 
- Overvaluation of acquired in-process R&D in purchase acquisition. 
- Overstatement of restructuring charges and asset write-offs. 
“Neutral” 
Accounting 
- Earnings that result from a neutral operation of the process. 
“Aggressive” 
Accounting 
- Understatement of the provision for bad debts. 
- Drawing down provisions or reserves in an overly-aggressive manner. 
 Violates GAAP 
Fraudulent 
Accounting 
- Recording sales before they are “realizable”. 
- Recording fictitious sales. 
- Backdating sales invoices. 
- Overstating inventory by recording fictitious inventory. 
Source: Dechow and Skinner (2000, p. 239). 
51 
Earnings management does not have to take the form of increasing profit. As will be 
discussed in the following paragraph the practice could take the form of decreasing the 
current net income; the reasons behind this practice have been called earnings management 
incentives and are discussed hereafter. 
3.5 Managerial Incentives for Earnings Management 
Incentives represent the rational basis for earnings management practice; without those 
incentives, managers should not be deterred from choosing accounting judgments and 
methods that fairly represent the economic performance of the firm. In many cases, 
managers may find themselves in situations in which they are tempted to manipulate the 
reported profits because the firm’s value and mangers’ wealth are associated with the 
reported earnings (Jackson and Pitman, 2001). Despite the fact that earnings management 
is widespread (Levitt, 1998), it is difficult for researchers to document it with credible 
proof as verifying whether earnings have been managed is not an easy task.  
Identifying the manger’s incentives to manage earnings and estimating whether patterns of 
otherwise unexpected accruals are consistent with these incentives could help (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999). Four kinds of incentives have been identified as inducing managers to be 
involved in earnings management: external contract incentives; management compensation 
contract incentives; regulatory and political motivations; and capital market motivations 
(Noronha et al., 2008). These motivations are briefly discussed in the following section. 
3.5.1 External Contract Incentives 
Some external contracts, for example debt contracts, dividend covenants and supplying 
contracts contain provisions by which a company agrees to reach a certain level of 
earnings, debt, or limit payments to the shareholders (Noronha et al., 2008). When the 
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company is close to violating one of the covenants
31
, managers may be motivated to 
misrepresent the accounting data and therefore the reported earnings so they can meet the 
contract requirements and avoid default by increasing the reported income (Noronha et al. 
2008; Duncan, 2001; Jackson and Pitman, 2001). Some lending contracts are based on 
accounting numbers and designed in a way to restrict certain types of managers’ decisions 
e.g. “value-reducing investment and financing decisions” which, according to Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986, p. 210), provide incentives to managers for accounts manipulation. 
They hypothesized that managers are expected to manipulate earnings when a “firm’s 
debt/equity ratio” (p. 216) becomes relatively large. The literature reports other evidence 
that firms which are close to lending covenant limits are engaged in earnings management, 
for example Defond and Jiambalvo (1994 cited in Noronha et al., 2008) in their study 
found that firms did accelerate earnings in the year prior to a covenant violation. Iatridis 
and Kadorinis (2009) found out that UK listed firms which are close to debt covenant 
violations employ earnings management practices in order to not default the covenants. 
3.5.2 Management Compensation Contract Incentives 
Accounting figures represent the basis to control and regulate contractual relationships 
among a company’s stakeholders; management compensation is such a relationship (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999). Companies may link the bonus programmes of managers with their 
economic performance in order to bring into line management’s’ goals with those of 
shareholders which in return provides a very strong incentive for managers to employ the 
reported earnings to increase their compensation payments (Duncan, 2001). Healy (1985) 
blamed management compensation for creating incentives that induce managers to engage 
in earnings management. Management compensation which is regarded as the “primary 
incentive for earnings management” (Achilles et al., 2013, p. 581) is basically placed to 
                                                 
31
 The focus of this chapter is earnings management; some creative accounting techniques could have an 
effect on balance sheet values but are not regarded as earnings management due to the absence of an earnings 
effect. Attempts to meet covenant requirements could be one such example. 
53 
combine both managers’ and shareholders’ interests as these two groups’ interests can be 
conflicted (Wolk et al., 2008). However, according to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), 
managers of firms with earnings-based bonuses are expected to manipulate the reported 
earnings to their own advantage. In the UK, listed firm managers, according to Iatridis and 
Kadorinis (2009), are improving their financial numbers through earnings management 
practices so that their compensation is protected or increased.  
Mangers may also attempt to manipulate reported income out of concern for job security. 
When current earnings are low while next year’s profit is expected to be relatively high, 
mangers may advance some earnings from the next period to the present and in contrast 
when the current year’s profit is high and next year’s earnings are expected to be low, 
mangers may also shift some earnings to the next year. Moreover, managers typically 
believe that reporting a growing steady stream of income is highly appreciated by financial 
analysts (Jackson and Pitman, 2001). In addition, individuals may be motivated to get a 
promotion based on the fact that people may be very obsessed with climbing the corporate 
ladder; this aspect along with a company policy to reward ambitious persons, means that 
seeking or gaining a promotion can be an incentive to manipulate earnings (Duncan, 2001). 
3.5.3 Regulatory and Political Motivations  
Regulatory incentives to manage earnings may be very significant in cases where reported 
earnings will affect the procedures of regulatory or government officials. Commercial 
banks in Libya, for example, are monitored by the Central Bank of Libya for compliance 
with regulation and in such a case, managers may be motivated to manipulate the reported 
earnings in order to avoid the actions that could be taken by such a governmental and 
regulatory body (Jackson and Pitman, 2001). Moreover, some banking regulations require 
banks to maintain a certain minimum level of capital adequacy requirements that are 
represented in the form of accounting figures. Such regulations may tempt managers to 
manipulate these figures to meet the requirements (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
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In addition, tough taxation laws may induce firms to manipulate their reported income. 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), managers are motivated to manipulate the 
reported earnings to avoid political costs, they hypothesised that managers are more likely 
to manage the reported earnings downwards to lessen the tax expenses. Baralexis (2004) 
found out that small firms in Greece employ earnings management to gain tax savings. 
Likewise, Gonchanalyze and Zimmermann (2006) tested the earnings management 
practices of Russian companies in the years 2001 and 2002 to find out that Russian 
companies lessen their reported income in order to reduce income taxes. 
3.5.4 Capital Market Motivations 
Meeting revenue expectations and analysts’ predictions may be the main catalysts that 
induce managers to manipulate earnings (Magrath and Weld, 2002). The capital market 
incentive stems basically from the connection between reported earnings and a company’s 
market value, due to the fact that stock markets typically respond negatively to companies 
that fail to meet analysts’ earnings expectations. Companies which are not reaching these 
predictions may be involved in earnings management to satisfy analysts’ expectations 
(Jackson and Pitman, 2001). Eventually, failing to meet analysts’ expectations can lead to 
adverse consequences on a company’s stock price e.g. when Procter & Gamble declared 
that the company would not reach  the analysts’ forecast in the first quarter of 2000, its 
stock price decreased by 30% (Duncan, 2001). Literature suggests that managers are 
concerned about meeting or beating the analysts’ expectations and that it is a 
“fundamental” target since stock market severely reacts to negative reported earnings 
(relative to expectations), moreover, the positive earnings (relative to expectations) are 
rewarded which, according to Athanasakou et al. (2009) gives managers a strong incentive 
to manipulate the reported earnings.  
Glaum et al. (2004), for example, compared the earnings management incentives of US 
and German firms; they found that both U.S. and German firms are managing their 
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earnings to avoid losses and decreases in earnings. Evidence was reported by Athanasakou 
et al. (2009) who examined UK firms’ engagement in earnings management for the 
purpose of meeting analyst earnings expectations. Their findings suggest that UK firms 
tend to manipulate their income to meet the analysts’ expectation and to avoid reporting 
negative earnings. Kamel and Elbanna (2010) examined the potential incentives for 
engagement in earnings management in Egypt to find out that Egyptian firms are mainly 
engaged in earnings management for the purpose of, among others, reporting profits and 
avoiding reporting losses as well as achieving high-share valuation. 
3.6 Earnings Management Forms 
In the following paragraph two popular forms of earnings management will be addressed: 
income smoothing and big bath accounting practices.  
3.6.1 Income Smoothing 
GAAP offers several methods to account for the same type of financial transaction, for 
example management can choose to depreciate an asset in numerous ways. Also 
management can time financial transactions e.g. delaying a sale. This flexibility opens the 
door for management to influence the reported income and thereafter to smooth reported 
income from year to year (Koch, 1981).    
The term “income smoothing” refers to management’s intervention to reduce the volatility 
of an income stream over time by transferring earnings from overweight years to 
underweight years (Copeland, 1968; Buckmaster, 2001). The accounting literature includes 
many definitions that describe management’s behaviour in seeking to level the reported 
income. Such conduct can be defined as: 
 “A means used by management to diminish the variability of a stream of 
reported income numbers relative to some perceived target stream by the 
manipulation of artificial (accounting) or real (transactional) variables” 
(Koch, 1981, p. 574). 
Mulford and Comiskey (2002) give this definition for income smoothing: 
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“A form of earnings management designed to remove peaks and valleys from 
a normal earnings series, including steps to reduce and “store” profits during 
good years for use during slower years” (p. 3). 
The income smoothing objective is clearly defined by Sun and Rath (2011) as: 
“Income-smoothing is a specific form of earnings management which has a 
clear objective to reduce the temporal volatility of earnings and to produce a 
steadily growing stream of profits” (p. 127). 
A very short definition was offered by Ronen and Sadan (1975) “… the dampening of the 
variations in income over time” (p. 62). 
Having discussed the definition of income smoothing, the next section provides a brief 
description of how this practice has emerged. 
During the first half of the twentieth century a considerable change in accounting took 
place; the emphasis on the information produced by financial statements transferred from 
the balance sheet to the income statement and this change was significant for some crucial 
accounting issues, one of which was income smoothing (Buckmaster and Jones, 1995). 
This view was informed by Hepworth (1953) who focused on the shifting concern of 
financial data users from the balance sheet to the income statement. Hepworth’s article 
“Smoothing Periodic Income” is considered as one of the best known references in the 
literature pre-1954 (Buckmaster, 2001) and one of the most influential studies on income 
smoothing (Michelson et al. 2000). Although Hepworth did not offer a straightforward 
definition of income smoothing, some of his expressions are notable in describing the 
nature of the practice, for example ‘… considerable “juggling” of income may be 
accomplished by management decision as to the normality or abnormality of an item of 
revenue or expense…’ (p.33). Hepworth was described as the first to mention that firms 
deliberately smoothed their incomes (Eckel, 1981).  
According to Copeland (1968) the practice of income smoothing implies settling of 
accounting choices or reporting methods in a particular pattern continually so as to produce 
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smoothed earnings. He set forth the features that a smoothing tool must employ in order to 
be used as a “manipulated smoothing device” which according to Copeland (1968) has to 
be holding the following characteristics: 
“(a) once used, it must not commit the firm to any particular future action; (b) 
it must be based upon the exercise of professional judgment and be 
considered within the domain of “generally accepted accounting principles”; 
(c) it must lead to material shifts relative to year-to-year differences in 
income; (d) it must not require a “real” transaction with second parties, but 
only a reclassification of internal account balances; and (e) it must be used, 
singularly or in conjunction with other practices, over consecutive periods of 
time” (p. 102). 
3.6.1.1 Income Smoothing Types 
Getting back to the definition of Koch (1981) a distinction can be made between two types 
of income smoothing; real (economic) income smoothing “represented by business 
decisions” and artificial (accounting) income smoothing “represented by accounting 
decisions” (Koch, 1981). Real smoothing results when management decide to commence 
or not to commence actual transactions or economic activities on the basis of their 
influence on reported profit (Eckel, 1981). Such activities e.g. offering big discounts at the 
end of a period, or hurrying or holding-up maintenance, in the end affect the cash flows as 
well as reported income (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). Artificial income smoothing does 
not affect the cash flows as management smooth income by manipulation of accounting 
rules e.g. shifting cost or revenue from one period to another or “shifting cost between 
expense and capital accounts”32 (Eckel, 1981; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995, p. 76). This 
affects the reported income of these periods while cash flows are not affected (Eckel, 
1981).  
Managers can reduce the volatility of the net income stream by creating secret reserves. 
These reserves are created in good years to be used in bad years to boost earnings, so that 
they dampen the fluctuation in reported income (Buckmaster, 2001). These reserves which 
                                                 
32
 Although this type is not affecting the cash flows, it may influence the cash flows indirectly via tax 
payments. 
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may also be known as “cookie jar reserves” (Levitt, 1998; McKee, 2005) and “secret 
reserves” (Buckmaster, 2001) are made by taking advantage of GAAP-based accrual 
accounting techniques where management can use these to achieve some benefits e.g. 
some financial transactions implying future obligations that according to GAAP must be 
estimated and recorded in the year the event occurred (McKee, 2005). In the estimation 
process managers will have to select only one estimate from a variety of options that are 
offered by GAAP and  thus, for example, the highest estimation may be selected and as a 
result more expenses will be recorded in the current year and thereby fewer expenses will 
be recorded in future years (McKee, 2005).  
3.6.2 Big Bath Accounting 
In a listed company, the desired reward that a manager would normally prefer and work 
towards is the increasing of the company’s share price through increasing earnings, 
however, in some cases they would prefer to decrease the profit (Mulford and Comeiskey, 
2002). This can be achieved through big bath accounting. Although the typical goal of 
earnings management is to avoid losses, big bath practice works the other way round; that 
is, when a company is really doing badly and definitely will incur and report losses, it may 
overstate the losses as much as possible. The main idea of big bath accounting is to inflate 
the loss and put bad news associated with poor earnings into the present fiscal year which 
will allow the boosting of earnings in future periods (Levitt, 1998; McKee, 2005). Possible 
motivations for engaging in big bath accounting are considered below. Mulford and 
Comiskey (2002) who described this form of earnings management as a “more flagrant” 
application give the following definition of big bath accounting: 
“A wholesale write-down of assets and accrual of liabilities in an effort to 
make the balance sheet particularly conservative so that there will be fewer 
expenses to serve as a drag on earnings in future years” (Mulford and 
Comiskey, 2002, p. 15). 
In a bad year when earnings expectation has not been met, management may decide to 
write-down assets in an extensive manner, the point is that as long as it is already a bad 
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year there may be no further consequences for making the results even worse by taking a 
“big bath”, and such cleaning up of the balance sheet may result in smaller amounts of 
expenses to charge on earnings in subsequent periods (Mulford and Comiskey, 2002).  
It is obvious that big bath accounting is a nonrecurring practice used to clean up the firm’s 
balance sheet in order to reduce the expenses in future periods. Also, it is very common to 
observe “big baths” when a new management is appointed (McKee, 2005), so the current 
poor performance can be attributed to the previous management.  
According to one of the first articles on “big bath” accounting by Moore (1973), the new 
management will benefit from big bath accounting in at least two ways. Firstly, reported 
low income will be attributed to old management and historical bases for future 
comparison will be lessened. Secondly, upcoming income will be free of these charges so 
that the earnings’ trend should get better (Moore, 1973). Also managers are inclined to 
engage in big bath charges when earnings have had a major hit as analysts will look 
beyond a one-time loss and focus on future earnings (Levitt, 1998). Moreover, when 
earnings are already low, making them worse may mean little damage to both company’s 
and management’s reputations since the market may punish a firm in virtually the same 
way whether it encounters a big or small loss (Jordan and Clark, 2004). In addition, there 
are some other situations that may encourage big baths; e.g. operation restructuring, asset 
impairment, troubled debt restructuring and discontinued operations (McKee, 2005).  
3.7 Earnings Management Related Parties 
Numerous stakeholders are involved in, or affected by, earnings management decisions. 
According to Ronen and Yaari (2008) these stakeholders can be classified into three 
groups; management, users and monitors. Generally speaking, the link between all these 
stakeholders is the financial reporting; reports are generated by management, used by users 
and monitored by monitors (Ronene and Yaari, 2008). These groups might be affected by 
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earnings management decisions in different ways where one group may consider a change 
in earnings as favourable while another group regards it as unfavourable (McKee, 2005). 
Those affected by earnings management decisions, have been described by Lo (2008) as 
victims. According to Lo (2008), the “potential victims of earnings management are, of 
course, the financial statement users” (p. 353). These users, according to Lo (2008), 
include “equity investors, bond investors, bankers, regulators, unions, suppliers, customers, 
and competitors” (p. 353). 
In the following paragraph, this chapter will restrict attention to major stakeholders 
involved in the earnings management decisions; management (as preparers), auditors and 
regulators (as monitors) and investors (as users). 
3.7.1 Managers 
Creative accounting is a means by which managers can alter the financial statements. 
Theoretically, managers are appointed by shareholders in order to run the business on their 
behalf for the good of owners. However, literature documents that managers may use the 
flexibility granted by GAAP so as to manage the financial results in a light favourable to 
themselves (Jones, 2011). Managers have the vital role of producing and reporting on 
earnings. Theoretically it is the board of directors that sets forth the accounting policies, 
but in practice it is the managers who make the vital decisions e.g. operating, investment 
and financing decisions (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). As discussed earlier in this chapter there 
could be managerial incentives inducing managers to indulge in earnings management e.g. 
managers may increase the reported earnings in order to increase their compensation as 
they might be income-based or they may possess shares whose price is basically related to 
the company’s earnings (Jones, 2011). Research on insider trading reveals that managers 
sell their shares when they are overvalued and in contrast buy shares when they are 
undervalued, benefiting from this asymmetry; managers could manage earnings in order to 
signal value related information or to conceal undesirable value related information (Ronen 
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and Yaari, 2008). Jones (2011) points out three preconditions have to exist so managers 
can indulge in earnings management: the opportunity to manage earnings; the knowledge 
of how to do it; and the “pressure of acceptable self-verbalizations to convince themselves 
that their behaviour is morally acceptable” (Jones, 2011, p. 23). 
3.7.2 Auditors  
Auditors are assigned primarily to increase confidence that financial statements fairly 
represent the financial position of a firm. Earnings management may distort this "fair 
presentation" and be a real concern to auditors. Moreover, auditors will become more 
worried when management use questionable accounting practices (Jones, 2011). According 
to Stolowy and Breton (2004) auditors are dealing with two important objectives; 
satisfying the client and avoiding risk from third parties.  
Given that creative accounting is lawful and legal when practiced withing GAAP and 
corporation laws, it is still a problematic issue to auditors as even if they spot the practice 
would feel worry as if they issue a qualified report that they may speed up the firm’s 
collapse since users will lose confidence. On the other hand, if they did not spot the 
practice of creative accounting or fraud then their reputation might be damaged especially 
if a firm collapses. Moreover, they might get prosecuted by investors in carelessness cases. 
Auditors find themselves depending on the regulatory framework to defend their 
procedures when it comes to deter creative accounting. Therefore, it is very important for 
every country to have effective accounting rules and regulations that auditors can depend 
on. Another inherent problem for auditors is whether or not they possess adequate 
independence from clients. However, auditors are typically assigned on the grounds of 
management recommendations despite the theoretical notion that they are appointed by 
shareholders. Also, they report on management who, in practice, pay for them. In the 
1990s, audit firms’ revenues became a mix of audit and non-audit services. Literature 
shows that since that time a large proportion of audit firms’ fees originates from non-audit 
 62 
rather than audit services, and as a consequence, accounting firms have paid less attention 
to auditing services. Arthur Anderson received more income for non-audit than audit from 
Enron (Jones, 2011). 
3.7.3 Regulators 
Regulators
33
 believe that creative accounting may distort accounting information and that 
“bad accounting” will expel “good accounting” so they strongly trying to control creative 
accounting (Jones, 2011). Therefore, they are concerned with “constraining this behaviour” 
(Achilles et al., 2013). Financial crises appear to happen on a regular basis and results in 
new rules and regulations that are intended to preclude or reduce the likelihood and 
severity of such crises. Creative accounting could threaten accounting information value 
and eventually result in more rules and regulations; for example, after the well-known 
collapse of Enron in 2002 the US regulators passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an attempt 
to diminish accounting abuses. Consequently, regulators and those who practice creative 
accounting are involved in an endless battle. One obstacle for regulators is that the 
flexibility within GAAP that is essential for presenting a true and fair view of a company’s 
transactions is the same tool that creative accountants use to produce a creative view of a 
company’s transactions (Jones, 2011). Moreover, regulators, as a group that are affected by 
the earnings management decisions, have a dual role in this context. On one side they use 
the accounting information for decision making (e.g. the tax authority). On the other side, 
they set the rules and regulations by which accounting information is prepared (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008). 
3.7.4 Investors 
Investors can be divided into two categories; existing shareholders and potential 
shareholders, these two groups may have different reactions to earnings management 
                                                 
33
 Regulators are those who set the accounting rules and regulations, for example, standards setters and 
legislators. It could include, as in the banking industry, the Central banks that govern and control commercial 
banks and the tax authority (government directory) who set the income tax law which may affect the 
accounting choices, as well as companies law. 
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decisions (Stolowy and Breton, 2004). For instance, increasing current profit can be seen 
as a positive mechanism by a current shareholder as it helps to maximise the firm’s value 
in the short run, but on the other side, it could be seen negatively by potential shareholders 
in the long run. Current shareholders may view creative accounting as either a “blessing or 
a curse” depending on what happened later and whether they return their holdings. If 
company stays in business, shareholders may be wining in the short run, but in the case of 
failure, shareholders could lose their money (Jones, 2011). 
3.8 Earning Management and Ethics 
Recent accounting scandals have raised the issue of earnings management ethics. Although 
earnings management could arguably be performed in a legal and lawful way, it remains an 
ethical issue in the financial reporting context (Abdelghany, 2005).  
Geiger and Smith (2010) argue that not all earnings management practices lead to 
inappropriate financial reporting, therefore, it is important to investigate the acceptability 
of earnings management from different perspectives, they added that: 
"… the evaluation of perceptions regarding earnings management behavior is 
a vital concern for business reporting worldwide. To the extent that 
perceptions lead to the practice of earnings management, an examination of 
these perceptions is particularly germane to the evaluation of the financial 
reporting climate in our growing international business community, and is of 
direct concern regarding the comparability of reported financial information 
across countries. Accordingly, it is critically important to examine the 
perceptions of individuals from different countries in an attempt to evaluate 
the climate for earnings management that may exist" (Geiger and Smith, 
2010, p. 21). 
Elias (2004) has concluded that despite the belief that earnings management practices are 
widespread however there is no agreement within the accounting profession regarding its 
ethical acceptability. In the same vein, Abdelghany (2005) suggests that although earnings 
management behaviour “does not explicitly violate accounting rules, it is an ethically 
questionable practice” (p. 1002).  
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The literature documents considerable research on the acceptability or otherwise of 
earnings management practices to different stakeholders. The following section discusses 
what is meant by ethics in general and what it means particularly in the business context. 
Then, related literature that focuses on the ethics of earnings management activities will be 
addressed. 
3.8.1 Business Ethics 
Business ethics has become an important issue in the current business world and is 
attracting a great deal of attention from the business community as well as researchers 
(Rashid and Ibrahim, 2008). Atakan et al. (2008) suggest that it becomes so essential to 
focus on the ethical values and perceptions of the involved parties due to the ethical 
violations that have arisen recently. They have also noticed that business practitioners have 
been frequently faced with ethical matters in their work place. Tseng et al. (2009) pointed 
out that in order for a business to be ethical it “requires that the organization or individual 
behaves in accordance with the carefully thought-out rules of moral philosophy” (p. 587). 
Valentine and Fleischman (2008) emphasized that attention to ethics as well as corporate 
social responsibility is a vital issue in light of the fact that business values are declining 
due to recent scandals. It has also been confirmed that the corporate scandals that recently 
took place have indicated that unethical and immoral practices that have been conducted 
by business organizations may impose substantial consequences for their stakeholders 
(Cacioppe et al. 2008). For instance, Enron and Arthur Andersen created chaos in the 
business world when their unethical practices became reported in the media (Rashid and 
Ibrahim, 2008). In the wake of the Arthur Andersen collapse, accountants became aware 
that the unethical behaviour of some individuals may have an adverse consequence for the 
entire profession. The accounting profession has to be able to maintain the perception of 
high ethical standards in order for it to be able to accomplish its fundamental function 
which is providing accounting information users with reliable accounting information. As 
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capital markets’ efficiency is contingent on accounting information users' confidence in 
this information is vital. Moreover, agency theory also suggests that the auditor's ethical 
behaviour is crucial in the process of financial reporting (Felton et al., 2008). According to 
Priest (2002, cited in Elias, 2004) failure of corporate ethics can be attributed to unethical 
earnings management. Elias (2004) suggests that recent organization collapses have 
powered the ethical argument toward the earnings management behaviour.  Any 
organization that is operating within a society is considered to be a social organization as 
long as it serves this society and is rewarded for its services, Preston (2001, cited in Yong, 
2008) suggested that a business has an obligation “to contribute towards society as part of 
its social responsibility” as long as it operates in and benefits from this society. De George 
(1990) considers business as a social enterprise and that its mandate and limits have been 
set by society; although business's limits are usually moral, they normally take the form of 
written law. 
According to De George (1990) ethics can be defined as:  
"A systematic attempt to make sense of our individual and social moral 
experience, in such a way as to determine the rules that ought to govern 
human conduct, the values worth pursuing, and the character traits deserving 
development in life. Ethics concerns itself with human conduct, taken here to 
mean human activity that is done knowingly and, to a large extent, willingly" 
(De George, 1990, p. 14). 
Rushton (2002, cited in Lopez-Gamero et al. 2008) defined ethics as “the application of 
moral principles in making choices between right and wrong courses of action” he added 
“business ethics is the application of those moral principles in making business decisions”. 
(p. 701). 
The Online Oxford Dictionary offers a number of definitions for ethics, one of which is 
"the branch of knowledge that deals with moral principles”. Morality, according to De 
George (1990) refers to: 
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"…practices and activities that are considered importantly right and wrong; 
the rules that govern those activities; and the values that are embedded, 
fostered, pursued by those activities and practices" (De George, 1990).  
Fisher and Lovell (2003) in distinguishing between ethics and morality consider ethics as 
about doing good and that it deals with the good life for humanity, while morality is 
considered as not doing harm and it is a concern for justice. Based on categories of bad, 
good, legal and illegal, they set forth four combinations to judge the rightness of actions 
that are; (a) actions that are good and legal but not a legal obligation; (b) actions that are 
wrong and illegal; (c) actions that legal but bad; and finally, (d) actions that are good but 
illegal. Earnings management (in the UK interpretation of the term as discussed above) as 
a practice obviously lies under section (c), earnings management is legal but it has bad 
consequences for some stakeholders. 
According to Geiger et al. (2006) an ethical issue in the context of financial reporting takes 
place in almost every month and they added that, evaluating the ethical behaviour in the 
financial reporting field is a critical issue in business practice. 
Earnings management has been regarded as one of the controversial and significant areas 
in the accounting literature and might be "the most important ethical issue facing the 
accounting profession "(Merchant and Rockness, 1994, p. 92). As stated earlier in this 
chapter earnings management is considered to be wide spread and according to Geiger et 
al. (2006) every accountant and every corporation has faced management temptation to 
manage the reported earnings. Companies can face continuous pressure to produce a steady 
growth of earnings which can eventually result in forceful managers being tempted to 
intervene in the financial reporting process. Furthermore, the practice of earnings 
management which arguably seeks to mask the true financial position of a company, in 
addition hides significant information that investors need to know (Loomis, 1999, cited in 
Elias, 2004)  Levitt (1998, p. 16) considers earnings management as “accounting hocus-
pocus where financial reality is hidden from investors”. 
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Several studies have been conducted to examine the perceptions of different stakeholders 
regarding the ethical acceptability of earnings management practices. According to 
Giacomino et al. (2006) little attention was paid to the morality of earnings management 
until the work of Bruns and Merchant that was published in an issue of Management 
Accounting in 1990. In their study Bruns and Merchant (1990) surveyed the readers of the 
Harvard Business Review asking for their perceptions about the acceptability of earnings 
management practices through a questionnaire consisted of 13 earnings management 
situations that the authors had observed either directly or indirectly. Since that time, 
research has been conducted using the same questionnaire in order to investigate the 
perceptions of the ethics of earnings management. 
Bruns and Merchant (1990) surveyed a total of 649 managers. That questionnaire 
contained 13 earnings management situations which the authors had observed either 
directly or indirectly, these situations were all legal and consistent with GAAP with minor 
ones that not consistent with GAAP. All situations involved earning management actions. 
Bruns and Merchant described their results as “scary” and noticed that if a practice is not 
clearly banned or deviated slightly from the rules it is considered as ethical irrespective of 
who is affected by the practice or “the information that flows from it”. 
Merchant and Rockness (1994) have carried out research to assess the perceived morality 
of earnings management practices in a sample of general managers, staff managers, 
operating-unit controllers and internal auditors using a modified version of the 
questionnaire of 13 earnings management activities that was used by Bruns and Merchant 
(1990). Their results reveal that accounting manipulations were judged more “harshly” 
than operating manipulation regardless of whether accounting manipulations were 
consistent with GAAP or not. Also the direction of earnings management practice (i.e. 
increase or decrease in reported profit) was not important as respondents showed no 
significant difference between the two directions. In addition, results showed that larger 
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earnings management actions were rated as being significantly less acceptable than smaller 
actions. The period of effect was also found to matter; respondents rated year-end actions 
as significantly less acceptable than quarter-end actions. Another study which examined 
how financial statements users’ judge the ethics of earnings management actions was 
conducted by Kaplan (2001) who considered his research as an extension of that of 
Merchant and Rockness (1994). The latter ascertained the views of various organizational 
members, while the former consulted those outside the organization because “managers, 
companies, and policy makers” should be concerned about how external parties perceive 
the ethics of earnings management activities. Therefore, the sample consisted of Master in 
Business Administration (MBA) students taking evening classes, (evening MBA students, 
according to Kaplan, are older and have large work experience in comparison to day MBA 
students). The study involved an experiment in which participants were given three 
scenarios describing earnings management by a general manager of a large division in 
different publicly owned corporations. The scenarios were developed and adopted from 
Bruns and Merchant (1990). The participants were randomly allocated into one of two user 
classes being shareholders and non-shareholders; also participants were randomly assigned 
to two subgroups depending upon the explanation supplied above the intent behind the 
earnings management; these were based on individual benefit and company benefit. The 
results showed that shareholders assess earnings management as being less unethical when 
it was intended for company benefit but that intent did not affect the ethical assessment of 
non-shareholders. Similarly, Clikeman et al. (2001) examined the perceptions of 
accounting students from the US and five Asian countries using the method developed by 
Bruns and Merchant (1990) and they found that students object most strongly to earnings 
management activity that involves accounting manipulation and increased reported 
income. Also their findings showed that students were less critical of earnings management 
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when the manipulation was small or was committed in order to help the company to 
survive. 
Elias (2002) tested the relationship between personal moral philosophies (i.e. idealism and 
relativism), ethics as well as social responsibility, and the ethical judgment of earnings 
management practices. His sample consisted of accountants in public practice and industry, 
accounting faculty and students. The questionnaire of Merchant (1989) was adopted in this 
study. The results showed that all respondents viewed operating earnings management as a 
questionable practice at worst, while accounting manipulations were viewed as “slight to 
serious” ethical breaches. The results revealed a positive relationship between an 
individual’s idealism and his/her perception of earnings management ethics, and a negative 
relationship between relativism and the ethical perception of earnings management.  
In another study, Elias (2004) investigated the relationship between corporate ethical 
values and earnings management, using a sample of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) 
in public accounting, industry and academia to test whether accountants who are employed 
in different organizations (possibly with different ethical values) will perceive earnings 
management practices differently. The Bruns and Merchant questionnaire was used to 
determine the perceptions of respondents. His results showed a positive relationship 
between perceptions of corporate ethical values and perceptions of earnings management 
though accountants employed in high (low) ethical values organizations perceived earnings 
management practices as unethical (ethical). Also the results revealed that “CPAs in 
industry were significantly less likely than those in public accounting and academia to 
perceive high ethical values in their organizations” (p. 92).  
Al-Hayale and Lan (2005) examined the attitudes of managers and external auditors 
regarding the ethical acceptability of earnings management. To determine the acceptability 
of earnings management practices by both managers and external auditors, a questionnaire 
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survey was employed; this questionnaire was partially based on the instrument of Bruns 
and Merchant (1990). Their results highlighted that auditors perceived earnings 
management practices to be less ethical than managers. No difference was found between 
male and female auditors towards the ethics of earnings management actions. 
Geiger et al. (2006) investigated the influence of national culture on perceptions about the 
acceptability of earnings management within eight countries; they drew on Hofstede’s 
work (1980, 1991, and 2001) where he classified cultural dimensions into: (a) 
individualism/ collectivism, (b) power distance, (c) masculinity/ femininity, and (d) 
uncertainty avoidance. They also drew on the questionnaire of Bruns and Merchant (1990). 
Their results suggested that middle individualism countries perceived earning management 
as being more unacceptable than low and high individualism countries. Individuals from 
high power distance countries viewed operational earnings management less favourably 
than those from low power distance cultures. Individuals from high masculinity countries 
perceived earnings management less favourably than low masculinity cultures and there 
was no relationship between the last cultural factor and earnings management activities as 
results did not find any support for either a positive or a negative relationship between 
uncertainty and individuals’ perceptions of earnings management techniques.   
Giacomino et al. (2006) undertook a comparison study. They examined the perceptions of 
undergraduate business students and business managers about the ethics of specific 
earnings management practices and compared their results with those of Bruns and 
Merchant (1990) to check if there were any differences after 15 years. They used the 
questionnaire of Bruns and Merchant (1990) as their research instrument. Their results 
suggested that females judged earnings management actions as being less ethical than 
males; undergraduate students had a stricter position toward earnings management 
activities than business managers, and accounting majors tended to perceive earnings 
management practices less favourably than other majors. 
71 
The ethics of earnings management have been also examined from the view point of 
students and professionals by Grasso et al. (2009). They investigated the perceptions of 
students and professionals after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). 
They found out that both students and professionals perceived earnings management as 
being more questionable and less ethical when comparing the year after to the year before 
SOX. Their findings also revealed that the perceived ethics of earnings management has 
been affected by the accounting scandals which had occurred. 
Jooste (2013) conducted a survey to examine the perceptions of students and business 
managers about the morality of earnings management. The survey objective was to 
determine if there was any difference between students’ and business managers’ views of 
the ethics of earnings management. Her survey instrument was the same questionnaire that 
was used in the Giacomino et al. (2006) who benefited from the questionnaire of Bruns and 
Merchant (1990). The results suggested a conflict of view between students and business 
managers; students tended to judge the practices more ethical than business managers. 
Also the results showed that earnings management tended to be judged differently by male 
and female. Males tended to view earnings management practices less favourably than 
females. 
Johnson et al. (2012) investigated the earnings management perceptions of managers using 
a different method from that mentioned above. In their study they investigated the 
managers’ perceptions in an experimental setting, based on descriptions of some actual 
events within a company. They developed a scenario of four earnings management 
practices. Their findings suggested that managers would engage in earnings management 
when the consequences for the company were favourable. 
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3.9 Detecting Earnings Management Practices 
A clearer understanding of earnings management requires knowledge on how to detect it. 
Mohanram (2003) identified two approaches that can be followed to identify the existence 
of earnings management practices; a qualitative approach and a quantitative approach. The 
first approach requires a detailed analysis of a firm’s accounting policies whereas the 
second approach focuses on an analysis of accruals (Mohanram, 2003). It could be inferred 
that the first approach is more likely to be applied by a single user of financial statements, 
for example, an auditor or investor. For instance, during the audit process, the auditor has 
the ability, being an expert with full access to the accounting records, to spot indications 
that might exist as a consequence of earnings management practices. Thus, this approach 
could be called a pragmatic approach for detecting earnings management. On the other 
hand, the quantitative approach for detecting earnings management deals mainly with 
identifying discretionary accruals on an aggregate basis, and uses statistical based 
techniques on large samples to test for the existence of earnings management. Furthermore, 
this approach has been adopted by academics so it could be called the academic approach. 
Figure 3.3 below illustrates components of the two approaches. 
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Figure 3.3: The Earnings Management Detecting Approaches 
 
 
3.9.1 Qualitative Approach (Financial Statements Analysis) 
Adopting this approach to detect earnings management practices requires a clear 
understanding of the firm’s accounting policies (Mohanram, 2003). This approach was 
adopted by Mohanram (2003) as a mechanism by which earnings management could be 
tested
34
. He has provided a framework
35
 to carry out accounting analysis in order to detect 
earnings management. 
The steps of the Qualitative Approach adopted by Mohanram (2003) are articulated in 
Figure 3.3 and can summarised in three basic stages; accounting analysis, identifying red 
flags, and restating accounting numbers.  
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 To date the author is unaware of any other research which uses this approach. 
35
 This framework, according to Mohanram (2003) is based on the Accounting Analysis chapter of “Business 
Analysis and Valuation” by Palepu et al. (2000). 
Detecting 
Earnings Management 
“Qualitative” 
Approach 
(Accounting Analysis) 
1- Accounting analysis 
2- Identify red flags 
3- Restate accounting 
figures 
“Quantitative” 
Approach 
(Discretionary accruals) 
Aggregate accruals 
e.g. Jones (1991) 
Specific accruals 
 e.g. McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) mo 
Earnings distribution 
after management 
e.g. Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) 
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First of all an accounting analysis has to be carried out. The first step in this stage is to 
identify the key accounting policies of the firm so that items that are most likely to be 
manipulated become evident and thereby receive adequate scrutiny. In the banking sector, 
for example, one of the key policies might be the loan loss provision (Palepu et al., 2000). 
The second step in the first stage is to assess the accounting flexibility a manager is 
offered. The more flexibility a manager has the more likely it is that earnings management 
occurs. Step number three is to evaluate the accounting strategy of the firm and compare it 
with industry norms. The fourth step is the assessment of the disclosure quality; despite the 
fact that accounting rules require a certain level of disclosure as a minimum requirement, 
managers still have a considerable choice in this regard. Given this considerable choice, 
managers can ease the analyst’s assessment of the firm by providing adequate disclosure 
given that disclosure quality is an important factor in assessing accounting quality. 
Disclosure quality is a vital aspect of an accounting system that can assist in the 
assessment of overall accounting quality (Palepu et al., 2000). 
The second stage of the qualitative approach is to identify the red flags that may indicate 
that earnings management has occurred. Palepu et al. (2000) provide potential red flags 
that should be considered during the qualitative approach to detecting earnings 
management practices. These potential red flags are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Red Flags Indicating Potential Earnings Management 
Unexplained changes in accounting in the case of poor performance. 
Unexplained transactions resulted in increasing profits. 
Accounts receivable that are not correlated with revenues.  
Increases in inventories that are not in relation to sales increases. 
A gap between reported income and cash. 
A gap between reported income and tax income. 
The use of financing mechanisms like research and development partnerships and the sale of receivables with 
recourse. 
Unexplained large asset write-offs. 
Large year-end adjustments. 
Qualified audit opinions or unjustified change in external auditor. 
Related-party transactions or transactions between related entities.   
Adaptation from: Palepu et al. (2000). 
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The list of red flags may also include  "allowances for uncollectible accounts that are not 
correlated with receivables, reserves that are not correlated with balance sheet items, 
questionable acquisition reserves, [and] earnings that consistently and precisely meet 
analysts’ expectations" (Magrath and Weld, 2002, p. 53). Finally, once the first two stages 
are performed and earnings management has been confirmed to appear very likely, the 
final stage for the analyst is to restate the financial statements figures to eliminate the 
effects of earnings management and so lessen the misrepresentation in the financial 
statements (Palepu et al., 2000). 
3.9.2 Quantitative Approach (Discretionary Accruals Identifying) 
The second approach to test for earnings management is the quantitative approach that is 
mainly based on identifying discretionary accruals. Accruals can be measured as the 
difference between net income and cash from operations (Yang et al., 2012). Basically, 
most earnings management activities are based on accruals because most accounting 
decisions involve some accruals. For example selling on credit requires the creation of an 
accrual since the sale is recognized in the income statement accompanied by an accounts 
receivable which is accused in the balance sheet because no cash is received; once the cash 
is received the accounts receivable will be reversed. Also, accruals are used as a basic 
principle
36
, i.e. this matching is done in order to obtain a better measure of period 
economic performance than cash flows (Mohanram, 2003). In the same context, Sun and 
Rath (2010) suggest: 
“Fundamentally, more management discretions are often made through 
accruals. More accruals are in place simply because the accounting system 
creates accruals in order to recognize revenues when they are earned and 
match expenses to those revenues, irrespective of whether cash has been 
received or paid. This matching principle makes accounting earnings a better 
economic measure of firm performance than cash flows” (p. 128). 
Accruals can be divided into two components; discretionary and nondiscretionary. 
Discretionary accruals are recognised as abnormal or managed accruals and are always 
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 IAS 1 requires the accrual basis for financial reporting purposes. 
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connected to earnings manipulation. On the other hand, nondiscretionary accruals are 
recognised as normal or unmanaged accruals. (Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995; Peasnell 
et al. 2000). Moreover, accrual accounting as a means to manage earnings seems to be the 
preferred option for management as accruals are difficult to observe compared to earnings 
management practiced through real transactions
37
. In this context, Young (1999) suggests 
that: 
“From a managerial perspective, accruals are likely to represent a favoured 
instrument for manipulating reported numbers because of their relative low 
cost and opaque nature” (p. 833).  
Sun and Rath (2010) suggest that it is easy for researchers to test for managing earnings 
through accounting choices for the following reasons: 
“First, the choices of accounting policies can have a material impact on 
reported earnings and consequently are unlikely to be adopted without 
management consideration of the effects. Second, the choices or changes of 
accounting policies provide a measure that is purely discretionary. No 
assumption needs to be made concerning the magnitude of the discretionary 
component of an accounting choice/change. This makes the detection of 
earnings management relatively easier” (p. 123). 
On the other hand, it might be difficult to test for earnings management through real 
transactions due to the lack of a measurement. In this regard, Sun and Rath (2010) indicate: 
“Nevertheless, researchers found it is difficult to detect earnings management 
through real actions, because there is no benchmark to determine the right 
actions that managers have taken” (p. 123). 
Given the flexibility offered by GAAP, managers could manage earnings by choosing from 
alternative accounting methods within GAAP or by applying these methods in particular 
ways e.g. changing estimates of assets’ lives. The former may be noticeable and thereby be 
spotted by the auditor. However, the latter could be a bit harder for an auditor to observe 
(at least in terms of motives) (Schipper, 1989). In this regard, Dechow (1994, cited in Sun 
and Rath, 2010) blames the flexibility offered by GAAP for giving the opportunity to 
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 Although some scholars argue that the real earnings management is the preferred means of earnings 
management by managers (for example, Graham et. al., 2005), a study by Zang (2012) reveals that managers 
trade off the two earnings management types (real and accounting) according to their relative costs. The 
discussion of which is preferred by managers is beyond the scope of this study. 
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managers for earnings management, “[d]ue to this flexibility, discretionary accruals are the 
component that often gives managers opportunities to manipulate earnings” (p. 124). 
Young (1999) considered testing for earnings management as a central issue in financial 
statement analysis. He added that managers are provided with a series of earnings 
management techniques that range from real operating decisions such as asset sales and 
changes in R&D expenses to financial reporting decisions such as accounting method 
changes and accrual choices. The latter, accruals choices, according to Young (1999): 
“Represent a less costly mechanism by which managers can affect reported 
numbers than, for example, changes in R&D expenditure or asset disposals. 
Further, because they are often difficult to observe directly, the effect of 
accrual decisions are more difficult for external parties to adjust for ex-post, 
compared with the effect of asset sales and changes in accounting methods. A 
disadvantage of using the accrual mechanism to manipulate reported numbers 
is that under- (over-)statements made in the current period must reverse in the 
future” (p. 858). 
Empirical studies for testing earnings management mainly focused on the discretionary 
part of accruals by testing the discretionary components of reported earnings (Dechow et 
al., 1995). According to McNichols (2000), one of the fundamental issues of earnings 
management testing is measuring management’s discretion in reported earnings. In this 
regard, Stolowy and Breton (2004) argue that “[a]s profit differs from cash flow by the 
total of accruals, manipulation of the profit figure implies manipulation of the accruals” (p. 
22). They also added that distinguishing between normal and abnormal accruals represents 
a challenge that researchers face (Stolowy and Breton, 2004). Separating out the 
discretionary and non-discretionary elements of accruals has been described by Mohanram 
(2003) as a “critical aspect”.  
In the quantitative approach for earnings management detection, McNichols (2000) 
provided an overview on three techniques by which earnings management can be tested 
based on discretionary accruals. These techniques are summarised in Table 3.2 and are 
briefly discussed in the next section.  
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3.9.2.1 Aggregate Accruals 
The first technique under the quantitative approach examines aggregate accruals by using 
regression models to compute both expected and unexpected accruals. Dechow et al. 
(1995) suggest that total accruals be used as a “starting point” to measure discretionary 
accruals. According to this method, a model is used to separate total accruals into 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components. This technique endeavours to recognize 
discretionary accruals based on the relation between total accruals and hypothesised 
descriptive factors. In this context, Sun and Rath (2010) argue: 
“Accruals, relative to other methods, are preferred in detecting earnings 
management. Nevertheless, the major challenge for researchers using accruals 
to detect earnings management is the ability of the model correctly separate 
accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals” (p. 130). 
One of the most used examples of accrual-based models is the Jones’ (1991) model. 
Beneish (2001) suggests that Jones (1991) model is based on the notion that accruals are 
normally influenced by manager’s discretion and change with economic conditions. To 
measure for earnings management Jones (1991) used the discretionary component of total 
accruals. She proposed a regression to control for nondiscretionary factors that affect 
accruals, by postulating a “linear relation between total accruals and changes in sales and 
property, plant and equipment” (McNichols, 2000). Beneish (2001) describes the 
relationships included in Jones model as “This model relates total accruals to the change in 
sales and the level of gross property, plant and equipment” (p. 6). He also added that the 
model is based on two assumptions; the first, that current accruals resulting from a firm’s 
economic situation are related to sales changes, or sales growth. The second, that “gross 
property plant and equipment controls for the portion of total accruals related to 
nondiscretionary depreciation expense” (p. 6). 
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3.9.2.2 Specific Accruals 
Alternatively, a specific accruals model could be used to test for earnings management; 
this technique is typically adopted for a specific industry where a particular accrual is 
significant and represents a substantial portion of the total assets (Sun and Rath, 2010). 
Testing earnings management by this technique, according to McNichols (2000), is based 
on the knowledge of nondiscretionary and discretionary behaviour of accruals in such an 
industry. As the researcher can benefit from his/her knowledge of GAAP “the researcher 
can develop intuition for the key factors that influence the behaviour of the accrual, 
exploiting his or her knowledge of generally accepted accounting principles” (p. 333). The 
banking industry is given as an example where such a technique is applicable and the loan 
loss provision (LLP) represents a large accrual that bank managers could use to manipulate 
earnings. Literature suggests that bank managers use LLP as a tool for earnings 
manipulation (Sun and Rath, 2010). 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) suggest the provision for bad debts in the banking industry 
as a mechanism for accrual-based earning management. A specific accrual technique, 
according to McNichols (2000), is applicable in such industries where business practices 
can lead to accruals being in question due to their materiality and their likelihood of being 
the object of judgment and discretion. Applying this technique requires knowledge of 
which accrual is likely to be manipulated. McNichols (2000) argues that “[i]f it is not clear 
which accrual management might use to manipulate earnings, then the power of a specific 
accrual test for earnings management is reduced” (p. 333). She also pointed out that using 
the specific accrual technique could be costly as “specific accruals approaches generally 
require more institutional knowledge and data than aggregate accruals approaches” (p. 
333). Another disadvantage of the specific accrual technique could be the lack of 
“generalizability of the findings” as she claimed that “the number of firms for which a 
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specific accrual is managed may be small relative to the number of firms with aggregate 
accruals” (p. 333). 
3.9.2.3 Earnings Distribution after Earnings Management 
The last technique for earnings management detection is based on the distribution of 
earnings after they have been managed. The distribution technique, according to Sun and 
Rath (2010, p. 126), is “relatively new in the literature” and according to McNichols 
(2000) was developed by Brughstahler and Dichev (1997). This technique, according to 
Holland and Ramsay (2003), implies that managers are motivated to manage earnings in 
order to meet “certain earnings benchmarks or thresholds such as reporting positive profits, 
or sustaining recent profit performance” (p.42).  
The study of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) investigated the stream of earnings 
distribution after being managed and they revealed that managers prefer to report positive 
earnings (profits) and that earnings are relatively close to the prior period’s figure. In their 
words, “firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses” (p. 99). 
This approach has been described by Beneish (2001) as an “interesting alternative 
methodology” and he reported on their work by saying: 
“They investigate discontinuing in the distribution of reported earnings 
around three thresholds: (1) zero earnings, (2) last year’s earnings, (3) this 
year’s analysts’ expectations. They make predictions about the behaviour of 
earnings in narrow intervals around these thresholds. The evidence appears 
consistent with predicted discontinuities: there tend to be less (more) 
observations than expected for earnings amounts just below distributions is 
informative about which firms are likely to have managed earnings” (p. 7).  
This technique has been criticised by Beneish (2001) for being “silent about the form and 
extent of earnings management” (p. 7). 
3.9.3 Alternative Approach (Questionnaire Survey) 
In addition to the above approaches to identifying earnings management, a third approach 
could be followed to test for earnings management. Researchers may resort to survey 
81 
opinions of some related parties to assess their perceptions of whether earnings are being 
managed. 
The literature shows that some researchers have carried out surveys to elicit professionals’ 
perceptions on earnings management. These include Baralexis (2004), who claims that 
adopting this approach enables researchers to conclude real “not hypothesized” motives 
behind such activity. Nelson et al. (2002) used a field-based questionnaire to elicit 
auditors’ recollections of specific managers’ attempts to manage earnings. They claimed 
that this approach provides transaction-level data on earnings management attempts and 
their consequences on auditors’ decisions. The accuracy of recollections is important, but 
cannot always be relied up on in field-based questionnaire. However, techniques have been 
developed to tackle the fallibility of human memory e.g. eliciting simple facts concerning 
recent events rather than asking leading questions or eliciting details of old events. Also, 
accurate recall could be encouraged by emphasizing the importance of the research and 
affirming the anonymity of responses (Nelson et al. 2002).  
Baralexis (2004) based his study on a questionnaire to survey 100 experienced auditors and 
100 experienced accountants. The questionnaire was designed with close reference to the 
relevant literature and consisted of eight questions exploring creative accounting in Greece. 
Similar to Baralexis’s work, Noronha et al. (2008) explored earnings management in 
China. They surveyed 11 accrual-earnings management techniques that might be used by 
Chinese companies. The questionnaire was distributed to 1400 companies. Their results 
indicated that earnings management is pervasive in China and that managers consider 
earnings management as reasonable and useful. Noronha et al. (2008) concluded that the 
prime incentive for earnings management in China is management promotion and 
compensation which is inconsistent with prior literature that suggests that capital market 
pressure is the most important motivation for earnings management. 
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Another study which followed this approach was by Al-khabash and Al-Thuneibat (2009). 
Their study aimed at providing evidence on earnings management existence from the 
perspective of external and internal auditors in Jordan. A specially designed questionnaire 
was used. Their sample consisted of 61 internal auditors and 66 external auditors. The 
results were summarized as suggesting that external auditors believe that managers are 
involved in earnings management to increase and decrease income while internal auditors 
believe that managers are involved in earnings management to only increase income. 
3.10 Earnings Management in the Banking Industry 
Bank managers are much more concerned about earnings stability and growth; therefore it 
is anticipated that bank managers are engaged in earnings management (Bhat, 1996). 
Banks generally represent a significant proportion of total listed companies which means 
that banks have an influential role in the capital market (Kanagaretnam et al. 2010). Shen 
and Chih (2005) stressed the importance of banks and describe the banks’ share in the 
capital market as “typically large”. Moreover, banks play a vital role in economic 
development, with investors and regulators monitoring banks’ performance on a regular 
basis; the former for monitoring share prices, the latter to assure the robustness of a 
banking system’s financial soundness. As a result, reported earnings growth remains one of 
the key pointers that demonstrate a bank’s performance and financial stability which 
ultimately suggests that bank managers may be inclined to smooth earnings volatility over 
periods. By earnings management in general and income smoothing in particular, bank 
managers can help to sustain the appearance of a robust financial position as well as 
meeting legal requirements (Taktak et al., 2010a). It has been suggested that income 
smoothing is a continuing practice that is employed by banks (Bhat, 1996). Moreover bank 
managers are accused of being more likely to indulge in earnings manipulations compared 
to others (Leventis, 2011). 
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For instance, Bhat (1996) suggests that banks’ managers exercise income smoothing for a 
number of reasons: (a) to enhance the risk perceptions of the bank to its investors and 
regulators; (b) to support managers’ efforts in maintaining their compensation schemes; (c) 
to satisfy shareholders where income smoothing will enable managers to afford a constant 
stream of dividends; and (d) to provide low quality managers with a good chance of 
delivering an image of high quality management to investors where measuring 
management’s quality is difficult.  Also, banks’ managers may smooth earnings to reduce 
tax payments and improve share prices. 
The literature reports that banks’ managers use the LLP as a mechanism for earnings 
manipulation (Anandarajan et al. 2003, 2007; Kanagaretnam, 2010; Leventis et al. 2011; 
DeBoskey and Jiang, 2012). GAAP offers latitude in choices available to account for a 
specific set of financial events which gives the opportunity to smooth income through 
choosing from accounting alternatives. Given the considerable scope for banks’ managers 
when estimating the amount of LLP, banks’ managers may smooth earnings by 
manipulating LLP (Bhat, 1996; Kanagaretnam et al., 2003). LLPs are designed to reflect 
the sum of funds that are likely to be lost in the future (Bhat, 1996). LLPs reveal the 
expected future loan losses to be disclosed in the current period as accrued expenses on the 
income statement (Whalen, 1994). However, “federal banks and securities regulators” 
realize that the LLPs that have been anticipated by bank managers cannot precisely match 
real losses and thus include a margin for inaccuracy, a margin that has been exploited by 
bank managers (Anandarajan et al. 2007). According to Whalen (1994), bank managers 
possess private information about the default risk inherent in LLPs and as a result their 
judgement in estimating LLPs each period is essential. He added that investors and 
regulators cannot obtain all of bank managers’ information as it is “prohibitively costly” 
and accordingly “bank managers can exercise discretion over the timing of provisions for 
certain loan losses”. 
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Shen and Chih (2005) list three factors that demonstrate the importance of studying 
earnings management in the banking industry. First, banks at all times fear a potential 
problem of illiquidity that puts them under the risk of extensive bank runs. Therefore, with 
the intention of retaining depositors’ confidence, banks resort to earnings management 
practices in order to avoid negative earnings. 
Second, they cite Morgan (2002) who says that: “… uncertainty over the banks stems from 
their assets, loans and trading assets in particular, the risks of which are hard to observe or 
easy to change. Banks’ high leverage compounds the uncertainty over their assets; their 
assets present bankers with ample opportunities’ for risk or asset substitution, and their 
high leverage inclines them to do so.” Therefore, bank managers have a high incentive to 
manage earnings to hide asset substitution behaviour.  
Third, banks are highly regulated organizations in which a non-performing loan ratio, 
among other things (i.e. capital adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio, etc.) is firmly regulated. 
Therefore, earnings management could be adopted in order to avoid regulations’ breach. 
According to Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) a bank’s LLP is the proper approach to study 
earnings management in the banking sector for two reasons. First, given the considerable 
discretion that is allowed by GAAP, bank managers may use this flexibility in using LLP 
for earnings management. Second, LLPs are considered to be major accrual items in banks 
accounts that provide bank managers with sufficient leeway in manipulating earnings. 
3.11 Empirical Research on Using LLPs to Manage Earnings 
The literature shows a great deal of research on earnings management practices. However, 
only little is related to the banking industry (Taktak et al. 2010b). According to Peasnell et 
al. (2000, p. 318), financial institutions may be excluded due to the difference in the 
financial reporting system between financial firms and industrial firms. Also, financial 
firms have a “fundamentally different accrual process” relative to other industries. 
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According to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, cited in Shen and Chih, 2005) conflicting 
incentives may exist within regulated firms in general to report lower earnings or decreases 
in earnings whenever economic benefits from reporting lower earnings to regulators take 
place. More particularly, in the financial institutions category which includes the banking 
industry, there may be a negative relationship between avoiding earnings decreases and the 
extent of regulatory oversight. Much research on financial institutions is carried out in the 
USA and Europe and has come to a conclusion that LLPs are widely used for, amongst 
other things, earnings management (Anandarajan et al. 2003, 2007; Leventis et al., 2011). 
Researchers have adopted different techniques to test for bank managers’ use of LLPs to 
manage earnings. Some used the specific accrual technique; others have applied the 
earnings distribution techniques. The next section provides a summary of some studies that 
examined earnings management or specifically income smoothing as a form of earnings 
management within the banking industry. It is notable that none of these studies followed 
the first quantitative technique (total accruals). 
Bhat (1996) examined the income smoothing hypothesis for 148 banks that reported their 
earnings over the period 1981-1991. To examine whether banks smooth their income the 
researcher regressed logarithms of earnings after taxes and LLP against the year. His 
results suggest that banks use LLP to manipulate reported earnings. 
Another study that followed the specific accrual technique was conducted by 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2003) who studied the underlying motives of bank managers for 
income smoothing through LLPs. They provided evidence that bank managers use LLPs 
for income smoothing as they save earnings through LLPs in good times to borrow them in 
bad times. Their results suggest that job security and the cost of borrowing motivate bank 
managers to engage in income smoothing practices; managers faced with job security fears 
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typically use LLPs as an income smoothing device. They claim their findings to be of great 
interest to regulatory bodies who are interested in banks’ financial reporting quality. 
Anandarajen et al. (2003; 2007) also followed the same technique to capture earnings 
management behaviour. For instance, Anandarajen et al. (2007) examine the use of LLPs 
by Australian banks for earnings management. The data used was from the financial 
reports of 50 commercial banks, 10 of which are listed banks, for the period of 1991-2001; 
the total number of observations was 441. Their results show that Australian banks in 
general use LLPs to manage earnings, and, listed banks are more likely to do so relative to 
unlisted ones. Their results also suggest that regulators consider the fact that managed 
reported earnings do not precisely represent the real economic performance when assessing 
the “overall financial risk”. 
Agarwal et al. (2007) investigate earnings management practices within Japanese banks 
and found out that Japanese banks do significantly use LLPs to manage earnings in the 
period of 1985-1996. Other evidence from Japan is provided by Kwak et al. (2009) who 
investigated the use of LLPs by Japanese bank managers for the period of 1996-1999 and 
found out that Japanese bank managers manipulate LLPs to signal financial strength when 
they need external financing. Both studies employed the specific accrual technique to 
detect earnings management within Japanese banks. 
Taktak et al. (2010a) studied the practice of income smoothing on a sample of 278 
commercial banks operating in OECD countries. They offered evidence of artificial and 
real income smoothing as their results indicate that the majority of the banks do smooth 
their incomes intentionally by LLPs or by selling trading securities. Their results also 
indicated that income smoothing is influenced by both banking regulatory and institutional 
factors.  
87 
The specific accrual technique has been also applied to Islamic banks. On a sample of 66 
Islamic banks from various Muslim countries, Taktak et al. (2010b) found that Islamic 
banks extensively smooth their incomes. However, their study provided no evidence on the 
use of LLPs to smooth income by Islamic banks. They examined whether Islamic banks do 
smooth their income using LLPs. However, they studied only one form of income 
smoothing that is, artificial income smoothing through LLPs resulting from Islamic 
financial products i.e murabaha, musharaka and mudaraba. 
Other studies, for example, Shen and Chih (2005) adopted the third quantitative technique 
that is, earning distribution discontinuities. In their study as to whether earnings 
management within the banking industry is practiced across 48 countries they found that 
earnings management certainly was practiced in their sample. They used three measures to 
test for earnings management based on those of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge 
et al. (1999), and Leuzet al. (2003). They tested whether banks manage their earnings so as 
to surpass thresholds, such zero earnings and zero earnings changes. 
Leventis et al. (2011) examined the impact of IFRS implementation on the use of LLPs to 
manage earnings within 91 EU listed commercial banks operating in 18 European 
countries. They divided their sample into two categories; early adopters and later adopters. 
Their results reveal that banks do manage their earnings through LLPs but the 
implementation of IFRS has meaningfully reduced earnings management behaviour. 
The earnings management in Islamic banks has been also confirmed by using the earnings 
distribution approach. Hamdi and Zarai (2012) revealed, that although earnings 
management practices are not as obvious in Islamic banks compared non-Islamic bank; 
Islamic banks are engaged in earnings management practices mainly to avoid reporting 
losses and earnings decreases. Their sample consisted of 125 Islamic banks which offered 
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1244 bank-year observations. The data related to 27 countries and covered the fiscal years 
2000 to 2009. 
This thesis adopts the alternative approach by which a questionnaire survey is employed. It 
also benefits from using interviews to elicit banks stakeholders’ perceptions on earnings 
management. According to the literature, research on detecting earnings management in 
the banking industry normally implies the use of the specific accrual technique which 
requires a relative bigger sample of banks than exist in the Libyan Stock Market (LSM)
38
.  
3.12 Discussion and Summary 
Earnings management continues to be a problematic issue in the financial reporting context 
(Man and Wong, 2013) and an important topic that concerns a wide range of stakeholders 
including regulators, investors and managers (Achilles et. al., 2013). Its importance, 
according to Man and Wong (2013), stems from its negative effects on the financial 
statements as it “may undermine the credibility of financial statements” (p. 400). It 
involves deliberately management intervention in the financial reporting process to 
misstate the reported earnings to achieve certain rewards (Foster and Shastri, 2013). This 
managerial behaviour, according to Aerts et al. (2013) is mainly incurred for “the benefit 
of insiders” by acting as to “mislead outsiders’ perceptions” about the firm’s financial 
performance (p. 94). Although earnings management might be used to make information 
more informative for outsiders, however it is still questionable. Aerts et al. (2013) argued 
that: 
“Management’s motives for earnings management are, however, not 
transparent from reported numbers, both manipulative [opportunistic] and 
communicative [informative] earnings management are likely to feed ex ante 
uncertainty of users with regard to earnings management consequences” (p. 
94). 
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 The total companies that were listed in the LSM as on 10 June 2012 was only 13 of which 7 are 
commercial banks. The cumulative (total) capital of listed companies is 3 billion LD of which the banks’ 
portion is 2.3 LD billion. 
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Earnings management may have an adverse consequence on accountability relationships. 
Accountability, or being accountable, relies on managers providing useful, unbiased, and 
reliable information to the firm’s stakeholders. Aers et al. (2013) stated that earnings 
management could reveal an accountability breach, they indicated: 
“Given users’ ex ante uncertainty with regard to management’s earnings 
management motives, indication of earnings management may be perceived 
as a significant accountability predicament, and bring management to offer 
more explanations on performance-related matters in ” (p. 95).  
This chapter has provided a literature review on the earnings management definition and 
motivations. The next chapter highlights the theoretical framework adopted for this study: 
accountability. 
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Chapter 4 
Theoretical Framework 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the literature on earnings management and how earnings 
management could affect financial reporting quality; the chapter also discussed earnings 
management practices in the banking sector and how such behavior could be seen in terms 
of business ethics. The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss accountability theory as 
a potential foundation for exploring the earnings management issue within Libyan 
Commercial Banks by gathering various stakeholders’ perceptions on the research 
questions being examined. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 contains definitions of theory and 
highlights the importance of theory in social research. Section 4.3 outlines the conceptual 
frameworks of financial reporting as suggested by Ijiri (1983) and presents a comparison 
between accountability and decision-usefulness theories. Section 4.4 outlines the 
accountability framework. Section 4.5 discusses the adoption of accountability as the 
theoretical perspective for this study and, finally, section 4.6 summarizes this chapter. 
4.2 Theory Importance and Definition 
The significance of using a theoretical framework in accounting studies has been 
highlighted by many researchers. For example, Abdel-Khalik and Ajinka (1979, cited in 
Sihotang, 2003) believed that every single piece of research has to adopt and follow a 
theoretical framework. Theory, according to May (2011), helps researchers in explaining 
and understanding the research finding;, it is also considered as “the mark of a mature 
discipline whose aim is the systematic study of particular phenomena” (p. 27). May (2011) 
also outlined the association between theory and research by stating, "…for social research 
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to intellectually develop and to be of use in understanding or explaining the social world, 
we need theory and theory needs research" (pp. 31-32). Theories contain concepts and 
assumptions whose relationships can be articulated by research; in other words, a 
theoretical framework specifies whether and how concepts are related and moreover 
whether a relationship does exist (Neuman, 2004).  
The main objective for accounting theory, according to Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) is “to 
provide a basis for the prediction and explanation of accounting behavior and events” (p. 
108). However, accounting theory has developed to prescribe how accounting behavior 
and events should look. In this context, Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 4), indicate that 
accounting theorists are more concerned about how firms should report about their events. 
This evolution led accounting theorists to be “normative”. Relatively new evidence 
showing the importance of understanding theory has been related to accounting scandals as 
pointed out by Deegan and Unerman (2006) who indicated: 
“In the wake of a growing number of high-profile accounting failures (such as 
Enron and WorldCom), it has never been more important for accountants to 
thoroughly understand and be able to critique the accounting practices which 
they use. Without such a theoretically informed understanding, it is difficult 
to evaluate the suitability of current accounting practices, to develop 
improved accounting …, and to defend the reputation of accounting where 
accounting practices are wrongly blamed for causing companies to fail” (p. 
4). 
They also added that the understanding of accounting theory could have a key role in 
restoring the “reputation and future of the accounting profession” (p. 5). 
Theory has been defined in a number of ways. For instance, it has been described as a 
"way of seeing and thinking about the world rather than an abstract representation of it" 
(Alvesson and Deetz, 2000, p. 37). Black (1993, p. 25), on the other hand, defined theory 
as "explanations of how things function or why events occur". Theory, according to 
Kerlinger (1986), is a mix of concepts, definitions and propositions that all together can 
explain and predict behavior. He defined theory as: 
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“A set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that 
present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among 
variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena” (p. 
9). 
Sekaran (2003) suggests that by ‘theory’, one can justify the relationships between 
different factors, he defined theory as: 
"A conceptual model of how one theorizes or makes logical sense of the 
relationships among the several factors that have been identified as important 
to the problem" (p. 87). 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) listed four basic functions that a theory performs; description, 
delimitation, generation and integration. To describe, theory uses research concepts or 
constructs and their relationships so that a best explanation of the research findings and the 
forces underlying them are offered. The second function is delimiting which: 
"Consists of selecting the favorite set of events to be explained and assigning 
a meaning to the formulated abstractions of the descriptive stage. Constraints 
on or boundaries around speculation and hunches serve that delimiting 
purpose” (p. 81).  
The generation function implies “the ability to generate a testable hypothesis, which is the 
main objective of a theory or to provide hunches, notions and ideas from which hypotheses 
could be developed". The last function is integration by which theory would be able to 
“present a coherent and consistent integration of the various concepts and relations…" (p. 
81). 
Within the accounting context, accounting theory, according to Hendriksen (1982), plays a 
significant role in accounting research. It is defined as:  
“Logical  reasoning in the form of a set of broad principles that (1) provide a 
general frame of reference by which accounting practice can be evaluated and 
(2) guide the development of new practices and procedures” (p. 1).  
He added that accounting theory is used to explain and understand current practices, as 
well as, to offer a “general frame of reference” so that accounting practices can be 
evaluated and developed.  
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According to Gray et al. (1996) the theoretical framework chosen by a researcher typically 
reflects his/her frame of mind. They state that "a theoretical framework adopted in a 
research project is actually a reflection of the researcher's frame of mind, which is 
temporary, conditional and debatable" (p. 96). 
4.3 Financial Reporting Research Theoretical Frameworks 
Despite the ample theories in the academic literature that could be applied in accounting 
studies, two broad frameworks are commonly adopted. Ijiri (1983) claims that "a 
conceptual framework of accounting can be decision based or accountability based". 
Accounting research that is following one of these approaches may not necessarily come to 
the same conclusion that would have been reached through the other approach (Williams, 
1987). In a similar vein, Collison et al. (1993) argue that accountability and decision 
usefulness are alternatives and may lead to different results. They stated: 
"Any deductive analysis of financial reporting ideally starts with specification 
of the purpose that financial statements serve. Such specification is 
problematic, because there appear to be two major alternatives which could 
generate different analyses and conclusions. These are 'decision usefulness' 
and 'accountability'." (p. 2). 
A notable difference exists between the two mentioned frameworks. The decision based 
theory is concerned about how useful the accounting information is to users, though 
focusing on one particular set of accounting information users i.e. investors and creditors. 
In the words of Williams (1987) it is “ends focused”.  On the other hand, the accountability 
framework seems to be broader to the extent that it recognises a relationship between the 
preparers of accounting information and the different groups of users as well as society as 
a whole. Williams (1987) described accountability as “means focused”. Ijiri’s (1983) 
contrast between the accountability and decision usefulness conceptual frameworks has 
been summarized by Coy et al., (2001) and is presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: The Distinction between Accountability and Decision Usefulness 
 Accountability Conceptual Framework Decision Usefulness Framework 
User versus supplier Focus is on the relationship between the 
supplier of accounting information and 
the user of accounting information 
(accountor/accountee). 
Focus is strictly on the user of 
accounting information. 
Fundamental objective 
of accounting system 
Fairness 
The qualitative characteristics are 
technical constraints, which the system 
must satisfy. 
Usefulness 
The qualitative characteristics are 
desirable traits, which require 
trade-offs. 
Key qualitative 
characteristics 
Objectivity, verifiability, and stability Relevance and reliability 
Stability Stability of the accounting system goes 
beyond consistency and comparability. It 
means that even if the accounting system 
is changed, an explicit means of 
reconciliation from one system to the next 
is maintained. Otherwise, the interests of 
one party can be damaged for the benefit 
of the other. 
Consistency and comparability 
imply a level of stability, but there 
is no implication that a means of 
reconciling old and new 
accounting standards be 
maintained. 
Fairness In this context, fairness is judged in 
relation to agreement. Without the agreed 
upon metric, fairness cannot be 
determined. 
Not explicitly considered. Some 
mild echoes of fairness in the 
concept of neutrality or freedom 
from bias. 
Information More information is not necessarily 
better. For example, subjective 
information may be useful to the 
accountee, but damaging to the accountor. 
More information is always 
preferred to less as long as it is 
cost effective. 
Records or reports Focus on both the reports and the records, 
upon which the reports are based. 
Focus on the reports. 
Motivation of accountor Takes into explicit consideration the 
accountor’s desire to present information 
in the best possible light. 
The role of accountor is largely 
ignored. 
Adapted from: Coy et al., (2001, p.5) 
Other distinctions between the accountability and decision usefulness frameworks are 
provided by Gray et al. (1991) who distinguished between the two approaches in many 
aspects. For example, they noted that accounting information within decision-usefulness is 
circulated only between management and financial information users
39
 while within the 
accountability framework, the accounting information is potentially the concern of more 
groups
40
. And, more importantly, accounting information within the decision-usefulness 
                                                 
39
 Accounting information users, according to this theory, are current and potential investors as well as 
creditors. 
40
 Although Gray et al. (1991) indicate that information parties in the accountability framework are the agent 
and the principal, they indicate that the principal within an accountability relationship should not be viewed 
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framework is used only for future decisions while within the accountability framework it is 
used to judge and assess past actions as well as the relationship between accountee and 
accountor. 
Although decision usefulness may be used widely in accounting research, it has been 
claimed that it ignores notions of justice and fairness as Coy et al. (2001) suggest: 
“The decision usefulness paradigm is based on a context of markets, and 
assumes resources will be allocated more efficiently when rational economic 
decisions are facilitated. However, this perspective ignores the simultaneity of 
efficiency and distribution effects. Value judgments about efficiency are, by 
necessity, also value judgments about distribution of resources. Consequently, 
notions of justice and fairness cannot be ignored” (p. 4). 
In the next section the accountability concept and relationships will be addressed and then 
two notions of accountability; narrow and wide notions of accountability will be discussed. 
4.4 Accountability Framework 
Accountability, according to Bovens (2010), as a term could embrace more than one 
meaning; depending on the context in which it is used, he indicated: 
“Anyone studying accountability will soon discover that it can mean many 
different things to many different people” (p. 946). 
According to Day and Klein (1987), accountability is expected to be perceived differently 
in different contexts since it is a social and political process; they believe that 
accountability is mainly concerned about the definition of a certain type of conduct and 
how it is assessed. They indicate: 
“Our starting-point is that accountability is all about the construction of an 
agreed language or currency of discourse about conduct and performance, and 
the criteria that should be used in assessing them” (p. 2). 
Sinclair (1995) stressed the importance of language in shaping accountability 
understanding. For example, an auditor views accountability as a financial matter, whereas 
a politician sees accountability as a political issue. He states that:  
                                                                                                                                                    
as in the agency theory relationship as it could embrace more than one group under the accountability 
framework. 
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"How accountability is defined has changed, underlining the importance of 
language as agent of ideology in shaping understanding. In theoretical 
research, accountability has discipline-specific meanings, for example the 
auditor discusses accountability as if it is a financial or numerical matter, 
political scientists view accountability as a political imperative and legal 
scholars a constitutional arrangement, while philosophers treat accountability 
as a subset of ethics" (Sinclair, 1995, p. 221). 
Accountability is arguably something that everyone should respect. Bovens (2007) asserts 
that accountability is a “gold” concept that everyone agrees with and that it is widely used 
in political discourse since it implies transparency and trustworthiness. He added that it is 
also an “elusive concept” that can mean different things to different people. Similarly, 
Perks (1993) views accountability as something that everyone benefits from; he stated: 
“Accountability sounds like a good thing –something that we can all be in favour of” (p. 
23).  
Stewart (1984) differentiated between three types of accountability namely managerial, 
commercial and public accountability. Managerial accountability exists within an 
organization where an employee could be accountable for his or her duty to the superior 
and vice versa. Commercial accountability refers to management accountability to 
shareholders. Finally there is public accountability which, according to Stewart (1984), 
includes both managerial and commercial accountability. Under this type of accountability 
management is accountable to a large range of stakeholders
41
 
The focus of this study is to examine and recognise the existing accountability process in 
the Libyan Commercial Banks focusing on financial accountability. Laughlin (1990) 
justifies the linkage between finance and accountability based on the importance of finance 
for an organisation and a particular domain. He also justifies it based on the notion that the 
way that finance is accounted for will influence how resources and responsibilities are 
accounted for. 
                                                 
41
 As will be discussed later on this chapter, this type could be referred to as the wide notion of accountability 
in which an agent is accountable to many groups of accountees. 
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Accounting, according to Ijiri (1983), is "a business diary", a diary that businessmen keep 
for the use of others. However, this does not mean that they will not benefit from keeping 
this record. Managers are required by law to maintain records and provide information to 
others. This implies an "accountability relationship" between managers and others by 
which managers are obliged to account for their actions to others. An accountability 
relationship implies a relation between two parties
42
: the "accountor" who is required to 
provide accounting information to the "accountee" who receives this accounting 
information. According to Ijiri (1983) accountability entails certain rights to both 
accountor and accountee. These rights are governed by accounting which assures that 
accounting information flows to the accountee in a way which is timely and accurate. On 
the other hand, the accountor is also protected as accounting requires a certain level of 
disclosure and determines what financial statements should and should not be disclosed. In 
other words, under the accountability framework the accountee has the right to know 
(receive information) and the accountor has the right to "protect privacy" (Ijiri, 1983). 
4.4.1 Accountability Concept and Relationships 
The accountability concept, according to Laffan (2003), relies on a combination of 
appropriate structures and procedures in the conduct of public business. In the accounting 
context, accountability, as a concept, according to Bovens (2007) is connected to 
accounting and more specifically to bookkeeping and this attached meaning has a historical 
justification
43
.  
                                                 
42
In between, according to Ijiri (1983), comes the accountant as a third party, this is because the accountant is 
responsible for preparing the information that flows from the first party to the second. He further claims that 
an agreement between these three parties is essential under the accountability framework so that a proper 
information system can be performed. This agreement implies that the accountee needs and wants to possess 
the information, the accountor  is prepared to provide this information, and, finally, the accountant is braced 
for providing this information in an "objective and verifiable manner" using two basic tools that are records 
and reports. These two tools are governed by the "conceptual framework of accounting" (Ijiri, 1983). 
43
 “Historically and semantically, it is [accountability] closely related to accounting, in its literal sense of 
bookkeeping. According to Dubnick, the roots of the contemporary concept can be traced to the reign of 
William I ... required all the property holders in his realm to render a count of what they possessed. … this 
had evolved into a highly centralised administrative kingship that was ruled through centralised auditing and 
semi-annual account giving” (Bovens, 2007, p. 448). 
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Coy et al., (2001), who perceived accountability and stewardship as identical, believe that 
accountability is an outcome of the separation of ownership from management. They 
indicate: 
“Accountability, or stewardship, as a modern concept may be traced to the 
separation of ownership from management in business organisations, and is 
linked to the notions of stewardship, whereby managers provide an account to 
owners. The development of joint stock companies and limited liability 
expanded the need for accountability in the business sector” (p. 7). 
The relationship between accounting and accountability is indicated by Gray (1983) as 
follows: 
“Accountability is a concept which is generally underdeveloped in the 
accounting literature. As a result it is frequently misused, and commonly 
taken as synonymous with external financial reporting or financial 
accounting. Accountability is, however, a very ‘rich’ concept and its 
relationship with ‘accounting’ is rather more complex than is generally 
recognized in the literature” (p. 4). 
Another issue related to the term “accountability” was indicated by Bovens (2007); that is 
the translation of the term into other languages. He indicates that accountability as a term 
does not exist in French, Portuguese, Spanish, German, Dutch or Japanese languages and, 
moreover, they do not distinguish between accountability and responsibility. The Arabic 
language seems to not have an equivalent word to accountability. The translation of 
‘responsibility’ is commonly used to refer to this term44.   
Bovens (2010) describes accountability as “an icon for good governance”45. He points out 
that it has become a general term that implies “any mechanism that makes powerful 
institutions responsive to their particular publics” (p. 947).  
To Gray (1992) accountability is basically concerned with "the right to receive information 
and the duty to supply it" (p. 413). In an extended discussion, accountability has been 
                                                 
44
 Bovens (2010), pointed out that “accountability is used as a synonym for many loosely defined political 
desiderata, such as good governance, transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, 
responsibility, and integrity” (p. 946). 
45
 In the USA, accountability is interchangeably used with “good governance or virtuous behaviour” 
(Bovens, 2007, p. 449). 
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succinctly defined by Gray et al. (1996) as "the duty to provide an account (by no means 
necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held 
responsible" (p.38).  
Accountability thus implies two "responsibilities or duties". First the accountor is 
responsible for performing a duty and then is responsible to account for that duty to whom 
he or she is responsible, the accountee (Gray et al, 1996). However, Cooper and Owen 
(2007, p. 653) noted a shortfall in the accountability definition given by Gray et al. (1996). 
The issues of “effective utilization of information” and “associated power differentials” 
have not been addressed. They suggest for an accountability to be achieved that the 
accountee (stakeholders) should be given the power to hold the accountor to account. They 
argue that stakeholder accountability can be enhanced by empowerment.  
Another definition given by Gray and Jenkins (1993) holds a similar perspective; they 
define accountability as "an obligation to present an account of, and answer for, the 
execution of responsibilities to those who have entrusted those responsibilities" (p.55). 
Accountability has been also defined by Bovens (2007) as a: 
“Relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences” (p. 450). 
If accountability were to be discussed within the business discourse, one could refer to 
Perks (1993)’, definition which indicates that: 
“Accountability as a concept may be traced to the separation of ownership 
from management in business organizations and is related to the concept of 
stewardship whereby managers provide an account to owners” (p. 24). 
An accountability framework is seen to imply justification and explanation of what an 
accountor has done. It also implies that accountability has to be discharged. Jackson (1982) 
views accountability as follows: 
“Basically, accountability involves explaining or justifying what has been 
done, what is currently being done and what has been planned. Accountability 
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arises from a set of established procedures and relationships of varying 
formality. Thus, one party is accountable to another in the sense that one of 
the parties has the right to call upon the other to give an account of his 
activities. Accountability involves, therefore, the giving of information” (p. 
220). 
Giving information in the above definition refers to discharging accountability which is 
considered as the end point of an accountability relationship. In Stewart’s (1984) words, an 
accountability relationship ends by providing an account (i.e. information). He describes 
the accountability relationship, as “involving both the account and the holding to account” 
(p. 16). Some scholars view an accountability relationship as mainly to provide an account. 
For example, Swift (2001) stated that “essentially accountability is about the provision of 
information…” (p. 17). Also Gray et al. (1997) offered this statement: “[s]imply stated, 
accountability is the duty to provide an account of the actions for which one is held 
responsible” (p. 334). Fitting the notion of providing an account in the accounting context, 
one could infer that providing accounting information represents a way for accountors to 
discharge their accountability to accountees. 
In other words, financial information is perceived as a way to discharge accountability 
(Gray et al., 1996). Hopwood (1990) considers the annual report as the major tool by which 
accountability can be discharged. However, conventional financial reporting might not be 
regarded as a satisfactory way to discharge one’s accountability, Normanton (1966) 
suggests: 
“To be accountable means, as any dictionary will confirm, to give reasons for 
and explanations of what one does. But a certified financial account rarely 
provides explanations, and it never gives reasons. It does not as a rule even 
contain much detail of what actually has been done... A financial account on 
any large scale hides far more than it reveals” (p. 1). 
Tower (1993) acknowledges that the annual report of a corporate entity is the main tool by 
which a business enterprise can communicate with its stakeholders but the question of what 
such a report would contain, according to him, still remains. Providing better financial and 
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non-financial information may help in this regard. He also suggests joint work on 
stakeholders, producers, and regulators to determine the “equilibrium level” of information. 
Stewart (1984) suggests different bases for accountability that an accountor would be 
accountable for. These bases can summarized in two aspects; first that in respect of the 
funds with which the accountor was entrusted; here the accountor will be required to prove 
that funds have been expensed efficiently as planned and in a proper way, which Stewart 
referred to as “accountability for probity”. Second, the accountor has to prove that he/she 
has acted legally and that entrusted powers have been exercised within appropriate laws 
and regulations; also the accountor is accountable for “good administration” and for not 
exercising practices that lead to injustice (Stewart, 1984). Based on these categories, 
Stewart has introduced what he called a “ladder of accountability” in which different levels 
of accountability are identified, as shown in Figure 4.1. The lowest level of accountability, 
according to Stewart’s ladder, is accountability for probity and legality which means the 
accountor is held accountable for misconduct with either entrusted funds or power. The 
next level refers to the procedures taken by the accountor to ensure the exercise of 
accountability, in other words, both accountor and accountee can easily exercise their 
rights
46
. Performance accountability and programme accountability are concerned with 
whether the accountability system produces the required information. Both levels are 
concerned with whether accountability has achieved its targets in terms of the accountor’s 
role. Finally at the top of the ladder comes policy accountability which complements both 
performance and programme accountability in that it ensures that the accountor has taken 
into consideration the system requirements when conducting his/her responsibility (Perks, 
1993). 
 
 
                                                 
46
 The right to protect privacy for the accountor when exercising his responsibility to give an account, and the 
right of the accountee to receive an account. 
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Figure 4.1: Accountability Ladder 
   
 Policy  Accountability  
 Programme  Accountability  
 Performance Accountability  
 Process Accountability  
 Accountability for  Probity 
and Legality 
 
   
Source: adapted from Stewart (1984). 
Within an accountability framework there is a need to distinguish between: "legal and non-
legal; or moral or natural, rights and responsibilities" (Gray et al. 1996, p. 39). Most 
obvious rights and responsibilities are determined by law and are considered the lowest 
level of rights and responsibilities that, according to the accountability framework, the 
accountor has to fulfill. 
In the following section a differentiation between two notions of accountability will be 
illustrated, namely narrow and wide notions of accountability. 
4.4.2 The Notion of “Narrow” Accountability (Shareholders) 
A narrow definition of accountability implies the existence of an explicit contract between 
two parties (accountor and accountee)
47
. Swift (2001) suggested a contract is essential in 
the (narrow) accountability relationship and that without it there will be no accountability. 
She stated that:  
“Narrow definitions conceive of accountability as being pertinent to 
contractual arrangements only, asserting that where accountability is not 
contractually bound there can be no act of accountability” (p. 17). 
                                                 
47
 A contract, or in the words of Gray et al. (1996), an accountability relationship, can be defined by society. 
In the case of the narrow notion of accountability, the contract can be defined by the Companies Acts (Gray 
et al., 1996). 
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A simple example to illustrate the narrow notion of the accountability relationship is given 
by Gray et al. (1996). Consider a company's directors and shareholders. Directors 
(accountors) have the duty to look after shareholder's (accountee’s) resources either 
financial or non-financial (managing the company). They are also responsible for 
providing an account for their mission (i.e. to prepare and provide financial statements). In 
this simple example, the accountor takes on the responsibility to undertake the 
management and is responsible for delivering or discharging accountability by preparing 
and submitting the financial statements. The responsibility to discharge accountability is of 
great importance and represents the essence of accountability overall. Perks (1993) for 
example, states that: "accountability means the obligation to give an account" (p. 23).  For 
Swift (2001) the accountability is basically “about the provision of information between 
two parties…” (p. 17).  
It is argued that in order to understand accountability in a specific situation four questions 
have to be answered; “(1) who is accountable (2) to whom, (3) how (by what means) and 
(4) for what?” (Perks, 1993, p. 24). In the narrow notion of accountability managers are 
accountable for the funds they are entrusted with by shareholders. They discharge their 
accountability by providing accounting information, although Gray et al. (1996) suggest 
that the discharge of accountability may not, and arguably should not, be only through 
financial information as managers could and should use narrative accounting as a means to 
discharge such information. The accountability relationship can be illustrated simply as 
shown in Figure (4.2). 
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Figure 4.2: The Accountability Relationship 
 
 
Source: Gray et al. (1996, p. 39). 
According to Swift (2001) the accountability relationship between two parties is usually 
represented in the form of a principal-agent relationship and a lot of accountability 
definitions support the notion that the accountability relationship is derived from agency 
theory
48
. She stated:  
“These definitions underpinning the accountability framework are rooted in 
economic agency theory which asserts that agents are prey to opportunism if 
they remain unchecked by regulation or other social controls imposed by 
society” (p. 17).  
Under the principal-agent framework there is a contractual relationship between the two 
parties and the question of whether this relationship needs to be explicit or implicit can be 
a controversial issue raising the question of whether an organisation has an implied 
contractual relationship with society and as a consequence has to provide an account for its 
actions to society (Swift, 2001). The traditional view of the narrow notion of accountability 
has been expanded to cover parties from outside the organization. The next section will 
discuss the wide notion of accountability. To Perks (1993), the accountability relationship 
is an extension to agency theory. He indicated: 
                                                 
48
 However, Gray et al. (1996) emphasise the importance of distinguishing between an accountability 
relationship between a principal and an agent and Agency Theory which makes explicit assumptions about 
the purely self-interested motivations of the parties to the relationship. 
Accountee 
(Principal) 
 
Accountor 
(Agent) 
Actions 
 Instructions about 
actions 
 Reward 
 Power 
Information 
about actions 
 
Contractual 
Relationship  
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“In the 1970s and 1980s it became fashionable to describe this accountability 
relationship in terms of ‘agency theory’… But the relationship implies much 
more: shareholders expect not only that good care will be taken of their 
money, but also that the company will be profitable and perhaps ‘efficient’ 
and ‘effective’” (p. 24). 
 
4.4.3 The Notion of “Wider” Accountability (Stakeholders) 
Accountability has recently been extended to include stakeholders other than only financial 
investors. According to Connolly and Dhanani (2013): 
“More recently, a second strand of literature which emphasizes the 
accountability paradigm as the basis for organisational reporting has come to 
the fore. This paradigm recognises the social, political and wider economic 
interests of reporting organisations and acknowledges stakeholders other than 
the financial investor. It is centred on relationships between a wide variety of 
stakeholders, some of these giving accounts of their behaviour and others 
receiving or judging those accounts” (p. 3).  
This extension may be due to the influence that organisations have on the other 
stakeholders. “If institutions affect the lives of others, so the argument goes, they 
[organisations] should be accountable to them [others]” (Steets, 2010, p. 41). Gallhofer and 
Haslam (1993) argue that an accountability relationship has wider scope than is depicted 
by an agency-principal relationship. They claim: 
“Accountability is not so much about holding responsible and judging 
behavior; nor does it assume a simple agency-principal relation… 
accountability appears equivalent to the ability to render accounts conducive 
to well-being” (p. 326). 
An accountability relationship, according to Ijiri (1983), could be in and/or out of the 
organisation. In a simple example as shown above (Figure 4.2), this relation could appear 
between management (accountor) and shareholders (accountee). The accountee group may 
include, in addition to shareholders, creditors, suppliers, customers, or wider society. An 
accountability relationship despite its simplest model representing only a two-way 
relationship between an accountee and an accountor according to Gray et al. (1996) is also 
more flexible. An accountability relationship exists between employees and management, 
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which, according to Stewart (1984), can be referred to as managerial accountability by 
which employees are accountor to the management in respect of performing their duties 
meanwhile management are accountor to employees in respect of offering them a healthy 
and safe work place (Gray et al. 1996). 
Perks (1993) claimed that the concept of accountability could be the consequence of the 
separation between management and ownership. He stated that: "the accounting model of 
accountability is based on the idea that, in companies, the owners (or shareholders) are 
separate from the managers…" (p. 25). He also believed that accountability is a good thing 
that everyone can benefit from. He added: 
"For simplicity the concept of accountability will be introduced as if there are 
only two parties involved: directors may be accountable to shareholders, 
politicians to the electorate, secretaries to managers, or children to parents. In 
practice, individuals and organizations may be accountable to a number of 
different parties. Accountability means the obligation to give an account. The 
extent to which the form and content of that account is defined will vary from 
one relationship to another" (p. 23). 
The wider view of accountability, according to Perks (1993), is that companies are 
accountable to various groups in society, rather than to only shareholders or perhaps the 
creditors in the narrow notion, and also that they are accountable in respect of different 
issues besides the financial position and performance e.g. reporting about social and 
economic issues of the company’s performance which is called corporate social reporting 
(CSR)
49
. 
Corporate accountability has developed from the narrow notion to the wide notion, and this 
expansion of corporate accountability was mainly due to the growing perception that 
companies working within a society have power (Tower, 1993). Table 4.2 shows the 
transformation of corporate accountability from the narrow notion to the wide notion. 
  
                                                 
49
 “CSR” has been used in the literature to refer to corporate social reporting but in recent years the 
abbreviation “CSR” is more commonly used to refer to corporate social responsibility. 
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Table 4.2: The Growth in Corporate Accountability 
Company 
managers 
Approximate time periods 
Pre-1930s 1930s-1960s Post-1960s 
Accountable to: Shareholders 
Shareholders, Employees, 
Creditors, Customers, 
Government (Stakeholders) 
Shareholders, 
Employees, Creditors, 
Customers, Government, 
General public (Society 
at large) 
Accountable for: 
Honest, authorized use of 
funds 
Honest, authorized, efficient 
and effective use of funds 
Honest, authorized, 
efficient and effective 
use of funds and socially 
responsible behavior 
Adapted from: Tower (1993, p. 67). 
Although accountability is generally seen as beneficial, not all people would view it in the 
same way. It depends, according to Perks (1993), on the position of the viewer, whether 
principal or agent. He outlined: 
“Whether or not we are in favour of increased accountability is likely to 
depend on whether we see ourselves as being the Principal or the Agent in a 
particular relationship. We are likely to favour increased accountability if we 
think of ourselves representing society; that we are the Principals; and that 
powerful individuals (whether politicians, directors, trade union bosses or 
university vice chancellors) should be more accountable to us. But if we see 
ourselves as being the Agent (accountable to our boss, parents, electorate or 
the public) we are less likely to favour any effective system of accountability 
that restricts our freedom of action” (p. 24).  
Considering the restriction that an agent might suffer to their freedom in an accountability 
relationship Coy et al. (2001) suggest that the accountor seeks ways to avoid such a 
constraint; they indicated that: 
“Accountability may be related to power relationships between accountors 
and accountees within organizations, and in society as a whole. More 
accountability may limit the freedom of agents to act, and as a consequence, 
they may seek ways to subvert, bypass, and control accountability systems 
that may be imposed on them. Agents generally control the preparation of 
accountability information reported to principals, and this provides 
opportunities for massaging, which may exaggerate strengths and understate 
weaknesses” (p. 8). 
Another limitation to the wider notion of accountability is that the majority of stakeholders 
would not be able to access the financial information of the firm as they do not possess the 
legal right for such a procedure. 
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4.4.4 Accountability Elements of the Libyan Commercial Banks 
Perks (1993) provides a number of elements for an accountability system to perform 
effectively: production of financial information; the audit of accounting information; and 
the publishing of accounting information. The operating commercial banks in Libya are 
required by commercial law as well as banking law to prepare and publish their financial 
statements (see Chapter 2). According to Article (226) of the Libyan Commercial Law, 
boards of directors of the company have to prepare the financial statements of the company 
along with notes to them. They are also required to submit a report highlighting the 
company's activity during the period. Moreover, listed banks have to prepare their accounts 
according to International Financial Reporting Standards (Kribat, 2009). 
The second element of accountability of Perks (1993) is the audit of accounting 
information. He believes that audited accounting information serves users better than 
unaudited information. The external audit function starts when the accounting process is 
completed; it represents the second stage in the process of holding those responsible for the 
management of an organisation’s finances accountable (White and Hollingsworth, 1999). 
Literature suggests that the external audit process has become an important factor within 
the accountability system based on the nature of the audit process
50
. Moreover, it is argued 
that auditing activities are the direct result of the need for accountability; “accountability is 
the raison d’etre of auditing activities” (Gong, 2009, p. 5). He concluded that “audits are 
able to curtail the [misuse of power] by enhancing monitoring and supervision” (p. 6). 
Therefore, it can be argued that the audit profession should be enhanced given its 
important role in terms of accountability. Audit, according to White and Hollingsworth 
(1999), “provides professionally structured and independent information to a variety of 
actors in the accountability [process]” (p. 9). In this regard, Gong (2009), points out that a 
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 Some scholars, according to Gong (2009), argue that “auditing has strong anticorruption functions” due to 
the nature of audit work that is dealing with financial accounts,  which puts the auditors in a position enabling 
them to uncover potentially illegal or immoral behaviour. 
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poor audit system “can leave the door open for irregular and illegal financial behaviors” (p. 
6). In this context, Laffan (2003) suggests that financial accountability requires external 
auditing; she added that accountability is enhanced by the practice of audit in a 
professional manner as well as by reporting the audits’ findings. 
Article (18) of the Libyan Commercial Law requires every company to appoint a licensed 
auditor to audit its accounts while Article (209) states that an auditor has to issue an 
auditor's report embodying his opinion on a company's accounting affairs; this report has to 
assert the auditor’s opinion as to whether a company's accounts are faithfully presented and 
comply with the law. The auditor's opinion also has to refer to whether accounts have been 
prepared according to the approved accounting standards
51
.  In terms of commercial banks, 
Banks Law requires that every bank’s accounts have to be certified by two external 
auditors. 
It is suggested that external auditors as well as published financial statements are regarded 
as part of the mechanism to monitor and control management’s actions (Benston, 1982). 
The third element identified by Perks (1993) is the publication of accounting information. 
For accountability to be discharged, accounting information has to be communicated to 
stakeholders.  According to Laffan (2003), accountability is promoted by the publication of 
the information. As discussed above, the commercial law requires a company to prepare 
and publish its financial statements; Article (227) indicates the items which a balance sheet 
of a company has to include (see Chapter 2.3.3.1) 
Although the above elements are basically required to ensure an effective accountability 
system, Perks (1993) acknowledges that in the real world, accountability is often less than 
predicted. Therefore, a complete and effective accountability process cannot be assumed in 
Libya.  
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 The law has not defined what approved accounting standards are. 
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4.5 Theoretical Framework for this Study 
Adopting a theoretical framework, as discussed earlier in this chapter, can help the 
research in a number of ways e.g. in explaining how and why a phenomenon is incurred, 
and how effective it is. Generally speaking, the accountability framework is believed to be 
an appropriate framework in research that deals with financial statements. Gray et al. 
(1996) pointed out that “the accountability framework is the most useful one for analyzing 
accounting information transmission in general" (p. 32).  
This study adopts an accountability based framework. In theory, it describes and matches 
the relationship between managers and shareholders in the narrow notion, and between 
managers and society at large in the wide notion. According to the wide notion of 
accountability, accounting information is used by a wide range of groups i.e. current and 
potential investors, auditors, regulators…etc, the wide notion also holds that not only 
financial information would be communicated to these groups
52
. The accountability 
perspective can be based on the assumption that both accountor and accountee have a 
conflict of interests. Therefore, it is predicted, according to the accountability theory that 
both accountor and accountee would try to maximize their own benefits. Chwastiak (1999) 
argues that “[a]ccording to principal-agent theorists, all human behavior is rooted in self-
interest” (p. 431). In a relatively similar vein, Swift (2001) stated: 
“In the accountability paradigm, the agent or organisation’s management 
cannot be trusted to provide information which may best serve stakeholder 
interests because he or she will inevitably resort to opportunism to promote 
the organisation’s best interests, i.e. those of management or shareholders” (p. 
18). 
In terms of the earnings management issue, the accountor may be motivated to engage in 
earnings management practices to ensure maximisation of his/her benefit and the 
accountee would adopt a mechanism to monitor the accountor’s performance through the 
external audit function. Therefore, the accountability framework can be well suited for 
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 Social information as well as economic information may be communicated (Perks, 1993). 
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organizations whose services affect many stakeholders who may have both financial and 
non-financial interests in the organization, in other words, public accountability (Perks, 
1993), as is the case with Libyan Commercial Banks
53
.  
The accountability framework, [as proposed by principal-agent theorists] is deemed to be 
the proper one to cover this study's objectives as on one hand it conceptually matches well 
the relationships between a bank’s managers and other stakeholders. On the other hand, 
research findings may be interpreted from the accountability perceptive i.e. recognising the 
consequences that earnings management practices may have on the accountability system. 
One of the ways in which accountability is used in the academic context, according to 
Bovens (2010), is as a “normative concept” to evaluate the actor’s behavior. He indicated: 
“Accountability is often used as a normative concept, as a set of standards for 
the evaluation of the behavior of public actors. Accountability, or more 
precisely ‘being accountable’, is seen as a virtue, as a positive quality of 
organisations or officials. Hence, accountability studies often focus on 
normative issues, on the standards for, and the assessment of, the actual and 
active behavior of public agents” (p. 947). 
This perspective fits well with this thesis's topic; earnings management, which refers to 
management intervention in the process of preparing and reporting accounting information 
which might be biased given the underlying motivations of earnings management 
behaviour. Tower (1993) recommends, in order to clarify the accountability relationship, 
asking to whom accountability is owed. One of the research objectives of this thesis is 
identifying the stakeholders of the Libyan Commercial Banks according to various 
perceptions. 
Moreover, it is suggested that accountability issues have some ethical and moral aspects as 
well as technical features that affect the trust needed in the accountability relationship 
(Gong, 2009). Therefore, an accountability framework will be used to interpret the 
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 Public accountability, according to Perks (1993), is applicable to any entity that is responsible to the 
public. Needless to say, many groups (stakeholders) are or would be affected by commercial banks’ activities 
and performance i.e employees, clients and wider society. As noted in Chapter 1, the recent financial crisis 
which has had far reaching effects socially in many countries clearly exemplifies this point. 
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stakeholders’ perceptions regarding the ethics of earnings management. If earnings 
management is regarded as unethical, for example, then one can judge about accountability 
as being compromised when it is acknowledged, or believed to be the case, that earnings 
management practices have been conducted. 
Based on the above discussion and taking into consideration the objectives of this study, 
the accountability framework properly meets this thesis's objectives.  
4.6 Summary 
Accountability relationship implies an accountor to provide an account to the accountee in 
order to discharge his/her accountability, within accountability; the aim is to restrict the 
accountor from misusing the power that could affect others’ interest. This chapter provides 
a context within which to understand the accountability framework and its relationships.  
First, section 4.2 considered the theory definition and its importance in accounting 
research. Section 4.3 outlined the conceptual frameworks of accounting as suggested by 
Ijiri (1983) that are accountability and decision usefulness; it also examined the distinction 
between these two theoretical frameworks. Section 4.4 examined the accountability 
framework; the accountability concept was discussed and defined and two notions of 
accountability were outlined. Section 4.5 justified the accountability conceptual framework 
for this study. In the next chapter the study’s methodology and methods are discussed. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Methodology and Methods 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the theoretical framework of this study. The study 
methodology as well as the adopted methods to carry out the empirical work of this study 
will be discussed in this chapter. Alternative methodological frameworks that are extant in 
the literature will be outlined. Then this study’s methodology, methods and paradigm will 
be explained.  
5.2 Social Research Philosophy and Approaches 
The literature offers numerous definitions for research. For example, Goddard and Melville 
(2001) perceive research as the “discovery and the creation of knowledge”. They argue that 
“[e]verything we now know had to be discovered by someone at some time”. They 
outlined the significance of pursuing research by suggesting that without it one could be 
“naked, homeless and penniless…” (p. 1). To Burns (2000) research is a “systematic 
investigation to find answers to a problem” (p. 2). In the context of social research, 
including accounting
54, Williams (2003) defined it as “the means by which social scientists 
understand, explain and predict the social world” (p. 1). Sarantakos (2005) considered that 
social research is about “discovery, expanding the horizons of the known, confidence, new 
ideas and new conclusions about all aspects of life”. He noticed that social research itself 
has become the main objective for the social scientist. He stated: 
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 Research in accounting is social science research, Ryan et al., (2002) claim that “[r]esearch in accounting 
and finance is generally accepted as being social scientific, as appropriate standards of scientific enquiry are 
applied to social issues rather than natural phenomena, which is taken to be the domain of the natural 
sciences and of physics in particular” (p. 9). 
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“As the quest for knowledge, social research has been the ultimate goal of the 
social scientist, who basically seeks not only to gather useful and valid 
knowledge, but also to educate the community about the status and validity of 
certain ‘source’ of knowledge” (p. 4). 
Rugg and Petre (2007) advocate that research leads to something new and in this context 
they distinguish between two types of research; primary research by which the findings are 
new to everyone and secondary research in which findings are not necessarily new to 
everyone but are actually new to the researcher. 
Social researchers, according to Sarantakos (2005), may be motivated for a number of 
reasons including: educational and institutional. Educational motivation suggests that a 
social researcher is conducting the research for the purpose of education and informing the 
public about the social problem or issue. On the other hand, institutional motivation 
denotes a researcher’s determination to “enhance the research quantum of the institution 
for which the researcher works” (p. 13).  Scanlon (2000) classified the purpose of research 
into three main categories: (a) to contribute to a specific field or knowledge; (b) to 
contribute to a debate or inform policy; and (c) to examine a particular problem or issue (p. 
2). He claims that research could be carried out in order to satisfy one or more of the above 
purposes as they are not mutually exclusive. 
According to Kumar (2005), the process of research implies that the research is conducted 
“within a framework of a set of philosophies” (p. 6). He also pointed out that research 
should be objective and unbiased and, in order to achieve its goals, a researcher should be 
using “procedures, methods and techniques that have been tested for their validity and 
reliability” (p. 6). Kumar has defined research as “a process for collecting, analysing and 
interpreting information to answer questions” (p. 7). Collis and Hussey (2009) summarize 
the research process as shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
115 
Figure 5.1: The Research Process 
 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2009, p. 10). 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2002), understanding the philosophical research issues 
is of great importance to the researcher for at least three reasons. First, understanding these 
issues would help the researcher to better design the research; for example, it helps in 
deciding what evidence is to be collected and from where; it also enhances the researcher’s 
ability to interpret it. Second, it puts the researcher in a position so as he/she is able to 
decide whether a research design works or not. Third, by understanding these issues the 
researcher will be able to identify any research design that he/she is capable of; it can, 
according to Esaterby-Smith et al. (2002), help the researcher to: 
“Identify, and even create, designs that may be outside his or her past 
experience. And it may also suggest how to adapt research designs according 
to the constraints of different subject or knowledge structures” (p.27). 
The literature documents two main approaches that form the basis of research in the social 
sciences. Before the 1960s there was only one approach for social science research; that 
was the traditional scientific approach which employs quantitative methods for data 
collection and which can also be described as an objective or quantitative approach. Since 
Write the dissertation, thesis or research 
report 
Analyse and interpret the research data 
Collect the research data 
Design the research and write the proposal 
Review the literature and define the 
research problem/ research question 
Choose a topic and search the literature 
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the 1960s social science research established a new approach namely the qualitative or 
subjective approach to carry out research using qualitative methods for data collection 
(Burns, 2000; Kumar, 2005; Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
Collis and Hussey (2009) define the research approach as the “philosophical framework 
that guides how scientific research should be conducted” (p. 55). According to Collis and 
Hussey (2009) there is only one research approach, that is, positivism, which is referred to 
in the natural sciences. After the emergence of social science the second paradigm existed 
which is called “social science”. These two main approaches are shown in the Figure 5.2. 
Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggest that research philosophy implies how to study the world. 
Figure 5.2: A Continuum of Approaches 
 
 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2009, p. 57) 
The positivism approach, according to Collis and Hussey (2009), “rests on the assumption 
that social reality is singular and objective, and is not affected by the act of investigation” 
(p. 56). On the other hand, the interpretivism approach “rests on the assumption that social 
reality is in our minds, and is subjective and multiple” (p. 57). Other terms can be used to 
describe the above approaches. Table 5.1 shows these terms. 
Table 5.1: Research Approaches 
The two main approaches for social research 
Positivism Interpretivism 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Objective Subjective 
Scientific Humanities 
Traditionalist Phenomenological 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2009, p. 58) 
These two approaches are different in terms of philosophical assumptions that support 
modes of inquiry, methods, models and procedures
55
 (Kumar, 2005, Collis and Hussey, 
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 Creswell (2003, 2009), classifies research approaches as; qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods. He 
argues that there is not, in today’s research, a pure neither quantitative nor qualitative research rather than a 
Positivism Interpretivism
mm 
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2009). Although, the two main research approaches -quantitative (positivism) and 
qualitative (interpretivism)- may have a similar process, they are different in terms of 
methods, data analysis and the “style of communication of the findings” (Kumar, 2005, p. 
17). Kumar (2005) outlined the distinctions between the two main research approaches. 
Table 5.2: Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Difference with respect to: Quantitative research Qualitative research 
Underpinning philosophy 
Rationalism: ‘That human beings 
achieve knowledge because of their 
capacity to reason’ (Bernard 1994: 
2) 
Empiricism: ‘The only knowledge 
that human beings acquire is from 
sensory experience’ (Bernard 1994: 
2) 
Approach to inquiry 
Structured/rigid/ predetermined 
methodology 
Unstructured/flexible/open 
methodology 
Main purpose of investigation 
To quantify extent of variation in a 
phenomenon, situation, issue etc. 
To describe variation in a 
phenomenon, situation, issue etc. 
Measurement of variables 
Emphasis on some form of either 
measurement or classification of 
variables 
Emphasis on description of 
variables 
Sample size Emphasis on greater sample size Fewer cases 
Focus of inquiry 
Narrows focus in terms of extent of 
inquiry, but assembles required 
information from a greater number 
of respondents 
Covers multiple issues but 
assembles required information 
from fewer respondents 
Dominant research value 
Reliability and objectivity (value-
free) 
Authenticity but does not claim to 
be value-free 
Dominant research topic 
Explains prevalence, incidence, 
extent, nature of issues, opinions 
and attitudes; discovers regularities 
and formulates theories 
Explore experiences, meanings, 
perceptions and feelings 
Analysis of data 
Subjects variables to frequency 
distribution, cross-tabulations or 
other statistical procedures 
Subjects responses, narratives or 
observation data to identification of 
themes and describes these 
Communication of findings 
Organisation more analytical in 
nature, drawing inferences and 
conclusion, and testing magnitude 
and strength of a relationship 
Organisation more descriptive and 
narrative in nature 
Source: Kumar (2005, pp. 17-18). 
The philosophical assumptions that underpin the above two paradigms are ontology, 
epistemology and human nature. Once a researcher has determined the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions for the research based on his/her human nature he/she should 
be able to decide about the methodology to be applied in the research (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). These assumptions are discussed in the next section. 
                                                                                                                                                    
combination of the two. He indicates: “The situation today is less quantitative versus qualitative and more 
how research practices lie somewhere on a continuum between the two. The best that can be said is that 
studies tend to be more quantitative or qualitative in nature” (2003, p.4). As for the mixed approach, he 
claims that it is “an approach to inquiry that Combines or associates both qualitative and quantitative forms” 
(2009, p. 4). This approach, according to Creswell (2009), is based on the mixing of both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in a study. 
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5.3 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
Under the two dimensions of approaches to carry out social science research (namely 
subjectivist and objectivist approaches) Burrell and Morgan (1979) classified four 
categories of philosophical assumptions: ontology, epistemology, human nature and 
methodology. Figure 5.3 demonstrates the Burrell and Morgan (1979) classification. 
Figure 5.3: The Subjective-Objective Dimensions 
 
The 
subjectivist 
approach to 
social science 
   The objectivist 
approach to 
social science 
Nominalism 
 
ontology 
 
Realism 
     
Anti-positivism 
 
epistemology 
 
Positivism 
     
Voluntarism 
 
human nature 
 
Determinism 
     
Ideographic 
 
methodology 
 
Nomothetic 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3). 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979) philosophical assumptions will be viewed 
differently under these two approaches. Grix (2004) considers ontology as the starting 
point of all research for which, once identified, the epistemological and methodological 
assumptions become clear and “logically follow” (p. 59). 
Collis and Hussey (2009) indicate that the ontological assumption is about dealing with the 
nature of reality and they note that these assumptions are viewed differently according to 
the research paradigm. They conclude that positivists (the objective approach) consider 
that reality is “objective and external to the researcher” (p. 59) and as a consequence there 
will be “only one reality”. Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that social scientists are faced 
with the question of whether reality (the issue that is under investigation) is separated from 
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the individual and exists as an object in the world or whether reality is constructed in the 
individual’s mind. Ryan et al. (2002) indicate that the ontology assumption rests on the 
study of existence; in other words on how researchers perceive that reality is constructed. 
“Reality is a difficult concept but is concerned with the construction of existence in 
objects” (p. 13). Moses and Knutsen (2007, p. 5) define ontology as “the study of being” 
which is based on the question “What is the world really made of?” Based on this notion, 
ontology could be described either as realism or idealism. Under the objective approach the 
ontological assumption would be realism which means “social reality is objective and 
external to the individual”. Realism simply reflects the rational view that reality is 
“independent of our perception” (Ryan et al., 2002).  On the other hand, interpretivist 
(subjectivist) researchers perceive reality as subjective and socially constructed. Reality, 
according to Sarantakos (2005, p. 41), exists in people’s mind and “each person constructs 
his/her own reality, which is therefore subjective”. As a consequence of people having 
different perceptions there would be as many realities as people. 
Subjectivism, according to Burns (2000, p. 3), recognises ontology as idealism and the 
social reality is then considered as “a creation of individual consciousness”. Walliman 
(2005) compared the realism and idealism ontological assumptions: realism assumes that 
“the world exists and is knowable as it really is”; organisations are regarded as real objects 
“with a life of their own”. According to the idealism perspective, the world does exist but 
is interpreted by different people in different ways as “different people construe it in very 
different ways”.  In contrast to realism, the idealism perspective considers organisations as 
a social reality (p. 205). In this regard, Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that realism 
assumes that the social world is "external to individual cognition" and exists separately 
from an individual's perception. They consider the social world as absolutely made up of 
physical components and as a "reality of its own" (p. 4). In contrast, the nominalism 
(idealism) position views the social world as being constructed only by nothing but 
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"names, concepts and labels". They further describe these names as "artificial creations" 
that could be used to describe reality only in accordance with nominalists' convenience. 
Related to the ontological assumption is the epistemological assumption. Epistemology 
rests on the idea of how can individuals understand the world and communicate this 
understanding to other people. Gribch (2007) explains that the origin of the term 
“epistemology” comes from the Greek language and consists of two words; episteme 
which means knowledge and logos which means theory. She added that epistemological 
assumptions concern the nature of evidence and therefore what is accepted to be truth and 
how it is constructed? Other questions taking place in social research are related to 
ontological assumptions about the nature of the social world and reality. In this context, 
questions of “what do we know? and how can we know this? are important. (Gribch, 
2007). The epistemological assumption, according to Collis and Hussey (2009), is 
“concerned with what we accept as valid knowledge” (p. 59). They demonstrate that 
positivist (objectivist) researchers consider phenomena as valid knowledge only when it 
can be observed and measured. In this context, Sarantakos (2005, p. 30) suggests that the 
“[o]ntological, epistemological and methodological prescriptions of social research are 
‘packaged’ in paradigms (approaches) which guide everyday research”. He also claimed 
that “realist/objectivist ontology and empiricist epistemology, guides the strategy of 
quantitative methodology” and therefore employs quantitative methods. On the other hand, 
a “constructionist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology, guide the strategies of 
qualitative methodology” based on qualitative methods 
Moses and Knutsen (2007, p. 5) described epistemology as “a more straightforward term” 
that is concerned with the “study of knowledge”. According to them the term epistemology 
basically holds the question “[w]hat is knowledge?” The epistemological assumption 
according to Burrell and Morgan (1979), deals with the “grounds or knowledge” which 
implies how knowledge can be gained and how to distinguish between true and false 
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knowledge. Two positions will reflect the epistemology assumptions: anti-positivism and 
positivism. In the words of Burrell and Morgan (1979), epistemological assumptions 
represent the extreme positions about whether knowledge can be “acquired on the one 
hand, or is something which has to be personally experienced on the other” (p. 2) as is the 
case in anti-positivist epistemology. From the standpoint of anti-positivism, the social 
world can be understood based on the involved individuals' viewpoint. They perceived the 
social world according to this view as being "essentially relativistic" and in order to 
understand what is happing in the social world one has to get involved inside rather than 
being an observer as in the case of positivism. According to the positivist viewpoint, the 
social world is regulated and its components are governed by causal relationships. Thus 
positivism is concerned with explaining and predicting the relationships included in the 
social world. Burrell and Morgan (1979) characterise positivists as taking the role of 
observer rather than getting involved to understand the social world. 
The ontology and epistemology of research are related issues. Crotty (1988) argues that 
ontological and epistemological issues normally arise together. To Grix (2004) ontology 
and epistemology represent the foundation of research. He stated: “ontology and 
epistemology are to research what ‘footings’ are to a house: they form the foundation of 
the whole edifice” (p. 57). 
The third assumption is correlated with ontological and epistemological assumptions and 
involves human nature assumptions. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979) the human 
nature assumption implies the relationship between human beings and their surroundings. 
They claim that it is based on the importance of “human life” and that it represents the key 
factor of knowledge. All social sciences have to regard this fact and take into consideration 
human nature assumptions. They identified two positions of human nature in social science 
namely voluntarism and determinism. The determinism perspective considers human 
beings and their experience as not free and that they are “products of the environment” (p. 
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2) and "determined by the situation" where they are located. By contrast, the voluntarism 
perspective views human beings as free, independent and creative who create their 
environment and control it (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
The assumptions discussed above will have, according to Burrell and Morgan (1979), a 
direct impact on the methodological assumptions of social science research. Each 
assumption will affect the way by which knowledge is viewed, obtained and investigated 
though different ontological, epistemological and human nature assumptions, and will 
definitely direct social scientists toward different methodologies. Methodology is defined 
as “the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and use of 
particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes” 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 3). Research methodology means how knowledge is acquired. It basically 
rests on the question “[h]ow do we know?” (Moses and Knutsen, 2007, p. 5). Methodology 
then is the process of how to conduct a research. This conduct, according to Sarantakos 
(2005) is affected by the theoretical ontology and epistemology assumptions. He defines 
the methodology simply as “the nature of research design and methods” (p. 30). Figure 5.4 
demonstrates his notion. 
Figure 5.4: Methodology Process 
 
Source: Sarantakos (2005, p. 29).  
Ontology 
Epistemology 
Methodology 
Designs 
Intsruments 
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One may be conflicted between the terms methodology and method: “[m]ethods and 
methodology, two words that are often confused, used interchangeably and generally 
misunderstood” (Grix, 2004, p. 30). In this regard, Payne and Payne (2004) demonstrate 
that “the term ‘methodology’ in a literal sense means the science or study of methods” (p. 
150) whereas, methods are “the specific techniques used in social research” (p. 149). 
Methods, according to Payne and Payne (2004), could be classified into two categories; 
qualitative methods and quantitative methods. In the same vein, Moses and Knutsen (2007) 
indicate that the term methodology can result in “ambiguity” and one may conflate it with 
methods; sometimes it is used as a fancy synonym for method. They define methodology 
as “an investigation of the concepts, theories and basic principles of reasoning on a 
subject”; in the social science context methodology refers to “philosophy of science 
applied to the social science” (pp. 5-6). Sachdeva (2009) offered a distinction between 
methods and methodology as shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: The Distinction between Method and Methodology 
Method Methodology 
Techniques for gathering evidence. 
 
The underlying theory and analysis of how research 
does or should proceed, often influenced by 
discipline. 
The various ways of proceeding in gathering 
information. 
“an epistemology” is a theory of knowledge. It is the 
theory that decides that 
Source: Sachdeva (2009, p. 7). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified two extremely different methodologies: the 
nomothetic and ideographic perspectives. According to the nomothetic methodology 
perspective the social world is considered as objective reality. The alternative perspective 
is ideographic which views social reality as created by individuals’ subjective experience 
and that the social world can be understood only by getting preliminary knowledge about 
the subject. This view, according to Burrell and Morgan (1979), is concerned with the 
analysis and getting involved in day-to-day situations. On the other hand, the nomothetic 
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position is concerned with the significance of quantitative methods for testing hypotheses 
by data analysis. 
Moses and Knutsen (2007) suggest two main methodologies under which “most work in 
social science can be grouped” (p. 3). They added, “[T]hese two different methodologies 
incorporate radically different views of the world and how we can come to understand it” 
(p. 3). To define methodology they draw on Waltz (1979) who stated: 
“They (students) have been much concerned with methods and little 
concerned with the logic of their use. This reverses the proper priority of 
concern, for once a methodology is adopted, and the choice of methods 
becomes merely a tactical matter. It makes no sense to start the journey that is 
to bring us to an understanding of a phenomenon without asking which 
methodological routes might possible lead there” (Waltz, 1979, p. 13). 
5.4 Assumptions about the Nature of Society 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) noted that Dahrendorf (1959) and Lockwood (1956) identified 
two approaches for sociology that explain the nature of social order on one hand and that 
are concerned with the "problem of change" on the other hand. This conflict in approaches 
has resulted in what became known as the order-conflict debate. Based on this notion, 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) recognised two approaches in research assumptions relating to 
the nature of society. This distinction is articulated in Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5: Two Theories of Society: 'order' and 'conflict' 
The 'order' or 'integrationist' 
view of society emphasises: 
The 'conflict' or 'coercion' 
view of society emphasises: 
Stability 
Integration 
Functional co-ordination 
Consensus 
Change 
Conflict 
Disintegration 
Coercion 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 13). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) have criticised the above distinction as being "most 
problematic". They instead introduced alternative terms; sociology of regulation and 
sociology of radical change. The former refer to theories that are concerned about 
explanations of society and support its "unity and cohesiveness". They argue that the main 
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challenge that the sociology of regulation faces is the unity of society and therefore it is 
trying to explain and justify this unity. The sociology of radical change, in contrast, refers 
to radical change explanations. This sociology is concerned with alternative possibilities 
rather than accepting the “status quo” position. Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) distinction 
between these two sociologies is articulated in Figure 5.6. 
Figure 5.6: The Regulation-radical Change Dimension 
The sociology of REGULATION 
 is concerned with: 
The sociology of RADICAL 
CHANGE 
Is concerned with: 
The status quo 
Social order 
Consensus 
Social integration and cohesion 
Solidarity 
Need satisfaction 
Actuality 
Radical change 
Structural conflict 
Modes of domination 
Contradiction 
Emancipation 
Deprivation 
Potentiality 
  Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 18). 
5.5 Burrell and Morgan’s Framework 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) distinguished between the philosophical assumptions about the 
nature of social science according to the subjective-objective dimension. They also divided 
the assumptions about society into two dimensions; radical change sociology and 
regulation sociology. Based on this notion, Burrell and Morgan (1979) developed four 
paradigms for research in social science by combining the subjective-objective dimensions 
with radical change-regulation sociological dimensions. This combination resulted in four 
social science research paradigms. The four paradigms are classified as follows: (a) the 
radical humanist; (b) the radical structuralist; (c) the interpretive; and (d) the functionalist. 
Figure 5.7 articulates the four paradigms for social science research adopted by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979). 
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Figure 5.7: Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Theory 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 22). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) claim that all social theory can be located within the four 
paradigms which they described as a “map” that is used to negotiate the research subject. 
Indeed, they have gone further to recognise that by this map one can locate a “personal 
frame of reference” in terms of social theory. Moreover, this map enables the researcher to 
recognise where he/she is and potential directions to take in the future. 
The radical humanist, according to Burrell and Morgan (1979), is a research paradigm that 
is concerned with developing the sociology of radical change through a subjective view of 
the world. It approaches social science from a perspective that is; nominalist, anti-
positivist, voluntaristm and ideographic. This paradigm rejects the notion ‘status quo’ and 
considers society as “anti-human”; thus it is trying to “release” the social society from its 
constraints (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Theories that recognise the sociology of radical change from an objective viewpoint locate 
themselves in the radical structuralist paradigm and approach the sociology of radical 
change from a realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic standpoint. This paradigm 
Radical 
Humanist 
Radical 
Structuralist 
Interpretive Functionalist 
The Sociology of Radical Change 
The Sociology of Regulation 
O
b
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according to Burrell and Morgan (1979) is “committed to radical change, emancipation, 
and potentiality, in an analysis which emphasises structural conflict, modes of domination, 
contradiction and deprivation” (p. 34). 
The functionalist paradigm reflects the sociology of regulation perspective and employs 
objectivist methods to approach the subject. This paradigm has been broadly characterised 
as “pragmatic orientation” for attempting to understand society as it is. It accepts the 
“status quo” and is “problem-oriented” for providing rational explanations that are 
practical and would be usable by society. Sociological assumptions imply that issues are 
investigated objectively or in other words from a “realist, positivist, determinist and 
nomothetic” perspective (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
The interpretive paradigm, according to Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) classification, adopts 
the subjective dimension in terms of social science assumptions and the sociology of 
regulation in terms of the nature of society assumptions. This paradigm tends to accept the 
social society as it is i.e. the ‘status quo’ from a subjective standpoint. In other words, it is 
emphasising understanding day-to-day social life by examining individual perceptions 
about the rules and regulation that govern their relationships. Researchers based in this 
paradigm will be, in terms of theoretical assumptions, nominalist, anti-positivist, 
voluntarist and ideographic (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the aforementioned paradigms are “mutually 
exclusive” as they provide “alternative views of social reality” (p. 25) so they state: “they 
[paradigms] should be viewed as contiguous but separate” (p. 23).  
5.6 Research Paradigm and Methodology 
This study aims to investigate the perceptions of different stakeholders about the earnings 
management behaviour in the LCBs. It locates itself in the interpretive paradigm. In the 
interpretive paradigm, the researcher elicits the individuals’ perceptions toward an issue as 
 128 
is done in this study. The previous chapter highlighted that the results of this study will be 
discussed from the accountability perspective; in other words the conceptual framework of 
this study is accountability. In addition to the above aims; this study is focusing on the 
accountability relationships of banks managers with; shareholders and other stakeholders. 
By other words, this study tries to examine whether evident accountability relationships are 
taking place in the context of financial reporting of the Libyan Commercial Banks. It also 
seeks to investigate how this accountability might be improved as one of this study 
objectives. 
5.7 Research Methods 
Research methods are tools by which research data is collected and analysed. Payne and 
Payne (2004) define social research methods as “the technical practices used to identify a 
research question, collect and analyse data and present findings” (p. 149). Hinds (2000) 
refers to research methods as “the tools you use to collect and structure data thus 
transforming it into useful information” (p. 41). Walliman (2011) argues that when a 
research problem is identified, it would be easy for a researcher to determine the required 
data and how to analyse it. When it comes to research methods, social research can be 
divided into two groups; qualitative and quantitative research. This distinction, according 
to Walliman (2001), is attributed to the different data characteristics of both groups and 
different analysis or techniques used. Smith (2011) states that the choice of a research 
method depends on three factors; the research question, data access, and what researcher 
wants to do. He argues that there is no single method that could be regarded as the best for 
all research, and according to him, for research that seeks out opinions, beliefs or factual 
information, surveys and interviews might be the proper methods. This study will employ 
two research methods; semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey. 
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5.7.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The first method applied in this study was semi-structured interviews. These interviews 
were undertaken in two periods; Jun-Aug 2011 and May-Jul 2012
56
. Interviews, according 
to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) are commonly used in qualitative research. Gillham 
(2000) defined the interview as a conversation between interviewer and interviewee in 
which the interviewer “is seeking responses for a particular purpose from the other person” 
(p. 1). He also indicates that interviews are normally conducted in research “to obtain 
information and understanding of issues relevant to the general aims and specific questions 
of a research project” (p. 2). Robson (2007, p. 73) states that “the heart of the interview 
technique is one person (the interviewer or researcher) talking to one or more other persons 
(the interviewees or participants)”. According to Robson (2011) interviews can be divided 
into three types; structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. He distinguished 
between the three types as follows: structured interviews consist of prepared fixed 
questions in a predetermined order. In unstructured interviews “the interviewer has a 
general area of interest and concern” (p. 280) and administrates the process allowing it to 
develop in the area and accordingly this type may be informal. With semi-structured 
interviews, the interviewer has a “shopping list” of issues to be covered and has the latitude 
to modify the words and order of questions according to the interview process (Robson, 
2011, p. 285). Questions in semi-structured interviews are normally specified, but the 
interviewer is freer to probe beyond the answers in a manner which would appear 
prejudicial to the aims of standardization and comparability” (May, 2011, p. 134). This 
makes the semi-structured interviews flexible. Semi-structured interviews have the 
advantage of flexibility in that the same questions are being asked to all participants but 
there is scope for individuals to develop additional areas of interest to them. Gillham 
(2005) describes this method as “the most important way of conducting a research 
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 Due to the Libyan revolution of 17
th
 Feb interviews in the first period Jun-Aug 2011 took place in the 
liberated city of Benghazi. In the second period May-Jul 2012 stakeholders from Tripoli (capital) were 
interviewed. 
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interview because of its flexibility balanced by structure, and the quality of the data so 
obtained” (p. 70). Also, flexibility could mean that a researcher has the opportunity to 
change the planned sequence of questions rather than being attached to the pre-planned 
question order. In this context, Robson (2007) indicates that: 
 “If the interviewee comments on something you had planned to cover later, 
you don’t choke them off. Go with it. If something is disturbing, you don’t 
follow it up with something likely to be more so. More on to something else 
and return later”. (p. 74). 
In addition to being flexible, Creswell (2003) suggested that an interview is a useful 
method when participants cannot be observed; it is also beneficial when participants are 
able to provide historical information. Creswell (2003) has also noticed some limitations of 
interviews: 
“(i) provides indirect information filtered through the views of interviewees, 
(ii) provides information in a designated place rather than the natural field 
setting, (iii) researcher’s presence may bias responses and (iv) people are not 
equally articulate and perceptive” (p. 186). 
Reporting interviews’ findings, according to Creswell (2003), depends on whether the 
research is qualitative or quantitative. When a qualitative approach is adopted, as the case 
of this study, findings would take the form of narrative text rather than numerical form. 
“This is a naturalistic study. Therefore, the results will be presented in 
descriptive, narrative form rather than as a scientific report” (Creswell, 2003, 
p. 205). 
The first empirical work of this study is based on 28 interviews with various stakeholders. 
These interviews were conducted mainly to clarify and investigate the perceptions of those 
stakeholders about the issue of earnings management and its related issues including the 
role of the external auditor as part of a corporate governance mechanism. Interview results 
were used to prepare and design the questionnaire. 
5.7.2 Questionnaire Survey 
The questionnaire survey represents one of the most important and widely used data 
collection methods in social science research and this is attributed, according to Gray 
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(2009), to it being easy to design for researchers. He defined questionnaires as “research 
tools through which people are asked to respond to the same set of questions in a 
predetermined order” (p. 337). A questionnaire survey is regarded as a “useful tool” for 
data collection when information is required from a large number of respondents (Hinds, 
2000). Questionnaires are useful and flexible tools that can be used to collect both 
quantitative and qualitative information (Walliman, 2011). Rugg and Petre (2007) describe 
the questionnaire by saying “[i]t is, in essence, a list of questions” (p. 142) a researcher 
prepares in advance to present to respondents who will either answer these questions by 
using their words or by picking the suitable answer from a set of alternatives. 
The first challenge a researcher faces in designing the questionnaire is the choice of 
questions to ask. Rugg and Petre (2007) argue that questionnaires “are very easy to use 
badly, and are very rarely used well” (p. 141). In the same vein, Gillham (2008) claims that 
“good research cannot be built on poorly collected data” (p. 1) so a questionnaire has to be 
developed in way that produces “good” data. This cannot be achieved unless questions are 
prepared adequately. In addition, a questionnaire is the preferred method to gather data for 
a number of reasons; Gillham (2008) suggests the following advantages for using 
questionnaires to collect research data: 
“Low cost in time and money, easy to get information from a lot of people 
very quickly, respondents can complete the questionnaire when it suits them, 
analysis of answers to closed questions is straightforward, less pressure for an 
immediate response, respondents’ anonymity, lack of interviewer bias, 
standardization of question (but true of structured interview), and can provide 
suggestive data for testing an hypothesis” (Gillham, 2008, p. 6). 
He also lists some drawbacks of using a questionnaire; for example, the accuracy and 
quality of data, the response rate
57
 and questions being misunderstood. In an attempt to 
tackle such issues of misunderstanding, this study adopts, in addition to the questionnaire, 
                                                 
57
 High proportion of the questionnaires will be distributed to people personally known to the researcher, 
what Gillham (2008) refer to as “sample captive”. He also advised the length of the questionnaire should not 
exceed the four or six pages length. 
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the semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews have been undertaken prior to 
the questionnaire survey in order to explore issues that might be unclear or conflated so 
helping to avoid such problems when designing the questionnaire. 
5.7.2.1 Types of questionnaires  
Sarantakos (2005) differentiates among questionnaires according to their nature and the 
way they are administered. He identified three types of questionnaire; standardised, 
unstandardized and semi-standardised questionnaires. In the standardised type the 
questions require inflexible answers and respondents will choose an answer from a set of 
alternatives. The unstandardized type consists of open questions which give the 
respondents leeway for answering. The semi-standardised questionnaires lay in between 
the above two types. They will include both structured and unstructured questions. 
5.7.2.2 Pilot Testing 
Piloting the survey is, according to Smith (2011), a crucial step to ensure that a 
questionnaire is well designed and will produce useful responses from the selected sample. 
He argues that at the pilot stage, the whole survey should be assessed and this step is of 
importance so as questionnaire reliability is improved and the questions asked are valid. 
Smith (2011) acknowledged that pilot tests are usually conducted on academic colleagues 
and suggested that other members of the target population also be tested. In order to 
improve the reliability of this study’s questionnaire, the questionnaire was tested on 
academic colleagues as well as external auditors. 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter highlighted the philosophical assumptions that underlie the social research 
and the nature of the society according to Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) perspective. It also 
outlined the adopted research paradigm of this study ‘interpretive’ and the data collection 
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methods that are employed in this study. In the next two chapters the analysis of the 
collected data will be reported. 
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Chapter 6 
Interviews Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the research methods used in this study. The first method 
employed in this study is the semi-structured interviews. Twenty eight interviews have 
been conducted with various stakeholders in order to elicit their perceptions about the 
quality of financial reporting, the phenomenon of earnings management, and other related 
issues including any motivations and constraints affecting the practice of earnings 
management in the Libyan banking sector. This chapter presents the results of these 
interviews. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 lists the interview questions 
and interviewees’ educational background and professional role. Section 6.3 describes and 
examines the interviewees’ perceptions about the quality and importance of financial 
reporting in Libya. Section 6.4 explores the interviewees’ perceptions of: earnings 
management and awareness of it; earnings management constraints and motivations; and, 
how interviewees perceive earnings management in terms of business ethics. Section 6.5 
analyses the interviewees’ responses about the role of accounting standards, corporate 
governance and the external audit in deterring earnings management practices in Libyan 
Commercial Banks. Section 6.6 provides a summary of this chapter. 
6.2 Interview Questions and Interviewees 
The questions for the interview can be divided into three principal categories; (i) financial 
reporting quality and importance (6.3); (ii) earnings management and its definition, 
meanings, motivations and ethics (6.4); and (ii) the role of accounting standards, corporate 
governance and the external auditor in mitigating the practice of earnings management 
(6.5). To cover these issues, interviewees were asked in total 19 questions. The list of 
interview questions can be seen in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Interviews Questions List 
1 
What is your opinion about the overall quality of financial reporting in Libya, particularly for 
listed companies? 
2 Why is financial reporting important? Who is it important to? 
3 Are you familiar with the term earnings management? 
4 What do you understand by the term earnings management? 
5 Do you think that earnings management is practiced in Libya and if so, to what extent? 
6 
In particular, do you think that earnings management is practiced in the banking sector and if 
so, to what extent? 
7 Who do you regard as the main stakeholders in banks? 
8 
Are you aware of any techniques that may be used to manage earnings both generally and 
particularly in the banking sector? 
9 Which factors do you think may influence the extent of earnings management? 
10 
What in your view are the possible motives for earnings management both in general and in 
the banking sector? 
11 How do you perceive the practice in terms of business ethics? 
12 
Do you think that absence of local accounting standards influences the practice of earnings 
management? 
13 Do you think that adopting IFRS could affect earnings management? How? 
14 
Could you comment on the impact of good corporate governance in relation to earnings 
management? 
15 
Could you comment on the ability of the external audit function to detect and/or deter 
earnings management? 
16 What is your assessment of the effectiveness of external audit of banks in Libya? 
17 To what extent do you think that stakeholders rely on the auditor’s report? 
18 Do you have any other view on the topic of earnings management in the Libyan banks? 
19 
Do you think that accounting manipulation could be used in other ways to mislead 
stakeholders e.g. in relation to capital adequacy and overall financial position? 
 
Twenty eight interviews were conducted in the two main cities of Libya: Benghazi and 
Tripoli, the capital. The first 20 interviews took place in the period Jun-Aug of 2011 in the 
city of Benghazi at a time when the capital had not been liberated
58
. The remaining eight 
were conducted in Tripoli in June 2012. In this study the interviews were conducted 'face 
to face' with all respondents. The interviewees were selected on the basis that they 
possessed the knowledge and the experience necessary that was relevant to contribute to 
the research objectives. At the beginning, interview appointments were arranged through 
telephone calls made to the respective persons. The researcher benefited from being an 
external auditor in Libya as a result of which personal relationships had been developed 
with some of the targeted interviewees. Once the researcher contacted those individuals 
and asked for an interview, they were willing to be interviewed and also recommend other 
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 On 15
th
 Feb, 2011, uprising events started in Benghazi and spread out to all the other cities in Libya; this 
revolution concluded with a declaration ending the dictatorship era on 20
th
 August 2011 (BBC, 2012a and b). 
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key persons that could be interviewed to gain more insightful information
59
. Interviewees 
have been divided into four groups namely: Preparers (PR); Auditors (AD); Regulators 
(RG); and Users (US). Some interviewees hold more than one position; for example, PR5 
is a bank chairman, external auditor and academic. Table 6.2 presents the interviewees 
organised by group. 
Table 6.2: Interviewee Groups 
Group Position Qualification Location 
Preparers 
PR1 Chairman  Msc Commercial bank 
PR2 Head of Correspondent Banking Office Msc Commercial bank 
PR3 Member of BoD  PhD Commercial bank 
PR4 Head of Accounting Dept. Bsc Commercial bank 
PR5 Chairman  PhD Commercial bank 
PR6 Head of Accounts Preparing Dept. Bsc Commercial bank 
PR7 Head of Accounts Preparing Dept. Bsc Commercial bank 
PR8 Head of Correspondent Banking  Bsc Commercial bank 
PR9 
Vice Manager of Eastern Branches 
Management 
Primary 
School 
Commercial bank 
PR10 Head of Finance and Control Msc Commercial bank 
PR11 Head of Financial Management Bsc Commercial bank 
PR12 Assistant Manager of Accounting Dept. Diploma Commercial bank 
Auditors 
AD1 Auditor Bsc Audit firm 
AD2 Auditor Msc Audit firm 
AD3 Senior Partner  PhD Audit firm 
AD4 Managing Partner Bsc Audit firm 
Regulators 
RG1 Chief of Benghazi Branch  Msc LAAA 
RG2 Inspector of commercial banks Bsc CBL 
RG3 Inspector of commercial banks Msc CBL 
RG4 Banking Exchange Control Dept. Bsc CBL 
RG5 
Governor Deputy of CBL (Benghazi 
branch) 
Msc CBL 
RG6 Vice General Manager Bsc Tax Authority 
RG7 Head of Listing and Follow-up Dept. Bsc LSM 
RG8 Head of Internal Audit Bsc LSM 
RG9 
Manager of Surveillance & Follow-up 
Risks Dept. 
Msc LSM 
RG10 Legal Consultant Bsc Commercial bank 
Users 
US1 Lecturer PhD Benghazi Uni. 
US2 Lecturer PhD Benghazi Uni. 
Note: This table shows the characteristics of the interviewees, PR= Preparer, RG= Regulator, AD= Auditor, 
US= Users.  
BoD= Board of Directors, LAAA= the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association, CBL= Central Bank of 
Libya, and LSM= Libyan Stock Market. 
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 Although the researcher benefited from the advantage of developed personal contacts, this situation had 
particular implications especially when auditors and high level employees (e.g. chairman) were interviewed. 
The former may consider the researcher as a competitor, hence giving sensitive information on the audit 
process they follow would be problematic, while the latter may consider the researcher a potential auditor of 
the firm. 
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All the interviews were recorded with the pre-permission of the interviewees. The 
interview recordings were later transcribed
60
 and translated into English and then notable 
quotations were highlighted. 
6.3 Interviewees' Perceptions about the Quality and Importance of Financial 
Reporting 
The quality of financial reporting represents a core element of accountability between 
preparers and report users. As discussed in Chapter 4, accounting can be seen and 
understood from an accountability perspective which perceives, according to Ijiri (1983), 
that the accounting objective is to provide fair accounting information. In other words, 
accounting information should flow fairly from accountor to accountee. The fundamental 
objective of the accounting system within the accountability framework, as reported in 
Table 4.1, is fairness. Fair accounting information, according to Ijiri (1983), can be seen as 
that accounting information which is objective and verifiable. Being objective means that 
accounting information presented to an accountee is free from bias while verifiability 
means that “there are sufficient trails to enable anyone to reconstruct the information” (p. 
75). Based on the above discussion, the accountability process has to be fulfilled in order 
to financial reporting be perceived as of high quality. Within the accountability framework, 
accounting information should be fairly presented and characterised as objective and 
reliable. In this study, the accountability process is taking place when high quality financial 
reporting is perceived as being obtained.  
A number of economic consequences of firms issuing high quality financial information 
have been documented in the literature. For example, the costs of capital could be lowered 
if high quality financial information is provided. Also, capital would be more efficiently 
allocated in the financial market if high quality financial information is supplied 
(Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). 
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 Interviews were not fully transcribed but all significant parts as determined by the researcher were 
transcribed verbatim then translated. 
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To evaluate the quality of financial reporting, researchers have used the qualitative 
characteristics that are mentioned in the conceptual frameworks. In US GAAP, for 
example, McDaniel et al. (2002) evaluated the quality of reporting by using the features of 
the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s conceptual framework that are contained in the 
Statement of Accounting Concept No. 2 Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information. Biddle et al. (2009) defined financial reporting quality as “the precision with 
which financial reporting conveys information about the firm’s operations, in particular its 
expected cash flows, that inform equity investors” (p.113). This definition is in line with 
one of the stated financial reporting objectives of Financial Accounting Standards Board 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (1978) , that is to provide current and 
potential investors with useful information to help them in making informed decisions 
(Biddle et al., 2009). Similarly, Chen et al. (2011) defined financial reporting quality as the 
“precision with which financial reporting conveys information about firms’ operations” (p. 
1256). 
If one opted to use the IASB conceptual framework, the quality of financial reporting can 
be assessed by reference to whether useful financial information has been provided. To be 
useful, financial information must be relevant and faithfully representative. To enhance the 
relevance and faithful representation of useful financial information, another four 
qualitative characteristics have to be met so that financial information could be considered 
of high quality: comparability, verifiability, timeliness and understandability (IASB, 
2010b). This study argues that providing financial information that is objective and 
verifiable to various stakeholders can be regarded as fulfilling accountability by the Libyan 
Commercial Bank managers. Moreover, for Libyan Commercial Bank managers to be 
accountable, they have to provide financial information that is relevant and faithfully 
representative. In other words, financial information has to be unbiased and free from 
management’s intervention so that bank managers are perceived to be accountable. This 
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study argues that in order for an LCB manager to be held accountable, he/she should act 
ethically by producing unbiased accounting information. 
In this section interviewees were asked how they perceive the quality of financial reporting 
of the Libyan banking sector as well as the importance of financial reporting and for whom 
they consider it to be important. As mentioned earlier, production of high quality financial 
reporting would refer to objective and reliable accounting information which, according to 
this study, constitutes an accountability system. 
6.3.1 The Quality of Financial Reporting 
The first question asked the interviewees how they perceive the quality of financial 
reporting in Libya generally and in listed companies specifically. Interviewees expressed a 
variety of views about the quality of financial reporting that ranged from an inability to 
assess the quality, to a perception that financial reporting reflected a high degree of quality. 
Interviewee PR3, who is a member of the Board of Directors of one bank and who holds a 
PhD degree in financial management, replied to this question as follows:  
"The term quality is flexible; you don’t have standards to measure the quality. 
The question is not clear, there are no standards in Libya so how to assess the 
quality? Due to the absence of accounting standards one cannot assess the 
quality". 
IASB pronouncements are implicitly required by the Central Bank of Libya
61
 (CBL) for all 
commercial banks and explicitly by the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) for all listed 
companies which suggests that in order for Libyan Commercial Banks to be accountable to 
their shareholders, financial statements have to be prepared accordingly otherwise 
accountability would be impaired. Although IAS/IFRS are required by the LSM in 
preparing accounts, however they are typically still not yet applied in the researcher’s 
experience. The reason behind that, according to PR3, is related to lack of knowledge on 
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 Although reference to IAS/IFRS was not explicitly made in the CBL regulations, the term “international 
standards” has been interpreted by many as IAS/IFRS. In the experience of the researcher this is the general 
view taken by the commercial banks community and auditors.   
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how to apply IAS/IFRS. This interviewee challenged the researcher to find a person in 
Libya who understands IAS/IFRS.
62
 
Financial reporting quality, according to RG8, could be measured by whether the financial 
statements are suitable for decision making; he answered this question by saying: 
"How to measure the quality? I would do that in respect of its usefulness for 
decision makers". 
The lack of accounting standards, according to some interviewees might be the reason why 
financial quality in Libya is low with no difference being observed between listed and 
unlisted companies. AD3, for example, stated: 
"It is a big question. It is not a stock market issue rather than a general issue 
that applied to all companies operating in Libya which is the lack of 
accounting standards". 
It could be said, according to this quotation, that either the issuance of local standards or 
adopting the international ones would improve the quality of financial reporting and thus 
accountability. One of the key qualitative characteristics identified in Table 4.1 that 
accounting information should have is stability which explicitly in such a case, lack of 
accounting standards, would be unreachable. However, the lack of accounting standards 
would also affect the objectivity and verifiability of accounting information. 
Another interviewee RG9 agreed with this notion and commented on the quality of 
financial reporting by stating: 
"The financial reporting quality is very weak. Moreover, there is no 
difference in the quality between listed and unlisted companies because of no 
accounting standards. All we have is the broken record that is "according to 
GAAP" which we don’t have any definition of so that we can be clear on 
what is meant when someone uses this expression. No one exactly knows 
what the term GAAP means. When you and I disagree we don’t have any 
reference that we go to so we should have a written GAAP, no matter if even 
written on a cement bag. Thereby, the quality is zero due to no accounting 
standards". 
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 He was holding the huge book of IAS/IFRS while stating “you will never find anyone who understands 
this well even though they say according to IAS/IFRS, but the fact is, it is not according to IAS/IFRS”. 
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However, it was expected that the LSM would have an influence over the quality of 
financial reporting and thus accountability. Therefore this unexpected assertion is worth 
noting as it is made by RG9 whose work location is the LSM which implies a reasonably 
wide knowledge about the financial reporting quality of listed companies. One could infer 
that the LSM has not improved the accountability of listed companies. 
From the interviews, it appears that financial reporting in Libya is unduly dependent on 
management judgment and therefore subject to bias. Therefore, its quality tends to be not 
perceived as good and not perceived as neutral. Interviewee RG4 said of financial 
reporting quality that: 
"They [financial statements] are biased to management; managers do use 
these reports to appear as successful. They are not good on average". 
This may suggest a conflict of interest between agents and principals which would have an 
adverse impact on financial reporting and accountability, given that managers would have 
managed the financial statements to, according to RG4, secure their jobs.  
The accounting literature, according to interviewee US1, offers a solution for this question. 
The interviewee advised that Libyans should get back to the literature in order to assess the 
quality of financial reporting. He stated: 
"Literature has answered this question. It is not good at all and the evidence is 
that they [financial statements] are not used in the decision making process in 
Libya. I don’t know why you ask this question. Investors base their decisions 
on dividends". 
Interviewees’ responses can be divided into two broad types according to two categories 
(Table 6.3); preparers and other stakeholders. 75% of the Preparers were satisfied with the 
quality of financial reporting and viewed it as good. On the other hand, most of the Other 
Stakeholders (about 88%) were dissatisfied with the financial reporting quality and 
perceived it to be less than satisfactory. The overall proportion of all interviewees who saw 
financial reporting quality as not good was 57%. The interview results suggest the reasons 
behind the perceived low quality of financial reporting of the Libyan Commercial Banks. 
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These relate to the lack of understandable accounting standards and unfaithful 
representation of financial information by managers, and as a consequence, financial 
information is not objectively presented. Table 6.3 provides a summary of interviewees’ 
responses to Question 1. Based on these interviews’ findings several perceptions were 
revealed: a lack of standards; the absence of local GAAP; the lack of knowledge on how to 
implement IAS/IFRS; and management bias. The overall view of 57% of stakeholders was 
that financial reporting quality was not good; the accountability system of the Libyan 
Commercial Banks can be said to be impaired. 
Table 6.3: Interviewees’ Reponses to Financial Reporting Quality Assessment 
Interviewee Q1: Assessment of quality Aggregate 
PR1 Good 
75 % of preparers (9) view financial 
reporting quality is good, 8% unable to 
assess the quality and 17% see it not good. 
PR2 Not good, “weak” 
PR3 Don’t know  “no standard to measure” 
PR4 Good 
PR5 Not good  
PR6 Good 
PR7 Good 
PR8 Good 
PR9 Good 
PR10 Good 
PR11 Good, “our bank’s quality is high” 
PR12 Good 
AD1 Not good 
100% of Auditors (4) regard the financial 
reporting quality as not good 
AD2 Not good 
AD3 Not good 
AD4 Not good 
RG1 Not good 
80% of Regulators (8) perceive the quality 
of financial reporting as being not good 
RG2 Not good 
RG3 Good 
RG4 Not good 
RG5 Not good 
RG6 Don’t know 
RG7 Not good 
RG8 Not good 
RG9 Not good 
RG10 Not good 
US1 Not good 100% of Users (2) see the financial 
reporting quality as not good US2 Not good 
The overall average who view financial reporting good is 10 that is equal to 36 % 
The overall average who view financial reporting not good is 16, this is equal to 57% 
The overall average for those who don’t know is 2 which are equal to 7%. 
Note: This table shows different perceptions of the stakeholders towards the quality of financial reporting of 
the Libyan commercial banks. The perceptions in this table are divided into four groups; Preparers, Auditors, 
Regulators, and Users. 
The above table clearly suggests a disagreement between Preparers of financial statements 
who believe quality is ‘good’ and those who monitor the Preparers’ activities (Auditors 
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and Regulators) who perceive quality to be poor. This arguably reflects a lack of trust and 
confidence between the two groups. 
6.3.2 The Importance of Financial Reporting 
The link between accounting information and accountability has been outlined in the 
literature. Accounting information represents one of the vehicles by which accountability is 
discharged according to Niskala and Nasi (1995): 
“Accounting information is used for accountability purposes. It covers 
traditional stewardship accounting which requires the firm to demonstrate that 
it has accounted for its resources in an accurate way, has utilized resources 
only for legitimate purposes and has correctly maintained its assets” (p. 123). 
Financial reporting is typically deemed of high importance to a wide range of users 
particularly investors. The second question (see Table 6.1) was to rate the importance of 
financial reporting and to whom it is important from the view point of interviewees. 97% 
of interviewees viewed financial reporting as important. The pervasive reason given was 
that it presents the financial position of the firm and informs decision making. It is also 
important for a wide range of stakeholders including owners, management, employees, 
investors and regulators. PR11 said that financial reporting is important in helping the 
owners in decision making. Obviously interviewees acknowledged the importance of being 
accountable to a wide range of stakeholders rather than only shareholders. Although this 
wider accountability concept will be discussed in detail later on when Q 7 (Table 6.1) is 
discussed, some interviewees addressed the wider notion of accountability in response to 
this earlier question about the importance of financial reporting by identifying stakeholders 
other than shareholders to whom financial reporting is important.  
The importance of financial reporting was expressed and explained in a number of ways by 
interviewees.  For instance, PR12 viewed the importance of financial reporting as very 
high since it shows the results of the company. He stated: 
"Financial reporting is highly important to the institution itself. It shows the 
profitability for the current year or in comparing to previous years. Also it is 
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important to shareholders and investors in that it influences the share price". 
 
It was also suggested by AD3 that financial reporting is important and that this fact needs 
no evidence. He commented on this question by saying: 
"Needless to say it is important. It represents the summary of transactions and 
especially in Libya where there are no quarterly reports". 
This view was also reflected in RG9’s perspective who emphasised the importance of 
financial reporting by stating: 
"They [financial statements] are important because they show the financial 
position and situation of the company, there is no argument in that". 
AD3 also added that the annual reports are most important as they are the only source of 
published information and thereby they are the only means by which accounting 
information can be obtained by external users. He added: 
"The financial statements are the only reports that are published. It is 
important to management, owners, the state, and tax authorities". 
It is clear that some interviewees acknowledged the importance of financial reporting and 
one can therefore argue that, implicitly, the provision of accounting information, at least 
once a year, is seen to fulfil an important accountability function. Accountability can 
therefore be seen to be exercised even if perceptions of the quality of reporting suggest 
that, for some, there is scope for the accountability to be improved. 
As mentioned earlier, some stakeholders other than shareholders have been addressed by 
some interviewees, which may suggest some awareness of the wider notion of 
accountability. RG3, for example, summarized his answer in which he particularly made 
reference to the banking sector by saying: 
"Sure it is important as it gives the real picture of the firm to the Libyan Stock 
Market (LSM), shareholders, employees and customers. It is important for the 
Central Bank of Libya (CBL), shareholders and society. The banking sector is 
very important". 
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Employees, according to RG9, should pay attention to the financial position of the 
company they work for. In his comment regarding for whom financial reporting is 
important, RG9 indicated that: 
"It is important to owners, creditors and employees. The latter have to be 
concerned about the financial position of the company they work for. They 
don’t want to work for it until it collapses… anyone who deals with the 
company has to be interested in its financial position". 
A summarized answer was given by RG7 who said: 
"They [financial statements] reflect the company's position and are important 
to all users". 
The findings of the interviews reveal that a majority of the interviewees (97%) believe that 
financial reporting is important. In other words, most of the interviewees recognise the 
importance of issuing the annual reports as a way of discharging the accountability of bank 
managers. Given that only 36% (Table 6.3) of interviewees perceive the quality of 
financial reporting as good this would suggest that most interviewees acknowledge the 
importance of accountability in the Libyan Commercial Banks but also feel that 
accountability is far from being all it should be.  
6.4 Interviewees' Perceptions about Earnings Management 
There is widespread agreement amongst western accounting practitioners and academics 
that earnings management is pervasive and therefore widely known within both the 
academic and practitioner communities (Levitt, 1998; Loomis, 1999). This section 
examines the interviewees’ awareness of the term ‘earnings management’; specifically, 
interviewees were asked several questions (Questions 3,4,5,6,8,9,10, and11 in Table 6.1) in 
order to elicit their understandings and views about it. First of all, interviewees were asked 
whether they were familiar with the term and what they understood by this term. In cases 
where an interviewee had not heard of earnings management, the definition by Healy and 
Wahlan (1999) was used to explain what is meant by the term in order to have meaningful 
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answers for the remaining questions. Earnings management, according to Healy and 
Wahlan (1999), occurs when: 
“… managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (p. 368). 
Afterwards, the interviewees were asked about the existence of earnings management in 
Libya generally and within the banking sector specifically. They were also asked about the 
motivation for and any constraints on earnings management. Finally interviewees were 
asked to determine whether the practice of earnings management is seen as ethical or 
unethical.  
6.4.1 Earnings Management Awareness 
Interview findings show that 79% (22) of the interviewees had not heard about the term 
“earnings management”. Table 6.4 summarises the answers to this question (Q3, Table 
6.1). 
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Table 6.4: Interviewees’ Responses about Familiarity with the term “Earnings 
Management” 
Interviewee 
Q1: Are you familiar with the term 
“Earnings Management” 
Aggregate 
PR1 No 
9 of preparers (75%) have not heard of the 
term.  
PR2 No 
PR3 Yes  “I haven’t yet seen a department for it” 
PR4 Yes 
PR5 Yes  
PR6 No 
PR7 No 
PR8 No 
PR9 No 
PR10 No 
PR11 No 
PR12 No 
AD1 No 
4 of auditors (100%) have not heard of the 
term. 
AD2 No 
AD3 No 
AD4 No 
RG1 No “this term is not in circulation” 
8 of Regulators (80%) said that they have 
not heard about the term. 
RG2 Yes 
RG3 No 
RG4 No 
RG5 No 
RG6 No 
RG7 No 
RG8 No 
RG9 Yes 
RG10 No 
US1 Yes  Only one  User (50%) has not heard of the 
term US2 No  
The aggregate number of interviewees who have not heard about the term is 22 representing 79% of all 
the interviewees. 
Note: this table summarises the interviewees’ awareness of the term “earnings management”, the answer 
“yes” means that interviewee has heard of the term, while “no” means otherwise. The perceptions in this 
table are divided into four groups; Preparers, Auditors, Regulators, and Users. 
 
Then, interviewees were asked what they understood by the term “earnings management” 
(Q4, Table 6.1); seemingly interviewees were drawn to a literal translation as most of the 
responses revolved around how to create and invest the earned profits through a specific 
department, (in other words they thought it referred to allocating and investing earnings 
that had been achieved). It is worth mentioning that some of the respondents, for instance, 
PR3 and RG2 who asserted that they had heard of the term, actually referred to the same 
meaning, that is, a department for creating and investing earned profits. Table 6.5 shows 
how interviewees interpreted the term “earnings management”. As the findings suggest, 
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only five of the 28 executives interviewed identified earnings management as a 
manipulative behaviour to manage the earnings figure. 
Although the Arabic translation used in this study is literal, same translation has been used 
in several Arabic studies on earnings management e.g. Issa (2008), Hamdan and Abo-Ijila 
(2012), and Al-Sartawi et al. (2013). 
Table 6.5: The meanings attributed to the term “Earnings Management” 
Interviewee 
Q4: What do you understand by the term 
“Earnings Management” 
Aggregate 
PR1 Managing the work to create profits 
9 of Preparers (75%) interpret earnings 
management as a department for 
monitoring profits or as how to invest the 
earned profits. 
PR2 Investing earned profit 
PR3 A department for monitoring the profit 
PR4 Result of transaction 
PR5 Over/understating the profit 
PR6 Managing the achieved earnings 
PR7 Investing earnings 
PR8 Investing profits 
PR9 Reusing the earned profit 
PR10 
Distributing earrings to shareholders or 
invest profit 
PR11 A dedicated dept. for following up profits 
PR12 Investing earned profits 
AD1 
Required procedures to achieve targeted 
earnings 
50% of Auditors viewed earnings 
management as being earnings 
manipulation 
AD2 A dept. that studies a firm’s earnings 
AD3 
Benefiting or manipulating the earnings in 
a manner that fits to preparers 
AD4 
The sum  one has earned and what was the 
targeted bottom line 
RG1 Using the profits 
8 out of 10 Regulators consider earnings 
management as to invest the earned profits 
RG2 Reusing the earnings 
RG3 A dept. to invest the profits 
RG4 A dept. to increase the profits 
RG5 Investing the net income 
RG6 The proper use of income 
RG7 Investing the realised profits 
RG8 
A dept. for managing and controlling the 
profits 
RG9 Earnings manipulation 
RG10 
Investing and managing the achieved 
earnings 
US1 A managerial behaviour to smooth income Only one User (50%) recognised earnings 
management US2 Reinvesting the profits 
Only five interviewees representing 17.8% have interpreted the meaning of “Earnings Management” as 
a manipulative behaviour. 
Note: this table shows how interviewees have interpreted the term earnings management. The perceptions in 
this table are divided into four groups; Preparers, Auditors, Regulators, and Users. 
 
For example, PR1 who is a commercial bank chairman, holding a masters degree in 
accounting, commented: 
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"I think it means how to create profit and how to manage the work so as to 
achieve more profits". 
Interviewee, PR10, saw earnings management as meaning distributing the earnings to 
shareholders. Another interviewee, PR11, went further in describing the meaning of 
earnings management by saying: 
"The term refers to a dedicated department that is mainly responsible for 
following up and improving the company's profits". 
Interviewee RG4 supported these ideas by saying: 
"The term means establishing a department to invest the realised profits". 
It appears that the problem in misunderstanding is with the word "management" since most 
of the interviewees are employees for whom such a word has only one meaning.  
The word “management” seems to have an impact on the meanings of the term “earnings 
management” as understood by some interviewees, for example, RG8 indicated: 
"Management means a management that plans and controls activities. 
Earnings management then is management that is concerned with planning 
and controlling the earnings in terms of retaining control of revenues and 
focusing on profitable activities". 
Interview findings also suggest that the term "earnings management" itself might be the 
reason for it not being known and understood in its conventional sense. The Arabic 
translation
63
 of earnings management may be interpreted as referring to a department 
which has responsibility for monitoring and controlling of earnings. When the definition, 
according to Healy and Whalan (1999) was offered to interviewees they readily identified 
the meaning of earnings manipulation. (RG1) stated: 
"This term is not in circulation… by this, the term refers to the disposal or use 
of the profit. I think it is a matter of translation. The term earnings 
manipulation should instead be used". 
Similarly, (RG6) suggests: 
"At the first glance, I understand it as the proper use for income. I think the 
name is a little strange, might be the translation". 
                                                 
63
 The literal Arabic translation of earnings management (Edaret Al-arbah) has been interpreted as the unit or 
department in which earnings were planned, controlled and managed. 
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Earnings management, as a term, is widely unknown
64
 amongst the interviewees, across all 
stakeholders groups. However, it is believed that this practice does exist in Libya. In this 
vein, PR5 suggests: 
"I have not seen any research asserting that earnings management does exist 
in Libya, but based on accounting policies for depreciation, inventory and tax 
purposes which give some margin to manager so I would expect it to occur". 
Interviewees were also asked to indicate to what extent they think earnings management is 
practiced in Libya generally (Table 6.1, Q5). Perceptions about whether earnings 
management is practiced by Libyan companies generated a mix of views. Some believe 
that earnings management does really exist while others believe otherwise. The 
interviewees’ responses to this question are summarised in Table 6.6. 
  
                                                 
64
 Based on the evidence of these interviewees, I would speculate that, if earnings management were to 
become more widely known it may be translated “earnings manipulation” rather than be given a literal 
translation. 
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Table 6.6: The Scope of Earning Management Practices by Libyan Corporations 
Interviewee 
Q5: Is earnings management practiced in 
Libya 
Aggregate 
PR1 No 
58% (7) of preparers think that earnings 
management is not practiced by Libyan 
corporations 
PR2 Yes 
PR3 Yes 
PR4 No 
PR5 Yes 
PR6 No 
PR7 Yes 
PR8 No 
PR9 No 
PR10 Yes 
PR11 No 
PR12 No 
AD1 Yes 
75% of auditors believe earnings 
management does exist within Libyan 
corporations 
AD2 No 
AD3 Yes 
AD4 Yes 
RG1 Yes 
60% of regulators confirm that earnings 
management is exercised by Libyan 
corporations  
RG2 No 
RG3 Yes 
RG4 Yes 
RG5 Don’t know 
RG6 No 
RG7 Yes 
RG8 Yes 
RG9 Yes 
RG10 Don’t know 
US1 Yes 50% of users think earnings management 
is practiced by Libyan corporations US2 Don’t know 
The overall average of who believe that earnings management is practiced by Libyan corporations total 
to 15 interviewees giving the overall percentage of 53.5%. 
The overall average of who believe that earnings management is not practiced by Libyan corporations is 
10 which equals to 35.7%. 
The remaining offered no answer. 
Note: this table summarises the interviewees’ perceptions regarding the practice of earnings management by 
Libyan corporations. The table differentiates between the different stakeholders based on four main groups; 
Preparers, Regulators, Auditors, and Users. 
 
The results reported above may have significant implications regarding the accountability 
of Libyan corporations. Given that the prevalence of earnings management may be related 
to the existence of low quality financial reporting, it can imply a relatively weak 
accountability process. Given that 53.5% of interviewees think that Libyan corporations 
are engaged in earnings management practices, one may judge that accountability is widely 
seen to be impaired for this reason. 
More specifically, Q 6 (Table 6.1) investigates interviewees’ perceptions about the practice 
of earnings management by the Libyan Commercial Banks and, if it did occur, how 
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management would or could alter the reported income. Eight preparers out of 12 believe 
that earnings management is not practiced by the Libyan Commercial Banks while 11 
stakeholders think that earnings management is strongly practiced in the Libyan 
Commercial Banks. Table 6.7 summaries these responses. 
Table: 6.7: The Scope of Earnings Management Practices in the Libyan Commercial 
Banks 
Interviewee 
Q6: Is earnings management practiced 
within the LCBs 
Aggregate 
PR1 No 
Only 4 Preparers out of 12 (33%) believe 
earnings management is practiced in the 
Libyan Commercial Banks 
PR2 Yes 
PR3 Yes  
PR4 No 
PR5 No 
PR6 No 
PR7 Yes 
PR8 No 
PR9 No 
PR10 Yes 
PR11 No 
PR12 No  
AD1 No 
2 Auditors out of 4 (50%) think that 
earnings management is practiced by 
Libyan Commercial Banks 
AD2 No 
AD3 Yes 
AD4 Yes 
RG1 Yes 
8 Regulators out 10 (89%) believe that 
Libyan Commercial Banks are engaged in 
earnings management practices 
RG2 Yes 
RG3 Yes 
RG4 Yes 
RG5 Yes 
RG6 No 
RG7 Yes 
RG8 Yes 
RG9 Yes 
RG10 Don’t know 
US1 Yes 1 (50%) of Users believes that earnings 
management is practiced within LCBs US2 Don’t know 
The overall average of who believe that earnings management is practiced within Libyan Commercial 
Banks total to 15 interviewees giving the overall percentage of 53.5%. 
Note: this table summarises the perceptions of interviewees regarding the engagements of the Libyan 
Commercial Banks in the earnings management practices. The table differentiates between the different 
stakeholders based on four main groups; Preparers, Regulators, Auditors, and Users. 
 
RG9 commented on whether banks manage their earnings by saying: 
"Yes, because the available standards
65
 give the chance for managers to 
intervene in the reported income. For example, they can maximise the 
provision; who can say “no”. I am personally convinced that banks do 
                                                 
65
 Although there are no local standards so far, practitioners usually refer to the current accounting practices 
as local standards. 
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manage their earnings as they use huge provisions and no bank had incurred a 
loss, how come? Surly they have managed their earnings".  
Notably, regulators believe that earnings management is practiced by LCBs unlike most of 
the preparers. For example, RG1 suggested that LCBs, to large extent, are manipulating 
their income. In his response to the question about whether he thinks earnings management 
is practiced in the Libyan banking sector, his answer came as follows: 
“Yes they do, banks do manipulate earnings to large extent”. 
In the same vein, RG4 believes that effectively all Libyan Commercial Banks are involved 
in earnings management. He said: 
“Yes almost all banks practice it [earnings management]”. 
PR12, who does not believe that earnings management is practiced by LCBs, offered the 
statement below during his interview
66
: 
"Last year (2011
67
) we incurred a loss while another commercial bank has 
booked net profit of 200m LD which in fact is not real. 2011 was the year of 
revolution and there was an economic recession in which the loan provision 
should be calculated for those loans that have not moved during the year and 
of course there was no movement on those loans which makes them, 
according to central bank regulations, regarded as bad loans and thereby 
proper provision should be calculated which has not happened with that bank. 
And instead they have calculated the interest and have not made any 
provisions". 
The continual process of reporting positive results (income) by the LCBs arguably 
represents, according to AD4, a strong piece of evidence that these banks are managing 
their income, AD4 considers this process of commercial banks as evidence of managing 
earnings, he commented: 
"Yes, I think they [banks] try to have their results positive [profits]. The 
evidence from reporting is that there is no bank incurred loss". 
The findings of the interviews suggests that a distrust exists between preparers and non-
preparers stakeholders, as 67% of preparers assert that Libyan commercial banks are not 
                                                 
66
 While his quotation clearly suggests that earnings management does exist within local banks, his answer 
was extremely opposite by saying that the practice does not exist. Obviously he was defending his bank’s 
reputation given that he is the chief accountant there, as noticed by the researcher. 
67
 The year 2011 was exceptional as witnessed the revolution of 17
th
 Feb where there was no activities and 
almost all industries have been affected. It is expected to see banks reporting losses in such circumstances 
given no income. 
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engaged in earnings management practices while 69% of non-preparer stakeholders believe 
that earrings management is widely practiced by the Libyan Commercial Banks. This, 
again, arguably reflects a lack of trust between the preparers and other stakeholders as 
suggested when the quality of financial reporting was discussed above. 
As discussed earlier, there is a strongly held belief amongst non-preparer stakeholders, that 
earnings management is widely exercised in LCBs as shown in Table 6.7. The findings of 
this question are in line with what may be expected according to their positions. Preparers 
who can be regarded as agents, may be expected to defend the quality of financial 
reporting and to declare that these reports are free from bias. In other words, the financial 
reporting according to them may be subjective though not biased by management. 
Therefore, management can be accountable to the principal by providing them with 
subjective accounting information. On the other hand, other groups’ perceptions are 
different. The majority of Regulators believe that earnings management is practiced by the 
LCBs, while only half of interviewed Auditors have expressed the view that this practice 
exists, (although it was only a small sample of 4 auditors) and one of them (AD1) had not 
actually engaged in auditing any commercial banks at the time of the interview. Also, the 
interview with AD2 took place in the commercial bank premises where he is the auditor 
which to some extent may have affected his answer towards such issues. In the Users 
group, only one (of two) agreed with the view that earnings management is practiced. The 
overall findings reveal, in addition to the distrust issue, perceptions of a lack of legislation 
so that accountability can be effectively performed. It has been noticed that the absence of 
(formalised) local accounting standards may give the opportunity for bank managers to 
indulge in earnings management practices
68
 which may lead to a breach in the 
accountability relationship. 
                                                 
68
 However, earnings management could be practiced even with exist of accounting standards. 
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Interviewees were also asked to determine who they regard as the main stakeholders in 
banks. Owners, management, investors, the Libyan Stock Market (LSM), the Central Bank 
of Libya (CBL)
69
, and the tax authority came in as the most common responses. 
Interviewees’ responses to this question are summarised in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8: The Main Stakeholder of a Libyan Commercial Bank as Determined by 
Interviewees 
Interviewee 
Q7: Who do you regard as the main 
stakeholders in banks? 
Aggregate 
PR1 LSM, investors and correspondents banks 
10 of Preparers (83%) perceive 
shareholders to be the main stakeholder to 
the LCBs. 
PR2 Shareholders 
PR3 Shareholders 
PR4 CBL and LSM 
PR5 Shareholders 
PR6 Shareholders and employees 
PR7 The state as the owner 
PR8 Shareholders, management, tax and CBL 
PR9 Shareholders 
PR10 Shareholders, customers and employees 
PR11 Big shareholders and big customers 
PR12 Shareholders 
AD1 Shareholders 
3 of  Auditors (75%) see shareholders as 
the main stakeholder of LCBs 
AD2 Major shareholders 
AD3 Owners, CBL, management and Tax. 
AD4 CBL 
RG1 CBL, shareholders, tax and investors 
7 of Preparers (70%) view shareholders as 
the main stakeholders for LCBs 
RG2 Shareholders for private banks and CBL for 
state banks 
RG3 CBL 
RG4 Shareholders, CBL and investors 
RG5 Shareholders 
RG6 Shareholders 
RG7 Shareholders and investors 
RG8 CBL and investors 
RG9 Shareholders and CBL 
LG1 Don’t know 
US1 Customers 1 of Users (50%) regard shareholders as 
being the main stakeholder US2 CBL and shareholders 
75% of interviewees perceive the shareholders as the main stakeholders for LCBs.  
Note: This table articulates the interviewees’ perceptions regarding who is the main stakeholder to the Libyan 
Commercial Banks.  
 
The interview findings suggest that shareholders are perceived to be the main stakeholder 
in Libyan Commercial Banks. It can be noticed that accountability is, in that case, only 
seen in its narrow notion that bank managers are only accountable to shareholders. 
                                                 
69
 It is worth mentioning that the CBL is the owner of the state banks, so when it is mentioned it would not be 
clear if it was being regarded as a regulator or as an owner, or both. 
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However, the wider notion of accountability was touched on by some interviewees as 
discussed earlier. For example, US1 perceives owners as not being the main stakeholder in 
LCBs. He regarded banks' customers as the main stakeholder. He stated: 
"The main stakeholder in my opinion is not the shareholder. The Bank of 
Commerce and Development
70
, for instance, has a total capital of 50m LD 
while the available resources for the bank are about 2b LD. However, when 
the bank collapsed, it is clients who will suffer more than shareholders. 
Theoretically the main stakeholder is the shareholder but practically it is the 
customer. If the bank had gone bankrupt the customers would lose much 
more than shareholders; this is the case in Libya". 
In addition to shareholders and customers, employees are also considered as stakeholders 
in LCBs. PR10 stated: 
"The main parties who affect or are affected by a bank are shareholders either 
private or state, customers who might suffer in case of bank default, and 
employees. At the end of the year employees will [implicitly] decide to 
continue to work for the bank with the same salaries, they are also interested 
because there might be compensation based on the reported income". 
Major customers may take their money away if they feel that the financial position of the 
bank is below a secure level. PR11 views the main stakeholders in banks as: 
"Major shareholders and customers given the fact that their cash is in the 
bank. They [customers] are concerned about the liquidity of the bank and 
want to make sure that a bank at all the times is able to pay what they owe… 
if they feel that the financial position is poor they will remove their money". 
RG9 stressed the importance of financial reporting to employees and indicated that 
employees have to monitor the financial position of the company they work for. This, 
according to RG9, would help them to decide whether to stay at the company or leave 
before it collapsed. 
The previous quotations clearly suggest that some interviewees regarded management 
responsibilities as extending beyond the shareholders. In other words, the wider notion of 
accountability is considered as an appropriate approach from the point view of some 
interviewees. Given the wide group of stakeholders in commercial banks in general 
potentially including the whole of society, and given that Libyan banks are not exceptional 
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in that respect, Libyan Commercial Banks could be understood only be regarded as owing 
some responsibility to a very wide group. Many stakeholders other than shareholders (e.g. 
clients, employees, and wider society) could be affected by the collapse of a commercial 
bank; therefore, for Libyan commercial banks the importance of effective accountability 
clearly follows. 
The accounting literature suggests that the loan loss provision (LLP) is a vehicle that can 
readily be used for earnings management. The next question (Q8, Table 6.1) sought to 
explore what tools could be used to affect the reported income of LCBs. Interviewees were 
asked to specify any techniques they are aware of that could be used by LCBs to manage 
earnings. Table 6.9 summarises the interviewees’ responses in regard to these questions. 
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Table 6.9: The Used Earnings Management Tools by LCBs 
Interviewee 
Q8: Are you aware of any techniques that 
may be used ot manage earnings in 
banks? 
Aggregate 
PR1 Reduce expenses and forward allowances 
9 Preparers (75%) believed that LLP could 
be used to manage LCBs’ income 
PR2 Reduce expenses and LLP. 
PR3 Reduce expenses and LLP 
PR4 Result can’t be changed71 
PR5 LLP 
PR6 No way to alter the result 
PR7 Provisions in general i.e. LLP 
PR8 Provisions i.e. LLP  
PR9 No use for such tools 
PR10 Reduce expenses and LLP 
PR11 LLP 
PR12 Set-aside interest and provision e.g. LLP 
AD1 LCBs earnings are not managed 
2 Auditors (50%) think that LLP is the 
way how LCBs manage their earnings 
AD2 Don’t know 
AD3 Provisions e.g. LLP 
AD4 Provisions and set-aside interest 
RG1 LLP, investment impairment and 
depreciation 
6 Regulators (60%) view LLP as used by 
LCBs for earnings management 
RG2 Allowances e.g. LLP 
RG3 Reducing expenses and revenue recognition 
RG4 LLP 
RG5 Provisions in general and LLP in particular  
RG6 Not managed 
RG7 Don’t know 
RG8 Provisions e.g. LLP 
RG9 Provisioned e.g. LLP 
RG10 Don’t know 
US1 LLP and exchange rate 1 Users (50%) believes that LLP to be 
used by LCBs for earnings management US2 Don’t know 
64% of interviewees perceive the LLP as being used by LCBs for earnings management. 
Note: this Table shows interviewees’ perceptions regarding how LCBs could manage their earnings. Most of 
interviewees volunteered to mention LLP as a technique to manage earnings, however the researcher in a 
very limited occasion prompted interviewee to such a technique. 
Most of the interviewees’ answers revolved around LLPs. AD3, for example, said: 
"Through the provisions, especially in banks as the main factor in any bank's 
accounts is provisions. There is a criterion on how to calculate the LLP 
regulated by CBL but it is a bit long and difficult to apply and there are 
always subjective points which we, as auditors, are facing. Managers are 
always trying to justify the way they did the calculation". 
One of the Preparers, PR7, who is the chief accountant of a commercial bank and had 11 
years of experience in preparing the financial statements of the bank, and who is one of the 
few preparers who thought earnings management occurs in the LCBs, answered this 
question, about how earnings management could be implemented, as follows: 
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"By using the provisions, management have only provisions to do so. For 
example, the evaluation of foreign currency rate of exchange provision as 
well as the LLP. Due to the weak system that we have, the accurate 
calculation of the latter can be an issue as it could not be accurately calculated 
due to the weak system we use… when I was a member of the LLP 
committee; I happened to receive a telephone call from our chairman asking 
for a certain figure to be stated as the LLP that year". 
Also another way to manipulate the reported earnings could be by ignoring the booking of 
some expenses due or accruals. PR10 argued that this is a legal way to alter the reported 
income. He said: 
"An example for a legal way to lessen the expenses might be the dealing with 
those expenses that neither booked nor yet bank is asked to pay it. A bank 
may wish not to show such expenses in accounts as long as it is not yet 
required to pay it". 
PR11, who does not believe that earnings management is practiced by LCBs, supported the 
idea of not booking some accruals or unpaid invoices as long as the provider has not asked 
for his money. His response was: 
"Accrual expenses may also be used to manage earnings. For instance, if you 
did not receive the invoice you may not book it. LLP represents the big item 
in the bank's accounts and despite the restricted procedures imposed by the 
CBL there is still a space for discretion". 
Regardless of the use of LLP for earnings management, interviewees mentioned other 
ways that can be, or actually are, used by bank managers to manage earnings; for example, 
ignoring the booking of dues as suggested by PR10 and PR11. Although they clearly stated 
that it was a legal way to manage earnings, it is obviously a contravention of any GAAP to 
ignore the booking of incurred current period expenses. Based on such quotations one may 
argue that not only is earnings management practiced in the LCBs but also they may 
commit fraud by omitting financial transactions
72
. This would aggressively harm the 
accountability mechanism as it would produce not only biased information but further it 
gives a financial position that is certainly not faithfully represented. 
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reported in Chapter 3. Earnings management, within the UK context, would be between the limits of GAAP 
whereas in the US context is both within and outside the GAAP. 
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According, to the CBL regulations, a provision is calculated as the difference between a 
debt that has gone bad and 80% of the warranty that was given as a guarantee. For 
example, if a debt equal to 1000 LD that is classified as a bad debt and the warranty given 
by the client is worth exactly 1000 LD. In this case the bank will have to make a provision 
of 200 LD being the difference between the deteriorated debt that is 1000 LD and the 80% 
of the warranty which amounts to 800 LD. PR11 suggests that this warranty might be re-
evaluated so as to lessen or cancel the provision calculation. He commented: 
"They might re-evaluate the assets and loans. Re-evaluation of the loan 
warranties as, according to CBL regulations and procedures, we have to 
calculate 80% of the warranty given to cover the loan. If this percentage 
equals or exceeds the debt then no need for any provision. In return, if this 
percentage was under the debt we will make a provision for the difference. 
For  example, a loan total to 1m LD with a warranty worth 1m LD when this 
client faces difficulties we will need to make a provision of 200,000 LD being 
the difference between 80% of the warranty and the original loan amount. We 
might resort to re-evaluate that warranty as it might be worth more than 1m 
LD say for example, 1.4m LD so we would not need to make any provision. 
The calculation of debt provision is done under the supervision of external 
auditors and the CBL. When I calculate the provision I tend to raise it rather 
than lower it in order to support the financial position of the bank". 
In addition to the re-evaluation of the warranties, managers may contact some deteriorating 
clients asking them to pay in some money so that the manager would be able to change the 
client's classification and thereby avoid a need for a provision calculation. RG4 referred to 
this method. He said: 
"They mainly use the LLP. They can change the classification of some 
debtors so as the allowance would be decreased. They also may contact some 
debtors asking them to make some deposits in their accounts in order to 
mobilize the accounts thus the debtor classification would easily be changed 
from bad to good debt". 
Banks also may use “set-aside interests” for earnings management. When a client faces any 
difficulties in paying the interest, a loan will be classified as a bad debt; interest is 
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calculated and booked as a set-aside interest provision
73
. However, this technique could be 
illegal, PR12 has indicated: 
"They can use the set-aside profits [interest] to increase the current year 
income or they may save some revenue for next year. Set-aside profits are 
those revenues on deteriorating debts that have been calculated but not 
booked as revenues. Also, provisions might be used… provision for loan and 
provision for lawsuits against the bank. These provisions could be used to 
modify the appearance of the financial position". 
Beside set-aside interests provision, managers may tend to calculate interest for the off-
interest periods. Some loans may have the first year interest-free and the borrower is then 
only asked to pay interest starting from the second year. RG2 mentioned that banks may 
ignore this procedure and calculate and include the interest in the first year accounts. He 
stated: 
"They might use the previous allowances to boost earnings. Also, sometimes 
they calculate interest during the off-interest period. They might also expand 
or reduce expenses. For example, last year a bank realised 10m LD profits 
and would like to make them 12m next year since the beginning of the next 
year they will monitor the expenses. They misuse the circular of CBL 
regarding the LLP. This circular is not correctly applied. It depends on who's 
in charge ethics". 
Simply, current year revenues are those revenues incurred in the year. RG3 mentioned that 
some banks go beyond the current year to use the next period's interest in order to boost 
current year earnings. This procedure was described as having been implemented by a 
foreign partner at one of the banks that has strategic participation with foreign investors.  
He indicated that: 
"Most banks try to raise income through reducing the expenses and including 
deferred revenues [interest]. Once of the commercial banks has applied this 
practice through the strategy partner [foreign management]; the case was to 
include the interest of the coming two years into the current year and justify it 
[on the ground] that the client is credible and that they have changed the base 
from cash to accrual". 
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whenever a loan is reclassified as a good loan. The notion behind this is to not recognise revenues on bad 
loans. 
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Another problem with bank loans had been raised during an interview as some banks have 
very old loans that go back 40 years. During the last regime all commercial activities were 
nationalised. RG9 consider this problem as a loophole for earnings management. He said: 
 "The provisions. You have had old loans for 40 years and they still appear in 
accounts and a lot of these loans are those which have been nationalized 
during the last regime but the original debts have not been transferred to the 
state. They remain on the names of the original clients". 
The majority of interviewees were of the view that LLP is mainly used by LCBs for 
earnings management. Other ways have also been indicated as tools for managing the 
reported income i.e. reducing expenses through not booking them. Although this could be 
motivated in order to manage earnings (and may be regarded as such), it clearly strays 
beyond the accounting standards on the side of fraud. The fact that LCBs’ financial 
reporting is regarded as being managed, however it is done, reveals that LCBs’ accounting 
information included in their financial statements are regarded as biased. In other words, 
the accountability mechanism is regarded as being extremely compromised by LCBs’ 
managers who, based on interview findings, are perceived to be highly engaged in earnings 
management practices and therefore providing biased accounting information. In fact the 
view of this research, based on the views of, and the evidence presented by the 
interviewees, earnings management is not only assumed to be done, but is actually carried 
out. Therefore, both regulators and users should have to look for some ways to restrict 
management freedom but in ways not to harm the flexibility needed for the exercise of 
professional judgement so in order to protect the quality of financial reporting. The next 
section is addresses the constraints that might be effective in mitigating the practice of 
earrings management by LCBs. 
6.4.2 Earnings Management Constraints 
This section considers the responses of interviewees to the question of what could affect 
the earnings management practice (Q9, Table 6.1); in fact the interviews showed many 
factors that might reduce the earnings management practices. For example, AD4 suggested 
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two broad categories of factors that would help in mitigating the earnings management 
practice. He said: 
"Two main factors; External and internal. The external is CBL which has the 
supervision power. The internal is the internal control system and internal 
audit of the bank". 
Another suggestion was offered by PR8 who suggested that enhancing the effectiveness of 
internal and external auditors would be one of the methods that could prevent or mitigate 
the practice of earnings management. He commented: 
 "Weak internal and external audit would allow this practice". 
PR11 also stressed the role of regulators in facing these issues. He stated: 
"The regulatory bodies, for example the central bank and external auditors as 
well as internal auditors [are important].  
 
He also referred to the tax authorities: 
 
“When you minimise the expenses it sound good with them but if you 
maximise expenses they will try to stop it". 
RG8 stated that regulators and auditors have to be taught about such issues so that they can 
affect the practice of earnings management. He said: 
"The knowledge and awareness of regulators and external auditors play a 
crucial role in mitigating it". 
As discussed above, the lack of accounting standards has been blamed for low quality in 
financial reporting which might be associated with earnings management. Applying 
accounting standards would play a significant role, according to AD3, in affecting the 
earnings management behaviour. He stated that what was needed was: 
"…accounting standards that clearly show how to account for revenues and 
how to apply recognition. Also, making the provisions calculation process 
clear and simple in a way that is easy to apply being that loans provision is 
the core business for banks". 
RG9 also supported the notion that accounting standards have a principal role in mitigating 
the practice of earnings management. He stated: 
"First of all, there should be accounting standards that are clear and able to 
remedy the issue along with the supervision over the companies for example 
by the CBL and the LSM". 
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Also AD1 considered the importance of accounting standards in constraining earnings 
management practice, as well as the CBL, and the internal and external auditors. He also 
mentioned that lack of professional management would have an influence on earnings 
management activities. He summed up what was needed as follows: 
"The presence of accounting standards that are applicable, internal and 
external control including the CBL and auditors, and finally professional 
management".   
The interviewees suggested a number of ways in order to improve the quality of financial 
reporting by preventing or mitigating the practice of earnings management. For example, 
strengthening the effectiveness of both internal and external audit would have a positive 
impact. Also, the role of oversight from the CBL has been stressed as being potentially 
very influential, and the issuance of formal local accounting standards or adopting the 
IFRS was suggested. Based on the interview findings it could be said that the 
accountability process is seriously affected by the weakness of monitoring bodies; and of 
external and internal audit as well as by the absence of accounting standards. In order to 
protect accountees’ rights and sustain a fair accounting system that provides fair 
accounting information available to all accountees, such monitoring bodies should be 
improved. For example, efficiency of the external audit function is said to provide 
credibility to financial information and therefore it should be less biased. In other words, 
more objective accounting information should be obtained with the existence of an 
efficient audit function. 
Deficiencies in education can also be viewed as having an adverse impact on 
accountability. 
Moreover it was suggested that supporting credit risk management may have an important 
role in mitigating the practice of earnings management. PR10 commented on this issue and 
also mentioned that IFRS could be a solution. He recommended: 
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"Applying the accounting standards or IFRS and activate the credit risk 
management". 
6.4.3 Earnings Management Motivations 
This section of the interviews was pursued to ascertain the views of interviewees regarding 
what motivates a bank’s management to engage in earnings management practices. Table 
6.10 briefly summarises earnings management motivation as perceived by interviewees. 
Table 6.10: Earnings Management Motivation in the Libyan Commercial Banks 
Interviewee 
Q8: What do LCBs use to manage 
earnings? 
Aggregate 
PR1 To make dividends to shareholders 
5 of Preparers (42%) consider job security 
as an earnings management motivation for 
LCBs 
PR2 Competition with other banks 
PR3 To satisfy shareholders 
PR4 
Satisfy shareholders, support financial 
position and compete with others 
PR5 
Job security, influence stock price and 
management compensation 
PR6 
To improve figures when a bank is facing 
poor results 
PR7 Job security and to obtain praise  
PR8 Did not answer question 
PR9 Did not answer question 
PR10 Job security 
PR11 Job security 
PR12 Job security 
AD1 To improve the firm 
3 Auditors (75%) view dividends to 
shareholders as being earnings 
management motivation for LCBs 
AD2 To pay dividends  
AD3 Showing success, dividends 
AD4 Satisfy shareholders through dividends  
RG1 Job security 
8 Regulators (80%) regard job security as 
an earnings management motivation for 
LCBs 
RG2 Job security 
RG3 
To pay employees’ dividends that recently 
took place in public sector 
RG4 Job security and ability to pay dividends 
RG5 Job security 
RG6 
Job security, ability to pay dividends and 
paying less tax 
RG7 Management compensation and job security 
RG8 
Job security and building up personal 
reputation and glory 
RG9 Job security 
R10 
Cover losses, accounting problems and to 
satisfy shareholders by dividends 
US1 
Cover up corruption, management 
compensation and job security 
2 Users (100%) perceive job security as 
being a motivation to manage the reported 
earnings by LCBs US2 
Job security and pressures from board of 
directors 
The overall average for ‘job security’ is 50%. 
The overall average for ‘dividends payments’ is 25% 
Note: this table shows the interviewees’ perceptions about the earnings management motivations in LCBs.. 
Apparently half the Preparers who answered this question identified job security as the 
main motivation for management to manage earnings. Eight of the 10 Regulators agreed 
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with this perception. However, the Auditors generally perceived that earnings were 
managed in order to satisfy shareholders and show the firm in a favourable light. This is in 
line with the earnings management literature (e.g. Norohna et al., 2008) which suggests job 
security as one of the earnings management motivations. AD4 offered the following 
statement: 
"A number of reasons, the principal one is to satisfy the shareholders, 
management always try to have a fixed rate of distributions". 
PR5 for example, expressed the following view: 
"Firstly, it is a personal matter, for managers that is to renew the assignment. 
Secondly, with the existence of the Libyan Stock Market, to increase the 
share price. Thirdly, sometimes a manager would receive a bonus that is tied 
to the net income". 
PR12 made the following statement: 
"The reason is to improve the image of the management as seen by concerned 
parties for example the Central Bank of Libya
74
 and to extend the length of 
the management assignment
75
". 
Earnings management motivations might differ based on whether a bank is public or 
private and either a national or a foreign company. RG1 who earlier suggested the term 
earnings manipulation
76
 differentiated between public, private and foreign companies and 
made the following observation: 
"Earnings manipulation is basically practiced for the reasons of increasing the 
profits in public sector companies including banks in order to burnish the 
Board of Directors’ picture so as to secure the renewal of the assignment. In 
the private sector, banks’ profits are increased to speed up capital recovery by 
which eventually the Board of Directors will be renewed for another period. 
And for family and foreign companies the direction is to understate the profit 
to pay less tax". 
Earnings management, according to some views, is practiced to improve management’s 
picture
77
 in the eyes of the owners. This can be achieved, according to the majority of 
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terms of achievements so as their positions are secured and renewed. 
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responses by dividends in both private and public banks. RG3 who is an inspector at the 
CBL stated: 
"To distribute dividends, the public banks became more concerned about 
earnings management when they started to give a portion to employees 
recently since about four years ago. After this they tended to increase the 
profit so that they can pay dividends to employees and themselves as well".  
Another regulator, RG4, also commented: 
"They tend to increase the profits rather than decreasing and they do that 
mainly to get shareholders satisfied and to have dividends". 
Other reasons were mentioned during the interviews. RG5 commented that earnings 
management is exercised to send a message that a "manager is successful".  
In a previous quotation one interviewee explained why he believes that all banks are 
managing their income by saying that he has never seen any bank that incurs a loss. This 
was also noticed by AD3 who expressed his fears that some new regulation could have a 
severe influence on banks’ accounts: 
"We have noticed recently that the trend is to maximise the profit; 
management is concerned to show success and profit distribution. In recent 
years they face a new problem in the calculation of the provisions. Before, 
bad debts should have a provision of 60% now any bad debt will have 100% 
provision. A lot of old bad loans are there in banks accounts so it is difficult 
for managers to calculate the real provision as the bank might collapse". 
Managers may also be engaged in earnings management for the reason of fraud. This 
notion emerged in the answer of US1, who is also an external auditor, in the following 
statement: 
"According to my experience, earnings management is practiced to cover 
corruption and to get some personal benefits in the form of a bonus. It is also 
practiced to satisfy shareholders so managers retain their positions". 
It appears that there is a belief amongst the interviewees that earnings management is 
motivated by issues relating to job security and satisfying shareholders. This belief reflects 
the interviewees’ acknowledgment that the accountability mechanism is to a large extent 
compromised when managers are concerned about their position. In other words, it is 
widely believed that there is a potential conflict in bank managers being held fully 
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accountable, as long as they are concerned about their jobs, for example. Therefore, they 
might be giving biased accounting information for this reason. Accountability in such 
circumstances may be seriously compromised. The existence of such circumstances (i.e. 
earnings management motivations) may affect the relationship between LCBs’ managers 
and their accountees. LCBs’ managers may therefore be put under certain pressure to 
behave unethically by practicing earnings management which eventually will provide 
biased accounting information. However, an accountability framework as reported in Table 
4.1 acknowledges the accountor’s desire to present the accounting information in the best 
possible way. 
6.4.4 Earnings Management Ethics 
This part of the interviews, (Q11, Table 6.1) sought to explore the interviewees' views 
about the ethics and acceptability of earnings management practices. Replies vary between 
respondents. Table 6.11 summarises interviewees’ perceptions about the ethics of earnings 
management practices where a “yes” answer reflects the interviewee’s perception that 
earnings management practice is ethical and acceptable, and a “no” answer means that the 
interviewee considers earnings management practices are neither ethical nor acceptable. 
The overall result suggests that there is as reported in Table 6.11, a disagreement between 
Preparers and other stakeholder groups. Although one might expect a preparer to justify the 
practice of earnings management, given the fact that motivations exist for them to manage 
earnings, it was expected that other groups would perceive that earnings management was 
unethical practice. Accounting information should be given in a way that is not biased so 
that one can say that it has been fairly presented to the accountees. If accounting 
information unbiasedly presented and was accepted by other groups other than preparers it 
would have a serious effect to the accountability mechanism. The acceptance of such 
behaviour may adversely affect many stakeholders’ interests and reflect a serious threat to 
the accounting system whose main objective according to Ijiri (1983), is to provide fair 
169 
accounting information. The accounting information, under the accountability framework, 
has to be, inter alia, objective which may not be the case when earnings management 
occurs and is perceived as an ethical practice. 
Since accountee groups should be more concerned about looking for unbiased accounting 
information, this unexpected result could be due to the fact that such groups are unaware of 
earnings management consequences and their impact on the quality of financial reporting; 
indeed, the interview findings of Q4 (Table 6.1) suggest that 75% of interviewees have 
wrongly interpreted the earnings management term. It again reflects the disagreement and 
the lack of trust between the preparers and other stakeholders groups.  
Table 6.11: The Ethics of Earnings Management Practices 
Interviewee Q11: Is earnings management ethical? Aggregate 
PR1 Yes 
8 preparers (67%) believed that earnings 
management practices are ethical 
PR2 Yes 
PR3 Yes 
PR4 Yes 
PR5 Yes 
PR6 Yes 
PR7 No 
PR8 No 
PR9 No 
PR10 Yes 
PR11 No 
PR12 Yes 
AD1 Yes 
Surprisingly, only 1 auditor (25%) believe 
that earnings management is unethical 
practice 
AD2 No 
AD3 Yes 
AD4 Yes 
RG1 No 
7 regulators (70%) think that earnings 
management is unethical practice 
RG2 Yes 
RG3 Yes 
RG4 No 
RG5 No 
RG6 Yes 
RG7 No 
RG8 No 
RG9 No 
RG10 No 
US1 No 2 users (100%) consider earnings 
management practices unethical US2 No 
The overall percentage that view earnings management as ethical is 50%, the other half view it as 
unethical 
Note: this table represents the interviewees’ perception regarding the acceptable and ethicalness of earnings 
management practices. 
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A significant portion took the view that if earnings management was implemented within 
accounting standards and regulation then it is viewed as ethical, otherwise not. PR4 
expressed the following view: 
"As long as [it is] within regulations and rules it is ethical". 
PR3 gave a similar reply, he stated: 
"If implanted within GAAP
78
 and the law then it is ethical". 
Also, earnings management, it was felt, could be justified due to the nature of human 
beings. RG3 commented: 
"I consider it ethical; it is human nature always to try to maximise their 
benefits". 
Consistently, AD3 expects the occurrence of earnings management and mentioned that 
there is no "pure accounting". He also outlined some factors that may push managers 
towards earnings management. His statement was: 
"In fact, we always say that social environments or practices e.g. accounting 
is unlike chemistry or physics where 1+1=2. Accounting and management are 
affected by the economic, political, social and cultural environments so no 
way there will be pure accounting or pure management. During the last seven 
years I have been fully involved in audit with managements that suffered 
from a lot of things; bored staff, weak staff, old debts with the state, laws and 
regulations that are complicated and unclear, lack of skilled staff, unjustified 
tightening by the CBL, unethical and severe competition with other banks. 
Management operating in such an environment like that one cannot say it is 
ethical or not. Managers try to fix what can be fixed in favour of the bank and 
deal with real problems and ask the auditor to understand the situation when 
the CBL issues a new regulation and asks for it to be applied in one year 
giving no room to study and understand it. This puts the auditor in an 
embarrassing situation as he will be considered neither not cooperating nor 
forgiving if he insisted on the application of the new regulation. I don’t accept 
a bank to be collapsed as a consequence for applying regulation so you have 
to accept. Life is not static and people work in very tough circumstances and 
suffer the old regime legacy. It is not acceptable but you find a justification 
for it at least some times with a condition that the practice is in the best 
interest of the company. According to my experience managers try to save 
what can be saved". 
Also it was suggested that earnings management could be justified just like tax planning. 
AD4’s statement was as follows: 
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 Although there are no local accounting standards, the term GAAP is widely used to refer to US GAAP. 
The accounting system education, as reported in Chapter 2, is American oriented.  
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"You remind me of tax planning and tax evasion. Sometimes I view 
management as being forced to do it in the light of unusual circumstances. A 
company may have a high profile in an unusual year so this trend is unusual 
given that the real value of the firm won’t be accurately determined unless in 
case of liquidation. Accounting standards depend on discretion in some cases 
and this enables the manager to act in some circumstances for example in 
Libya the old tax law was not permitting the recognition of bad debts. I 
remember a bank that was not allowed to include bad debts in their accounts 
and resulted in a net profits total of 80% of revenues and of course this was 
not real. It is acceptable in the light of unusual conditions to maintain the 
going concern. Being extreme in everything leads to break down. Another 
example, a bank has issued a guarantee letter of 400m LD for one company 
that later failed; if I insisted to make the provision of 400m LD the bank will 
collapse because their capital was only about 400m LD so you have to give 
some room to the other (manager)".   
On the other hand, other interviewees completely refuse to accept that earnings 
management is appropriate. RG1 for example stated: 
"Earnings manipulation in general is unethical". 
RG8 indicated that a company should be attached to its principles. The following statement 
was offered: 
"Of course [it is] unethical, every institution is supposed to have principles, 
policy and a general overview (plan) that it works to achieve with the basic 
rule being that  not achieving any target at the expense of a principal". 
Within an accountability framework, bank managers have to act in an ethical manner. 
Therefore providing biased information (i.e. when earnings management is practiced) 
could reveal that bank managers are not accountable. The interview findings for this 
question identify what appears to be a really serious problem when 50% of interviewees 
perceive that earnings management is ethical; it could lead to acceptance of such practices. 
Again this finding should be looked at while taking into consideration the findings of Q4 
(Table 6.1) presented in Table 6.5 which reveal that 75% of interviewees did not know the 
meaning of the term earnings management. 
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6.5 Interviewees' Perceptions about the Role of Accounting Standards, Corporate 
Governance and the External Auditor 
6.5.1 The Role of Accounting Standards 
Interviewees were asked if the absence of local accounting standards would have any 
influence on the practice of earnings management (Q12, Table 6.1).  
Only two respondents, AD2 and PR11 believed that the absence of local accounting 
standards would not have an impact on the practice of earnings management. The reason, 
as PR11 suggests, is that some alternatives to local accounting standards are available; he 
indicated: 
“I don’t think so, because although we don’t have local standards we still 
have the IFRS or GAAP which could be used by any accountant in the 
world”. 
On the other hand, the majority of interviewees, 93%, agreed that the lack of accounting 
standards contributed to the incidence of earnings management, AD3, for example, has 
commented: 
"The absence of standards opens the door for manipulation. We need 
standards as a background for using as one language. Any standards would 
help even from anywhere". 
Also, RG9 viewed the absence of local standards as a big opportunity for preparers to do 
what they want. He stated: 
"Sure, freedom and you have the stadium open
79
". 
PR10 suggested that managers have excuses when there are no accounting standards. The 
existence of local accounting standards can act as a defence for the accountant who refuses 
to do anything wrong when asked to do so. He offered the following statement: 
"If there were local accounting standards it would make clear how to account 
for a specific event. If I was an accountant and my manager asked me to do 
something I can say no because the accounting standards require a specific 
treatment". 
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 By this, he meant, the door is opened. 
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Given the absence of local standards in Libya, some interviewees felt that they needed 
other standards to be in force. PR5 believed that: 
"Due to no local standards, any standards would be ok, better than nothing". 
The second question (Q13, Table 6.1) in this part of the interview asked interviewees 
whether they thought that IFRS, if applied, would have any effect on the practice of 
earnings management. Table 6.12 summarises interviewees’ responses regarding the 
potential effect of applying IFRS on earnings management practices; the responses are 
presented in form of “yes” and “no”. A ‘yes’ response refers to the interviewee thinking 
that adopting IFRS would positively restrict the earnings management behaviour while a 
‘no’ answer refers to the interviewees’ belief that there would be no impact on the 
practices of earnings management if IFRS was imposed. 
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Table 6.12: IFRS Influence on Financial Reporting Quality by Interviewees 
Interviewee 
Q13: Will adopting IFRS have a positive 
effect on earnings management? 
Aggregate 
PR1 Yes 
11 preparers (91%) believed IFRS would 
positively affect the earnings management 
practices and therefore improve reporting 
quality 
PR2 Yes 
PR3 No “there is no good understanding of IFRS” 
PR4 Yes 
PR5 Yes “as no local standards so far” 
PR6 Yes 
PR7 Yes “to some extent” 
PR8 Yes 
PR9 Yes 
PR10 Yes “it will prevent illegal manipulation” 
PR11 Yes  
PR12 Yes 
AD1 Yes All 4 (100%) of auditors believe that 
adopting IFRS leads to mitigating 
earnings management practices 
AD2 Yes  
AD3 Yes 
AD4 Yes 
RG1 No  
6 (60%) out of 10 regulators think 
applying IFRS would reduce the earnings 
management practices and therefore, 
financial reporting quality could be 
improved 
RG2 Yes 
RG3 Yes 
RG4 Yes  
RG5 Yes 
RG6 No 
RG7 Yes 
RG8 No 
RG9 Yes, quality would be 100% 
RG10 Don’t know about IFRS 
US1 No The Users’ responses come somehow 
differently, where only 1 user (50%) think 
of no positive impact for adopting the 
IFRS on earnings management, others 
looks like not sure about the consequence 
of such a procedure 
US2 Depends on how to apply them 
21 interviewees (75%) believe that IFRS would have a positive influence over financial reporting quality 
Note: This table shows the interviewees’ perceptions regarding the impact of adopting the IFRS on the 
earnings management practices. 
A majority of the interviewees (21, or 75%) agreed that IFRS would have a positive impact 
on earnings management and that it would improve financial reporting quality. This result 
reflects the interviewees’ belief that adopting IAS/IFRS would restrict earnings 
management and the accountability mechanism would, therefore, be effectively enhanced. 
In addition to the fact that there are no local accounting standards to govern the current 
accounting practices in Libya generally and within the banking sector in particular, such a 
finding could refer to the importance of either issuing local accounting standards or 
adopting IFRS so that accountability is enhanced. The importance of adopting a framework 
to govern the accounting practices would lead to high quality accounting information. The 
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existence of a theoretical framework would provide the basis of stability on which 
accounting information can be provided as reported in Table 4.1.  
Apparently adopting IAS/IFRS for the accounting practices in Libya would not be without 
its shortcomings as suggested by RG9
80
 who believes that IFRS would affect net income 
negatively. He indicated: 
"If IFRS was applied the quality of financial reporting would be 100% but 
there will be decreasing in the profits over the first years because you have 
applied standards that wiped out the provisions and recognised all of them as 
a loss”. 
Applying IFRS at one time (i.e. in one step) might not be the right solution even in the case 
that the State itself asked for this. RG9 and AD4 suggested that IFRS should be applied 
step by step. The interviewee RG9 recommended: 
"The wisdom is to apply IFRS gradually, not all in one go, also it is not a 
button to press; to apply the IFRS you need to train staff about it which would 
take time". 
Another interviewee agreed with this notion. AD4 similarly said: 
"Our standards should be IFRS. My view is to apply IFRS gradually since not 
all IFRS are applicable". 
In contrast, some interviewees seem to have a different perception about IFRS. US1, for 
example, who thinks that the quality of financial reporting is poor and believes the practice 
of earnings management to be unethical, advocates the issuance of local accounting 
standards rather than using the international ones. He considers that local standards are 
more suitable, and therefore more applicable, than their international counterparts. He said: 
"No, the international standards are not good for the Libyan environment. The 
good standards are those applicable (local) standards" 
Similarity, RG6 believes that accounting standards should be a product of the surrounding 
environment. His comment was as follows: 
"I don’t believe in international standards. Standards should be derived from 
the environment". 
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 It is worth noting that RG9 regard the financial reporting quality as being poor and that earnings 
management is widely practiced by LCBs. 
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Whatever the accounting standards to be applied (i.e. local standards or IFRS) the 
importance of such a framework was stressed by most of the interviewees since the 
accountability process would be less effective without them. Therefore, based on the 
interview findings that 75% of interviewees perceive IFRS would produce high quality 
financial reporting it could be suggested that adopting IFRS would play a positive role in 
terms of an accountability system. Though it should also be noted that there is a view that 
great care should be taken over the way in which they are adopted (i.e. gradually). 
6.5.2 The Role of Corporate Governance 
The second important factor in mitigating the practice of earnings management that was 
discussed during the interviews was the role of good corporate governance. Q14 (Table 
6.1) sought to explore the interviewees’ perceptions regarding how good corporate 
governance could influence the exercise of earnings management. Twenty five 
interviewees (89%) believed that good corporate governance would effectively mitigate the 
practice of earnings management. According to PR10, for example: 
"It will constrain the management and prevent it from overriding the normal 
procedures. Good corporate governance will separate functions so it would be 
difficult for managers to manage earnings". 
Such a finding could lead to an assumption that in order for an effective accountability 
mechanism to be applied, corporate governance codes, among other things, should be 
practiced. This could be affected by the position of the interviewee i.e. agent or principal as 
others seem against corporate governance and consider it as having no influence on 
earnings management. PR1 the chairman of a commercial bank completely disagreed with 
the notion of the value of corporate governance in general and thinks that it is not 
applicable in Libya due to the fact of the lack of qualifications among Libyan citizens. He 
said: 
"I am against corporate governance
81
, Basel 2 and 3, and splitting between 
functions
82
 in Libya as there is no corporate governance and they couldn’t 
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 PR1 is the chairman of a private commercial bank, he is one of the founders of that bank, and actually he is 
the first of them who advocated establishing it. So effectively he was chairman, general manager, accounts 
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split them due to no qualifications. For me it is nonsense, theory only. But if 
it is implemented in a good way it would tackle the earnings management". 
However, PR1 agreed that good corporate governance could have a role in deterring 
earnings management if it was only “implemented in a good way”. 
One of the interviewees, RG6, suggested that earnings management might be exercised 
even with good corporate governance: 
"I don’t think so. Earnings management could be practiced within laws and 
with good intent". 
On the other hand, good corporate governance, if it did not resolve the issue, it would at 
least control it, according to RG4. It is arguably needless to stress the importance of the 
role of corporate governance in the accountability process. However, the above discussion 
reveals an awareness by some interviewees regarding the important role that good 
corporate governance could play in improving financial reporting quality and thus the 
accountability process. Better corporate governance can increase public confidence in the 
integrity of the financial reporting process and in the credibility of the accounting 
information generated from the entity. Some corporate governance rules may restrict 
LCBs’ managers and make them work in the interest of shareholders and other 
stakeholders. 
Table 6.13 briefly outlines interviewees’ perceptions in respect of the effect that good 
corporate governance could have in relation to deterring managers from being involved in 
earnings management practices. 
  
                                                                                                                                                    
chief (he is a certified accountant) and almost everything in that bank, that’s why he did not like it when the 
central bank issued the corporate governance guide and asked to split the function of chairman and general 
manager into two positions. This may clarify why his response may be seen as contradictory.  
82
 He is referring to the function segregation between chairman and general manager positions that is required 
by most corporate governance codes. 
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Table: 6.13: Good Corporate Governance Influence on Financial Reporting Quality 
Interviewee 
Q14: Can good corporate governance 
deter earnings management? 
Aggregate 
PR1 Yes 
11 Preparers  (91%) agree that good 
corporate governance would negatively 
impact earnings management practices 
PR2 Yes 
PR3 Yes 
PR4 Yes 
PR5 Yes 
PR6 Yes 
PR7 Yes 
PR8 Yes 
PR9 Yes 
PR10 Yes 
PR11 Not answered 
PR12 Yes 
AD1 Yes All Auditors (100%) believe applying 
good corporate governance could deter 
managers of being engaged in earnings 
management practices 
AD2 Yes 
AD3 Yes 
AD4 Yes 
RG1 Yes 
8 Regulators (80%) think that good 
corporate governance can mitigate 
earnings management 
RG2 Yes 
RG3 Yes 
RG4 Yes 
RG5 yes 
RG6 No 
RG7 Yes 
RG8 Yes 
RG9 Yes 
RG10 No 
US1 Yes All Users (100%) showed their agreement 
as good corporate governance can affect 
the practice of earnings management 
US2 Yes 
25 (89%) of interviewees believe that applying good corporate governance in LCBs could have deter 
LCBs’ manager from being engaged in earnings management practices. 
Note: This table shows the interviewees’ perceptions regarding applying good corporate governance in 
deterring the practice of earnings management. 
 
As Table 6.13 shows, most interviewees (89%) believed in the potential role of applying 
good corporate governance in relation to reducing earnings management by LCBs. In other 
words, accountability in LCBs is perceived to be potentially enhanced, partially, by 
applying good corporate governance. 
In the next section, the role of the external auditor in relation to earnings management is 
addressed. Interviewees were asked whether the external auditor was able to detect and 
prevent the practice of earnings management by LCBs’ managers. 
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6.5.3 The Role of the External Auditor 
Auditors’ ability to detect and prevent the practice of earnings management was also 
discussed with interviewees (Q15, Table 6.1). They were asked whether, and to what 
extent, they thought that the auditor is able to detect and prevent managers from being 
involved in earnings management. Table 6.14 summarises the interviewees’ responses to 
this question. 
Table 6.14: The External Auditor’s Ability to Detect and Deter Earnings 
Management 
Interviewee 
Q15: Can the external auditor detect and 
deter earnings management? 
Aggregate 
PR1 Can detect and deter 
All Preparers (100) confirmed the external 
auditor’s ability for detecting earnings 
management, but only 5 (41%) believe of 
the auditor’s ability to deter the practice. 
On the other hand, 6 Preparers (50%) 
think that auditor cannot deter the practice 
PR2 Can detect and deter 
PR3 Can detect, cannot deter 
PR4 Can detect, cannot deter 
PR5 Can detect 
PR6 Can detect and deter 
PR7 Can detect, cannot deter 
PR8 Can detect, cannot deter 
PR9 Can detect, cannot deter 
PR10 Can detect, cannot deter 
PR11 Can detect and deter 
PR12 Can detect and deter 
AD1 Can detect, cannot deter All Auditors who answer this question (3 
out of 4) see the external auditor able to 
detect the practice but not able to deter it. 
AD2 Did not answer question 
AD3 Can detect, cannot deter 
AD4 Can detect, cannot deter 
RG1 Can detect 
9 out of 10 Regulators think that external 
auditor is able to detect earning 
management but only 2 (20%) believe the 
external auditor ability to deter it. 
RG2 Can detect and deter 
RG3 Can detect, cannot deter 
RG4 Can detect, cannot deter 
RG5 Can detect and deter 
RG6 Can detect, cannot deter 
RG7 Can detect, cannot deter 
RG8 Cannot detect 
RG9 Can detect, cannot deter 
RG10 Can detect, cannot deter 
US1 Can detect, cannot deter The only User who answered believed that 
external auditor can detect earnings 
management but not deter it 
US2 Did not answer question 
25 (89%) of interviewees believe of the external auditor ability to detect the practice of earnings 
management but only 7 (25%) think of the external auditor ability to deter it. 
Note: This table shows the interviewees’ perceptions regarding the external auditor’s ability in detecting and 
deterring the practice of earnings management. 
As noted in Table 6.12, all Preparers are in agreement about the external auditor’s ability 
to detect earnings management but their views in respect of whether the external auditor 
can deter the practice of earnings management showed almost equal results; 5 of them 
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believe that the external auditor can deter it while 6 Preparers hold the opposite view that 
they cannot deter it. All Auditors who have answered this question said that the external 
auditor can detect the practices of earnings management but will be unable to deter it. The 
majority of Regulators (9 out of 10) think that the external auditor can detect earnings 
management practices but only 2 (out 9 who believe he/she can detect) think that the 
external auditor can deter earnings management. On the other hand, 6 out 10 Regulators 
acknowledged the external auditor’s ability in deterring the earnings management 
practices. The only User who answered this question gave the view that the external 
auditor is able to detect earnings management but is unable to deter it. 
PR1, for instance, suggested that the auditor is able to prevent through his opinion and can 
detect the earnings management practices. On the other hand, the ability to prevent such a 
practice apparently is affected by a number of factors as will be discussed later. The 
majority of interviewees (82%) agreed that the external auditor can detect earnings 
management if he/she is qualified. As for preventing earnings management, responses 
come in different ways. Some say that he can prevent it through ‘waving’83 his/her report 
and some say that he cannot prevent it for some reasons. PR4, for example, mentioned the 
fees amount that an auditor may lose in case of any conflict with management. He said: 
"The auditor is supposed to be qualified to detect it through the process of 
audit. It depends on his personality if he is not caring about the money he 
would say “no”. But actually most of them say ok. Our fees have reached 
50,000 LD". 
The external auditor efficiency, which is a central issue within the accountability 
mechanism
84
, is seen to be compromised by the high audit fees commercial banks usually 
pay and also the personality of the individual external auditor.  Ironically, the external 
audit represents a very important element in the accountability process which theoretically 
should be enhanced by the payment of high fees to reflect rigorous and high quality audits. 
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 Threatening that he/she may issue a qualified opinion. 
84
 If the external audit was not properly carried out the quality of financial information may not be assured. 
Given the fact that that financial information may have been managed and therefore less quality financial 
information is being provided. 
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Those high fees themselves could, however, harm the accountability as the external auditor 
may do anything to ensure that these fees are maintained and secured. 
Also, interviewees perceived that an auditors' experience plays a significant role in 
detecting earnings management practices. In the year one of an audit, auditors may not be 
experienced enough in relation to understanding the new client’s business to detect 
earnings management as expressed by PR5 and PR12 who respectively said: 
"It depends on what is the experience of the auditor in terms of time; an 
auditor for one year could not, but an auditor who has being auditing for five 
years for instance could detect and can give some advice on how to reduce 
the practice". 
"External auditor in his first time of auditing will not be able to detect it. But 
if he discovered he can prevent it". 
The notion of audit tenure
85
 was also mentioned in the response of PR10 who also blamed 
limited audit samples for not uncovering earnings management practices. 
"To some extent, the external auditor can detect earnings management, but 
only to some extent as he will take samples. He will not be able to audit all 
transactions. When he detects the earnings management, it is supposed that he 
has the power to prevent it. Due to the limited number of auditors who are 
qualified to audit big institutions, the more the auditor becomes familiar with 
the institution the more the auditor creates a kind of relation with the 
institution that makes the auditor work for the management instead of 
shareholders". 
The audit process itself could be seen, as in above quotation, as one of the factors that 
could affect the detection of earnings management practices. This was also stressed by 
US1, who considered the problem of audit samples by saying: 
"Yes, the auditor can discover it. But not all earnings management practices 
because of audit samples. The auditor is one of the tools to discover earnings 
management practices. The auditor needs standards, and professional 
management in order to be able to discover, also has to be qualified. This is a 
big question that cannot be answered easily; auditor has to be protected when 
appointed and when terminated. He has to have standards to be applied". 
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 According to the CBL’s regulation, an auditor can only be assigned for maximum two years for same bank. 
However, the relationship may be back again after a one year audit by another auditor.  
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Auditor independence represents a core element in the audit function and thus in the 
accountability process. AD1 described the relation between auditors and management by 
saying: 
"Auditor assignment is 90% or 99% dependent on personal contacts so an 
auditor’s decision is consistent with the management's desire”.  
In the same vein, RG1, when asked to rate the efficiency of listed auditors, mentioned the 
problem of personal contacts in appointing the external auditor. He said: 
"Not all of them are at the same level of efficiency. Some audit assignments 
are based on personal contacts and are regardless of the effectiveness or 
efficiency". 
The accountability process can be seen as less effective once an auditor’s independence is 
compromised; therefore more efforts have to be taken in order to enhance auditor 
independence. 
AD3 commented: 
"If he was capable he would detect it. The profession is suffering. In Libya 
there is a problem unfortunately; industry got a lot of unqualified auditors 
meanwhile a lot of qualified people as well. The market and life 
circumstances play a role in making auditors give up (no resistance) to the 
management. I know and you know there are some auditors who only have 
one client and he is not braced for losing it". 
The profession itself could contribute to an auditor’s ability to detect and prevent earnings 
management practices. For example, PR3 has said: 
"Most external auditors don’t prevent the practice of earnings management. 
The audit function is traditional in Libya". 
This suggests that the improvement of the entire profession (which arguably could start 
with the setting of accounting standards) is needed in order to back accounting practices 
and therefore facilitate the audit function. In other words, the conceptual framework would 
empower the accountability process. 
PR10 also commented on this issue in assessing the listed auditors’ efficiency by saying: 
"They have the experience in banks audit. They have the ability. But they are 
a bit traditional, they are not following the technology". 
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Earnings management itself could be the reason why auditors cannot detect or prevent it. 
RG8 commented: 
"Well it is a new topic and most auditors have no idea about it so I think they 
cannot detect if. On the other hand, the independence of the auditor is all the 
time questionable". 
The external auditor plays a crucial role in the accountability relationship, his/her role is to 
give assurance and confidence that financial statements faithfully represent the financial 
situation of the firm. This role may be impaired by some factors, as interview findings 
show a view that the external auditor’s effectiveness may be affected by knowledge, 
experience, conflict of interest (fees, tenure) and audit procedures and sampling. Therefore, 
and based on interview findings, the external auditor’s effectiveness is questionable and 
therefore accountability would be judged as being breached. Moreover, the interview 
findings reported in Table 6.13 suggest that 89% of interviewees acknowledge the ability 
of the external auditor in detecting earnings management practices, but only 25% of 
interviewees believe that the external auditor is able to play a role in deterring LCBs 
managers from being engaged in earnings management. This suggest that accountability is 
to some extent affected by the personality of the external auditor that was suggested by 
PR4 when he was speaking about the high fees for bank audits. 
The second question in this area (Q16, Table 6.1) was to ascertain views about the ability 
and efficiency of auditors who are listed at the CBL
86
 and thereby authorised to audit 
banks. Some interviewees see that most of those listed auditors have the capability to audit 
banks and some see that only a few auditors have the efficiency for banking audit. 
PR1 has stated: 
"It is a very good question. Only those who have audited banks and got the 
experience. Not all of them are qualified to audit banks". 
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 As previously discussed, in Chapter 2, the CBL maintains a register of listed auditors who are only 
permitted to audit banks. 
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This might lead to the question of what standards does the CBL follow in listing external 
auditors. PR3 raised this query: 
"The auditors who are listed and authorised to audit banks, I am not 
convinced about them, because there are no standards to accept the auditor 
and licence him to audit banks".  
This question sought interviewees’ perceptions regarding listed auditors and whether they 
are capable for bank audit so that one can judge about the accountability relationship of 
LCBs. Listed auditors presumably are effective and capable of bank audit however, the 
interview findings showed mixed views. 
Interviewees were also asked to determine the extent to which the auditor's report is used 
by various stakeholders (Q17, Table 6.1). Libyan stakeholders may lack the culture and 
tradition of reading the reports as declared by RG1 who said: 
"Some ways of manipulation are easy to detect but giving a qualified opinion 
is not enough because of inaccuracy of the auditor’s report on one hand. On 
the hand there is no report reading culture by interested parties... the use of 
the auditor report is very limited and in most cases is informal". 
RG5 thinks that the auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and that no one is using it. 
He said: 
"There is no relying on it at all. It is only a legal requirement". 
RG9 also suggested: 
"Unfortunately it is a legal requirement by the LSM and I don’t think people 
are interested in it". 
Interviewees view the CBL, LSM, tax authorities and management as the stakeholders who 
are most interested in the auditor's report. PR1 added correspondent banks as another party 
which is interested in the external auditor's report. He also commented on investors' use of 
the auditor's report. He said it was: 
"Supposed to be very important for the CBL and the LSM and correspondents 
are very interested in the auditor's report. Investors are not, as they depend on 
their broker when deciding on buying or selling shares". 
According to, PR4, no one is using the auditor’s report. He noticed: 
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"Supposed to depend on it, but I don’t think they do use it here". 
The auditor’s reputation may have a role on it being used. PR11 stressed the good 
reputation of the auditor. He stated: 
"The owners are much more interested in the detailed report
87
 rather than an 
opinion report. Also the auditor himself plays an important role for example a 
report signed by one auditor, for example, will be accepted by the tax 
authority with no suspicion, on the other hand another auditor's report could 
be thrown away". 
For AD4 only foreign companies are interested in the auditor's report while the local 
authorities only ask for it as a legal requirement. He observed: 
"Frankly no one uses it [the auditor’s report] except the foreign companies 
who send it to their head offices in order to make the consolidated statements. 
In Libya they use it as a legal requirement only. One time in a general 
assembly meeting the auditor was not invited to read his report". 
As understood, the main functions of the external auditor are to examine the financial 
statements and to provide an opinion based on that examination. In other words, the 
external auditor’s role within the accountability system is fulfilled when the external 
auditor’s report is issued. In the case that this report is not being used, the accountability 
system may not be fully implemented. It could also reflect lack of awareness by various 
stakeholders about the accountability system in general and that the role of the external 
auditor in the accountability process in particular. 
The questions 18 and 19 (Table 6.1) attracted no interest or comments from the 
interviewees, and therefore, the researcher was not able to report about them. 
6.6 Summary 
This Chapter examines and reports the findings obtained from twenty eight interviews 
conducted with a variety of LCB stakeholders from the two main cities in Libya; Benghazi 
and Tripoli. The interview findings indicate that the majority (97%) of stakeholders 
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 There are, in Libya, two reports an auditor has to submit to the general assembly; a detailed report which 
normally consists of auditor’s remarks on the internal control system and any mistaken transactions, the other 
is the opinion report. 
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perceive that financial reporting is important. Also a significant portion of interviewees 
(57%) view the quality of financial reporting as being not good. The interview findings 
also revealed that there is a lack of understanding of the terminology and the concept of 
earnings management. Twenty two interviewees (79%) had not heard of the term and when 
they were asked about the term’s connotation, apparently some of these who indicated that 
they were familiar with the term actually did not really understand the real meaning of it as 
82% of the interviewees interpreted the term in a wrong way; i.e. how to invest and reuse 
the earned profits. The findings suggest that translation of the term may have led to this 
misinterpretation of the term and that “earnings manipulation” might be more informative. 
Interview findings suggest that earnings management is relatively widely practiced within 
LCBs as 53.5% of interviewees believe that LCBs are engaged in earnings management 
practices. Given the impact earnings management would have on the quality of financial 
reporting it can be said, based on the interviewees’ perceptions, that LCBs financial 
reporting is affected by the practice of earnings management and therefore is of reduced 
quality which may reveal a serious threat to the accountability system for LCBs 
stakeholders. 
Interview findings also suggest that the loan loss provision (LLP) is one of the key 
mechanisms by which bank managers alter the reported income; this was referred to by 
64% of interviewees who believe LLP is being used by LCBs to manage earnings. As for 
who is the main stakeholder to LCBs, the interview findings suggest shareholders are seen 
as the main stakeholder for LCBs; the percentage was 75% of interviewees who indicated 
that. 
In regards to what motivates bank managers to indulge in the earnings management 
practices; overview results indicate that about 50% of interviewees view job security as a 
principal factor to induce bank managers to engage in earnings management practices. 
187 
The ethics of earnings management was also explored; the interview findings pointed out 
that 50% of the interviewees perceive earnings management as being ethical while the 
other half perceive it as unethical. In more detail, 67% of Preparers view earnings 
management as acceptable which might not be surprising. On the other hand, 100% of 
Users and 70% of Regulators see that earnings management is not ethical, but only 25% of 
Auditors see earnings management as unethical. 
Based on above results, it can be seen that there is strong evidence that earnings 
management does exist in LCBs’ financial reporting resulting in their quality being 
impaired. Also, earnings management is perceived to be mainly exercised using LLP. This 
behaviour is to a large extent motivated by job security. This behaviour is being seen as 
both ethical and unethical as well, since only half of the interviewees perceived it as 
ethical. One of the main factors that make such behaviour easy for LCBs’ managers, as per 
interviewees’ perceptions, is the absence of local accounting standards. Based on all the 
above one can say, from an accountability perspective, that the above findings are leading 
to an assumption that the accountability of LCBs is really under threat. The remaining 
results show how such accountability could be promoted from the view point of the 
interviewees. 
Interviewees were also asked to indicate whether lack of local accounting standards, weak 
corporate governance and the external audit function may have an influence over the 
existence of earnings management within the LCBs and in this regards, interviews suggest 
that absence of local accounting standards have an impact suggesting that adopting IFRS 
would positively impact the financial reporting quality and deter earnings management 
practices. Also, the corporate governance tools are believed, when are well applied, to have 
an influence on earnings management practices.  
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As regarding the external auditor’s role in mitigating the earnings management practices, 
there was a relatively wide agreement amongst interviewees (89%) that a qualified external 
auditor may easily detect earnings management practices but as to deter the practices the 
interviews findings reveal that only 7 or 25% of interviewees think that an external auditor 
is able to effectively deter earnings management practices. The interviewees referred to 
some issues that may affect the external auditor’s effectiveness; knowledge, experience, 
conflict of interest i.e. fees, and audit sampling. 
The auditor report represents the auditor’s potential power towards influencing 
management actions in terms of earnings management, but in Libya, this is thought to 
often not be the case. The interview findings indicate that the auditor’s report is often 
viewed as only a legal requirement and is not used when it comes to make economic 
decision regarding the financial position of a bank. 
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Chapter 7 
Questionnaire Analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As previously outlined, this study aims to explore the views and perceptions amongst the 
various stakeholders of the Libyan Commercial Banks regarding earnings management 
practices and related issues. As mentioned in the previous chapter, interviews were used, as 
the first method in this study, to investigate and explore the perceptions of a variety of 
relevant stakeholders about the topic of earnings management. The second method used in 
this study was a questionnaire survey, which was partly built on the findings of the 
interviews analysis presented in Chapter 6. Questions were also based on a wide review 
and analysis of the existing related literature. This chapter contains six sections. Following 
the introduction, Section 7.2 outlines the questionnaire design and structure; Section 7.3 
highlights the questionnaire piloting and administration process; Section 7.4 reports the 
reliability and validity tests for this questionnaire; Section 7.5 presents the data analysis 
process and shows the findings of this analysis; while Section 7.6 provides a summary of 
the chapter. 
7.2 Questionnaire Design and Structure 
Chapter 5 discussed and explained the interpretive paradigm was adopted to satisfy the 
research objectives of this thesis. It also outlined that the survey questionnaire was chosen 
as one of the two methods for data collection. A questionnaire survey is one of the most 
widely used methods in social science research (Blaxter et al., 2010). According to Sekaran 
(1992), it is an efficient method for data collection where it is reasonably clear to the 
researcher what information is required, and is a way to measure the variables of interest. 
In order to develop an efficient questionnaire, or, in Bell’s (2010) words, “to produce 
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really good questionnaires…” it “requires discipline in the selection of questions, in 
question writing, in the design, piloting, distribution and return of the questionnaire” (p. 
140). Considerable time and effort have been devoted towards the design for this study’s 
questionnaire; questions were prepared and written carefully and special attention was paid 
to the layout and the ordering of the questions; they were structured in a logical manner so 
that they were easy to read and follow. Also attempts were made to make the questionnaire 
clear and uncluttered in order to encourage respondents to complete and return the 
questionnaires
88. This questionnaire adopts the “funnel approach” that was suggested by 
Oppenheim (1992). According to this approach, questions are designed to flow from a 
general or a wide idea to a specific or narrow idea. The advice of Saunders et al. (2012) is 
that a considerable amount of time should be spent on the order and flow of the questions 
to ensure that they and their order, are logical to the respondent. In this questionnaire, 
questions of similar content were grouped in one section; for example, all questions related 
to financial reporting quality and earnings management were included in Part 2. This 
study’s questionnaire started from the quality of financial reporting and led to questions 
exploring disincentives in respect of financial reporting. The questionnaire appearance is 
highly important; Robertson and Dearling (2004) pointed out that a questionnaire‘s layout 
is a crucial matter that has to be considered. They added: “[n]ot only should the document 
look professional, but good layout is also an essential element for the smooth running of 
any questionnaire” (p. 145). As mentioned earlier, there was specific feedback that the 
questionnaire was successful in having a professional appearance. The questionnaire 
consisted of seven A4 pages; including the covering letter and two open ended questions 
which gave a reasonable space for comments; in other words, the total number of pages for 
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 Some respondents expressed their admiration for the order of the questions; they liked the order which 
starts by investigating perceptions of earnings quality, then goes to understanding and, if necessary, 
clarification of the term earnings management and its related issues. 
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closed ended questions was five pages which was considered to be reasonable
89
. The 
questionnaire, in both English and Arabic can be found in Appendices 7.1 and 7.2. 
Questionnaire questions can either be open or closed ended; in open questions the 
respondent is left with a space to write their answer; open ended questions usually begin 
with the words like “How”, “Why”, “What”, etc. In such questions respondents should be 
offered an adequate amount of space to write down an answer without unreasonable 
restrictions. Although responses to open ended questions may be difficult to analyse, they 
might lead to a richness in the results with interesting and unexpected responses (Gray, 
2004). Closed ended questions, on the other hand, are those questions in which a 
respondent is given the opportunity to choose one answer from a set of pre-selected 
alternatives; this type can range from a simple form e.g. Yes/No, Male/Female to a 5-point 
‘Likert’ ranking scale of alternatives for the respondent to choose from (Hall and Hall, 
1996). Such questions allow easy coding for analysis (Gray, 2004). This questionnaire 
comprised a mix of open and closed ended questions as will be discussed later. Part 1, for 
example, consisted of both types of questions. It asked for participants’ age, for example, 
by giving five answers (age ranges) to choose from as well as open questions, for instance, 
respondents were asked to write about their experience, if any, in the banking sector. With 
the exception of Question 2.2, all other questions used a Likert scale where participants 
were asked to determine the strength of their feeling towards a given set of statements. The 
higher the answer chosen the higher the level of agreement the participant has (Bell, 2010). 
The questionnaire structure consisted of a covering letter and three parts with questions. 
The covering letter represents the questionnaire introduction which, according to Sekaran 
(2003), is of great importance, he pointed out: 
“A proper introduction that clearly discloses the identity of the researcher and 
conveys the purpose of the survey is absolutely necessary. It is also essential 
to establish some rapport with the respondents and motivate them to respond 
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The reasonable length for a questionnaire, according to Bell (2008), should be between four to six pages. 
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to the questions in the questionnaire wholeheartedly and enthusiastically. 
Assurance of confidentiality of the information provided by them will allow 
for less biased answers. The introduction section should end on a courteous 
note, thanking the respondent for taking the time to respond to the survey” (p. 
245).  
Sarantakos (2005) suggests that the covering letter has an influence on the response rate. 
The notion behind the covering letter, according to Sarantakos (2005), is to introduce the 
participants to the research topic and describe the main objectives and social significance 
of the study so that any uncertainties those participants may have can be eliminated. Also, 
the covering letter should assure anonymity and confidentiality which would encourage the 
respondents to participate in the survey. Respondents should be given reasons why they 
have been chosen to participate in the survey. Walliman (2011) suggested: 
“When sending out the questionnaire, you should courteously invite the 
recipients to complete it, and encourage them by explaining the purpose of 
the survey, how the results could be of benefit to them, and how little time it 
will take to complete” (p. 191). 
In some cases, this researcher verbally explained to the participants that filling out the 
questionnaire could have a positive impact on their knowledge given the possible 
importance of earnings management on financial reporting quality and ultimately on 
financial decisions. 
Considerable efforts were made to guarantee that important issues within the topic of 
earnings management were included in the questionnaire. In addition, the first part of the 
questionnaire was about the personal data of the participants which should have been 
relatively easy to complete. They were asked to determine their age, gender, qualifications, 
place of work and banking experience if any.  
The objective of the second part was to elicit participants’ perceptions about financial 
reporting quality and earnings management practices. In this part of the study, participants 
were asked to indicate if they had heard about the term “earnings management” and to 
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indicate their understanding of the term
90
. They were given a variety of possible replies 
based on the differing ways in which the term had been understood by the interviewees. 
Then, participants were subsequently given a definition for earnings management in the 
sense that it was to be understood for the purpose of the questionnaire so as to have 
relevant replies to the rest of questions about earnings management motivations, 
techniques, constraints and ethical issues. This part also examined the accountability 
relationship between Libyan Commercial Banks’ managers and their stakeholders.  
The third part was designed to obtain questionnaire participants’ views regarding the 
external auditor’s role in connection with earnings management practices. The external 
auditor’s efficiency and accountability were addressed as well as the use of the auditor’s 
report by various stakeholders. 
7.3 Questionnaire Piloting and Administration 
It is highly recommended that a questionnaire be tested before it is distributedt. A 
questionnaire should be pre-tested on a small number of people from a similar group to 
that to be surveyed and this procedure is called a pilot study (Walliman, 2011). A 
questionnaire should be pre-tested to ensure that all questions and instructions are clear to 
participants, it is also good practice to test the time it takes a participant to complete it 
(Bell, 2010). It is suggested that asking two or three people of a similar group to go 
through the questionnaire under the supervision of the researcher would be extremely 
useful (Bill, 2008). This study’s questionnaire was originally produced in English91, which 
is not widely spoken nor an official language in Libya. Therefore, it had to be translated 
into the official language in Libya, Arabic. Precise wording of questions is of great 
significance in surveys therefore numerous efforts were undertaken to ensure an accurate 
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 One of the research questions deals with the extent to which earnings management as a term is known and 
understood by the various stakeholders of the LCBs. 
91
 The questionnaire went through several revisions and discussions with the supervisors before the final draft 
was ready for translation and pilot testing. 
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translation by the researcher
92
. The first pilot study was undertaken in December 2012 in 
the School of Business at the University of Dundee on three PhD students who were 
undertaking their doctoral studies in different accounting topics. Their comments and ideas 
were important and resulted in some helpful suggestions. Their comments were mainly 
about the wording of some questions in the Arabic version of the questionnaire. The 
second pilot study was undertaken in Libya with three auditors, one of whom holds an 
MSc in accounting from a US university and two academics, one of whom holds a PhD 
from an Egyptian university, to ensure an accurate translation and understandability of the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was handed out by the researcher during the pilot testing 
with an explanation of the research aims and objectives. When completed questionnaires 
were collected there was a discussion with each of the respondents about their comments 
and feedback and valuable comments were received in this way. The feedback was useful 
in terms of the Arabic translation and questions were modified based on the suggestions of 
two of the auditors. 
Questionnaire surveys can be administered either by post or by the researcher, in person. 
Although a postal questionnaire may have some advantage in the sense of cost and the 
wide geographical distribution that can be achieved, it is not practical in Libya. Zagoub 
(2011) concluded that: 
“The post system in Libya is old and it is now under development. Therefore, 
individuals and organisations still depend on post boxes that are available 
inside the post buildings. Moreover, the e-mail system is still not commonly 
used in Libya and many of the individuals and organisations do not have this 
system” (p. 159). 
Thus self-administration was selected, partially based on the above statement, and to a 
large extent due to the short time the researcher had to spend in Libya. Sekaran (2003) 
indicated:  
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 As an auditor, the researcher had frequently been asked to participate in questionnaires made by Libyan 
postgraduate students, it was notable to the researcher that the questions had not been carefully translated into 
Arabic which means that the student had just translated with no attention to what it would look like in 
Arabic.  
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“The main advantage of this [self-administration questionnaire] is that the 
researcher or a member of the research team can collect all the completed 
responses within a short period of time” (p. 236). 
The distribution process took place in the period early January 2013 till February 2013 
during which time 193 copies were given to various stakeholders of the Libyan 
Commercial Banks. The researcher had the benefit of a helpful network that had been 
developed over the previous years from the audit profession; a number of potential 
respondents were personally known to the researcher, or are currently, or were, clients for 
either audit or non-audit services of the office where the researcher works
93
. In addition, 
some of respondents offered to help to distribute more copies of the questionnaire to their 
own colleagues who worked in the same place and also to contacts in other banks. The 
procedure with other stakeholders was largely the same. Regulators from the Central Bank 
of Libya, for example, were accessed through a family member who works for the bank in 
a non-accounting position, as well as through the manager
94
 of the Benghazi branch of the 
central bank of Libya who is known to the researcher and who was of great assistance 
when asked to contact more employees to encourage their participation in the survey. 
Personal contacts were also useful in getting co-operation from the tax authority, the 
Libyan Stock Market, external auditors, academics and other stakeholders. 
In total 193 questionnaires were distributed and collected personally. Questionnaires were 
attached to a covering letter (English and Arabic versions are included in Appendices 7.1 
and 7.2 together with the questionnaires) stating the purpose of the study and encouraging 
the participants to take part in it; it also identified the researcher and assured the anonymity 
and confidentiality of any information which respondents would provide. 
                                                 
93
 Efforts were given to ensure that those who were identified as respondents were involved in the financial 
reporting process e.g. accountant, internal auditor or holding a management position. 
94
 He expressed his interest in the research topic and asked more people to contribute in it. He said it was a 
good opportunity to understand a topic by answering a survey, and the first time he had done this. 
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Once questionnaires started to come back, the process of coding and keying them into an 
Excel spreadsheet was started. After feeding all the responses into the spreadsheet, a 
double check was made to ensure that all responses had been correctly entered.  Table 7.1 
summarizes the number of returned questionnaires categorized by different stakeholders. 
7.3.1 Questionnaire Response Rate 
The term “response rate”, according to Denscombe (1998), refers to the “proportion of the 
total number of questionnaires distributed which are completed and returned as requested” 
(p. 19). It is assumed that not all distributed copies will be returned and be fit for analysis. 
In this study numerous procedures were followed to help maximize the response rate. This 
included the questionnaire design and length, layout and question sequencing and wording 
of questions. In addition the researcher made an effort to get the most from his past 
experience as an auditor who has a helpful network through job contacts. As shown in 
Table 7.1 the response rate of this questionnaire was 53%. It varied, amongst the groups of 
respondents, from 48% for Preparers to 64% for Regulators. 
Table 7.1: The Returned Questionnaires 
Respondent Groups 
Distributed 
Questionnaires 
Returned 
Questionnaires 
Response Rate 
Preparers 56 27 48% 
Auditors  54 27 50% 
Regulators 31 20 64% 
Users  52 28 54% 
Total 193 102 53% 
Note: this Table shows the numbers of distributed and returned questionnaires, as well as the response rate 
according to each group. More details about the personal information of the respondents are presented in 
Table 7.2. 
7.4 Questionnaire Reliability and Validity  
Before getting the data analysed, it is important, according to Field (2009), to “ensure that 
measurement error is kept to a minimum” (p. 11). For this aim two properties of the 
instrument should be examined: reliability and validity. Bell (2010), pointed out that both 
reliability and validity have to be tested regardless of the method used for data collection. 
He outlined that:  
197 
“Whatever procedure for collecting data is selected, it should always be 
examined critically to assess to what extent it is likely to be reliable and 
valid” (p. 119). 
7.4.1 Questionnaire Reliability  
Reliability refers to an instrument’s ability to produce constant and reliable results; a 
method is considered reliable when if re-used it would produce the same results 
(Sarantakos, 2005). To Field (2009), reliability refers to the ability to interpret the 
instrument consistently through different times. In the sense of a questionnaire, a high 
degree of reliability, according to Gray (2004), means that a researcher should get the same 
results if the thing being measured is re-measured at some other time
95
; it is a measure of 
consistency. According to Gray (2004), although reliability can be tested in several ways, 
one of the most common ways to examine the scale of reliability is Cronbach’s alpha test 
which “presents the average of all possible split-half correlations, and so measures the 
consistency of all items” (p. 208). The value of Cronbach’s alpha is interpreted using a 
scale from 0 to 1.0; the higher the coefficient, the more reliable the data is (Gray, 2004). 
This test, according to Saunders et al. (2012), is used to measure the response consistency 
among the questions; its values range between 0 and 1.0 where a scale of 0.7 or above is 
considered as acceptable. The Cronbach’s alpha for this study has been calculated by SPSS 
and the generated score was 0.922 which is, according to the above recommendations, 
acceptable. 
7.4.2 Questionnaire Validity 
Once the reliability of the instrument is accomplished, its validity should be examined. A 
reliable method does not mean that it is valid instrument; an instrument’s validity should 
also be tested. Validity is arguably a more complex concept; a valid instrument, according 
to Bell (2010), is an instrument that measures what it is supposed to measure (Bell, 2010). 
Sarantakos (2005) defined validity as: 
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 Subject, presumably, to any changes in perceptions in the intervening period that may have been caused by 
changes in the respondents’ environment in relation to the subject matter of the questionnaire. 
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“The property of a research instrument that measures its relevance, precision 
and accuracy… it is a measure of the quality of the process of measurement, 
and one that reflects the essential value of a study, and which is accepted, 
respected, and indeed expected by the researchers and users of research” (p. 
83). 
To test for an instrument’s validity, it is suggested that it should be pre-tested before 
conducting the research (Saunders et al., 2012). In the current study, the validity of the 
questionnaire was examined for validation by a number of academics and professionals 
who were targeted in the pilot study as outlined earlier in this chapter. 
7.5 Questionnaire Analysis 
It was explained earlier in this chapter, that questions were derived from the interview 
findings, as well as from previous literature. For example, possible earnings management 
motivations were listed in light of what respondents indicated during the interviews. The 
questionnaire was designed to be answered by all stakeholders which, for the analysis 
process, were categorized into four groups: Preparers, Auditors, Regulators, and Users (see 
Table 7.1). 
Once the responses were coded into an Excel spreadsheet as discussed earlier, the data was 
transferred to the SPSS statistical package for analysis. This study focuses on different 
stakeholders’ perceptions regarding the earnings management practices in Libyan 
Commercial Banks; for this purpose, most questions were designed based on five-point 
Likert scales which suggests using non-parametric statistical tests due to the ordinal nature 
of the qualitative date (Saunders et al., 2012). Determining the statistical tests to be used is 
based, according to Anderson et al. (2010), on the scale of measurement used in the 
survey. They indicate that: 
“One consideration in determining whether a parametric or a non-parametric 
method is appropriate is the scale of measurement used to generate the data” 
(p. 728). 
199 
Therefore, non-parametric tests will be employed in this study, in particular the Kruskal-
Wallis (KW) and Mann-Whitney (MW) tests. The KW test is used to identify whether any 
significant difference exists among the perceptions of the groups; if so, a MW test is 
carried out to determine which pairs of groups show significantly different perceptions. For 
further illustration, descriptive statistics, means and standard deviations
96
, were also 
calculated to provide more insightful pictures of the perceptions. 
As previously reported in this chapter, the majority of the questions were based on 5-point 
Likert scales ranging from (1) strongly disagree (SD) to (5) strongly agree (SA). The 
findings discussion will be restricted only to those which have p-values of 0.05 or under. 
7.5.1 Personal Background of the Respondents 
The first part of the questionnaire deals with general personal information about the 
respondents. This part’s questions dealt with respondents’ age, gender, professional 
qualification as well as their education and where it took place. It also sought information 
about any particular experience that a respondent might have had within the banking 
sector. Table 7.2 summarises the personal information about the respondents 
corresponding to their groups. 
The total proportions of each individual group (Preparers, Auditors, Regulators, and Users) 
are 26.5%, 26.5%, 19.6%, and 27.5% respectively; most are male (90 out of 102 or 
88.2%). Twenty eight (27.5%) are professionally qualified, mainly being members of the 
Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association (LAAA) (24 or 23.5%). Ninety (88.2%) of 
the respondents have an academic qualification higher than a Diploma which suggests a 
good basic knowledge of financial issues. Most importantly, 78 (76.5%) of the respondents 
have indicated that they have banking experience which again gives a reasonable level of 
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 Means and standard deviations are, strictly speaking, not appropriate as measures of ordinal data, but their 
use is widespread and they arguably have reasonable information content subject to assumptions made about 
the intervals in the ordinal data. 
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assurance as regards to obtaining informed  views about Libyan commercial banks  
(LCBs). 
Table 7.2: Respondents’ Personal Information 
Statement Category 
Groups 
Preparers Auditors Regulators Users 
 %  %  %  % 
Age 
Less than 25 1 3.7       
26-30 3 11.1   2 10.0 11 39.3 
31-40 15 55.6 5 18.5 8 40.0 10 35.7 
41-50 4 14.8 11 40.7 9 45.0 7 25.0 
Over 50 4 14.8 11 40.7 1 5.0   
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Gender 
Male 26 96.3 25 92.6 20 100 19 67.9 
Female 1 3.7 2 7.4   9 32.1 
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Professional 
Qualification 
LAAA 6 22.2 12 44.4 1 5.0 5 17.9 
ACCA 3 11.1       
AICPA   1 3.7     
ICAEW         
CIMA         
Others 1        
Total 10 37.0 13 48.1 1 5.0 5 17.9 
Education 
PhD   6 22.2   3 10.7 
Master 2 7.4   4 20.0 7 25.0 
Bachelor 20 74.1 19 70.4 14 70.0 15 53.6 
Diploma 3 11.1 1 3.7 1 5.0 3 10.7 
Other  1 3.7 1 3.7 1 5.0   
Total 26 96.3 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Location of 
highest 
qualification 
Libya 23 85.2 20 74.1 19 95.0 25 89.3 
Other Arab country 1 3.7 5 18.5   2 7.1 
UK 2 7.4 1 3.7 1 5.0 1 3.6 
USA 1 3.7 1 3.7     
Other          
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Place of Work 
Commercial Bank 27        
Central Bank of Libya     14 65.0   
Libyan Stock Market     3 20.0   
Tax Authority     3 15.0   
Audit firm   19 70.3     
State Audit   8 29.6     
Academic       15 53.6 
Others       13 46.4 
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Banking 
Experience 
Less 5 years 9 33.3 15 55.6 3 15.0 24 85.7 
5-10 8 29.6 2 7.4 7 35.0 1 3.6 
11-15 3 11.1 2 7.4 4 20.0 2 7.1 
Over 15 7 25.9 8 29.6 6 30.0 1 3.6 
Total 27 100 27 100 20 100 28 100 
Note: LAAA = Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association, ACCA = Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants, AICPA = American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, ICAEW = Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, and CIMA = Chartered Institute of Management Accountants. 
7.5.2 The Quality of Financial Reporting and Earnings Management 
The objective of this section is to report the respondents’ perceptions about the quality of 
financial reporting in Libya, as well as their awareness of earnings management.  
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7.5.2.1 Perceptions Regarding the Quality of Financial Reporting  
This section reports the sample groups’ perceptions about the quality of financial reporting 
in Libya. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with 
a set of statements about the quality of financial statements. At first, the K-W test was 
performed to highlight any differences between the groups towards the financial quality 
question. The responses are summarized in Table 7.3 (Panel A). It should be noted that the 
statements shown are abbreviated versions of the statements on the full questionnaire, see 
Appendix 7.1. 
Table 7.3: Financial Reporting Quality: Perceptions of the Groups 
Panel A: Group Means, Standard Deviations, and K-W test 
Q Statement N 
Overall 
Mean 
SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
2.1.1 Financial reporting is generally good 99 2.75 1.063 3.22 2.88 2.68 2.21 .005* 
2.1.2 
Financial reporting of listed companies 
is good 
101 3.03 0.984 3.37 3.07 2.95 2.71 .051 
2.1.3 
Financial reporting is generally good 
for banks 
101 3.20 1.000 3.41 3.41 3.11 2.86 .044* 
2.1.4 
Financial reporting is good for listed 
banks 
100 3.23 0.973 3.41 3.22 3.06 3.18 .478 
2.1.5 
Listed banks provide relevant 
information 
101 3.32 0.927 3.44 3.41 3.32 3.11 .463 
2.1.6 
Listed banks provide reliable 
information 
100 3.11 0.863 3.15 3.11 3.16 3.04 .908 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
financial reporting quality. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis 
(K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each 
question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It 
ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly agree”. 
The overall results presented in Table 7.3 (Panel A) show that, in aggregate, most of the 
groups agreed with most of the statements. The test shows that two significant differences 
in respondents’ perceptions relate to the first and third questions. While Preparers, who, as 
may be expected, in aggregate showed agreement with all the questions by giving means 
above the mid-point 3, perceive financial reporting quality in Libya as good by giving it a 
mean score of 3.22, the other groups have different views. In particular, the Users group, 
for example, has a mean score as low as 2.21 indicating that they perceive the quality of 
financial reporting in Libya to be of low quality. The second question sought to explore 
views of the same question regarding listed companies; in other words, it allowed them to 
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put forward a view of whether the quality of financial reporting of listed companies was 
perceived to differ from those that were not listed. Again the respondents come to different 
views. The Preparers and Auditors perceived listed companies to produce in aggregate 
good quality financial reporting whereas Regulators and Users, in aggregate, stand on the 
other side. This may indicate that both Preparers and Auditors believe that the Libyan 
Stock Market (LSM) requirements play a role in enhancing financial reporting quality, 
given that the LSM requires listed companies to adopt International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) when preparing financial statements. The third question also shows 
different perceptions between the groups, apparently, as all the groups except Users 
generally believe that, on balance, listed banks produce financial reporting of good quality.  
Apparently, Users do not perceive financial reporting for Libyan companies, listed 
companies and banks in a favourable light; for each question they answered, the mean is 
less than 3.00. However, Users tend, on balance, to believe that the financial reporting of 
listed banks in Libya is of good quality and provides relevant and reliable information 
(Table 7.3, Panel A, Q 2.1.5 and 2.1.6).  
The results reported in Table 7.3 are inconsistent with the interview findings reported in 
Chapter 6 which indicate that 57% of interviewees perceive the quality of financial 
reporting as not good; based on the overall mean scores, the questionnaire respondents 
view the financial reporting quality as good for both banks in general and listed banks in 
particular (their mean scores of 3.20 and 3.23 respectively for Q 2.1.3 and Q 2.1.4, Table 
7.3). Moreover, questionnaire respondents, on average, showed an agreement with the 
statement that listed banks do provide both relevant and reliable information. Based on the 
questionnaire results, the accountability of Libyan Commercial Banks either listed or 
unlisted may be viewed as favourable.  
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Focusing on the subject of this study, earnings management by LCBs, all groups, 
excluding Users, believe, in aggregate, that LCBs provide financial information of good 
quality, which may potentially reflect these stakeholders groups’ perception of the 
accountability of LCBs. On the other hand, all groups, including Users, believe that listed 
banks provide financial reporting that is relevant and reliable. From an accountability 
perspective, and based on the results reported in Table 7.3 (Panel A and B), one would 
judge that all stakeholders groups are satisfied with the accountability mechanism 
employed by LCBs. However, some stakeholders have shown their disagreement with 
respect to some of the above issues; for example, the questionnaire responses from 
Preparers (see Appendix 7.3) indicates that 5 Preparers (out of 27) are not in agreement 
that LCBs provide good quality financial reporting; 3 these are strongly disagree. Also, not 
all stakeholders believed that LCBs provide relevant and reliable information as some 
Preparers suggested that LCBs do not provide relevant and reliable financial information (4 
and 6 out of 27 respectively). Another notable difference is that although the Users group 
showed, on average, a level of agreement with the view that listed LCBs produce financial 
reporting that involves relevant and reliable information, some of them in strong disagreed 
with this perception. The questionnaire responses from Users (Appendix 7.6) reveals that 
10 Users disagreed with the statement that LCBs financial reporting is of good quality (2 
of which strongly disagreed), and other Users expressed their disagreement with the notion 
that listed LCBs’ financial reporting is of good quality (Q 2.1.4), and provides relevant (Q 
2.1.5) and reliable (Q 2.1.6)  information. The total numbers of Users expressing these 
opinions were 8, 9, and 6 respectively. 
Another test was performed to examine whether stakeholders groups may have different 
views regarding the quality of financial reporting.  Table 7.3 (Panel A) shows that the K-W 
test scores reveal that significant differences exist between the perceptions in questions Q 
2.1.1 and Q 2.1.3 (Table 7.3, Panel A). In order to identify which pairs have significant 
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differences six MW tests have been performed; Table 7.3 (Panel B) presents the results of 
these tests.  
Table 7.3: Financial Reporting Quality: Perceptions of the Groups 
Panel B: K-W and M-W tests 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-
values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.1.1 Financial reporting is generally good .005* .187 .048* .001* .491 .023* .069 
2.1.2 
Financial reporting of listed 
companies is good 
.051 .146 .020* .013* .486 .263 .593 
2.1.3 
Financial reporting is generally good 
for banks 
.044* .924 .150 .023* .145 .022* .415 
2.1.4 
Financial reporting is good for listed 
banks 
.478 .412 .116 .363 .365 .798 .640 
2.1.5 
Listed banks provide relevant 
information 
.463 .744 .542 .177 .657 .201 .475 
2.1.6 
Listed banks provide reliable 
information 
.908 .786 .931 .512 .948 .657 .593 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about financial reporting quality. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and 
users (US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
The M-W test between Preparers and Regulators groups shows significant differences, they 
differently perceive the quality of financial reporting in Libya and the financial reporting 
quality of listed companies. This result may not be unexpected, as preparers normally 
would defend the quality of the financial reporting which they produce. On the other hand, 
Regulators (CBL, LSM, and Tax authority) whose job is to inspect and make judgments 
based on their inspection
97
 (which suggests a good knowledge of the quality of financial 
reporting) expressed views that significantly disagreed with Preparers which is potentially 
concerning to other stakeholders. 
The differences in perceptions are also evident, perhaps unsurprisingly, between the 
Preparers and Users groups in three questions. The Auditors and Regulators groups show 
no significant differences. On the other hand, Auditors and Users are different in two 
places; the first and third questions. Users groups also view the financial reporting quality 
in Libya differently compared to Regulators. It is notable, as Table 7.3 (Panel B) shows, 
                                                 
97
The tax authority, for instance, performs an inspection of a bank’s financial statements in order to judge the 
tax charge.  
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that the Users group expressed significantly different responses in relation to these 
questions.  
M-W tests show that the views of Preparers and Auditors differ significantly for certain 
questions from the views of Users with the Preparers and Auditors perceiving listed banks’ 
financial reporting as on balance ‘good’ and Users disagreeing with this notion. The 
difference between Preparers and Users is particularly notable given that is significant at 
the 0.1% level. 
As discussed above all stakeholders, except Users, agreed, on average, that LCBs’ 
financial reporting in general is of good quality, however, as discussed in Chapter 2, there 
are no local accounting standards in Libya and accounting practices are mainly dependent 
on local laws and regulations. This apparent conflict, may be due to a lack of awareness by 
some stakeholders about the topic of earnings management and its implications for 
financial reporting.  
Also, listed LCBs’ financial reporting was, on balance, thought by all stakeholders to be of 
good quality and it was agreed that listed LCBs provide both relevant and reliable financial 
information. This may indicate that the LSM requirements have had an impact on the listed 
LCBs’ financial reporting from the stakeholders’ point of view. Whether LSM 
requirements have an effect on LCBs’ financial reporting is examined later on in this 
Chapter. It could also be argued, based on this result, that earnings management may not 
be practiced by LCBs. The next section examines in more detail the stakeholders’ 
awareness and understanding of earnings management; the perceived effect of earnings 
management on the quality of financial reporting is also examined in order to gain some 
understanding of the current level of financial reporting quality of LCBs. 
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7.5.2.2 Perceptions Regarding Awareness and Understanding of Earnings 
Management 
Respondents were asked to indicate their familiarity with the term “earnings management” 
(Q 2.2
98
). Only 86 respondents answered this question; 57 (66%) of them indicated that 
they had heard of the term while only 29 (34%) of them answered that they have not heard 
of the term. This result is not in line with the interview findings reported in Chapter 6, 
which showed that the majority of the interviewees had not heard of the term “earnings 
management”. The interview findings also indicated that the term “earnings management” 
is confusingly interpreted.  
Table 7.4: Respondents Familiarity with the Term Earnings Management 
Respondents Answer % 
57 Yes 55.9
99
 
29 No 28.4
100
 
Note: This table presents the respondents answer to the question 2.2 
 “Are you familiar with the term earnings management”. 
 
The result is also not consistent with the findings reported in earlier questions where most 
stakeholders showed some agreement with the view that LCBs’ financial reporting is of 
good quality. However, respondents’ claim that they recognise the term “earnings 
management” may conceal differing views about the meaning of the term. The next 
question in this section (Q2.3) listed three of the most common interpretations that 
interviewees offered as well as a very brief definition of earnings management as widely 
understood in the accounting literature. At first, a K-W test was performed to ascertain if 
there is any significant difference between the groups regarding their understanding of the 
term “earnings management”. Table 7.5 (Panel A) summarises the responses of the 
surveyed groups. 
 
                                                 
98
 As discussed in Chapter 6, the Arabic translation for the term ‘earnings management’ is the one that is in 
wide use in a number of Arabic speaking countries. 
99
 This percentage represents those who answered ‘Yes’ (57) to the overall respondents (102). 
100
 This percentage represents those who answered ‘No’ to the overall respondents (102). 
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Table 7.5: Respondents Perceptions about the Meaning of Earnings Management  
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
2.3.1 Reinvesting the earned profits 92 3.23 1.110 3.13 3.62 3.47 2.76 .044* 
2.3.2 Manipulating earnings 93 3.18 1.233 3.20 3.08 2.88 3.48 .358 
2.3.3 
A department responsible for 
planning and controlling the reported 
income 
91 3.20 1.024 3.48 3.12 3.18 3.00 .515 
2.3.4 
Increasing or decreasing income 
according to management’s desire 
95 3.41 .995 3.36 3.12 3.33 3.81 .084 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
earnings management meaning   . It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-
Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for 
each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
The first question (Q2.3.1, Table 7.5, Panel A) asked whether earnings management refers 
to management reinvesting its income. The results reveal that all groups, except Users, 
agreed that earnings management held the meaning of reinvesting the earned profits. The 
K-W test also indicated a significant difference in perceptions regarding this question; it is 
evident that the Users group holds an extreme view compared to all other groups by only 
looking at the groups’ means. The K-W test did not show any other differences suggesting 
no other significant disagreement between the groups, however, again by looking at the 
groups’ means, it is apparent that Regulators perceive that the link to earnings 
manipulation is different as their mean (2.88) answer to the 2
nd
 question would suggest. 
Unlike other groups, the Regulators groups do not perceive earnings management as being 
earnings manipulation. In this regard it is worth noting the questionnaire responses by 
Regulators only in respect to this statement: 17 out of 20 Regulators have answered this 
questions and their answers were as follows; 7 disagree, 3 of whom are strongly disagree 
and 7 agree only one of whom is strongly agrees; 3 Regulators gave neutral answers to 
these questions. Given this fact, there is no total disagreement with the answers of other 
groups to this question; rather Regulators had an equal attitude toward it.  
The mean scores of the remaining questions (2.3.3 and 2.3.4) show a broad level of 
agreement with the statements among all the groups regarding these questions since all of 
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them are above the mid-point 3. Although all groups’ means are above the mid-point, it is 
noticeable that the Preparers group has the highest mean score (3.48) in agreeing that 
earnings management is a bank department that is responsible for the planning and 
controlling of income; this is potentially due to the fact that the term “management” is 
being mistakenly interpreted as a department.  The last question (2.3.4) gave a brief 
description of earnings management behaviour to which all groups agreed as the mean 
scores suggest. Although this result may show that all groups are aware that such a 
meaning refers to earnings management it is noteworthy that the Users’ mean score is the 
highest (3.81). This could be partially due to the fact that this group consisted of 15 
academics out 28, since academics are expected to have knowledge about such a financial 
reporting issue.  
As outlined earlier, a number of the questionnaire questions were drawn from the 
interviewees’ answers, as in the case of the first three questions have. A brief definition of 
the term ‘earnings management’ was inserted in case a respondent was unsure about what 
earnings management could mean; this was in Questions 2.3.4 (Table 7.5). The 
respondents were in agreement, on balance, that earnings management implies that 
management desire to alter the reported income by giving this statement a mean score of 
3.41. This result is not in line with the interview findings reported in Chapter 6 (Table 6.4) 
which revealed that 79% of interviewees have not heard of the term ‘earnings 
management’. 
The second stage was to perform 6 M-W tests to identify which two pairs of groups 
perceive the questions differently; the results are shown in Table 7.5 (Panel B). 
  
209 
Table 7.5: Respondents Perceptions about the Meaning of Earnings Management  
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.3.1 Reinvesting the earned profits .044* .138 .390 .296 .636 .006* .059 
2.3.2 Manipulating earnings .358 .684 .423 .327 .677 .174 .117 
2.3.3 
A department responsible for 
planning and controlling the 
reported income 
.515 .159 .360 .240 .852 .940 .753 
2.3.4 
Increasing or decreasing the 
income according to 
management’s desire 
.084 .375 .793 .106 .476 .020* .078 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about earnings management meaning. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), 
and users (US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
Although, the K-W test reveals that there is only one significant difference between the 
groups, the M-W test refers to two significant differences existing between Auditors and 
Users regarding the first and last questions. It is shown in Table 7.5 (Panel A) that the 
Auditors’ mean score (3.62) for the first question is the highest suggesting that their 
agreement with the view that earnings management is the reinvesting of profits is more 
strongly held; the users group had the lowest mean score (2.76) for this question. As for the 
last question, the difference can also be explained by looking at the mean scores in Table 
7.5 (Panel A) which highlight that users (3.81) are more strongly of the view that earnings 
management is the behaviour of increasing and decreasing income as per management’s 
desire than other stakeholders. As discussed earlier, this could be because most of the 
Users are academics. The Auditors’ score is the lowest for this question (3.12) although it 
is above the mid-point. It could potentially be perceived as an issue of concern by other 
stakeholders given the importance of the role of the external auditor in the financial 
reporting process. Stakeholders, arguably depend on the external auditor when making 
economic decisions so his/her knowledge might be expected to be higher than any other 
related group. However, it is worth nothing that the Auditors group consisted of 27 
individuals of which only 13 are professionally qualified (see Table 7.2). In addition the 
questionnaire responses by Auditors shows that 11 Auditors agreed to this statement and 9 
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Auditors did not agree. Another important point in regard to the Auditors group, is that the 
majority have less than 5-years work experience in a bank which may imply that they have 
limited knowledge about such issues. 
At this stage, all respondents were given an earnings management definition so that the 
remaining responses are reasonably comparable by ensuring that respondents have about 
the same understanding of the meaning of the term earnings management. 
7.5.2.3 Perceptions about Earnings Management in Relation to Various Issues 
This section explores various issues relating to earnings management. First of all it asks 
about the implications of earnings management in relation to the quality of financial 
statements. Then four questions are asked to investigate whether there is a difference 
between private and public banks, and between listed and unlisted banks in terms of the 
application of earnings management. Afterwards, the underlying reasons of why bank 
managers would engage in earnings management are investigated. Table 7.6 (Panel A) 
presents the responses relating to these questions 
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Table 7.6: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about the Practice of, and Motivations for, 
Earnings Management 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
2.4.1 
Earnings management affects the 
quality of financial statements 
99 3.96 .768 3.81 4.00 3.94 4.07 .734 
2.4.2 
Earnings management is practiced by 
private listed banks 
98 3.35 .932 3.62 3.19 3.44 3.18 .101 
2.4.3 
Earnings management is practiced by 
private unlisted banks 
97 3.31 .755 3.32 3.38 3.33 3.21 .822 
2.4.4 
Earnings management is practiced by 
public listed banks 
94 3.11 .861 3.00 3.04 3.31 3.14 .622 
2.4.5 
Earnings management is practiced by 
public unlisted banks 
93 3.01 .787 2.84 2.87 3.17 3.19 .331 
2.4.6 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate 
information communicated to 
shareholders 
96 3.02 1.036 2.62 3.15 3.11 3.23 .166 
2.4.7 
Managers exercise earnings 
management for their own benefits 
98 3.16 1.012 2.73 3.12 3.56 3.36 .058 
2.4.8 
Earnings management enables 
managers to better communicate 
economic information to stakeholders 
97 2.74 1.044 2.65 2.76 3.06 2.61 .526 
2.4.9 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate 
information to regulators 
97 3.22 1.033 3.04 2.96 3.39 3.50 .201 
2.4.10 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate 
information communicated to credit 
rating agencies 
97 3.19 1.024 3.08 3.00 3.39 3.33 .524 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
various issues related to earnings management   . It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for 
the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and 
users (US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
Stakeholders expressed a broad level of agreement, based on their mean scores, on the first 
four issues (Q 2.4.1- 2.4.4). All stakeholders agreed, in aggregate, that earnings 
management practices affect the quality of financial statements; they also showed similar 
scores regarding the practice of earnings management by private banks; they perceived that 
earnings management is practiced by private banks no matter whether they are listed or 
unlisted. Earnings management is also perceived by each stakeholder group to be practiced 
by public listed banks. Unlisted banks are, in aggregate, only perceived by the Preparer and 
Auditor groups not to be engaged in earnings management practices; this may suggest that 
from the view point of these two groups there is an influence by the Libyan Stock Market 
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on the public banks. However, it worth noting in detail the questionnaire responses only by 
Auditors; the total number of Auditors who responded to this question is 23 (out of 27) the 
majority of whom (15 out of 23) expressed a neutral attitude; 5 disagreed and only 3 
agreed with the statement. Given that the majority of Auditors who answered this question 
neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that listed public banks are engaged in 
earnings management, the overall opinion of Auditors in respect of this issue may not be 
clear. 
The other two groups (Regulators and Users) seem to perceive that earrings management is 
practiced by public banks regardless of whether they are listed or not. That is similar to 
their views regarding private banks. Some underlying reasons as to why bank managers 
may be involved in earnings management practices are discussed in the remaining six 
questions of Table 7.6 (Panel A and B).  Questions as to whether bank managers exercise 
earnings management practices to mislead or satisfy shareholders or for their own benefits 
show different perceptions between the Preparers group and other groups. While Preparers 
tend to believe, on average, that bank managers do not engage in earnings management to 
either affect the shareholders or for their own benefit, other groups think that bank 
managers exercise earnings management for these reasons. This result suggests that, from 
the view point of Auditors, Regulators, and Users, bank managers are involved in what is 
called “opportunistic earnings management” where managers engage in earnings 
management for their own benefit. The other type of earnings management is “informative 
earnings management” where bank managers manage earnings so as to better communicate 
the economic and financial situation of the bank. Notably, only the Regulators group think, 
on average, that this type of earnings management is practiced by the bank managers while 
other groups’ mean scores are at the mid-point suggesting that, on balance, they do not 
think that this type of earnings management exists within Libyan Commercial Banks. 
Whether earnings management does exist to affect the information communicated to 
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regulators is only doubted by the Auditors group although their mean score is very close to 
the mid-point (2.96). However other groups’ mean scores are over 3.00 confirming that, 
there is, on balance, a perception that earnings management could be practiced to send 
misleading information to regulators. Lastly, all groups agreed, on balance, that earnings 
management is practiced in order to affect the bank rankings supplied by the credit rating 
agencies. 
Table 7.6 reveals some contradict results. On one hand, it shows a relatively wide level of 
agreement, that earnings management has a negative effect on the quality of financial 
reporting and confirms, on balance, that earnings management is practiced by LCBs. This 
may conflict with the results reported previously in Table 7.3 which suggest that the 
financial reporting quality of LCBs is good and that listed banks do provide relevant and 
reliable information. 
Although the Kruskal-Wallis test does not show any significant differences between the 
stakeholder groups, the Mann-Whitney test results in Table 7.6 (Panel B) shows that there 
are three significant differences; the first two are between the Preparers and Users groups, 
the third is between the Preparers and Regulators groups. Preparers and Users show a 
significant difference in views regarding the practicing of earnings management by private 
listed banks. Although both groups think, on average, that private listed banks are engaged 
in earnings management, the Preparers’ mean score is slightly higher than Users’: 3.62 and 
3.18 respectively. Also, the Preparers group thinks that earnings management is not 
practiced to influence the shareholders; by contrast, the Users group believes that earnings 
management is practiced for such a reason. This result is in line with many findings 
reported in Chapter 6; that a trust issue does exist between the Preparers and some other 
groups. The second significant difference occurred between the responses of the Preparers 
and Regulators groups; while the former think, on balance, that opportunistic earnings 
management does not exist, Regulators think, on average, that this type of earnings 
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management does exist giving further evidence of a significant disagreement that refers to 
trust; this conflict has implications for the extent to which accountability can be seen to 
exist. Perceptions relating to accountability are explicitly considered in the next subsection. 
Table 7.6: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about the Practice of, and Motivations for, 
Earnings Management 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.4.1 
Earnings management affect the 
quality of financial statements 
.734 .497 .426 .360 .788 .788 .821 
2.4.2 
Earnings management is practiced by 
private listed banks 
.101 .073 .548 .038* .193 .848 .120 
2.4.3 
Earnings management is practiced by 
private unlisted banks 
.822 .915 .964 .544 1.000 .386 .472 
2.4.4 
Earnings management is practiced by 
public listed banks 
.622 .872 .296 .602 .257 .773 .323 
2.4.5 
Earnings management is practiced by 
public unlisted banks 
.331 .852 .249 .186 .177 .174 1.000 
2.4.6 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate 
information communicated to 
shareholders 
.166 .095 .114 .045* .965 .717 .686 
2.4.7 
Managers exercise earnings 
management for their own benefits 
.058 .240 .015* .053 .096 .426 .373 
2.4.8 
Earnings management enables 
managers to better communicate 
economic information to stakeholders 
.526 .721 .242 .850 .447 .540 .153 
2.4.9 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate 
information to third party regulators 
.201 .749 .337 .158 .152 .056 .721 
2.4.10 
Managers exercise earnings 
management to manipulate 
information communicated to credit 
rating agencies 
.524 .746 .404 .460 .219 .240 .833 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about different issues related to earnings management. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), 
regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
It is worth noting here that the thinking behind asking the questions (2.4.2 and 2.4.3) and 
(2.4.4 and 2.4.5) is to examine the affect, if any, of the LSM’s requirements on financial 
reporting quality. It may be assumed that such requirements may put pressures on LCBs’ 
managers to produce financial report in a certain way. It may also be assumed, based on 
such requirements, that list LCBs’ managers are potentially held more accountable relative 
to their unlisted LCBs counterparts. However, the results, as reported above, showed, on 
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average, that the LSM had a slight impact on LCBs’ financial reporting. The accountability 
of LCBs’ managers are examined in the next section.  
7.5.2.4 Perceptions Regarding the Accountability of LCBs’ Managers 
This section investigates to whom LCBs’ managers are held accountable. The interview 
findings suggest that bank managers are thought, to a large extent, to be accountable to 
shareholders as the interview findings indicated that 75% of interviewees perceived LCBs’ 
shareholders as the main stakeholder for LCBs. However, some other stakeholders were 
mentioned during the interviews; these stakeholders along with some others have been 
included in this question (Q 2.5) to identify the extent to which respondents agree that bank 
managers are seen as being accountable to a list of stakeholders. The reason behind this 
question was to examine the extent to which a narrow or wide notion of accountability 
exists in LCBs. This may inform the thesis about the accountability system of LCBs. The 
results are presented in Table 7.7 (Panel A), and show no significant differences in 
perceptions according to a Kruskal-Wallis test performed to investigate whether any 
significant variation occurs between the responses of the various stakeholders groups 
Table 7.7: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about LCBs’ Accountees 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
2.5.1 Shareholders 102 3.94 .818 4.00 4.07 3.90 3.79 .531 
2.5.2 Employees 102 2.91 1.082 2.78 2.85 2.75 3.21 .343 
2.5.3 Current and potential customers 101 3.48 .901 3.52 3.56 3.25 3.52 .467 
2.5.4 Central Bank of Libya 101 4.17 .788 4.26 4.07 4.00 4.29 .592 
2.5.5 Tax authority 98 3.83 .813 3.84 3.69 3.79 3.96 .325 
2.5.6 The Libyan Stock Market 100 3.76 .806 3.73 3.81 3.65 3.82 .914 
2.5.7 Corresponding banks 99 3.63 .803 3.88 3.73 3.50 3.39 .136 
2.5.8 Bank credit rating agencies 100 3.54 .892 3.56 3.63 3.60 3.39 .734 
2.5.9 Media 101 3.00 1.020 3.15 3.11 3.10 2.68 .337 
2.5.10 Academia and research centers 100 2.85 .999 3.04 2.92 2.95 2.54 .284 
2.5.11 Society as a whole 99 2.84 .987 3.12 2.74 3.00 2.57 .212 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
whom bank managers are accountable to. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the 
Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users 
(US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
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The results presented in Table 7.7 (Panel A) reveal a relatively strong level of agreement 
from the questionnaire respondents as to whom the LCBs’ managers are accountable. 
However, questionnaire respondents consider that employees (Q 2.5.2), academia and 
research centres (Q 2.5.10), and society as a whole (Q 2.5.11) are, on balance, not 
considered as LCBs’ accountees with the overall mean scores for these accountees being; 
2.91, 2.85, and 2.84 respectively. It is notable from the mean scores reported in Table 7.7 
(Panel A) that the Users group has a different view in regards to whether employees are 
accountees for LCBs in contrast to the Preparers, Auditors, and Regulators groups who, on 
average, disagreed with this statement. This may, partially, be due to normative ideas held 
by academics who represent 53% of the Users group. Also, revisiting the questionnaire 
responses by individual groups give us some indications that are worth noting. For 
example, the questionnaire responded by Preparers (Q 2.5, Appendix 7.3) shows that 8 (out 
of 27) Preparers agreed that employees are regarded as one of LCBs’ accountees; it is also 
worth noting that 4 of these strongly agreed with this statement. On the other hand, 
although the Auditors group, on average, disagreed that employees are LCBs’ accountees, 
a more detailed analysis reveals (in their group’s responses, Appendix 7.4) that 8 (out of 
27) agreed with the statement about employees being an LCBs’ accountee. It should again 
be noted that only 13 (out of 27) of Auditors are professionally qualified. However, no 
significant difference appeared between qualified and non-qualified Auditors in this 
regard
101
. 
Ironically, the Preparers group think of academia and research centres as an accountee for 
bank managers while, on the other hand, the Users group (53% of which are academic) 
disagree, on balance, with that idea (by giving a mean score of 2.54), and so do Auditors 
and Regulators groups. Another area of disagreement appears when society as a whole was 
                                                 
101
 A M-W test showed no significant difference between professionally qualified and non-professionally 
qualified Auditors.  
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suggested as an accountee. The Preparers group agreed with this statement while the 
Auditors and Users groups disagreed. 
As mentioned earlier, interview findings reveal that shareholders were thought of as the 
main stakeholder group for LCBs (75% of interviewees). This conforms with the results 
revealed in Table 7.7, as per Q 2.5.1. From this question, it is clear that questionnaire 
respondents perceive shareholders as accountees to LCBs. It is also notable that the highest 
mean score of 4.17 in this Table was given to the Central Bank of Libya (CBL, Q 2.5.4). 
This result suggests a dual role for the CBL in this regard. On one hand, they are the owner 
of the public banks and on the other hand a regulator for both private and public banks. 
This may partially justify the high mean score given which suggests that the CBL is the 
main accountee to LCBs. 
To see whether any two groups have any significant differences in perceptions, six Mann-
Whitney tests were performed; the results are shown in Table 7.7 (Panel B). It can be seen 
that the only significant difference exists between the Preparer and User groups despite the 
fact that both groups agree that corresponding
102
 banks are an accountee. However, one 
might think that the Users group may not have sufficient knowledge and awareness of what 
“corresponding banks” meant which may suggest a disagreement in responses between 
both groups. 
  
                                                 
102
 “Corresponding banks” is a term used within banking sector when a bank is being offered banking 
services by other bank.  
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Table 7.7: Stakeholders’ Perception about LCBs’ Accountees 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.5.1 Shareholders .531 .991 .419 .269 .369 .214 .842 
2.5.2 Employees .343 .684 .758 .144 .847 .202 .114 
2.5.3 Current and potential customers .467 .915 .161 .863 .188 .956 .244 
2.5.4 Central Bank of Libya .592 .697 .207 .956 .473 .644 .197 
2.5.5 Tax authority .325 .344 .575 .549 .691 .084 .188 
2.5.6 The Libyan Stock Market .914 .917 .739 .773 .625 .871 .488 
2.5.7 Corresponding banks .136 .524 .094 .039* .344 .172 .638 
2.5.8 Bank credit rating agencies .734 .855 .888 .464 .992 .335 .386 
2.5.9 Media .337 .828 .975 .113 .933 .181 .165 
2.5.10 Academia and research centers .284 .698 .675 .077 .941 .164 .197 
2.5.11 Society as a whole .212 .170 .598 .060 .506 .450 .168 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about whom bank managers are accountable to. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), 
regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
7.5.2.5 Stakeholders’ Perceptions about Earnings Management Motivations 
This question (Q 2.6) investigates respondents’ opinions about the motivations that induce 
bank managers to indulge in earnings management practices. Several questions have been 
listed in this section; these were mainly based on the literature. The questions were split 
into two groups (state and private) in order to examine whether ownership has any 
influence over perceived earnings management motivations in the LCBs; they also 
examined the influence of the Libyan Stock Market’s effect on earnings management 
practices by asking if it was thought to affect the bank’s share price.  The results are shown 
in Table 7.8 (Panel A) and reveal a relatively strong level of agreement overall among 
stakeholder groups for all the questions. This suggests that the listing requirements were 
perceived to influence bank managers to engage in earnings management practices no 
matter the type of ownership as state and private banks were seen to be similarly motivated 
on this issue. More specifically, the Auditors group recorded a slight difference for 
question (Q 2.6.6) which investigated whether there was any institutional effect on bank 
managers that encouraged involvement in earnings management practices. They perceived 
that State owned banks, on average, were not motivated by other banks behaviour (mean 
score 2.92), and that private banks were, on balance, neutral on this motive; their mean 
score was 3.00. This result should be considered in light of the fact that most of the 
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Auditors who responded (14 out of 27) have no professional qualification (see Table 7.2) 
which therefore, may explain this unexpected response. The questionnaire responses by 
Auditors only (Appendix 7.4) reveals that Auditors agreed and disagreed with this 
statement almost equally; as 7 agreed whereas another 7 disagreed and only one Auditor 
strongly disagreed with this statement. It seems that this Auditor, in addition, to a relatively 
large amount (11) who gave a neutral responses to this statement, is responsible for the 
below mid-point mean score (2.92) that was generated by the Auditors group. 
As can be noted in Table 7.8 (Panel A), the KW test reveals no significant differences.  
Table 7.8: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about Earnings Management Motivations 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
2.6.1.1 Management compensation – state 91 3.37 1.071 3.43 3.26 3.24 3.54 .610 
2.6.1.2 Management compensation – private 92 3.73 .939 3.74 3.88 3.50 3.73 .606 
2.6.2.1 Job security – state 89 3.43 1.010 3.38 3.33 3.44 3.56 .774 
2.6.2.2 Job security – private 92 3.62 .936 3.74 3.72 3.53 3.48 .756 
2.6.3.1 To avoid regulatory intervention – state 91 3.42 1.065 3.45 3.37 3.00 3.68 .198 
2.6.3.2 
To avoid regulatory intervention – 
private 
91 3.51 .935 3.52 3.44 3.47 3.58 .950 
2.6.4.1 
The desire to report smooth earnings – 
state 
92 3.40 .973 3.40 3.19 3.53 3.54 .305 
2.6.4.2 
The desire to report smooth earning – 
private 
91 3.52 .886 3.74 3.32 3.44 3.56 .359 
2.6.5.1 To influence other stakeholders - state 91 3.16 1.036 3.21 3.04 3.12 3.29 .864 
2.6.5.2 
To influence other stakeholders – 
private 
91 3.43 1.034 3.52 3.16 3.67 3.44 .376 
2.6.6.1 
Because other Libyan banks manage 
earnings – state 
89 3.13 .882 3.10 2.92 3.20 3.32 .367 
2.6.6.2 
Because other Libyan banks manage 
earnings – private 
87 3.26 .982 3.41 3.00 3.29 3.36 .499 
2.6.7.1 To avoid reporting losses - state 91 3.59 1.033 3.40 3.56 3.25 3.96 .109 
2.6.7.2 To avoid reporting losses – private 88 3.58 1.047 3.55 3.64 3.35 3.71 .885 
2.6.8.1 To meet predetermined income – state 90 3.39 1.013 3.57 3.19 3.37 3.44 .562 
2.6.8.2 
To meet predetermined income – 
private 
88 3.48 .947 3.83 3.29 3.53 3.29 .165 
2.6.9.1 To decrease tax payment – state 92 3.29 1.022 3.55 3.04 3.29 3.36 .381 
2.6.9.2 To decrease tax payment – private 90 3.71 .939 3.64 3.60 3.82 3.81 .868 
2.6.10.1 
To influence assessment by credit 
rating agencies – state 
94 3.43 .823 3.48 3.33 3.56 3.39 .706 
2.6.10.2 
To influence assessment by credit 
rating agencies – private 
89 3.69 .748 3.76 3.56 3.78 3.68 .745 
2.6.11.1 To influence stock price – state 93 3.44 1.005 3.48 3.26 3.41 3.61 .678 
2.6.11.2 To influence stock price – private 89 3.66 .941 3.86 3.28 3.78 3.80 .112 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
earnings management motivation in LCBs. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the 
Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users 
(US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
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The results reported above in Table 7.8 (Panel A) show that the stakeholders’ perceptions 
of the earnings management motivations of LCBs are to large extent consistent with 
earnings management motivations reported in the literature; for example Management 
Compensation Contract Incentives, Regulatory and Political Motivations, and Capital 
Market Motivations (see Section 3.5, Chapter 3). In addition results are consistent with 
interview findings which refer to ‘job security’ as the primary motivation for LCBs’ 
managers to engage in earnings management practices. However, in very limited 
circumstances, some individual groups showed a different perception as discussed earlier 
(Auditors group’s perception in regards to Q 2.6.6.1, Table 7.8, Panel A). However, with 
the exception of this case, as reported in Table 7.8 (Panel A) the overall mean scores are 
above the mid-point of 3.00 which indicate a level of agreement among all stakeholder 
groups about the statements. 
Six MW tests were performed to identify any significant differences between any two 
pairs. The results of these tests are shown in Table 7.8 (Panel B). 
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Table 7.8: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about Earnings Management Motivations 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.6.1.1 Management compensation – state .610 .424 .409 .785 1.000 .301 .320 
2.6.1.2 
Management compensation – 
private 
.606 .843 .262 .709 .219 .601 .506 
2.6.2.1 Job security – state .774 .899 .682 .475 .584 .363 .680 
2.6.2.2 Job security – private .756 .936 .546 .387 .598 .402 .821 
2.6.3.1 
To avoid regulatory intervention – 
state 
.198 .829 .261 .489 .238 .322 .021* 
2.6.3.2 
To avoid regulatory intervention – 
private 
.950 .963 .619 .868 .796 .789 .559 
2.6.4.1 
The desire to report smooth 
earnings – state 
.305 .556 .341 .407 .112 .121 .911 
2.6.4.2 
The desire to report smooth earning 
– private 
.359 .066 .435 .684 .394 .271 .779 
2.6.5.1 
To influence other stakeholders - 
state 
.864 .635 .901 .767 .790 .412 .663 
2.6.5.2 
To influence other stakeholders – 
private 
.376 .221 .547 .938 .074 .341 .613 
2.6.6.1 
Because other Libyan banks 
manage earnings – state 
.367 .639 .518 .323 .276 .109 .720 
2.6.6.2 
Because other Libyan banks 
manage earnings – private 
.499 .208 .944 .998 .281 .200 .948 
2.6.7.1 To avoid reporting losses - state .109 .593 .878 .049* .452 .120 .034* 
2.6.7.2 To avoid reporting losses – private .885 .796 .753 .600 .525 .867 .516 
2.6.8.1 
To meet predetermined income – 
state 
.562 .202 .552 .750 .429 .332 .834 
2.6.8.2 
To meet predetermined income – 
private 
.165 .056 .211 .064 .410 .893 .520 
2.6.9.1 To decrease tax payment – state .381 .131 .506 .548 .316 .216 .940 
2.6.9.2 To decrease tax payment – private .868 .851 .759 .642 .489 .476 .962 
2.6.10.1 
To influence assessment by credit 
rating agencies – state 
.706 .581 .701 .746 .239 .840 .387 
2.6.10.2 
To influence assessment by credit 
rating agencies – private 
.745 .351 1.000 .688 .341 .687 .683 
2.6.11.1 To influence stock price – state .678 .523 .934 .621 .638 .235 .579 
2.6.11.2 To influence stock price – private .112 .041* .727 .959 .071 .060 .713 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about earnings management motivation in LCBs. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), 
regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. A * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The MW results reveal four significant differences across the different stakeholder groups. 
First of all, the Preparer and Auditor groups seem to have different views about whether 
bank managers practice earnings management in order to affect the share prices of private 
banks. Both groups agreed, on balance, that private LCBs are motivated to practice 
earnings management in order to influence their share price (Capital Market Motivations). 
However, a notable difference can be observed by looking at the questionnaire responses 
for each individual group. It is clear that Preparers stand on the side of agreement given 
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that only 2 Preparers (out of 21 who responded to this statement) selected the disagreement 
option. On the other hand it is less obvious where Auditors are standing. Although 11 
Auditors (out 25 who responded to this statement) expressed agreement with the statement, 
2 of which strongly agreed, six (out of 25) disagreed with the view that private LCBs 
engage in earnings management. The reason why the Auditors’ attitudes may not be that 
clear could be that 8 Auditors selected the neutral response. The response of the Auditor 
group, in this study, should also be treated with caution in light of the fact that only 13 (out 
of 27, the total number of Auditors group) are professionally qualified. Therefore, some of 
Auditors (the remaining 14) may lack the expected experience to answer the questions. For 
example, they may not have dealt with this statement, and others, with appropriate 
‘professional scepticism’ and therefore, their answers may not be consistent with the rest of 
the Auditor sample
103
.  
The second significant difference relates to the Preparer and User groups regarding 
whether State owned banks manage earnings in order to avoid reporting losses. Again this 
difference should be looked at in light of how the questionnaires were answered by each 
group individually. Preparers showed, on average, a level of agreement with the view that 
state banks may engage in earnings management in order to avoid reporting losses with no 
a single Preparer expressing a strong level of disagreement with this statement. In addition, 
a relatively large number of Preparers did not respond to this statement (7 out of 27) and 6 
responded neutrally. This leaves us with only 14 Preparers who showed, on balance, a 
clear overall attitude; 5 Preparers disagreed, another 5 agreed, and 4 strongly agreed with 
this statement. As for the Users group, they showed a clear level of agreement with this 
statement with only one response on the strongly disagree side. It should be noted that all 
Users responded to this statement; 17 agreed, 6 strongly agreed, and very few (4) selected 
a neutral response. 
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 No significant difference was found between professional and non-professional Auditors in regards to this 
statement. 
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A third significant difference revealed by the MW tests was between the Regulator and 
User groups as to whether state banks engaged in earnings management in order to avoid 
any regulator intervention. The Regulators group answered this statement with a neutral 
mean score while Users were, on average, in agreement with a mean score of 3.68. This 
significant difference could be, partially, due to the ambiguous attitude of Regulators to 
this issue; as 6 agreed while only 5 disagreed with the statement, one of which showed 
strong disagreement. On the other hand, Users’ attitudes regarding this statement were 
more clear in their agreement; the total number of Users who agreed to this statement is 20 
including 4 who strongly agreed that state LCBs may be engaged in earnings management 
to avoid regulatory interventions. 
Finally, a significant difference exists between the Regulator and User groups in terms of 
whether state banks are motivated to manage earnings in order to avoid report losses. The 
general view of Users in respect of this statement was clearer than the opinion of 
Regulators. The total number of Users who expressed a level of agreement with this 
statement is 23 of which 6 strongly agreed with the notion expressed. On the other hand, 
only 9 Regulators agreed with the statement (one of which strongly agreed) while a 
relatively significant number (4) of Regulators disagreed to this statement 2 of which 
strongly disagreed. 
There is a wide spread level of agreement amongst stakeholder groups that most of the 
listed motivations are perceived as potentially motivating LCBs to engage in earnings 
management practices. The Auditor who gave this statement a mean score of 2.92 (for Q 
2.6.6.1 Table 7.12) apparently did not believe, on average, that a public commercial bank 
would be inspired by other banks’ behaviours to engage in earnings management. Also the 
Auditors group appeared neutral in relation to a similar question relating to private banks 
(Q 2.6.6.2 Table 7.12) as their mean score was 3.00. 
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This general level of agreement could reflect stakeholder groups’ beliefs that such 
motivations, when they exist, represent threats to the accountability relationship of LCBs 
regardless of whether they are public or private, or listed or unlisted. An LCB manager 
may not be seen to be properly accountable when such motivations exist. 
7.5.2.6 Perceptions about Earnings Management Tools 
This section identifies to what extent stakeholders agree regarding the techniques which 
might be used by bank managers to alter reported income. The respondents were asked to 
indicate their agreement or disagreement regarding the effectiveness of some potential 
earnings management techniques which were referred to during the interviews. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted, at first, to identify any significant differences between 
stakeholders groups. The test results are presented in Table 7.9 (Panel A). With few 
exceptions, most stakeholders groups’ perceptions showed similar means, and most of 
them indicated their agreement with the potential usage of the earnings management 
methods listed in Table 7.9 (Panel A). More specifically, reserves (Q 2.7.1) are accorded 
the highest mean (3.71) suggesting it as potentially the most likely method to be used by 
bank mangers to change their firms’ reported income. It has to be mentioned that the term 
‘reserves’ does include, inter alia, the Loan Loss Provision (LLP) which was mentioned a 
lot during the interviews. However, in this questionnaire the LLP is separately examined as 
will be discussed later. 
The lowest mean score was given to foreign currency (Q 2.7.8) and this was because of 
different views held by the Auditors group regarding this question; apparently auditors, on 
balance, do not agree that foreign currency may be used for earnings management by 
LCBs as their mean score was only 2.88. Another two areas of disagreement were in Q 
2.7.5 and Q 2.7.9 which both had the same overall mean score of 3.33. Concealing losses 
(Q 2.7.5) which means that bank managers may not register transactions in a timely 
fashion could have an adverse impact on the reliability of the reported income e.g. failing 
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to book a huge amount of expenses in the current period. For this question, most 
stakeholders agreed in aggregate that such a tool could be used for earnings management; 
the exception was the Preparers group that was non-committal since it only gave this 
question a mean score of 3.00. The third area of disagreement was about the manipulation 
of the loan loss provision (LLP) (Q 2.7.9). In this question, the mean score of the Preparers 
group, on balance, suggests doubt about whether the LLP could be used for earnings 
management purposes; but all the other stakeholders groups agreed with the view that it 
could as indicated by the mean scores. However, an overview on the questionnaire 
responses by Preparers (Appendix 7.3) may be informative; the total number of Preparers 
who answered this question is 25 (out of 27) and the total number of those who agreed (11) 
is greater than those that did not agree (9) while 5 gave  neutral answers. The reason why 
the overall mean was below 3.00 is that five of the nine Preparers who disagreed strongly 
disagreed that LLP could be used as an earnings management tool. As the previous 
Chapter mentioned, the LLP is one of the provisions a company usually maintains. It, on 
balance, highlighted by all stakeholder groups (according to the overall mean) to be one of 
the techniques that LCBs’ manager may use since it received the highest mean score of 
3.71. 
Table 7.9: Earnings Management Techniques 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
2.7.1 Reserves 99 3.71 .799 3.73 3.73 3.68 3.68 .918 
2.7.2 Revenue recognition 97 3.61 .758 3.60 3.54 3.61 3.68 .942 
2.7.3 Disposing of high market value assets 100 3.44 .891 3.42 3.26 3.58 3.54 .536 
2.7.4 Investments 100 3.68 .803 3.58 3.63 3.84 3.71 .872 
2.7.5 Concealing losses 98 3.33 1.003 3.00 3.19 3.39 3.71 .060 
2.7.6 Use of misuse of asset-aside interests 97 3.30 .880 3.04 3.48 3.22 3.39 .395 
2.7.7 Accounting changes 96 3.34 .938 3.08 3.36 3.33 3.57 .423 
2.7.8 Foreign currency 97 3.20 .953 3.12 2.88 3.22 3.54 .129 
2.7.9 Manipulation of the loan loss provision 98 3.33 1.110 2.92 3.37 3.67 3.43 .170 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
earnings management tools. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis 
(K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each 
question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
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Although a number of techniques were mentioned during the interviews, LLP was the 
technique most mentioned, according to interview findings reported in Chapter 6 (Table 
6.8); 64% of interviewees thought that LCBs’ managers use LLP to alter their reported 
income. LLP is suggested by the accounting literature investigated in Chapter 3 to be 
amongst the most likely tools for earnings management by a bank. Moreover, it may be the 
most widely used technique since it represents a large accrual figure that bank managers 
can use for earnings management (Sun and Rath, 2010). The results reported in Table 7.9 
are consistent with the literature in respect of the usage of LLP as an earnings management 
tool. 
The second highest mean score (3.68) was given to Investments (Q 2.7.4). The term 
“Investments” refers to either long term or short term amounts invested in shares. The 
valuation of these shares may increase or decrease at the year-end which requires an 
accounting treatment that would affect the reported income on a Fair Value basis. Based on 
this result, and given that it received the second highest mean score, one might argue that 
LCBs depend, to a large extent, on ‘investment’ to manage their earnings which is 
inconsistent with both the literature and prior interview findings. 
Although the KW results did not reveal any significant differences in Table 7.9 (Panel A), 
to be consistent with the analysis order adopted in this chapter, Mann-Whitney tests were 
performed for more details and discussion. The results of the six MW tests are displayed in 
Table 7.9 (Panel B). 
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Table 7.9: Earnings Management Techniques 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.7.1 Reserves .918 .958 .916 .595 .885 .606 .599 
2.7.2 Revenue recognition .942 .886 .976 .663 .848 .577 .811 
2.7.3 Disposing of high market value assets .536 .412 .636 .742 .164 .272 .844 
2.7.4 Investments .872 .928 .566 .773 .398 .668 .731 
2.7.5 Concealing losses
104
 .060 .539 .195 .013* .491 .055 .207 
2.7.6 Use of misuse of asset-aside interests .395 .101 .506 .265 .329 .618 .737 
2.7.7 Accounting changes .423 .509 .531 .113 .904 .307 .381 
2.7.8 Foreign currency .129 .375 .959 .257 .290 .014* .213 
2.7.9 Manipulation of the loan loss provision .170 .212 .026* .164 .208 .800 .429 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about earnings management tools. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and 
users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The test results shown above in Panel B reveal three significant differences among the 
stakeholders.  
The first significant difference is between the Preparer and Regulator groups as regard to 
the use of LLP as a means of managing LCBs’ earnings. The Preparers’ mean score was 
only 2.92 (the least) which suggests that these stakeholders do not regard this method as a 
potential way for managing earnings in the LCBs. On the other hand, the Regulators group 
showed a mean score of 3.67 (the highest) revealing their relatively strong agreement with 
the view that LLP may be used for earnings management by LCBs. In addition, the 
questionnaire responses by the Regulators group (Appendix 7.5) reveal more details that 
may clarify this difference in perceptions. The responses of Regulators to this statement 
were, to a large extent, clearly in favour of the potential use of the LLP, as 15 Regulators 
expressed agreement with the statement whereas only 2 expressed their disagreement, one 
of which was strong disagreement. The responses of the Regulators should be viewed in 
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 Although Concealing Losses is not a specific technique, it could be achieved, as interview findings 
showed, by several ways, for example, postponing the booking of some expenses to the next period so that 
current period income is boosted. This technique may be used when the bank is not invoiced yet or the 
supplier has not requested payment. Omitting financial transactions, such as this case, is fraud rather than 
earnings management (according to the UK definition of earnings management). One of the potential 
interesting findings this study may reveal is that LCBs are committing fraud when they think of themselves 
practicing earnings management.  
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the light of the fact that most of them have work experience at the Central Bank of Libya 
and three of them work for the tax authority. Both these experiences may indicate a good 
deal of knowledge regarding the environment in which LCBs work and the way LCBs’ 
financial information is compiled and presented. 
On the other hand, Preparers’ responses were not that clear. As discussed above, 11 
Preparers agreed that LLP could be used to manage earnings, one of which was strongly 
agree, while 9 Preparers disagreed with the statement including 5 who strongly disagreed 
about the potential use of LLP for earnings management by LCBs. 
The second significant difference appeared between the Preparer and User groups 
regarding the use of loss concealment (Q 2.7.5) by LCBs to affect reported income.  This 
difference may have occurred because of that the Users group has had the highest mean 
score of 3.71 while the Preparers’ gave more neutral responses yielding an exact mean 
score of 3.00. This apparent different can also be explained by looking at the questionnaire 
responses of individual groups. For example, the questionnaire responses from Preparers 
(reported in Appendix 7.3) shows that 10 Preparers agreed that concealing loss is 
potentially used to manage LCBs’ earnings. On the other side, 8 Preparers disagreed with 
this view; 2 of them expressed their strong disagreement. 5 Users disagreed and 19 agreed 
including 6 who strongly agreed. 
The last significant difference is that between the Auditors and Users groups regarding the 
usage of exchange rates manage LCBs’ reported income. This was the subject of aggregate 
disagreement by the Auditors group according to their mean score of 2.88 (the least) 
compared to Users’ mean score of 3.54 (the highest). This potential conflict in views can 
be explained as follows: most Auditors are not professionally qualified and thereby may 
arguably be viewed as lacking the required scepticism and/or it may simply be that some of 
the respondent Auditors do not possess a high level of experience, given the fact that 15 
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(55.6%) of Auditors have less than 5-years of banking experience (see Table 7.2). On the 
other hand, the Users group consisted mainly of academics that may, arguably, be viewed 
as having less practical experience but look at such issues normatively. However, all other 
stakeholder groups showed, on balance, agreement that ‘foreign currency’ may be used by 
LCBs’ managers to alter reported earnings. 
7.5.2.7 Perceptions about Factors that may Enable Earnings Management Practices 
This section investigates the factors that might give bank managers the opportunity to 
manage earnings. In other words, if bank managers decide to report lower or higher 
income, what factors may make this behaviour feasible and possibly quite easy. 
Stakeholders groups were asked to express their agreement or disagreement regarding a set 
of nine factors. In order to identify any differences in views regarding these factors a KW 
test was performed. The test results are displayed in Table 7.10 (Panel A). 
Table 7.10: Potential Factors that may Enable Bank Managers to Practice Earnings 
Management  
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
2.8.1 Local accounting practices 96 3.56 .904 3.71 3.48 3.84 3.32 .310 
2.8.2 Ineffective external audit function 99 3.83 .904 3.64 3.78 4.05 3.89 .510 
2.8.3 Poor corporate governance mechanism 99 3.91 .809 3.84 3.89 4.05 3.89 .888 
2.8.4 
Poor commercial and business 
knowledge of users 
97 3.86 .829 3.64 4.00 3.89 3.89 .471 
2.8.5 Ineffective monitoring by CBL 98 3.84 .870 3.68 3.93 3.83 3.89 .751 
2.8.6 Ineffective monitoring by LSM 99 3.80 .869 3.76 3.74 3.79 3.89 .789 
2.8.7 
Ineffective monitoring by Tax 
authority 
98 3.76 .897 3.67 3.81 3.89 3.68 .820 
2.8.8 Difficulty of detection by auditors 98 3.54 1.007 3.37 3.56 3.68 3.57 .761 
2.8.9 Difficulty of detection by users 99 3.67 .904 3.36 3.78 3.74 3.79 .380 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
the factors may open the door for bank managers to be engaged in earnings management practices. It also 
provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; 
preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates 
significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
All stakeholders groups were, on average, in agreement that the above factors could have 
enabled bank managers to be engaged in earnings management practices. Focusing on the 
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average of responses, the results indicate that all factors were considered by respondents to 
have the potential to influence earnings management practices given the recorded mean 
values significantly over the mid-point. It is worth mentioning that the term “local 
accounting practices” does not refer to Libyan accounting standards; rather it refers to the 
current accounting practices that are accepted by local practitioners. As reported in Chapter 
6, a majority of the interviewees (93%) believe that the lack of local accounting standards 
play a crucial role in the existence of earnings management. One of the interviewees 
(AD3) who stressed the importance of having accounting standards wherever they 
originate from confirms that the absence of accounting standards leads to earnings 
management. He stated: 
"The absence of standards opens the door for manipulation. We need 
standards as a background for using as one language. Any standards would 
help even from anywhere". 
The lack of good corporate governance has been ranked as the factor that most assists in 
opening the door for bank managers to engage in earnings management practices; it was 
associated with highest mean score of 3.91. On the other hand, the difficulty in detecting 
earnings management practices by external auditors was given the lowest mean score of 
3.54. 
To investigate whether there were significant differences in the views expressed, six MW 
tests were conducted and the results are summarized in Table 7.10 (Panel B). 
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Table 7.10: Potential Factors that may Enable Bank Managers to Practice Earnings 
Management  
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.8.1 Local accounting practices .310 .369 .569 .243 .130 .643 .126 
2.8.2 Ineffective external audit function .510 .719 .228 .296 .306 .390 .956 
2.8.3 
Poor corporate governance 
mechanism 
.888 .821 .557 .838 .370 .738 .774 
2.8.4 
Poor commercial and business 
knowledge of users 
.471 .119 .310 .254 .585 .739 .552 
2.8.5 Ineffective monitoring by CBL .751 .300 .563 .351 .879 .925 .841 
2.8.6 Ineffective monitoring by LSM .789 .933 .841 .407 .766 .329 .667 
2.8.7 
Ineffective monitoring by Tax 
authority 
.820 .589 .394 .913 .567 .745 .526 
2.8.8 Difficulty of detection by auditors .761 .721 .349 .383 .531 .671 .917 
2.8.9 Difficulty of detection by users .380 .136 .227 .137 .972 .806 .786 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about the factors may open the door for bank managers to be engaged in earnings management practices. 
Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. 
Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The MW tests results revealed no significant difference among the stakeholders groups. 
This was expected from an analysis of the mean scores of each group which showed a 
relatively strong level of agreement as the mean scores were well above the mid-point for 
each group. In other words, stakeholder groups acknowledge explicit weaknesses in the 
accountability process within the Libyan Commercial Banks. Such factors if addressed 
would arguably deter bank managers from engaging in earnings management, which then 
should lead to better quality financial reporting and thus an improvement in accountability. 
These results are not unexpected and are consistent with the interview findings reported in 
Chapter 6. 
For example, stakeholder groups agreed that the local accounting practices can play a role 
in allowing earnings management practices among LCBs which may suggest a need to 
adopt International Accounting Standards (IAS/IFRS). In other words, accounting 
standards may have an important role in the accountability system. Views on how earnings 
management would thus be deterred and financial reporting would be improved, and 
ultimately, accountability enhanced, are examined in the next question (Q 2.9). 
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7.5.2.8 Perceptions about Earnings Management Constraints 
Having discussed the factors which may enable bank managers to engage in earnings 
management, this section aimed to identify certain elements that may constrain bank 
managers from practicing earnings management. Respondents were asked to indicate their 
agreement or disagreement regarding certain procedures that if adopted might deter 
earnings management practices by LCBs. The responses to this question (Q 2.9) are 
summarized in Table 7.11 (Panel A). 
Table 7.11: Earnings Management Constraints 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
2.9.1 Adopting IFRS in practice 99 4.27 .586 4.36 4.00 4.37 4.39 .046* 
2.9.2 Applying good corporate governance 99 4.28 .607 4.24 4.07 4.37 4.46 .079 
2.9.3 Educating and training of preparers 98 4.30 .735 4.28 4.04 4.42 4.46 .121 
2.9.4 Educating and training of auditors 99 4.25 .733 3.92 4.22 4.26 4.57 .025* 
2.9.5 Educating and training of investors 99 3.88 .884 3.64 3.74 3.79 4.29 .025* 
2.9.6 Strengthen audit regulation 100 4.41 .552 4.31 4.30 4.32 4.68 .015* 
2.9.7 
Strengthen oversight of financial 
reporting 
100 4.36 .560 4.27 4.22 4.42 4.54 .100 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
the earnings management constraints in the LCBs. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value 
for the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), 
and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
Focusing on the average of the responses by different stakeholders groups, the results 
indicate a relatively strong agreement by all stakeholder groups regarding the potential 
value of all listed constraints since, with the exception of the fifth constraint “educating 
and training of investors” which had a mean score of 3.88, all constraints reported a mean 
score over 4.00. Table 7.11 (Panel A) shows that what was perceived to be the most 
important constraint that may have an important impact on earnings management practices 
was the strengthening of audit regulation. 
As with the interview findings reported in Chapter 6 (Table 6.12) where 75% of 
interviewees believed that IFRS could play a crucial role in deterring earnings management 
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practices and ultimately lead to an improvement in the quality of financial reporting which 
implies an enhanced accountability. One of the interviewees (RG9) indicated that the 
application of IFRS would lead to a high quality financial reporting by saying: 
"If IFRS was applied the quality of financial reporting would be 100%...” 
 
The results reported in above in Table 7.11 Panel A agree with the interview findings as 
regards to IFRS. It is notable that questionnaire respondents are not satisfied with the audit 
profession itself as their mean score of 4.41 (the highest in Table 7.11, Panel A) is very 
high. Revisiting the interview findings reported in Chapter 6, the audit profession in Libya 
faces certain challenges; according to AD3, the audit profession in Libya suffer from 
auditors themselves. He indicated: 
"… The profession is suffering. In Libya there is a problem unfortunately; 
industry got a lot of unqualified auditors meanwhile a lot of qualified people 
as well…". 
The questionnaire findings in this regards come in line with those reported by interviewees 
as mentioned above. The statements (Q 2.9.4 and 2.9.6) reflect the questionnaire 
respondents’ agreement, on balance, that audit profession in Libya have a lot work to do, 
for example, to train auditors and place some regulation as to strengthen the profession. 
Given the important role of the external auditor in the accountability process, these results 
may reveal serious shortcoming to the current accountability system of LCBs as it is 
acknowledged by respondents that audit profession weak and auditors need to be trained. 
Table 7.11 (Panel A) reveals a number of significant differences between stakeholder 
groups regarding the influence of certain constraints in deterring bank managers from 
being involved in earnings management practices. The overall results of the differences 
between stakeholders groups indicate that, although they agreed on the effect of the above-
mentioned constraints, there were some significant differences among them about the 
degree of the impact of these constraints. To identify which pairs may have different views 
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in respect to these constraints, six Mann-Whitney tests were conducted and the results are 
summarized in Table 7.11 (Panel B). 
Table 7.11: Earnings Management Constraints 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.9.1 Adopting IFRS in practice .046* .024* .867 .687 .035* .018* .899 
2.9.2 
Applying good corporate 
governance 
.079 .364 .550 .116 .122 .024* .421 
2.9.3 
Educating and training of 
preparers 
.121 .212 .799 .330 .099 .025* .491 
2.9.4 Educating and training of auditors .025* .368 .252 .006* .641 .020* .142 
2.9.5 Educating and training of investors .025* .744 .665 .015* .910 .008* .034* 
2.9.6 Strengthen audit regulation .015* 1.000 1.000 .006* 1.000 .018* .014* 
2.9.7 
Strengthen oversight of financial 
reporting 
.100 .952 .347 .053 .299 .048* .361 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about the earnings management constraints in the LCBs. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors 
(AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The above table (Panel B) reveals several significant differences between stakeholders 
groups. Most of these differences were between the Auditors and the other groups. For the 
first point, adopting the IFRS in practice, the Auditors group has a significantly different 
view point from all the other stakeholder groups. Also, the Preparers and Users groups 
have three significant differences regarding educating and training of auditors, educating 
and training of investors, and strengthening audit regulation. Regulators and Users groups 
significantly viewed the educating and training of investors, and strengthening audit 
regulation in different ways. 
7.5.2.9 Perceptions about Earnings Management Ethics 
This question (Q 2.10) sought to explore the respondents’ agreement or disagreement 
regarding the acceptability of earnings management practices. Respondents were asked 
how they perceived the nature of ethical practice at first. Then they were asked how they 
viewed the exercise of earnings management when applied within the law and GAAP 
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limits before being asked to indicate whether earnings management is an unethical 
practice. The responses as well as the KW p values are presented in Table 7.12 (Panel A).  
Table 7.12: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about the Ethics of Earnings Management 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
2.10.1 
Ethical behaviour mean complying 
with law 
97 3.71 .912 3.71 3.77 3.84 3.57 .946 
2.10.2 
Ethical behaviour mean thinking 
about the impact of one’s decisions 
on others 
96 3.80 .776 3.63 3.96 3.58 3.96 .157 
2.10.3 
Earnings management is ethical if 
practiced within the law 
96 3.30 1.007 3.22 3.23 3.32 3.43 .880 
2.10.4 
Earnings management is ethical if 
practiced within the GAAP 
98 3.30 1.017 3.28 3.35 3.21 3.32 .950 
2.10.5 
Earnings management affects others’ 
interests 
97 3.80 .745 3.78 3.81 3.74 3.86 .958 
2.10.6 
Earnings management is an unethical 
practice 
95 3.07 .959 3.17 3.00 2.95 3.15 .831 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
earnings management ethicalness. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-
Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for 
each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The overall averages of the mean responses indicate a slight agreement with all questions 
which was partially unexpected given the sensitivity of the moral questions being covered. 
In particular, one would expect a higher agreement from some stakeholders e.g. the Users 
group, about whether earnings management aas an unethical practice. The responses 
indicate that ethical behaviour implies consistency with the law and consideration of the 
effect of decisions on others, with means of 3.71 and 3.80 respectively. This was followed 
by the agreement of stakeholder groups that earnings management would be ethical if 
practiced within the law and GAAP (the average mean scores were 3.30 for both 
questions). Also, earnings management was, on average, agreed by stakeholders to have an 
impact on other people’s interests by being given a mean score of 3.80. And finally, 
whether earnings management is perceived as ethical or not, the overall mean score of 3.07 
reveals that all stakeholders groups consider that, on balance, and narrowly, earnings 
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management is considered an unethical practice. Although, this result is expected, given 
the sensitivity of such moral questions, it was only slightly over the mid-point which 
means a very mild level of agreement with this question. Also this result is inconsistent 
with earlier findings; stakeholder groups agreed, on balance, that behaving ethically means 
to comply with law and consider others’ interest when making decisions. In particular, they 
agreed, on average, that earnings management could be regarded as ethical if it was 
implemented within the law and GAAP. Moreover, stakeholder groups, on balance, 
acknowledge that earnings management practices have an influence on the interests of 
others. All the above results are inconsistent with the last one, as it is expected to see a 
relatively wide agreement that earnings management is perceived as unethical practice. 
However, this result is, to large extent, consistent with interview findings reported in 
Chapter 6 (Table 6.11) which refer to 50% of interviewees indicating that earnings 
management is an ethical practice. The individually responded questionnaires (Appendices 
7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6) refer to responses almost equally spread on both sides of agreement. 
For example, the notable unexpected result that the Regulators group, on balance, 
disagreed that earnings management is an unacceptable practice; their responses to this 
statement were 6 disagreements and 5 agreements. The position of Regulators in terms of 
LCBs’ financial reporting, as scrutiny, may lead to a presumption that earnings 
management is viewed as unethical practice by LCBs’ managers. On the other hand, the 
(on balance) disagreement by the Preparers group, which may be expected due to their 
position in the financial reporting process, should also be viewed with their individual 
responses questionnaire in mind; their responses turned out as only 4 disagreements, one of 
which showed a strong disagreement and 7 agreements, two of which showed strongly 
agreements. 
As discussed earlier, the ethics of earnings management as perceived by interviewees in 
Chapter 6 revealed mix findings. Only 50% of interviewees perceived earnings 
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management practices as unethical. Although questionnaire respondents, on balance, 
showed an agreement that earnings management ethics is a bit questionable, it was only 
given a mean score of 3.07 that is slightly over the mid-point. This would really refer to a 
serious problem of the accountability system of LCBs. Since such behaviour is expected to 
be reviewed as unethical by a large extent of stakeholders as it does seriously affect the 
quality of financial reporting. Therefore, there is a need to raise the awareness of 
stakeholders to such issues, and questionnaire respondents apparently agree with the notion 
that some stakeholders (preparers, auditors, and investors) may lack the knowledge of such 
issues as revealed in Table 7.11 (Q 2.9.3, 2.9.4, and 2.9.5). one of this study’s objectives 
and aims is to provide some knowledge about this issue.  
Table 7.12 (Panel A) reveals no significant differences in perceptions between the 
stakeholders groups according to the Kruskal Wallis test. The next test was to identify if 
any significant difference may occur between any two pairs. Six MW tests were performed 
and the results are shown in Panel B. 
Table 7.12: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about the Ethics of Earnings Management 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-
values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG 
PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
2.10.1 
Ethical behaviour mean complying 
with law 
.946 .778 .671 .859 .874 .712 .639 
2.10.2 
Ethical behaviour mean thinking 
about the impact of one’s decisions 
on others 
.157 .118 .955 .142 .092 .825 .111 
2.10.3 
Earnings management is ethical if 
practiced within the law 
.880 .813 .662 .447 .812 .597 .821 
2.10.4 
Earnings management is ethical if 
practiced within the GAAP 
.950 .683 .971 .816 .577 .962 .684 
2.10.5 
Earnings management affects 
others’ interests 
.958 .912 .906 .710 .800 .798 .620 
2.10.6 
Earnings management is an 
unethical practice 
.831 .475 .409 .839 .919 .685 .603 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about earnings management ethicalness. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators 
(RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
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The results shown in Table 7.12 (Panel B) reveal no significant differences between any 
two pairs. 
The next section of the questionnaire focused on the role of the external auditor of the 
Libyan Commercial Banks in respect of earnings management issues. 
7.5.3 Earnings Management and the External Auditor 
The external auditor plays an important role in corporate financial reporting and represents 
a key element in the accountability process. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the Central 
Bank of Libya possesses a list of external auditors who are allowed to audit banks due to 
their qualifications and experience. This section aimed to explore the stakeholders’ 
perceptions regarding some issues related to the external auditors’ role. 
7.5.3.1 Perceptions about the Effectiveness of the External Auditor 
As mentioned earlier, only specifically listed auditors are permitted to conduct an audit of 
banks. This requirement would imply that listed auditors are of high qualifications and 
experience, and thereby are effective and able to prevent or at least deter bank managers 
from being involved in earnings management practices. Stakeholders were asked to assess 
the capability of listed auditors for auditing banks and how able they are to deter and 
prevent earnings management. The use of the auditor’s report in helping interested parties 
assess the bank’s financial performance was also examined. In addition, a question 
addressed views as to whether the auditor’s reporting is being used by the auditor to deter 
or prevent the practice of earnings management. The results are summarized in Table 7.13 
(Panel A). 
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Table 7.13: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about External Auditors Efficiency 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
3.1.1 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well 
qualified and capable to audit banks 
102 3.18 1.066 3.30 3.11 3.20 3.11 .860 
3.1.2 
The auditor’s report is relied upon 
when assessing a bank’s financial 
performance 
102 3.69 .844 3.85 3.37 3.65 3.86 .074 
3.1.3 
Listed auditors are likely to detect and 
deter earnings management practices 
in LCBs 
102 3.37 .943 3.52 3.26 3.55 3.21 .523 
3.1.4 
An auditor’s ability to report on 
earnings management is compromised 
by audit fees 
102 2.98 .975 2.96 2.70 3.00 3.25 .253 
3.1.5 
An auditor’s willingness to report 
earnings management breaches is 
compromised by conflict of interest to 
an auditor’s independence 
102 3.09 .902 2.96 3.07 3.00 3.29 .519 
3.1.6 
The external auditor can prevent the 
practice of earnings management using 
the power of the auditor’s report 
99 3.53 .849 3.81 3.12 3.58 3.61 .025* 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
the external auditor’s efficiency. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-
Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for 
each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
As shown in Table 7.13 (Panel A), the mean scores indicate that stakeholders groups 
agreed to most of the questions. Listed auditors, according to stakeholders groups, were 
viewed as qualified and capable of performing banks’ audits with an average mean of 3.18. 
It is worth noting that some of the interview findings suggested that at least not all of the 
listed auditors are perceived as well qualified and able to audit banks due to experience 
discrepancies among listed auditors as per, for example, PR5: 
“It depends on what is the experience of the auditor in terms of time; an 
auditor for one year could not, but an auditor who has being auditing for five 
year for instance could detect and can give some advice on how to reduce the 
practice”. 
It is worth looking again at the individual questionnaire responses by Auditors in respect of 
this statement; it is noted that the numbers of Auditors who agreed and disagreed regarding 
the capability of listed auditors for bank audits were equally spread: 9 Auditors showed 
disagreement with only one strongly disagreeing, 9 Auditors showed a neutral attitude, and 
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9 Auditors showed agreement including 4 with strong agreement. This information may be 
seen as an inside information since it flows from Auditors who know most about their 
status. 
The stakeholder groups agreed, on balance, also that the auditor’s report is being used to 
help assess the financial performance of banks which again is unexpected and is in conflict 
with some of the interview findings that suggest auditors’ reports are only a legal 
requirement and nearly ignored in the decision making process.  
In keeping with the first finding in this table, stakeholders agreed on balance that listed 
auditors are able to detect and deter earnings management practices by LCBs which may 
indicate that this ability is not compromised by any factor i.e. audit fees. However, 
stakeholder groups disagreed, on balance, that audit fees affect the auditor’s ability to 
report on earnings management, the overall mean score is 2.92. This result comes in 
conflict with some views expressed in the interviews; for example, one of the interview 
findings offered by PR4 suggests that bank audit fees may affect the external auditor’s 
ability to report about earnings management practices by LCBs, he indicated: 
“The auditor is supposed to be qualified to detect it through the process of 
audit. It depends on his personality; if he is not caring about the money he 
would say no [to earnings management practices]. But actually most of them 
say ok. Our fees have reached 50,000 LD”. 
The relative disagreement of audit fees’ impact on auditor’s ability to report on earnings 
management could be partially due to the fact that the Auditors group tends, more than 
others, to disagree with this statement by giving the least mean score of 2.70. Given the 
responses reported in Appendix 7.4 (Questionnaire responses by only Auditors) it 
obviously clear the general attitude of Auditors tends to the disagreement side. The 
Auditors have showed 4 strong disagrees, the most compared to other groups, and 7 
disagreements. However, due to the sensitivity of such a question, this may be influenced 
by their desire to appear not compromised by audit fees. Preparers’ responses have spread 
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equally; 10, on the side of disagreement, including 2 strongly disagreements, and 10 on the 
side of agreement, including 1 strongly agreement. 
Stakeholder groups have shown, on balance, a perception that an auditor’s willingness to 
report about earnings management is affected by conflict of interest and thereby auditor’s 
independence is compromised. In other words, there are some perceptions that reporting 
about earnings management breaches may lead to termination which would affect the 
auditor decision, and thus his/her independence is compromised. The last question asked 
about the external auditors’ ability to prevent earnings management practices just by the 
power of the audit report. In other words, if bank managers did not adjust the reported 
income to undo the earnings management practices according to the external auditor’s 
notes, a qualified opinion will be given by the auditor. Stakeholder groups agreed, on 
balance, the effective power of the auditor’s report. Needless to say no single client would 
be happy to receive a qualified report. 
The perceptions of questionnaire respondents come in line with those reported in Chapter 6 
(Table 6.13) which suggest that 89% of interviewees think of the ability of the external 
auditor in detecting the practices of earnings management. This conforms partially with 
the, on balance, agreement of questionnaire respondents’ agreement of the ability for the 
external auditor in detecting and deterring earnings management practices. The mean score 
for this question was 3.37 (Q 3.1.3). In a more specific question regarding the ability of the 
external auditor in preventing earnings management practices (Q 3.1.6), respondents, on 
average, apparently agree that the external auditor is able deter such behaviour moreover, 
this can be achieved through the power of the external auditor’s report. However, the 
interview findings reported in Chapter 6 (Table 6.13) refer to a contradict view, that is, 
only that the external auditor able to do is detecting the practice of earnings management 
as for deterring this practice, 25% of interviewees think that the external auditor is unable 
to do that. And this, as mentioned earlier, could be due to the fact that bank audit fees are 
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relatively high according one interviewee (PR4). Again there is a disagreement between 
what interviewees have said and questionnaire respondents have expressed; interview 
findings suggest bank audit fee as to affect the ability of the external auditor in deterring 
earnings management, while questionnaire respondents, on average, disagree to the effect 
of bank audit fees. Instead, questionnaire respondents, on average, agree of the potential 
effect of that conflict of interest may have on the external auditor’s independence thus 
ability to deter earnings management practices. 
The results articulated in Table 7.13 (Panel A) reveal only one significant difference; 
therefore, six Mann-Whitney tests were implemented to identify which pairs have 
conflicting views. The results of these tests are presented in Panel B. 
Table 7.13: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about External Auditors Efficiency 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
3.1.1 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well 
qualified and capable to audit banks 
.860 .481 .714 .533 .564 .905 .798 
3.1.2 
The auditor’s report is relied upon 
when assessing a bank’s financial 
performance 
.074 .032* .262 .972 .265 .037* .290 
3.1.3 
Listed auditors are likely to detect 
and deter earnings management 
practices in LCBs 
.523 .305 .987 .268 .374 .816 .280 
3.1.4 
An auditor’s ability to detect 
earnings management is 
compromised by audit fees 
.253 .386 1.000 .335 .278 .057 .249 
3.1.5 
An auditor’s willingness to report 
earnings management breaches is 
compromised by conflict of interest 
to an auditor’s independence 
.519 .554 .836 .213 .553 .488 .209 
3.1.6 
The external auditor can prevent the 
practice of earnings management 
using the power of the auditor’s 
report 
.025* .005* .246 .420 .054 .042* .783 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about the external auditor’s efficiency. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators 
(RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
Although one significant difference resulted from the KW test, four significant differences 
appeared when the MW tests were performed. The first resulted between Preparers and 
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Auditors groups regarding the use of the external auditor’s report, it can be seen from 
Table 7.13 (Panel A) that both groups agreed to reliance being placed on the auditor’s 
report in the financial decision making process. Also, Preparers and Users groups 
seemingly have a conflict of views in this respect as the MW test results in a significant 
difference between them (.037). The Preparers and Auditors again show a significant 
difference in connection with the influence of the external auditor’s report in preventing 
earnings management practices, and there was also a significant difference between 
Preparers and Users regarding the same question. However, all groups’ means reveal an 
aggregate level of agreement with the last question. 
The implications of the results reported above in Table 7.13 (Panel A, Panel B) on the 
accountability process stem basically from the importance role of the external auditor 
within accountability mechanism. The function of the external audit rely mainly on the 
qualification and independence of the external audit. If the external audit was not qualified, 
in this case to conduct bank audit, and that his/her independence is compromised by i.e 
audit fees would potentially affect the external audit efficiency and then compromise the 
accountability of LCBs which is, according to this study, to provide of high quality 
financial information, more specifically, to provide financial information free from 
earnings management. 
The next section discusses, in addition to the use of the external auditor’s report, whether 
the external auditor is aware of his/her accountability towards other stakeholders rather 
than only shareholders. 
7.5.3.2 Perceptions about External Auditor Accountability 
This section examined the external auditor’s awareness of his/her accountability from the 
viewpoint of different stakeholders. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or 
disagreement as to whether external auditors are aware of their responsibility towards 
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shareholders and other parties who may make a decision based on the external auditor’s 
report. The section also surveyed perceptions of the use of the external auditor’s report by 
stakeholders. Finally, the section also examined one of the viewpoints of an interviewee 
that the external auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and that it is not used in the 
financial decision making process. The results are presented in Table 7.14 (Panel A). 
Table 7.14: The External Auditor’s Accountability and the Extent to Which His/Her 
Report is used 
Panel A: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
3.2.1 
External auditors are fully aware of 
their accountability to the shareholders 
98 3.46 1.047 3.64 3.64 3.80 3.07 .074 
3.2.2 
External auditors are fully aware of 
their accountability to the third parties 
97 3.33 .898 3.56 3.56 3.47 3.04 .128 
3.2.3 
The auditor’s report is widely used by 
interested stakeholders 
98 3.46 .864 3.80 3.80 3.65 3.14 .040* 
3.2.4 
The auditor’s report is only a legal 
requirement and not used widely in the 
financial decision making process 
98 2.85 1.068 2.52 2.52 2.70 3.00 .223 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
the auditor’s accountability and his report extent. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for 
the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and 
users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
Table 7.14 (Panel A) shows the overall mean responses for these questions. The average 
responses indicate that, overall stakeholders groups agree that the external auditor is 
mindful of his/her responsibility and accountability not only to shareholders but beyond; 
the results also reveal that external auditors are aware of their accountability to third 
parties. The average means were 3.46 and 3.33 respectively. Stakeholders groups also 
agreed that the auditor’s report is being widely used by interested stakeholders in the 
decision making process with a mean score of 3.46, and, unexpectedly, refuted the notion 
that the auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and not widely used in financial 
decision making. This result is at variance with the interview findings reported in Chapter 
6 as some interviewees indicated that the external auditor’s report is not widely used. RG5, 
for example, stated that “There is no relying on it [auditor’s report] at all. It is only a legal 
requirement”. In this respect, questionnaire respondents were directly asked whether the 
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external auditor’s report has no use and is only asked in complying with regulations. The 
result comes contradict to those reported in Chapter 6 which suggest no use to the external 
auditor’s report, more specifically, questionnaire respondents, on average, disagree with 
the notion that auditor’s report not being relied upon or it is just a legal requirement. 
The K-W test points out a significant difference amongst the groups regarding the use of 
the external auditor’s report by interested stakeholders. To identify which pairs have 
significantly differing viewpoints, 6 M-W tests were performed and the results are shown 
in Table 7.14 (Panel B). 
Table 7.14: The External Auditor’s Accountability and the Extent to Which His/Her 
Report is used 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
3.2.1 
External auditors are fully aware of 
their accountability to the 
shareholders 
.074 .496 .549 .040* .243 .215 .024* 
3.2.2 
External auditors are fully aware of 
their accountability to the third 
parties 
.128 .290 .562 .027* .665 .228 .113 
3.2.3 
The auditor’s report is widely used 
by interested stakeholders 
.040* .043* .627 .012* .209 .507 .085 
3.2.4 
The auditor’s report is only a legal 
requirement and not used widely in 
the financial decision making 
process 
.223 .052 .550 .172 .191 .734 .437 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about the auditor’s accountability and his report extent. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), 
regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The results shown in Table 7.14 (Panel B) pointed out a number of significant differences. 
Preparers and Users groups have shown different views regarding the auditors’ awareness 
of their accountability towards shareholders; although both agreed with the statement on 
balance as their mean scores suggest, though the Users group’s agreement is only slightly 
above the mid-point (3.07). Regulators and Users have also shown a disagreement 
regarding this question. The second statement has a significant difference between 
Preparers and Users, who have generated mean scores of 3.56 and 3.04 respectively, it is 
notable that the Preparers’ mean is the highest while the Users is the lowest. 
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Although Preparer and Auditor groups generated the same mean score of 3.80 regarding 
the use of the auditor’s report by stakeholders, M-W results reveal a significant difference 
between these two groups towards this statement. The M-W results also show a significant 
difference for this statement between preparers and users groups whose mean scores are 
3.80 and 3.41 respectively. 
7.5.3.3 Perceptions about the Use of the External Auditor’s Report by Various 
Stakeholders 
The use of the auditor’s report has been generally discussed earlier; this section reports, in 
particular, which stakeholders are perceived to be using the external auditor’s report. 
Respondents were asked to assess the use of the external auditor’s report by a certain list of 
stakeholders. The listed stakeholders have been partially mentioned in the interviews, 
others are drawn from the literature. However, the results shown in Table 7.15 (Panel A 
and B) reveal no significant differences and the respondent groups all agreed (on 
aggregate) and with different levels, that the auditor’s report is being used by these 
stakeholders.  
Table 7.15: The External Auditor’s Report Use by Various Stakeholders 
Panel A: K-W 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
3.3.1 Shareholders 99 3.88 .848 4.04 3.72 3.90 3.86 .487 
3.3.2 Management 99 3.70 .963 3.85 3.40 3.95 3.64 .304 
3.3.3 Employees 98 3.22 .914 3.36 3.08 3.45 3.07 .475 
3.3.4 Tax authority 98 3.76 .909 3.96 3.58 3.80 3.68 .531 
3.3.5 Current and potential customers 96 3.49 .962 3.58 3.52 3.47 3.39 .864 
3.3.6 The Libyan Stock Market  98 4.02 .786 3.92 3.88 4.10 4.18 .309 
3.3.7 Central Bank of Libya 99 4.09 .771 4.15 3.96 4.00 4.21 .376 
3.3.8 Corresponding banks 96 3.64 .964 3.58 3.60 3.75 3.63 .989 
3.3.9 Media 97 3.27 1.005 3.25 3.28 3.45 3.14 .825 
3.3.10 Academia and research centers 98 3.43 .952 3.48 3.44 3.70 3.18 .359 
3.3.11 Society as a whole 97 3.24 .966 3.42 3.24 3.40 2.96 .411 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
who use the auditor’s report. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis 
(K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each 
question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
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As the results in Table 7.15 (Panel A) suggest, no significant differences appeared from the 
K-W test. This indicates, unexpectedly, a view that all listed stakeholders, on balance, and 
on aggregate, are using the external auditor’s report. However, The Central Bank of Libya 
and the Libyan Stock Market have been indicated to be the users for whom there is 
strongest agreement that they use the external auditor’s report with mean scores of 4.09 
and 4.02 respectively. On the other hand, Employees have been indicated as the least users 
of the external auditor’s report, however, with a mean score of 3.22. 
Table 7.15: The External Auditor’s Report Use by Various Stakeholders 
Panel B: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
3.3.1 Shareholders .487 .148 .546 .460 .430 .416 1.000 
3.3.2 Management .304 .118 .704 .675 .076 .345 .445 
3.3.3 Employees .475 .336 .860 .305 .250 .895 .217 
3.3.4 Tax authority .531 .103 .438 .551 .479 .563 .893 
3.3.5 Current and potential customers .864 .537 .405 .566 .721 .841 1.000 
3.3.6 The Libyan Stock Market  .309 .630 .685 .225 .356 .101 .398 
3.3.7 Central Bank of Libya .376 .328 .570 .413 .815 .137 .259 
3.3.8 Corresponding banks .989 .709 .949 .996 .789 .875 .773 
3.3.9 Media .825 .936 .604 .681 .560 .644 .395 
3.3.10 Academia and research centers .359 .809 .374 .302 .287 .390 .119 
3.3.11 Society as a whole .411 .484 .999 .155 .568 .359 .205 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding questions 
about who use the auditor’s report. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), 
and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The results in Table 7.15 (Panel B) point out no significant differences between any two 
groups in respect of the using of the auditor’s report by the various stakeholders. These 
results as well as of those reported in Table 7.15 (Panel A) come in line with those reported 
above in Table 7.14 (Panel A and B) which indicate, on balance, wide use of the external 
auditor’s report by shareholders and other stakeholders. 
7.6 Summary and Discussion 
The questionnaire was conducted in order to obtain a larger view of stakeholders about 
earnings management practices and related issues in the Libyan Commercial Banks 
context. More specifically, it meant to investigate the difference in views between the 
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various stakeholder groups; preparers, auditors, regulators, and users. Although 
stakeholder groups responded consistently in many questions, the differences in views 
amongst stakeholders groups have been mentioned in due course as necessary. 
This summary discussion will be restricted only to the main research and subsidiary 
questions.  
The quality of financial reporting by LCBs was perceived, on balance, but by a fairly 
narrow margin, to be of good quality by all groups except the Users group. As for listed 
LCBs all stakeholder groups showed on balance narrow agreement that listed LCBs’ 
financial reporting is of good quality. Moreover, listed LCBs’ financial statements were 
viewed, again on balance and by a narrow margin as providing relevant and reliable 
information. However, it is evident that a disparity of views typically exists within 
different stakeholder groups in regards to the quality of LCBs’ financial reporting. This 
range of views shows that, in spite of narrow agreements in aggregate, important doubts 
exist in all the stakeholder groups regarding the accountability of LCBs. This will more 
discussed in the conclusion in Chapter 8. 
The term ‘earnings management’ is apparently not well understood amongst different 
stakeholders of LCBs. Although most of them acknowledged that they heard of it, the term 
has been interpreted in some different ways which may refer to their uncertainty to what it 
exactly refers to. However, all stakeholder groups agreed the most of the short definition of 
earnings management, as well as other statements. Subsequent to respondents being asked 
about their understanding of the term ‘earnings management’ all respondents were offered 
a definition for what earnings management is in order to ensure that afterwards questions 
were answered concisely as regards the interpretation of the rest of the questionnaire. All 
stakeholder groups agreed, on average, that earnings management affects the quality of 
financial reporting and that both listed and unlisted private LCBs are engaged in earnings 
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management practices. As for state-owned LCBs, Regulators and Users groups agreed, on 
balance, regarding the existence of earnings management practices however, Preparers and 
Auditors, on the other hand, on average, disagreed about the existence of earnings 
management practices within unlisted state-owned LCBs. 
The motivations which are thought to be behind the exercise of earning management in 
LCBs are the same as those in the literature. Management compensation and job security, 
regulatory and political, and capital market motivations are perceived, on balance, by all 
stakeholder groups to have induced LCBs’ managers to intervene in the process when it 
comes to determining the reported income. This can be achieved, according to the 
questionnaire results by all listed techniques that respondents were asked about. LLP, 
which the literature suggests is the most influential technique of earnings management by 
banks, is perceived to be used by LCBs’ managers as well as other techniques. The results 
also suggest that LCBs’ managers tend to use both accounting and real earnings 
management. 
Questionnaire respondents provided interesting results in respect of their views about 
earnings management ethics. Stakeholder groups had very mixed views about whether 
earnings management is an unethical practice, however they showed a relatively high 
agreement that earnings management is acceptable when it complies with both law and 
GAAP. This result comes in conflict with another result, that is, the stakeholders’ 
agreement that some of the techniques used to manage earnings are explicitly out of GAAP 
and breaching the law e.g. their agreement of using ‘concealing losses and foreign 
exchange’. 
Earnings management behaviour is viewed as having a place in LCBs’ financial reporting 
due to the existence of a range of factors. Stakeholder groups agreed, on balance, that such 
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behaviour does exist because of local accounting practices, weak external auditor, and poor 
corporate governance. 
The above discussion leads to the assumption that financial reporting of LCBs implies 
managed earnings by some techniques with some certain motivations lied behind which 
eventually suggest that LCBs’ financial reporting would have been of less quality105 given 
the existence of the motivations and factors that may facilitate such behaviour. It could 
also be due to the mixed views that earnings management is unethical. All that should draw 
attention to the accountability relationship of LCBs as the existence of earnings 
management affect the quality of financial reporting and ultimately leads to providing 
biased information or in other words, reveal that LCBs’ managers are not properly held 
accountable. 
Due to the importance of an accountability system in almost all corporations, in particular 
those which have a wide range of stakeholders, e.g. banks it is of high crucially to seek 
various ways to improve the accountability. The questionnaire results shed light on how, it 
is thought, by an informed body of opinion, accountability could be promoted. 
Specifically, the role of IFRS, corporate governance, and the external auditor were all 
supported with a slightly greater level of agreement that the latter would help in this 
regard.  
In respect of the impact of adopting the international accounting standards (IFRS), 
questionnaire results showed, on average, agreement amongst LCBs’ various stakeholders 
that IFRS would improve the accountability system of LCBs. Adopting IFRS would, it 
thought, improve the quality of LCBs. This should therefore lead to LCBs’ managers being 
held more accountable to LCBs’ stakeholders. 
                                                 
105
 Despite the, on balance, agreement that LCBs’ financial statement are of good quality and provide 
relevant and reliable information. 
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As well, applying good corporate governance is seen by different LCBs’ stakeholders to 
have an influence over the occurrence of earnings management.  The quality of LCBs’ 
financial reporting would therefore be promoted and thus so would accountability. 
Applying good corporate governance is, on average, agreed by all stakeholders to 
positively affect accountability process of LCBs. 
However, the questionnaire results regarding the role of the external auditor in respect of 
the accountability relationship of LCBs come in with conflicted outcomes. On one hand, 
LCBs’ stakeholders showed, on balance, agreement about the need to educate auditors, 
strengthen the audit function, and promote the function of financial reporting oversight 
which could be seen as an acknowledgment by those stakeholders of the weakness of the 
role of the external auditor in respect of promoting accountability within LCBs. On the 
other hand, stakeholders showed, on balance, agreement that listed auditors are qualified 
and capable to the job of banks audit. Moreover, listed auditors are seen, on balance, to be 
able to detect and deter earnings management practices and, it was thought that, this would 
not be affected by high fees that bank audit would normally generate. The power the 
external auditor can rely on was thought to derive from the power of the importance of the 
auditor’s opinion on a bank’s financial position. Stakeholders, on balance, agreed about the 
ability of the external auditor in preventing earnings management practices on the basis of 
auditor’s opinion power. 
The external auditor is perceived, on balance, by all stakeholder groups as being held 
accountable not only to shareholders but to almost all stakeholders of LCBs. Eventually, 
the role of the external auditor is perceived, on balance, to be in a good level in terms of 
accountability of LCBs. Based on the above discussion, bank auditors are viewed as being 
able to detect and prevent earnings management as they have the power to prevent it, in 
addition they are aware of their accountability and are perceived as accountable to almost 
all stakeholders.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Summary 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to summarise the previous chapters and to provide a general 
discussion of the empirical findings in the light of the research questions of the thesis and 
its theoretical framework. This thesis examines a number of issues relating to the topic of 
earnings management by Libyan Commercial Banks (LCBs) by investigating the 
perceptions of various stakeholders regarding this topic. Specifically, the perceptions of 
various stakeholders are studied regarding the quality of financial reporting of LCBs by 
eliciting their perceptions in respect of earnings management practices of LCBs. How 
financial reporting of LCBs can be improved is also addressed by investigating 
stakeholders’ perceptions regarding a certain set of ways, by which financial reporting is 
seen to be improved. 
8.2 Summary of the Research 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduced and outlined the research topic, 
motivation, questions and structure.  Chapter 2 tries to put the research into the Libyan 
context by examining the internal environmental factors that are believed to have 
influenced the accounting practices in Libya. In particular, it provides a background about 
Libya and briefly examines the environmental factors that may have had an impact on the 
accounting practices in Libya; the economic system, the political system, the legal system, 
the education system and the religion of the country are discussed as well as the accounting 
profession in Libya. Chapter 3 presents the literature review on the earnings management 
topic, its definitions, motivations, and ethics. Also literature on earnings management 
practices within the banking sector was addressed. The Chapter also discussed briefly 
methods to measure earnings management. Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical framework of 
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this study: accountability. This thesis acknowledges the importance of the accountability 
relationship of LCBs with a wide range of stakeholders who will be affected by their 
activities therefore, the result of this study are interpreted from an accountability 
perspective, in particular, with reference to the key aspects of accountability factors 
identified in Table 4.1. As mentioned in Chapter 4 the accountability as a term is widely 
seen as a synonym for many terms such as good corporate governance, transparency, 
efficiency, responsibility, and integrity. Therefore, any shortfall within the accountability 
relationship may refer to an impairment of the above aspects. 
Chapter 5 reviews the study’s methodology and methods employed to collect its data. The 
paradigm of this study is ‘interpretive’ in which the researcher is looking at the object 
through people’s perspectives. Chapter 6 and 7 report the findings of the two data 
collection methods used by this thesis: semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire 
survey, respectively. 
8.2 Research Findings 
As noted in Chapter 1, the following research questions are examined in this thesis: 
1- To what extent is earnings management perceived to influence the quality of 
financial reporting in LCBs? 
 What do LCBs' stakeholders understand by the term 'earnings management'? 
 How are LCBs’ perceived as being able to manage their earnings? 
 What are the perceived motivations behind the earnings management practices in 
LCBs? 
 How do LCBs' stakeholders perceive earnings management in terms of business 
ethics? 
 What factors were perceived as enabling LCBs to manage earnings? 
2- To what extent, from an accountability perspective, could such perceptions be 
addressed? 
 What do LCBs' stakeholders perceives the implications of adopting IFRS in relation 
to earnings management? 
 How do LCBs' stakeholders perceive the role of the external auditor in relation to 
earnings management? 
 How do LCBs' stakeholders perceive the implications of good corporate 
governance in relation to earnings management? 
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This section reviews the major findings of the study in the light of the research questions. 
It will briefly review the interview findings and questionnaire results with the focus on 
differences in views between stakeholder groups that summarised in Table 8.1.  Also, it 
attempts to interpret the research findings on the basis of the accountability framework. In 
particular research findings will be addresses on the basis of the accountability 
characteristics that are identified in Table 4.1. The adoption of accountability as a 
theoretical framework for this study is proposed both as an underlying motive and to 
identify and understand the issue of LCBs’ financial reporting quality and to suggest how it 
can be improved. In the next section, the stakeholders’ perceptions in regard to the research 
questions are summarised. 
Table 8.1: Summary of the Statistically Significant Differences between the 
Stakeholder Groups from the Questionnaire Findings 
Section Topic No* PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
Financial 
reporting 
quality and 
earnings 
management 
Perceptions regarding financial 
reporting quality 
6 0 2 3 0 2 0 
Perceptions regarding earnings 
management definition 
4 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Perceptions regarding the effect 
of earnings management on 
financial reporting quality 
10 0 1 2 0 0 0 
Perceptions regarding LCBs’ 
accountess 
11 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Perceptions regarding earnings 
management motivations 
22 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Perceptions regarding earnings 
management techniques 
9 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Perceptions regarding earnings 
management determinants  
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Perceptions regarding earnings 
management constraints 
7 1 0 3 1 7 2 
Perceptions regarding earnings 
management ethics 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 84 2 4 11 1 12 4 
The role of the 
external 
auditor in 
relation to 
earnings 
management 
Perceptions regarding the 
auditor’s efficiency 
6 2 0 0 0 2 0 
Perceptions regarding auditor’s 
report 
4 1 0 3 0 0 1 
Perceptions regarding who use 
auditor’s report 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 21 3 0 3 0 2 1 
Sub Total 105 5 4 14 1 14 5 
Rank 3 4 1 5 2 3 
Note: This table summarises the significant differences between stakeholder groups at p-value .05. PR = 
Preparers, AD= Auditors, RG= Regulators, and US= Users. * No. of statements. 
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8.2.1 Perceptions of Stakeholders on LCBs’ Financial Reporting Quality 
This section discusses the evidence collected from the empirical work to support answering 
the first research question: “To what extent is earnings management perceived to influence 
the quality of financial reporting in Libyan Commercial Banks?” To answer this question a 
set of five subsidiaries questions were posed and initially stakeholders were asked to assess 
the quality of financial reporting of LCBs. 
At the interviews, stakeholders stressed the crucial importance of financial reporting 
functions as being in most of the cases the only source of information about LCBs. They 
also expressed their opinions on the quality of financial reporting by LCBs. The views of 
stakeholders regarding the quality of financial reporting were mixed. Only 57% of 
stakeholders perceived the LCBs’ financial reporting as being not good. Although this 
percentage might be seen as showing at least majority agreement many of those who 
agreed about the good quality of financial reporting were from Preparers (12 out of 28)
106
 
who may not be expected to criticize the quality of something of their own production 
(although some did). Interview findings, in this regard, provide mixed views about how 
different stakeholders perceive the quality and therefore, the accountability process of 
LCBs. 
Questionnaire findings, similarly, showed a range of differences in views between 
stakeholder groups, as reported in Table 8.1, regarding the quality of LCBs’ financial 
reporting. The range of differences is also evident by looking at questionnaire responses by 
individual groups. The financial reporting quality of LCBs is perceived differently by 
stakeholders. This means that accountability is also perceived differently by different 
stakeholder groups. This conflict of views may refer to a serious breach to the 
accountability relationship between LCBs’ managers and their stakeholders thus indicating 
lack of trust between both parties.  
                                                 
106
 Please refer to Table 6.3 where it is shows 75% of Preparers agreeing that financial reporting is good. 
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As stated earlier, to have this question well answered the following subsidiary questions 
have to be considered. 
8.2.1.1 Earnings Management Awareness 
In this section, stakeholders’ awareness of the term ‘earnings management’ was examined. 
The reasonable understanding, by stakeholders, of such a term that is closely related to the 
quality of financial reporting is basically necessary to understand their comments on the 
quality of financial reporting. 
The interview findings denote a lack of knowledge about the ‘earnings management’ term 
as most of them (22 out of 28), representing 79%, answered that they have not heard of 
such a terminology. However, most of the questionnaire respondents acknowledged their 
understanding of the issues when they were offered different interpretations to choose 
from, most of which were derived from interview findings. All stakeholder groups showed, 
on balance, agreement to all interpretations which may potentially refer to lack of 
familiarity with such a term or at least uncertainty about the generally accepted meaning of 
it. One of the key findings of the research is that the literal Arabic translation of the 
English term "earnings management" may not provide the same meaning as the English 
term although the literal translation is in use in some Arab countries. This may lead to a 
high possibility that the translation could cause misunderstanding or be misleading. 
Reference was made earlier in Chapter 6 that the Arabic translation that was used in this 
study although it is a literal translation it has been used in other Arabic studies. It is 
recommended that monitoring, supervisory, and regulatory bodies should take 
responsibility for spreading an awareness of earnings management and improving society's 
knowledge of its importance by setting up conferences, seminars and workshops and 
distributing publications that focus on financial reporting quality and earnings management 
issues and practices. 
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As regards the existence of earnings management practices within LCBs, interview 
findings revealed the view that such a practice does take place. On the other hand, 
questionnaire results refer to the existence of the practice in LCBs’ financial statements 
with some differences in views depending on ownership structure and listing status. All 
stakeholder groups showed an average agreement that earnings management is practiced 
by private LCBs either listed or unlisted. Public listed and unlisted LCBs are also 
perceived to be engaged in earnings management by all stakeholder groups except by 
Preparers and Auditors who did not, on balance, agree to the practice of earnings 
management by unlisted public LCBs. 
8.2.2.2 Earnings Management Techniques 
Having examined the existence of earnings management by interview findings and 
questionnaire respondents, this study is also concerned with how LCBs’ managers could 
alter the reported earnings. As reported in the literature and discussed in Chapter 3, LLP is 
quite commonly used by bank managers as a tool for earnings management. And 
apparently this is the case in Libya according to a number interviewees. However other 
ways to manage earnings were raised during the interviews and some of them have been 
agreed upon by questionnaire respondents. Interview findings reveal that 64% of 
interviewed stakeholders hold the view that LLP is one of the tools by which LCBs’ 
earnings can be managed. This finding was also corroborated by questionnaire results. 
Whatever the technique to manage earnings is to be, the main issue is the existence of 
earnings management. This raise concerns about the quality of financial reporting. The 
interview findings and questionnaire results provide evidence on the existence of earnings 
management in LCBs’ financial reporting which may refer to low quality and breach of 
accountability. For example, some interviewees, provided evidences regarding some 
techniques that are being used, based on their own experience, to manager LCBs’ earnings. 
AD3, for instance, indicated that ‘provisions’ including LLP may be the main factor in any 
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bank’s financial statements that is available to managers to alter their reported earnings. 
Another evidence is obtained from PR7 who indicated that bank managers use LLP to alter 
their earnings.  Such statements provide a good piece of evidence that LCBs are engaged in 
earnings management practices given that fact that some interviewees possess a reasonable 
knowledge about LCBs’ financial reporting107. On the other hand, questionnaire results, on 
average, refer to LLP as being perceived by stakeholders to be used as an earnings 
management technique.  
The financial reporting that is being provided to LCBs’ stakeholders, based on the results 
of this study, may not be fair i.e. the objectivity of the accounting information is not 
properly applied. 
Another major finding this study may refer to is that both interview findings and 
questionnaire results provide evidence of LCBs’ managers actually committing fraud when 
they thought of themselves as managing earnings. PR10, for example, referred to ignoring 
booking some expenses in bank’s books as being a “legal way” to manage its earnings. this 
evidence may be seen as an explicit evidence that accounting information provided by 
LCBs’ managers may not be objective and therefore, the entire accounting system of LCBs 
may lack its main function, according to Ijiri (1983), of being, and of being seen to be, fair. 
8.2.2.3 Earnings Management Motivations 
The current study examined also the motivations that induce LCBs’ managers to be 
engaged in earnings management behaviour. Interviewees have mentioned certain 
motivations however 50% of them had the view that ‘job security’ could mainly be blamed 
for such a practice by LCBs’ managers. However, interview findings provide evidence 
about other motivations; for example, US1 indicated that earnings management may be 
practiced to cover corruption as well as for job security reasons.  
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 PR7, for example, as reported in Chapter 6, has been the chief accountant at a commercial bank for 11 
years.  
259 
Questionnaire results demonstrated views that LCBs’ managers could be motivated by a 
set of motivations: management compensation and job security, regulatory and political 
reasons, and capital market. This result comes in line with those informed by the literature 
(see reported earnings management motivations in Chapter 3). 
The evidence provided by both interview findings and questionnaire results regarding the 
motivations of earnings management refer to a serious problem to the accountability. The 
existence of these motivations, although, they may be unavoidable, put pressure on the 
accountability process and expose it to a lack of trust and disrepute which therefore may 
have an adverse effect on the relationship between LCBs’ managers and their stakeholders. 
LCBs’ manager should be free from such motivations in order to produce unbiased and fair 
accounting information. 
8.2.2.4 Earnings Management Ethics 
The ethics of earnings management was also examined. The total of interviewed 
stakeholders was equally divided on this matter, as 50% of interviewees think that earnings 
management is an ethical practice. However, it is worth noting that this includes 67% of 
interviewed Preparers who believe that earnings management is ethical, which might not 
be a surprise. However, 75% of interviewed Auditors also think of earnings management 
as being ethical, which this time, might be surprising. Due to the crucial role that the audit 
function plays in financial reporting quality and then accountability, this would be not 
expected and is a cause for concern. 
Questionnaire results reveal the overall perception of stakeholders toward earnings 
management ethics. Unlike the interview findings, earnings management according to the 
questionnaire results is perceived, on balance, to be unethical. However, it is notable that 
stakeholders’ views are almost equally split on the ethics of earnings management with no 
statistically significant difference in aggregate views between different groups of 
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stakeholders as shown in Table 8.1. This may raise concerns about the accountability 
process given the potential implications of such behaviour on various stakeholders. The 
financial information, according to the accountability framework, should be objectively 
presented in order to be useful and fair to all stakeholder groups. 
As reported in Chapter 2, the accountability concept in a Muslim country, like Libya, is 
different from that applied in the West where the companies are only responsible and 
therefore accountable to their stakeholders and in particular to shareholders. In an Islamic 
country, firms as well as individuals should be held accountable not only to their 
stakeholders, but to God. Each Muslim is explicitly held responsible and accountable to 
God for everything he/she does including commercial activities given the fact that Islam is 
regulating every facet in a Muslim life. 
8.2.2.5 Earnings Management Facilitations Factors 
During the interviews, some factors have arisen when interviewees were asked about the 
factors that could influence the extent of earnings management (Q 9, Table 6.1). Most of 
the views revolved around some key factors: local accounting standards, corporate 
governance, and the external auditor. These factors and some other more ones were 
examined in the questionnaire survey.  
On average, stakeholders perceived that local accounting practices, ineffective external 
auditing, and poor corporate governance would make it easy for bank managers to exercise 
earnings management. In addition to the above factors stakeholders also perceived, on 
balance, that the lack of business knowledge by users and the ineffective monitoring by the 
different monitoring bodies (the CBL, LSM, and tax authority) may also encourage bank 
managers to easily be engaged in earnings management practices. 
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8.2.2 Perceptions of Stakeholders on How LCBs’ Financial Reporting Quality Can be 
improved 
Both interviewees and the questionnaire respondents were asked about their perceptions in 
regard to how could LCBs’ financial reporting be improved by applying a certain set of 
procedures. Both interview findings and questionnaire results showed, on balance, 
agreement that such procedures (as discussed below) are seen to positively influence the 
quality of LCBs’ financial reporting and therefore their accountability mechanism would 
be improved. The discussion below summarises the interview findings as well as the 
questionnaire results in respect of these procedures. 
8.2.2.1 IFRS and Financial Reporting Quality 
The applying of IFRS by LCBs is seen by most interviewees (75%) to have a positive 
impact on LCBs’ financial reporting. Therefore, the accountability process of LCBs would 
be improved, it was thought, if IFRS is implemented. This finding is in agreement with the 
questionnaire results in this respect. 
IFRS is perceived, in particular, by the questionnaire respondents to have an influence on 
LCBs’ financial reporting quality. LCBs’ stakeholders agreed, on average, that adopting 
IFRS may mitigate the practice of earnings management by LCBs’ managers which 
ultimately may promote the accountability process of LCBs. Without such a framework it 
could be difficult to satisfy characteristics of verifiability and stability. For example, if two 
accountants were to produce financial statements using the same accounting data, they 
would probably reach a very similar outcome if there was a framework. The importance of 
a framework has been stressed by some interviewees, for example, AD3 indicated that the 
absence of accounting standards would lead to accounting manipulation.  Another evidence 
on the importance of the framework provided from RG9 who stated that absence of 
accounting standards resulted in low financial reporting quality and that there is indeed a 
need to an accounting framework even written on a cement bag. He said: 
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"The financial reporting quality is very weak. Moreover, there is no 
difference in the quality between listed and unlisted companies because of no 
accounting standards. All we have is the broken record that is "according to 
GAAP" which we don’t have any definition of so that we can be clear on 
what is meant when someone uses this expression. No one exactly knows 
what the term GAAP means. When you and I disagree we don’t have any 
reference that we go to so we should have a written GAAP, no matter if even 
written on a cement bag. Thereby, the quality is zero due to no accounting 
standards". 
The evidence provided by this study, that IFRS may improve the financial reporting quality 
and thereby accountability, is consistent with a wide stream of scholars who believe IFRS 
would mitigate earnings management practices and therefore promote financial reporting 
quality. 
8.2.2.2 Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Quality 
Accountability as explained earlier in Chapter 4 is perceived as being a golden concept that 
everyone is agreeing with and that corporate governance as a term may refer to 
accountability or virtuous behaviour (Bovens, 2007 and 2010). 
Most of the interviewees had the view that applying good corporate governance would 
improve the financial reporting quality of LCBs. The majority of interviewees (89) had the 
view that if good corporate governance was applied, the exercise of earnings management 
practices by LCBs’ managers would be deterred. This finding comes in line with 
stakeholders’ perceptions examined by the questionnaire survey as well. However, 
interview findings as well provided evidence that corporate governance may well be seen 
by some stakeholders as a barrier.  PR1, for example, the chairman of a commercial bank 
completely dismissed the value of corporate governance in general. He also thought that it 
is not applicable in Libya due to the fact of the lack of qualification from which Libya 
suffers. He said: 
"I am against corporate governance,  … and splitting between functions in 
Libya as there is no corporate governance and they couldn’t split them due to 
no qualifications. For me it is nonsense, theory only. But if it is implemented 
in a good way it would tackle the earnings management". 
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This evidence is consistent with Coy et al. (2001) who indicate that accountors may seek 
some ways in order to avoid some constraints, they said: 
“Accountability may be related to power relationships between accountors 
and accountees within organizations, and in society as a whole. More 
accountability may limit the freedom of agents to act, and as a consequence, 
they may seek ways to subvert, bypass, and control accountability systems 
that may be imposed on them. Agents generally control the preparation of 
accountability information reported to principals, and this provides 
opportunities for massaging, which may exaggerate strengths and understate 
weaknesses” (p. 8). 
LCBs’ stakeholders showed, on balance, agreement towards the impact of applying good 
corporate governance on financial reporting quality. It would limit the practice of earnings 
management by LCBs’ managers which, arguably, results in higher quality financial 
reporting and therefore, accountability would be enhanced. 
8.2.2.4 External Auditing and Financial Reporting Quality 
The external auditor represents a key element in the accountability mechanism. Their 
important role, providing assurance and improving credibility of the financial statements, 
increases the public confidence in respect of the reliability and relevance of the provided 
financial information. It arguably can be said that quality audit would reduce or prevent 
earnings management practices thus provided financial information would be of good 
quality and ultimately one can argue good audit quality has a crucial role in promoting the 
accountability system. As mentioned in Chapter 2 and 4, only registered auditors with the 
CBL are authorised to perform banks audit which implies a certain level of audit quality is 
required by the CBL. Based on this one could expect that good audit quality is being 
carried out in LCBs and therefore LCBs’ financial reporting is of a reasonable level of 
quality i.e. unbiased accounting information is being provided. 
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Interviewees were asked to assess the role of the external auditor in respect of earnings 
management by LCBs’ managers. Although they expressed the view that registered 
auditors are able to detect earnings management practices of LCBs, they were doubtful 
about the ability of the external auditor when it comes to preventing or deterring the 
practices due to a number of reasons including the audit fee. 89% of interviewees had the 
view that auditor is able to detect earnings management but 75% of them thought that the 
auditor is unable to prevent such a practice. Some other issues were referred to as reducing 
the external auditor’s ability to detect or prevent earnings management, these were: lack of 
knowledge, limited experience, conflict of interest, and audit sampling. 
The role of the external auditor was examined in more detail by the questionnaire survey. 
The external audit function is related to the accounting standards as it is the auditor’s job  
to ensure financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the adopted 
framework i.e. accounting standards. As reported earlier, the lack of accounting standards 
in Libya would make such a mission a challenging task in many aspects: lack of a 
framework leads to financial information being instability, the accounting practices applied 
in one year may not be applied in the next period or it may happen two banks apply 
different practices. Also the verifiability characteristic would not be an easy task, absence 
of accounting standards will potentially lead to different outcomes if financial information 
was to be produced by another accountant. The lack of accounting standards may also open 
the door for managers to apply any accounting practice that serves their own benefit and 
present the financial statement in a favourable position to their stakeholders. To sum up it 
could arguably said that deficient, or lack of, standards lead to a deficient audit function. 
As discussed earlier, questionnaire respondents were asked to assess the impact of some 
factors that may ease the exercise of earnings management by LCBs’ managers, and two of 
these were related to the auditor. Questionnaire results showed, on balance, agreement by 
LCBs’ stakeholders that the ineffective function of the external audit as well as difficulty 
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of detecting earnings management by auditors may be reasons why earnings management 
is taking place in LCBs’ financial reporting. Another result revealed stakeholders’ 
agreement that educating the external auditor may have a positive impact over the external 
auditor’s ability to deter earnings management behaviour. This result lead to the 
assumption that listed auditors are not trained and educated enough to detect the behaviour. 
However this is not in line with the interview findings which refer to the view by the 
majority of interviewees who had the view that the problem with the external auditor (in 
respect of earnings management) is to deter it rather than detect it. This conflict in views 
between the interview findings and questionnaire results is confirmed again when 
questionnaire respondents showed, on balance, agreement that listed auditors are well 
qualified to perform banks’ audit. Moreover, questionnaire results reveal that listed 
auditors are relatively (on balance) in a good position that enables them to detect and deter 
earnings management practices of LCBs’ managers. The power by which listed auditors 
are able to deter earnings management practices, according to the questionnaire results, 
comes from the auditor’s report. Another area of disagreement arose between the interview 
findings and the questionnaire results. Interviewees had the view that listed auditors are 
unable to deter earnings management practices referring to some issues to support this 
notion, e.g. audit fees and the lack of significance of the external auditor report since in 
some cases it is only regarded as a legal requirement. On the other hand, questionnaire 
respondents agreed, on balance, that audit fees may lead to compromising the auditor’s 
ability to report on earnings management, but that the auditor’s report is being used to 
deter the practice which contradicts some interviewees’ perceptions. This potentially may 
lead to assumption that the relationship between the auditor and the various groups of 
stakeholders which may indicate a wide accountability notion that listed auditors are aware 
of as will be discussed in the next section. 
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In more detail, questionnaire respondents were asked more questions regarding the external 
auditor. LCBs’ stakeholders showed, on balance, agreement that the external auditor is 
aware of his/her accountability to shareholders and other parties and also that the auditor’s 
report is not only a legal requirement but is being widely used by various stakeholders 
unlike the views given in interviews. Specifically, questionnaire results showed, on 
average, unexpectedly
108
 wide agreement between respondents that the auditor’s report is 
being used by: shareholders, management, employees, tax authority, customers, the LSM, 
the CBL, corresponding banks, media, academia, and society as a whole. 
Although questionnaire results in many aspects come in favour of the current status of the 
bank audit function, unlike interview findings, however LCBs’ stakeholders acknowledged 
the weak regulation that govern the audit function as well as lack of oversight of the 
financial reporting function. They agreed, on balance, to the need to strengthen both audit 
regulation and oversight of financial reporting. 
Within accountability framework, accounting information should be characterised of being 
‘verifiability’. This simply means accounting information when reproduced it would come 
to the same conclusion. This mission, partially, done by auditors who will review, re-
perform, and re-calculation some accounting information in order to verify it. This job 
would not be as easy as one may think when the audit profession itself is below the level 
i.e. not well organised and strengthened.  
This may lead to a conclusion that in order to enhance the accountability process of LCBs, 
efforts should be paid to enhance the audit function by strengthening it through legislation. 
Also, the oversight of the financial reporting function, which does not exist at the moment, 
should be established so that the accountability system is enhanced. 
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 It could arguably said, based on self-experience of the researcher, that not all stakeholders would deal with 
auditor’s report properly e.g. tax department in many cases ignores the auditor’s report. Also other 
stakeholders e.g. employees, customers, media and society according to researcher’s experience do not deal 
with it. Media and society for example have only recently become affective and it was not adequate time to 
judge about them. 
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8.4 Limitations and the Problems of Conducting the Research 
Despite the attempts afforded to get this study to achieve its objectives, this thesis, like any 
other social research, was subject to some certain limitations. First of all, the research has 
coincided with 17
th
 Feb Revolution in Libya. The study started in Sep 2010 when Libya 
was relatively stable, until the embarking of the “17th Feb Revolution” which started on 
15
th109
 Feb 2011 and officially came to end on 23th Oct 2011 when the country was 
announced as being liberated
110
. This affected this study in two aspects: firstly the 
researcher was concerned about family and relatives as there were no contacts available; 
secondly this affected the study in terms of data collection. Interviews were undertaken as 
reported in Chapter 6, firstly in Benghazi and then in Tripoli after liberation. However, it 
could be said that the number of interviews could have been raised in more stable and 
better conditions. Only 28 interviews were conducted and 192 usable questionnaires were 
returned and analysed. As normal when adopting such approaches this may not reflect the 
perspective of the entire population of LCBs’ stakeholders. In addition, one of the 
stakeholder groups, Users was particularly small, consisting of only two interviewees, all 
academic, and there were 28 Users in the questionnaire survey 15 of whom were from 
academic positions.  
Another limitation that might have occurred concerns the potential bias of some 
participants; Preparers might try to create a favourable impression regarding the financial 
reporting of their firms, while auditors may have given a positive evaluation when it came 
to assessing the role of the external auditor. 
The position of the researcher, as an external auditor, may also act as a limitation. It has 
been noticed during some interviews that some Preparers tried to give a good impression 
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 It was planned to start revolution on 17
th
 Feb, the date when a demonstration started in Benghazi in 2006 
against the Italian ministry who appeared on TV showing the photo of who made the film that abusing our 
Prophet Mohamed, but the Libyan police by time arrested a human rights campaigner who used to guide 
demonstrations against the regime in Benghazi which provoked people against the regime and start the 
Revolution (BBC, 2012a). 
110
 However, up to date of writing this thesis the security status of the country remains unstable. 
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about their work places. Also some Auditors’ responses during interviews could have been 
affected by this fact as they may have seen the researcher as a competitor and therefore 
have been reticent about sharing some information about their clients. 
The topic itself may also represent a limitation to this study. As was apparent from 
interview findings, as well as the questionnaire results, earnings management is a new 
topic. Due to this unfamiliarity, some interview questions were left unanswered, while 
other questions that related to earnings management techniques were answered with lack of 
understanding of the topic as some interviewees mixed it with fraud and provide some 
techniques that completely out of GAAP and laws. 
The questionnaire survey itself may represent a limitation. Answering qualitative questions 
might be challenging for some so they may be tempted to provide random answers to 
finish quickly. Despite efforts afforded to make a reasonable length questionnaire it looked 
long and apparently time consuming for some as a number of questionnaires were returned 
uncompleted and those were excluded. 
Notwithstanding the above limitations, the study provides evidence of the state of LCBs’ 
financial reporting quality and accountability by addressing the topic of earnings 
management specifically. It also addressed related issues including the influence of IFRS, 
corporate governance, and the external auditor in respect of LCBs financial reporting 
quality and accountability. 
8.5 Contribution to Knowledge  
This study aims to advance the earnings management practices research of the banking 
industry in the Libyan context. It addressed stakeholders’ perceptions of the phenomenon 
of earnings management in LCBs and how such a practice could be implemented and why 
it may occur. Also, the ethics of managing earnings as well as factors that may enable 
LCBs’ managers to easily exercise this behaviour was considered. The impact of: adopting 
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IFRS, applying good corporate governance, and the role of the external auditor were also 
discussed. The findings of this study are interpreted from an accountability perspective 
which may potentially be seen as a contribution. Many studies on earnings management 
have been carried out based on other theories other than accountability. Habbash (2010), 
for example, examined the effectiveness of corporate governance and external audit on 
earnings management practices in the UK using agency theory. Also, Alghamdi (2012) 
carried out a study to investigate earnings management practices by Saudi listed companies 
using both agency theory and institutional theory. However, with referring to the 
importance and impact of the banking sector not only to shareholders but to all 
stakeholders and society as a whole such a framework may lead to protect their rights. One 
of the interviewees, US1, mentioned that in the event of a commercial bank collapsed it is 
customers group who will be affected the worse being. He indicated: 
"The main stakeholder in my opinion is not the shareholder. … However, 
when the bank is collapsed, it is the clients who will suffer more than 
shareholders. Theoretically the main stakeholder is the shareholder but 
practically it is the customer. If the bank had gone bankrupt the customer 
would lose much more than shareholders; this is the case in Libya 
The current findings may assist to fill the gap in the literature in respect of earnings 
management practices in Libya in general and in Libyan Commercial Banks (LCBs) in 
particular. There is a wide literature on earnings management in developed countries. 
However, relatively little is dedicated to developing countries. Due the fact of differing 
environmental factors between developed and developing countries such study should be 
of interest to research on developing countries in general and in Libya in particular. To the 
best of researcher’s knowledge it is the first study of its kind that dealt with LCBs’ 
financial reporting.  
The current study findings highlighted the problem of misinterpretation of the term 
‘earnings management’, it then contributes to knowledge by providing a general 
understanding of how such a term could be considered in a developing country like Libya 
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and drew attention to the fact of inaccurate  translation of terms from English to Arabic. 
Such translation should be based on meaning rather than being a literal translation. 
This study provides evidence on current earnings management techniques that LCBs are 
thought to be using. This contribution to the knowledge is potentially of great interest to all 
stakeholders given the importance of the financial reporting quality and accountability. In 
particular, Auditors who have a key role in the accountability process and Regulators 
whose LCBs financial reporting lay in their concerns would benefit a lot through 
understanding how such a topic would affect the quality of LCBs’ financial reporting and 
therefore their roles. According to Beaudoin et al. (2013), the practice of earnings 
management has led regulatory changes as a response the downfall of some high profile 
corporations that have been engaged in such a practice. In particular, Regulators of 
commercial banks may be concerned, according to Cohen et al. (2014, p. 174), with LLP. 
The recording of LLP has a direct impact on reported earnings therefore regulators view 
LLP as a “type of capital that can be used to absorb losses”.  
8.6 Future Research Avenues 
A very few studies have been conducted in Libya in regards to earnings management 
behaviour in general and on the banking sector in specifically. Although the current study 
aimed to shed light on such an issue, more research is needed so that such an important 
topical issue is well known at least amongst the financial community. 
The present study investigated the perceptions of various stakeholders, including User who 
consisted of people who are involved directly or in directly with the financial reporting of 
LCBs. Due to instability which the country was –and still- suffering it only few 
shareholders were approached. The researcher’s attempts through LSM to get in touch with 
some more investors ended up with no result.  
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Future research may also focus on the ethics of earnings management by approaching 
different stakeholders including accounting students. It could also be recommended to 
think about including such topic in text books as well as business ethics. The present study 
provides evidence on the need for educating and training of preparers, auditors, and 
investors. However future research may seek proper ways on how to perform the training 
and education.  
However, future research may focus more on the appropriateness and suitability of 
adopting IFRS in the Libyan environment as well as detailed research on corporate 
governance of LCBs as related to the earnings management phenomenon, for example, the 
role of internal audit in respect to earnings management, the effectiveness of audit 
committee, and the function of board of directors. 
The recent financial crises have reflected the importance of the quality of financial 
reporting and accountability. Managers should be held accountable not only to 
shareholders but to a wide range of stakeholders. In the banking sector the stakeholders list 
would include, for example, depositors who will arguably suffer the most in the event of 
collapse and when bank managers are not properly held accountable. Therefore, the 
importance of accountability should be acknowledged, and improved through promoting 
the quality of financial reporting for the benefit of society as a whole. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 6.1 
Interview Questions List (English) 
 
1- What is your opinion about the overall quality of financial reporting in Libya, 
particularly for listed companies? 
2- Why is financial reporting important? Who is it important to? 
3- Are you familiar with the term earnings management? 
4- What do you understand by the term earnings management? 
5- Do you think that earnings management is practiced in Libya and if so, to what 
extent? 
6- In particular, do you think that earnings management is practiced in the banking 
sector and if so, to what extent? 
7- Who do you regard as the main stakeholders in banks? 
8- Are you aware of any techniques that may be used to manage earnings both 
generally and particularly in the banking sector? 
9- Which factors do you think may influence the extent of earnings management? 
10-  What in your view are the possible motives for earnings management both in 
general and in the banking sector? 
11- How do you perceive the practice in terms of business ethics? 
12- Do you think that absence of local accounting standards influence the practice of 
earnings management? 
13- Do you think that adopting IFRS could affect earnings management? How? 
14- Could you comment on the impact of good corporate governance in relation to 
earnings management? 
15- Could you comment on the ability of external audit function to detect and/or deter 
earnings management? 
16- What is you assessment of the effectiveness of external audit of banks in Libya? 
17- To what extent do you think that stakeholders rely on the auditor’s report? 
18- Do you have any other view on the topic of earnings management in the Libyan 
banks? 
19- Do you think that accounting manipulation could be used in other ways to mislead 
the stakeholders e.g. in relation to capital adequacy and overall financial position? 
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مااو تاام م لاالم ج دم ااممر راامال ةدم ااويلي ةدمودلاار ااال دلدلااو مالاملاااو د  ااي و  ةدم لااال د اام  ة مية   -1
 ةدمودلر؟
 دموذة ديألك لعم ا أن ةدم ويلي ةدمودلر مهمر؟ مدمن معمدي مهمر؟ -2
 تل  مع  عن ملاط ح إاةيل ةلأيدوح؟ -3
 ة يدوح"؟موذة مفهج من عدويل "إاةيل  -4
 تل معم ا دمطدل  ةم مموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوح ال دلدلو؟ مةدل أر مار؟ -5
 ع ل مره ةدالامص، تل معم ا أن ةدملاويف ةد لدلر م مج دإاةيل ةلأيدوح؟ مةدل أر مار؟ -6
 ) دودن در د ملاويف؟sredlohekatsمن ديألك ةدطيف أم ةلأطيةف ةديئل لر ( -7
 ال ةد ي و  دلافر عومر مةدملاويف دلافر اولار؟ تل دالك أر ا يل عن  لفلر إاةيل ةلأيدوح -8
 مو تل ةدعمةمل ديألك ةدمل قا محا من إاةيل ةلأيدوح؟ -9
 ح عمممو مال ةد طوع ةدملاياي دلافر اولار؟ومو تل ديألك ةدامةاع ةدمحمم ر لإاةيل ةلأيد  -11
 )؟scihte ssenisub لف منظي ةدل تذة ةد  مك المو لمع   دأالا  ةدعمل ( -11
 ةدمعوللي ةدمحو دلر ةدمح لر لؤثي ع ل إم ونلر مموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوح؟ تل معم ا أن غلوب -21
 تل معم ا دأن مطدل  ةدمعوللي ةدامدلر لم ن أن لؤثي ال إم ونلر مطدل  إاةيل ة يدوح؟  لف؟ -31
 مو تم مع ل ك ع ل مأثلي مطدل  ةدحم مر ةدرلال ع ل إاةيل ةلأيدوح؟  -41
 إ م وف ممنع مطدل  إاةيل ةلأيدوح؟ل مو تم مع ل ك ع ل قايل ةدميةرع ةداويرل ا -51
 مو تم م للمك د فوءل ةدميةرع ةداويري د ملاويف؟  -61
 ةدل أر مار ال ةعم واك لعمما ةدم مااملن مة طيةف ة اير ع ل م يلي ةدميةرع ةداويرل؟  -71
 تل دالك أر مرهر نظي أاير حمل ممضمع إاةيل ة يدوح؟  -81
) لم ااان noitalupinam gnitnuoccaودح اااودو  (تااال معم اااا أن ةدحلااال ةدمحو ااادلر أم ةدملاعاااب د  -91
ة امااةمهو دمضا لل ةدم امااملن مة طايةف ة  اير، ع ال  ادلل ةدمثاول الماو لمع ا  د فولار يأ  ةدمااول 
 مةدمي ز ةدمودل دلافر عومر؟
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Appendix 7.1 
Questionnaire Survey (English) 
 
 
 
School of Business 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of Financial Reporting in the Libyan Commercial Banks 
 
 
 
Dear participant 
 
I am conducting research, in collaboration with Prof. David Collison and Dr. Louise 
Crawford at the University of Dundee (UK). The study examines the issue of “Earnings 
Management” in the context of Libyan Commercial Banks from the perspective of various 
stakeholders. In order to have insightful results, your participation in filling in this 
questionnaire would be highly appreciated. I therefore, would be most grateful if you 
would complete this questionnaire and please be assured that the information you provide 
in this questionnaire will be treated in complete confidence and responses will only be 
reported in aggregate with no individual responses being identified. If you have any 
questions please feel free to contact me at the email address or phone numbers below. 
 
Thank you in anticipation for your participating in this survey 
 
Yaser Saleh 
 
For any information, please contact the researcher at: 
y.saleh@dundee.ac.uk 
Mobile: +218(91)3262155 
+44(77)33373971 
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Part 1 :General Information (Please respond by ticking (√) in the appropriate box) 
 
Please indicate your age 
Less than 25 years 
old 
Between 26 and 
30 years old 
Between 31 and 
40 years old 
Between 41 and 
50 years old 
Over 50 years old 
     
 
1.1 Please indicate your gender:  M (     )  F (     ) 
 
2. Are you professionally qualified in accountancy or finance?  Yes (      )  No (      ) 
 
If yes, please indicate which of the following professional qualifications that you have: 
Professional Body  
LAAA  
ICAEW  
CIMA  
ACCA  
AICPA  
Other, please specify ….  
 
3. What is your highest educational qualification? 
Qualification  
Diploma  
Bachelor degree  
Master degree  
Doctorate  
Other, please specify ………  
 
4. Please indicate your place of education for your highest degree 
Place  
Libya  
Other Arab country  
UK  
USA  
Other, please specify ………  
 
5. Please tick your place of work and position 
Place of Work  position 
A commercial bank   
Central Bank of Libya   
The Libyan Stock Market   
Tax Authority   
Audit Firm   
State Audit   
Current or potential investor   
Academia and Research Centres   
Other, please specify ………   
 
6. Please indicate the work experience, if any, that you have: 
Less than 5 years  Between 5 and 10 years  
Between 11 and 15 years  Over 15 years  
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7. Where applicable, please describe any work experience that you have had in the Libyan 
banking sector (e.g. accountant for 5 years, internal auditor for 3 years)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2: Financial Reporting Quality and Earnings Management 
For the purpose of this questionnaire, financial reporting is defined as being of good quality when 
it provides useful information to the users of financial statements. 
 
2.1 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree, with the following statements 
about the quality of financial reporting in Libya. 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement  SD D NAD A SA 
Financial reporting, generally, is of good quality      
Financial reporting of listed companies is of good quality      
Financial reporting of banks generally is of good quality      
Financial reporting of listed banks is of good quality      
Financial reporting by listed banks provides relevant 
information 
     
Financial reporting by listed banks provides reliable 
information 
     
 
2.2 Are you familiar with the term “Earnings Management?”   
 Yes (       ) No (      )  
 
2.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about earning 
management: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Earnings management means reinvesting the earned profits      
Earnings management means manipulating earnings      
Earnings management is a bank activity which is responsible 
for planning and controlling reported income 
     
Earnings management means Increasing or decreasing the 
reported income according to management’s desire 
     
Other, please specify ……………………….  
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For the purpose of this questionnaire, “Earnings management” is defined as the manipulation of 
the externally reported income statement to alter the reported income according to 
management’s desire. [Such adjustments may take place within GAAP but in some cases they 
could be done in breach of GAAP]. Such manipulation is widely known as ‘earnings management’ 
in the professional and academic accounting literature in the US and UK. 
 
2.4 Such earnings management would, according to the literature, affect the quality of financial 
statements; to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the 
Libyan commercial banks:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Earnings management affects the quality of financial 
statements 
     
Earnings management is practiced in the private listed banks.      
Earnings management is practiced in the private unlisted 
banks. 
     
Earnings management is practiced in the listed state-owned 
banks. 
     
Earnings management is practiced in the unlisted state-
owned banks. 
     
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to shareholders 
     
Managers are managing earnings for their own benefits      
Earnings management enables managers to better 
communicate economic information to stakeholders 
     
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to the regulators 
     
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to credit rating agencies 
     
 
2.5 please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that bank managers are paying most 
attention to the following users when it comes to preparing financial statements 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Stakeholder SD D NAD A SA 
Shareholders      
Employees      
Current and potential costumers      
Central Bank of Libya      
Tax authority      
The Libyan Stock Market      
Corresponding banks      
Bank credit rating agencies      
Media      
Academia and research centres      
Society as a whole      
Other, please specify …………………………..      
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2.6 Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors motivate 
Libyan commercial bank managers to manage earnings: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Motivation Ownership SD D NAD A SA 
Management compensation 
State      
Private       
Job security 
State      
Private       
To avoid regulatory interventions 
State      
Private       
The desire to report smooth earnings 
State      
Private       
To influence other stakeholders 
State      
Private       
Because other Libyan banks manage earnings 
State      
Private       
To avoid reporting losses 
State      
Private       
To meet predetermined expectation (budgets) 
State      
Private       
To decrease tax payments 
State      
Private       
To influence assessment by credit rating 
agencies 
State      
Private       
To influence stock price 
State      
Private       
Other, please specify ……………………..       
 
Please comment, if you think that listed and unlisted status would influence your response to any 
of the above factors: 
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2.7 Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following areas or techniques 
may be used by Libyan commercial bank managers to manipulate reported earnings. 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Method SD D NAD A SA 
Reserves       
Revenue recognition      
Disposing of high market value assets      
Investments      
Concealing losses      
Use or misuse of set-aside interests111      
Accounting changes       
Foreign currency      
Manipulation of the loan loss provision      
Other means, please specify ………………….      
 
 
2.8 please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors enable Libyan 
commercial bank managers to manipulate earnings: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Factor SD D NAD A SA 
Local accounting practice      
Ineffective external audit function      
Poor corporate governance mechanism      
Poor commercial and business knowledge among users      
Ineffective monitoring by Central Bank of Libya      
Ineffective monitoring by Libyan Stock Market      
Ineffective monitoring by Tax authority       
Difficulty of detection by auditors      
Difficulty of detection by users      
Other, please specify …………………..      
 
2.9 To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following actions would mitigate the 
practice of earnings management:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Action SD D NAD A SA 
Adopting international accounting standards (IFRS) in practice      
Applying good corporate governance e.g. existence of audit 
committee, effective internal auditing… 
     
Educating and training of preparers      
Educating and training of auditors      
Educating and training of investors      
Strengthen audit regulation       
Strengthen oversight of financial reporting      
Other, please specify ……………………………      
                                                 
111
 Set-aside interests. Literal translation for interests that are calculated and booked as a provision rather than 
revenue because of a client bad debt risk.  
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2.10 To what extent, do you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning the 
ethics of earnings management: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Ethical behaviour means complying with law      
Ethical behaviour means thinking about the impact of 
one’s decisions on others 
     
Earnings management is ethical if practiced within the 
law  
     
Earnings management is ethical if practiced within the 
GAAP 
     
Earnings management affects others' interests      
Earnings management is an unethical practice      
 
Part 3: External Auditor 
3.1 According to Libyan regulations, only auditors who are listed with the Central Bank of Libya 
are allowed to audit Libyan commercial banks. This restriction implies that those “listed auditors” 
are qualified to undertake an effective audit for banks. To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well qualified and 
capable to audit banks 
     
The auditor’s report is relied upon when assessing a 
bank’s financial performance 
     
Listed auditors are likely to detect and deter earnings 
management practices in Libyan commercial banks 
     
An auditor’s ability to report on earnings management is 
compromised by audit fess 
     
An auditor’s willingness to report earnings management 
breaches  is compromised by confliction of interest to an 
auditor’s independence 
     
The external auditor can prevent the practice of EM 
using the power of the auditor’s report 
     
 
3.2 Please indicate the extent by which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the shareholders 
     
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the third parties 
     
The auditor’s report is widely used by interested  
stakeholders 
     
The auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and not 
used widely in the financial decision making process. 
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3.3 Presumably, an auditor’s report is used by several parties when making economic decisions 
regarding financial statements. Please indicate to what extent do you agree or disagree that the 
following stakeholders place greater trust in financial statements of Libyan commercial banks as a 
result of the auditor’s report than they would otherwise do: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Users SD D NAD A SA 
shareholders      
Management      
Employees      
Tax department      
Current and potential customers      
The Libyan Stock Market      
Central Bank of Libya      
Corresponding banks      
Media      
Academia and research centres      
Society as a whole      
Other, please specify ………………      
 
Part 4:  Additional Information 
4.1 Please use the space below to make any comments about the earnings management practices 
in the Libyan Commercial Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher would like to take the opportunity to thank you for filling in the questionnaire. 
Also, if you would like to receive a summary of the research results and findings please write 
down your name and contact details. Thank you. 
 
Name  
Address  
Email  
Phone number  
Fax number  
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 جودة التقارير المالية في المصارف التجارية الليبيةإستمارة إستبيان حول 
  
 ةدم ويك ةد يلج
اميا درومعر اناي (ةدمم  ر ةدممحال)  داية ٍر م ةن مع ةدديا مي الفلا  مدل من مةدا مميل دمل   ي م ول مج ةددوحث دودمع
من ج ةد يلج دملء تذه ون معألاحوب ةدملاودح ةدمعنللن. إ منظمي ال ةدملاويف ةدمرويلر ةد لدلر من ةلأيدوح إاةيلعن 
نموئج ةداية ر.  مو أؤ ا أن  ل ةدمع ممو  ةدمل  مادمن دهو  إدلثي ةدطلب مةلإلرودي د ملامل  ممويل  ل من ده ةلأةلإ
 ةدع مي.  مف معومل د يلر مومر مدن م مااج إ  ال أغيةض ةددحث
 
 ع ل أ ئ ر ةلإ مدلون.ن ج دمالالص رزٍء من مقم ج ةدثملن دلإرودر م وأ  ي ج م امًو ع ل مع
 
 لو ي محما ةدديغثل
 
 لأي ة مف وي ليرل ةلإملاول ع ل ةدعنمةن:
 
 
 ku.ca.eednud@helas.y
 )44(1752722277  - 0013232155تومف: 
 
 
 
  
 003 
 إستمارة إستبيان حول جودة التقارير المالية في المصارف التجارية الليبية
 ل: معلومات عامة عن المشاركوالجزء ال 
 دعا  ل  ؤةل. ) ال ةداونر ةدمنو در  مو تم ممضح  √(ليرل ةلإرودر دمضع علامر 
 . يرجى تحديد العمر:1
  نر 10 ثي من أ  نر 50حمل  14من   نر 54حمل  12من   نر 52حمل  23من   نر 03قل من أ
     
 )    فى المحاسبية؟  نعم (     )   لا (  مهنياا  مؤهلا  تحمل. هل 2
 رودر دنعج، ليرل محالا ةدمؤتل: ون  ةلإ إذة
اير، ليرل أ AMIC WEACI APCIA ACCA ن ودر ةدمحو دلن مةدميةرعلن ةد لدللن
 ةدمحالا
      
 مؤهل تعليمى تحصلت عليه؟ آخر. ما هو 3
 اد مج د ودميل  مور ملي ا مميةل
مؤتلا  أاير، 
 ةدمحالاليرل 
     
 . يرجى تحديد المكان الذى تحصلت منه على هذا المؤهل:4
 دلدلو
د ا عيدي 
 آاي
ةدمم  ر 
 ةدممحال
ةدم لو  
ةدممحال 
 ة ميل لر
أاير، ليرل 
 ةدمحالا
     
 . يرجى تحديد مكان العمل والوظيفة:5
  مكان العمل
  ملايف مرويي
  ملايف دلدلو ةدمي زي
  ية  ةدمودلرم  م  ةلأ
  ةدضيةئب إاةيل
  م مب ميةرعر
  المن ةدمحو در
  م وتج أمم مثمي 
  أ والمي
  اير، ليرل ةدمحالاأ
 
 . يرجى تحديد سنوات الخبرة فى مجال العمل المصرفي:6
  نر 01 من أ ثي  نر 01 إدل 11 من  نمة  51 إدل 2 من  نمة  ام  من أقل
    
مراجع داخلي  أوسنوات  5المصرفي (على سبيل المثال، محاسب لمدة  القطاعالخبرة المكتسبة فى مجال ومدة . يرجى بيان 7
 سنوات) 3لمدة 
 
 
 103
 وا  دارة الرباح الجزء الثانى: جودة التقارير المالية
 
 .لهو  مفلال دم ماام ون  م اج مع ممو إذةلأغيةض تذه ةداية ر، معمدي ةدم ويلي ةدمودلر ذة  رمال 
 لا توافق على العبارات التالية بخصوص جودة التقارير المالية فى ليبيا: أوأيِّ مدى توافق  إلى الاشارةجى ير  2.1
 ةدعدويل
 أمةا   
 د ال
 ةا أم  محولا أمةا   
 ةا أم 
 د ال
      معمدي ةدم ويلي ةدمودلر ال دلدلو دلافر عومر ذة  رمال
      ةدمول ذة  رمالمعمدي ةدم ويلي ةدمودلر د  ي و  ةدم لال د م  
      معمدي ةدم ويلي ةدمودلر د ملاويف ةدمرويلر دلافر عومر ذة  رمال
      معمدي ةدم ويلي ةدمودلر د ملاويف ةدم لال د م  ةدمول ذة  رمال
      معمدي ةدمع ممو  ةدمودلر د ملاويف ةدم لال ملائمر  ماوذ ةد يةية 
      ةدم لال ممثمقر عنا ةماوذ ةد يةية معمدي ةدمع ممو  ةدمودلر د ملاويف 
 
 )  نعم (     )    لا (    "؟ الرباح إدارةهل سمعت عن مصطلح " 2.2
  يحمل المعنى التالي: "الرباح إدارة"أن مصطلح  الى أى مدى توافق او لا توافق 2.3
 ةدمعنل
 ةا أم   
 د ال
 ممةا  محولا ةا أم   
 ممةا 
 د ال
      ةلأيدوح ةدمح  رإعوال إ مثموي 
      ةدملاعب دولأيدوح
      أحا أق وج ةدملايف مهممه ةدماطلط مةديقودر ع ل ةلأيدوح
      مافلض لاوال ةداال أمزلوال 
      أاير، ليرل ةدمحالا
 
مثل تذه  .اةيلد وئمر ةداال دغيض معالل لاوال ةداال ح ب يغدر ةلإ اةيلمعيف إاةيل ةلأيدوح ع ل أنهو ملاعب ةلإ لغراض الدراسة،
وللي. ةدماالا  لم ن أن ممج من الال معوللي ةدمحو در ةدم دمدر مةدممعويف ع لهو، إ  أنه ال دعض ةدحو   لمج مطدل هو دودماودفر دهذه ةدمع
  لو  ةدممحال مديلطونلو دإ ج "إاةيل ةلأيدوح". والمل ال ةدم اب ةدمهنل مةلألعيف تذة ةدملايف ع ل نطو  مة ع ال ةلأ
 
 :ما يليتوافق على  لا أومدى توافق  أيِّ  إلىمؤثي ع ل رمال ةد مةئج ةدمودلر،  إاةيل ةلأيدوحاإن   ديدح ب ةلأاب ةدمحو 2.4
 ةدعدويل
 ةا أم   
 د ال
 ممةا  محولا ةا أم   
 ممةا 
 د ال
      ةدمودلرمؤثي إاةيل ةلأيدوح ع ل رمال ةدم ويلي 
      ية  ةدمودلر دمموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوحم  م  ةلأدار ةداولار ةدم لال  م مج ةدملاويف
      ية  ةدمودلر دمموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوحم  م  ةلأدار م مج ةدملاويف ةداولار غلي ةدم لال 
      ية  ةدمودلر دمموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوحم  م  ةلأدار م مج ةدملاويف ةدعومر ةدم لال 
      ية  ةدمودلر دمموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوحم  م  ةلأدار م مج ةدملاويف ةدعومر غلي ةدم لال 
      م مج إاةيل ةدملايف دمموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوح د لاا ةدملاعب دودمع ممو  ةدممرهر د م وتملن
      م مج إاةيل ةدملايف دمموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوح دمح ل  منواع اولار
      إاةيل ةلأيدوح لم ن دلإاةيل إظهوي ةدنموئج ةدح ل لر د ملايفمن الال مطدل  
      م مج ةلإاةيل دمموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوح دغيض ةدملاعب دودمع ممو  ةدممرهر د رهو  ةديقودلر
      م مج ةلإاةيل دمموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوح دغيض ةدملاعب دودمع ممو  ةدممرهر دم و   ةدملانلف ةلإئممونل
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إعداد القوائم  دعن بفئات المستخدمين التالية أكبر إهتماماا  الى اى مدى توافق او لا توافق أن إدارة المصرف تولي 2.5
 :المالية
 ةدفئر
   أمةا 
 د ال
 ةا أم  محولا   أمةا 
 ةا أم 
 د ال
      ةدم وتممن
      نم ةدممظف
      ن د ملايفم ن مةدمممقعم ةدزدوئن ةدحودل
      ةدمي زيملايف دلدلو 
      إاةيل ةدضيةئب
      ية  ةدمودلرم  م  ةلأ
      ةدملاويف ةدمية  ر
      ئممونل د ملاويفم و   ةدملانلف ةلإ
      علاجةلإ
       والملر ممية ز ةددحمثةدمؤ  و  ةلأ
      ةدمرممع دلافر عومر
      اير، ليرل ةدمحالاأائر 
 للقيام بإدارة الرباح: ا لإدارة المصرففعادتمثل سباب التالية الن مدى توافق أو لاتوافق أ أي   إلىيرجى تحديد  2.6
 الملكية الدافع
 لا أوافق
 بشدة
 موافق محايد لا أوافق
 موافق
 بشدة
 م واآ  ةلإاةيل
      عومر
      اولار
 ةدحفوظ ع ل ةدمظلفر
      عومر
      اولار
 مرنب ماال ةدرهو  ةديقودلر
      عومر
      اولار
 ظهوي ةلأيدوح د  ل ممنو   مع ةدفميل ةد ود رإةديغدر ال 
      عومر
      اولار
 ةدممظفلن أملاحوب ةدملاودح  ودزدوئن أد مأثلي ع ل دعض 
      عومر
      اولار
 اير م مج دمموي ر إاةيل ةلأيدوحقنوعر إاةيل ةدملايف دأن ةدملاويف ةلأ
      عومر
      اولار
 دمرنب إظهوي ا وئي
      عومر
      اولار
 إظهوي ةدنموئج دمو لممةا  مع ةدملزةنلر ةدم اليلر
      عومر
      اولار
 ةدم مح ر ع ل أيدوح ةدملايفدمافلض قلمر ةدضيةئب 
      عومر
      اولار
 ئممونلدمح لن ةدملانلف ةلإ
      عومر
      اولار
 اي  م  ةلأمية  ةدمودلرد مأثلي ع ل  عي ةد هج 
      عومر
      اولار
       امةاع أاير، ليرل ةدمحالا
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ية  ةدمودلر ليرل ة مااةج م  م  ةلأدار  غلي م لا ٍ أج ئ ر ةد ود ر  ممأثي دح ب  من ةدملايف م لا رودمك عن ةلأإ ون   إذة
 ةدفيةغ ةدمودي د مع ل :
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 إاةيلةدملايف دإ مغلال ةدطي  مةدم وئل ةدمودلر دمطدل   إاةيل  ممةا  ع ل قلوج  أممار ممةا   أي   إدل ويل ليرل ةلإ 2.7
 :ةلأيدوح
 ةدطيل ر
   أمةا 
 د ال
 ةا أم  محولا   أمةا 
 ةا أم 
 د ال
      حملوطلو ةدمالالاو  مةلإ
      عميةف دو ليةاممقل  ةلإ
      ةد مقلر ةدعودلرلامل ذة  ةد لمر ةدملايف ال ةلأ
       مثموية ةلإ
      ثي ةد  ديافوء ةدا وئي مةدعم لو  ذة  ةلأإ
       ؤ ة مااةج ةدفمةئا ةدمرندر أمة مااةج 
      مغللي ةدطي  مةد لو و  ةدمحو دلر
      رندلرةدعملا  ةلأ عوي لايف أ
      ةدملاعب دمالاص ةدالمن ةدم  مك الهو
      ةدمحالااير، ليرل أ
 
 مكن إدارة المصرف من التلعب بالرباح:أن العوامل التالية ت   توافق او لا توافقمدى  أيِّ  إلى  2.2
 ةدعومل
   أمةا 
 د ال
 ةا أم  محولا   أمةا 
 ةا أم 
 د ال
      )معوللي ةدمحو در ةدمح لر (ةدمموي و  ةدمحو دلر ةدمطد ر اع لو ً
      عاج  فوءل ةدميةرع ةداويري
      ضعف إريةءة  ةدحم مر
      ضعف ةدمعيار ةدمرويلر مةدمهنلر دلن م ماامل ةد مةئج ةدمودلر
      ضعف يقودر مممودعر ملايف دلدلو ةدمي زي
      ية  ةدمودلرم ضعف يقودر مممودعر  م  ةلأ
      ةدضيةئب إاةيلضعف يقودر مممودعر 
      من قدل ةدميةرع ةداويري ةلأيدوح إاةيللاعمدر ة م وف 
      من قدل م ماامل ةد مةئج ةدمودلر ةلأيدوح إاةيللاعمدر ة م وف 
      عمةمل أاير، ليرل ةدمحالا
 
 403 
 من ممارسة إدارة الرباح: تعتبر مهمة للحدأن الاجراءات التالية  توافق او لا توافقمدى  أيِّ  إلى  2.2
 ريةءةلإ
   أمةا 
 د ال
 ةا أم  محولا   أمةا 
 ةا أم 
 د ال
      مدنىل معوللي ةدمحو در ةدامدلر اع لو ً
      مطدل  إريةءة  ةدحم مر د  ل رلا
      مأتلل ممايلب معاي ةد مةئج ةدمودلر
      مأتلل ممايلب ةدميةرعلن ةداويرللن
      مأتلل ممايلب ةدم مثميلن
      معزلز مهنر ةدميةرعر
      ةدم ويلي ةدمودلر معزلز ةديقودر ع ل
      ةريةءة  ةاير، ليرل ةدمحالا
 
 
 مدى تعتقد بصحة العبارات التالية: أيِّ  إلى 2..1
 ةدعدويل
   أمةا 
 د ال
 ةا أم  محولا   أمةا 
 ةا أم 
 د ال
      الاقل تم مو لممةا  مع ةد مةئح مةد مةنلنةدملايف ةلأ
      ةد يةية  ع ل ملاودح ةدغليةدملايف ةلأالاقي لعنل ميةعول أثي 
      مج مطدل هو دمو   لاودف ةد مةنلن إذة أالاقلو ً ملاياو ً ةلأيدوح إاةيلمعمدي 
مج مطدل هو دمو   لاودف ةدمعوللي ةدم دمدر  إذةملاياو أالاقلو  ةلأيدوح إاةيلمعمدي 
 مةدممعويف ع لهو 
     
      ع ل ملاودح ةدغلي ةلأيدوح إاةيلمؤثي 
      تل ملايف غلي أالاقي ةلأيدوح إاةيل
 
 
 : المراجع الخارجيالثالثالجزء 
 
دار ةدمعممالن  رل ةدميةرعلن اي ن م ن ةدم لام ميةرعر ةدملاويف ةدمرويلر ةدميةرعح ب مع لمو  ملايف دلدلو ةدمي زي لممدل 
أن تؤ ء ةدميةرعلن ع ل قاي من  إدلملايف دلدلو ةدمي زر، مرما  رل د ميةرعلن ةدمامدلن دميةرعر ةدملاويف ةدمرويلر ل لي 
 .ل مم نهج من ةد لوج دودمهمرةد فوء
 لا توافق على العبارات التالية: أومدى توافق  أيِّ  إلى 3.1
 ةدعدويل
   أمةا 
 د ال
 ممةا  محولا   أمةا 
 ممةا 
 د ال
      ةدميةرعمن ةدم لامن تج اعلا مؤت من مقوايمن ع ل ميةرعر ةدملاويف
يلي ةدميةرع عنا م للج لعمما م ماامل ةد مةئج ةدمودلر د  ل  دلي ع ل م 
 د ملايف دلموة اةء ةد
     
      ةلأيدوح إاةيللم ن د ميةرعمن ةدم لامن ة م وف ممعطلل 
      دأمعوب ةدميةرعر ةلأيدوح إاةيلممأثي قايل ةدميةرع ع ل ة م وف 
      قا ممأثي دمضويب ةدملاودح ةلأيدوح إاةيليغدر ةدميةرع ال ةدم يلي عن 
      من الال م يليه ةلأيدوح لمنع إاةيللم ن د ميةرع ةن 
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 يرجى الاشارة إلى مدى موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك على العبارات التالية: 3.2
 ةدعدويل
   أمةا 
 د ال
 ممةا  محولا   أمةا 
 ممةا 
 د ال
      مدلمهج مروه ةدم وتملنؤ لعي ةدميةرعمن د  ل موج م 
      مدلمهج مروه ةدطيف ةدثودثؤ لعي ةدميةرعمن د  ل موج م 
      ل مااج م يلي ةدميةرع ع ل نطو  مة ع من قدل ةدمهمملن
م  لعمما ع له عنا ةماوذ  ،ط ب قونمنل ا طلعمدي م يلي ةدميةرع م
 ةد يةية  ةدمودلر
     
 
 
توافق او مدى  أيِّ إلى ود مةئج ةدمودلر. د ممع  أطيةف دإ مااةج م يلي ةدميةرع ةداويرل عنا ةماوذ قيةية  ةقملاوالر م مج عال  3.3
كانت معززة بتقرير مراجع خارجى، هذه الثقة ما  إذاان المستخدمين فى الجدول أدناه يعطون التقارير المالية ثقة اكبر  لا توافق
 كانت لتمنح فى حالة عدم وجود تقرير للمراجع.
 ةدم مااج
   أمةا 
 د ال
 ممةا  محولا   أمةا 
 ممةا 
 د ال
      ةدم وتملن
      اةيلةلإ
      ةدممظفلن
      ةدضيةئب إاةيل
      ةدزدوئن ةدحودللن مةدمممقعلن
      ةدمودلرية  م  م  ةلأ
      ملايف دلدلو ةدمي زي
      ةدملاويف ةدمية  ر
      علاجةلإ
      عضوء ةدمايل  مةدمية ز ةددحثلرأ
      ةدمرممع دلافر عومر
       اير، ليرل ةدمحالاأ
 
 ضافيةإ: معلومات الرابعالجزء 
 :يرجى استخدام الفراغ التاليال ةدملاويف ةدمرويلر ةد لدلر،  ةلأيدوح إاةيلر مع ممو  عن مموي ر أللإضوار  4.1
 
 
 
  
بك للحصول على ملخص بنتائج هذه الدراسة يرجى كتابة البيانات الخاصة  مدلون. دود  ي  تمموم ج دمعدئر تذة ةلإ لم اج د ج ةددوحث
 فى الجدول التالي:
 سمالإ 
 العنوان 
 بريد الكترونى 
 الهاتف 
 الفاكس 
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Appendix 7.3 
Questionnaire Responses by only Preparers 
 
 
Part 1 :General Information (Please respond by ticking (√) in the appropriate box) 
Please indicate your age 
Less than 25 years 
old 
Between 26 and 
30 years old 
Between 31 and 
40 years old 
Between 41 and 
50 years old 
Over 50 years old 
1 3 15 4 4 
 
1.1 Please indicate your gender:  M (   26  )  F (    1 ) 
 
2. Are you professionally qualified in accountancy or finance?  Yes (    8  )  No (   19   ) 
 
If yes, please indicate which of the following professional qualifications that you have: 
Professional Body  
LAAA 6 
ICAEW 3 
CIMA  
ACCA  
AICPA  
Other, please specify …. 1 
 
3. What is your highest educational qualification? 
Qualification  
Doctorate  
Master degree 2 
Bachelor 20 
Diploma 3 
Other, please specify ……… 1 
 
4. Please indicate your place of education for your highest degree 
Place  
Libya 23 
Other Arab country 1 
UK 2 
USA 1 
Other, please specify ………  
 
5. Please tick your place of work and position 
Place of Work  position 
A commercial bank 27  
Central Bank of Libya   
The Libyan Stock Market   
Tax Authority   
Audit Firm   
State Audit   
Current or potential investor   
Academia and Research Centres   
Other, please specify ………   
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6. Please indicate the work experience, if any, that you have: 
Less than 5 years 9 Between 5 and 10 years 8 
Between 11 and 15 years 3 Over 15 years 16 
 
 
Part 2: Financial Reporting Quality and Earnings Management 
For the purpose of this questionnaire, financial reporting is defined as being of good quality when 
it provides useful information to the users of financial statements. 
 
2.1 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree, with the following statements 
about the quality of financial reporting in Libya. 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement  SD D NAD A SA 
Financial reporting, generally, is of good quality 2 6 3 16  
Financial reporting of listed companies is of good quality 2 4 3 18  
Financial reporting of banks generally is of good quality 3 2 5 15 2 
Financial reporting of listed banks is of good quality 2 2 7 15 1 
Financial reporting by listed banks provides relevant 
information 
2 2 7 14 2 
Financial reporting by listed banks provides reliable 
information 
2 4 9 10 1 
 
2.2 Are you familiar with the term “Earnings Management?”   
 Yes (   14    ) No ( 12     )  
 
2.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about earning 
management: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Earnings management means reinvesting the earned profits 2 7 3 10 2 
Earnings management means manipulating earnings 2 6 4 11 2 
Earnings management is a bank activity which is responsible 
for planning and controlling reported income 
 3 7 15  
Earnings management means Increasing or decreasing the 
reported income according to management’s desire 
1 4 6 13 1 
Other, please specify ……………………….  
 
 
For the purpose of this questionnaire, “Earnings management” is defined as the manipulation of 
the externally reported income statement to alter the reported income according to 
management’s desire. [Such adjustments may take place within GAAP but in some cases they 
could be done in breach of GAAP]. Such manipulation is widely known as ‘earnings management’ 
in the professional and academic accounting literature in the US and UK. 
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2.4 Such earnings management would, according to the literature, affect the quality of financial 
statements; to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the 
Libyan commercial banks:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Earnings management affects the quality of financial 
statements 
1 2 1 19 3 
Earnings management is practiced in the private listed banks. 1 3 5 13 4 
Earnings management is practiced in the private unlisted 
banks. 
 5 8 11 1 
Earnings management is practiced in the listed state-owned 
banks. 
1 9 5 9 1 
Earnings management is practiced in the unlisted state-
owned banks. 
1 8 10 6  
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to shareholders 
4 8 8 6  
Managers are managing earnings for their own benefits 4 8 5 9  
Earnings management enables managers to better 
communicate economic information to stakeholders 
3 11 4 8  
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to third party regulators 
3 6 6 9 2 
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to credit rating agencies 
2 7 6 9 2 
 
2.5 please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that bank managers are paying most 
attention to the following users when it comes to preparing financial statements 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Stakeholder 1 2 3 4 5 
Shareholders 1 1 3 14 8 
Employees 3 12 4 4 4 
Current and potential costumers 2 2 5 16 2 
Central Bank of Libya  1 1 15 10 
Tax authority  3 4 12 6 
The Libyan Stock Market  3 5 14 4 
Corresponding banks  1 5 15 4 
Bank credit rating agencies  4 6 12 3 
Media  7 10 7 2 
Academia and research centres 1 7 9 8 1 
Society as a whole 1 6 8 7 2 
Other, please specify …………………………..      
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2.6 Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors motivate 
Libyan commercial bank managers to manage earnings: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Motivation Ownership SD D NAD A SA 
Management compensation 
State 2 3 2 12 2 
Private  2 1 1 16 3 
Job security 
State  5 6 7 3 
Private   3 4 12 4 
To avoid regulatory interventions 
State  6 3 7 4 
Private   4 4 14 1 
The desire to report smooth earnings 
State  3 9 5 3 
Private   1 5 16 1 
To influence other stakeholders 
State  5 6 7 1 
Private   4 5 12 2 
Because other Libyan banks manage earnings 
State  5 9 5 1 
Private   4 8 7 3 
To avoid reporting losses 
State  5 6 5 4 
Private   5 5 7 5 
To meet predetermined expectation (budgets) 
State  4 4 10 3 
Private   2 3 15 3 
To decrease tax payments 
State  5 4 6 5 
Private   5 3 9 5 
To influence assessment by credit rating 
agencies 
State  4 6 8 3 
Private   1 5 13 2 
To influence stock price 
State  4 6 8 3 
Private   2 4 10 5 
Other, please specify ……………………..       
 
Please comment, if you think that listed and unlisted status would influence your response to any 
of the above factors: 
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2.7 Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following areas or techniques 
may be used by Libyan commercial bank managers to manipulate reported earnings. 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Method SD D NAD A SA 
Reserves   3 2 20 1 
Revenue recognition  2 6 17  
Disposing of high market value assets  6 4 15 1 
Investments  6 1 17 2 
Concealing losses 2 6 7 10  
Use or misuse of set-aside interests112 1 7 7 8 1 
Accounting changes  2 7 3 13  
Foreign currency 2 7 3 12 1 
Manipulation of the loan loss provision 5 4 5 10 1 
Other means, please specify ………………….      
 
2.8 please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors enable Libyan 
commercial bank managers to manipulate earnings: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Factor SD D NAD A SA 
Local accounting practice  2 5 15 2 
Ineffective external audit function 1 3 4 13 4 
Poor corporate governance mechanism 1 1 4 14 5 
Poor commercial and business knowledge among users 1 2 5 14 3 
Ineffective monitoring by Central Bank of Libya  3 5 14 3 
Ineffective monitoring by Libyan Stock Market  1 7 14 3 
Ineffective monitoring by Tax authority   3 6 11 4 
Difficulty of detection by auditors  7 2 14 1 
Difficulty of detection by users  7 3 14 1 
Other, please specify …………………..      
 
2.9 To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following actions would mitigate the 
practice of earnings management:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Action SD D NAD A SA 
Adopting international accounting standards (IFRS) in practice    16 9 
Applying good corporate governance e.g. existence of audit 
committee, effective internal auditing… 
  1 17 7 
Educating and training of preparers  1 2 11 11 
Educating and training of auditors  3 3 12 7 
Educating and training of investors  4 6 10 5 
Strengthen audit regulation     18 8 
Strengthen oversight of financial reporting    19 7 
Other, please specify ……………………………      
 
                                                 
112
 Set-aside interests. Literal translation for interests that are calculated and booked as a provision rather than 
revenue because of a client bad debt risk.  
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2.10 To what extent, do you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning the 
ethics of earnings management: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Ethical behaviour means complying with law  3 5 12 4 
Ethical behaviour means thinking about the impact of 
one’s decisions on others 
 2 8 11 3 
Earnings management is ethical if practiced within the 
law  
 6 8 7 2 
Earnings management is ethical if practiced within the 
GAAP 
 6 8 9 2 
Earnings management affects others' interests  2 4 14 3 
Earnings management is an unethical practice 1 3 12 5 2 
 
Part 3: External Auditor 
3.1 According to Libyan regulations, only auditors who are listed with the Central Bank of Libya 
are allowed to audit Libyan commercial banks. This restriction implies that those “listed auditors” 
are qualified to undertake an effective audit for banks. To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well qualified and 
capable to audit banks 
2 5 7 9 4 
The auditor’s reports are widely relied upon when 
assessing banks’ financial performance. 
 3 2 18 4 
Listed auditors are likely to detect and deter earnings 
management practices in Libyan commercial banks 
 4 6 16 1 
An auditor’s ability to report on earnings management is 
compromised by audit fess 
2 8 7 9 1 
An auditor’s willingness to report earnings management 
breaches  is compromised by confliction of interest to an 
auditor’s independence 
1 7 12 6 1 
The external auditor can prevent the practice of EM 
using the power of the auditor’s report 
 2 5 15 4 
 
3.2 Please indicate the extent by which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the shareholders 
2  6 14 3 
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the third parties 
1 1 8 13 2 
The auditor’s report is widely used by interested  
stakeholders 
  7 16 2 
The auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and not 
used widely in the financial decision making process. 
2 13 5 5  
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3.3 Presumably, an auditor’s report is used by several parties when making economic decisions 
regarding financial statements. Please indicate to what extent do you agree or disagree that the 
following stakeholders place greater trust in financial statements of Libyan commercial banks as a 
result of the auditor’s report than they would otherwise do: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Users SD D NAD A SA 
shareholders  2 2 15 7 
Management  2 4 16 4 
Employees  3 11 10 1 
Tax department  1 4 16 5 
Current and potential customers 1 3 3 15 2 
The Libyan Stock Market 1 1 2 16 5 
Central Bank of Libya  1  19 6 
Corresponding banks 2 2 3 14 3 
Media 1 4 8 10 1 
Academia and research centres  3 8 13 1 
Society as a whole  4 8 10 2 
Other, please specify ………………      
 
Part 4:  Additional Information 
4.1 Please use the space below to make any comments about the earnings management practices 
in the Libyan Commercial Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher would like to take the opportunity to thank you for filling in the questionnaire. 
Also, if you would like to receive a summary of the research results and findings please write 
down your name and contact details. Thank you. 
 
Name  
Address  
Email  
Phone number  
Fax number  
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Appendix 7.4 
Questionnaire Responses by only Auditors 
 
Part 1 :General Information (Please respond by ticking (√) in the appropriate box) 
Please indicate your age 
Less than 25 years 
old 
Between 26 and 
30 years old 
Between 31 and 
40 years old 
Between 41 and 
50 years old 
Over 50 years old 
  5 11 11 
 
1.1 Please indicate your gender:  M (   25  )  F (    2) 
 
2. Are you professionally qualified in accountancy or finance?  Yes (    14  )  No (11   ) 
 
If yes, please indicate which of the following professional qualifications that you have: 
Professional Body  
LAAA 12 
ACCA  
AICPA 1 
ICAEW  
CIMA  
Other, please specify ….  
 
3. What is your highest educational qualification? 
Qualification  
Doctorate  
Master degree 6 
Bachelor 19 
Diploma 1 
Other, please specify ……… 1 
 
4. Please indicate your place of education for your highest degree 
Place  
Libya 20 
Other Arab country 5 
UK 1 
USA 1 
Other, please specify ………  
 
5. Please tick your place of work and position 
Place of Work  position 
A commercial bank   
Central Bank of Libya   
The Libyan Stock Market   
Tax Authority   
Audit Firm 
27 
 
State Audit  
Current or potential investor   
Academia and Research Centres   
Other, please specify ………   
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6. Please indicate the work experience, if any, that you have: 
Less than 5 years 8 Between 5 and 10 years 2 
Between 11 and 15 years 2 Over 15 years 8 
 
Part 2: Financial Reporting Quality and Earnings Management 
For the purpose of this questionnaire, financial reporting is defined as being of good quality when 
it provides useful information to the users of financial statements. 
 
2.1 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree, with the following statements 
about the quality of financial reporting in Libya. 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement  SD D NAD A SA 
Financial reporting, generally, is of good quality 2 8 7 7 1 
Financial reporting of listed companies is of good quality 2 5 10 9 1 
Financial reporting of banks generally is of good quality 2 3 5 16 1 
Financial reporting of listed banks is of good quality 2 3 9 13  
Financial reporting by listed banks provides relevant 
information 
2  10 15  
Financial reporting by listed banks provides reliable 
information 
2 2 14 4  
 
2.2 Are you familiar with the term “Earnings Management?”   
 Yes (   15    ) No (    7  )  
 
2.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about earning 
management: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Earnings management means reinvesting the earned profits 1 2 5 16 2 
Earnings management means manipulating earnings 3 5 8 7 3 
Earnings management is a bank activity which is responsible 
for planning and controlling reported income 
2 3 10 10  
Earnings management means Increasing or decreasing the 
reported income according to management’s desire 
1 8 6 9 2 
Other, please specify ……………………….  
 
For the purpose of this questionnaire, “Earnings management” is defined as the manipulation of 
the externally reported income statement to alter the reported income according to 
management’s desire. [Such adjustments may take place within GAAP but in some cases they 
could be done in breach of GAAP]. Such manipulation is widely known as ‘earnings management’ 
in the professional and academic accounting literature in the US and UK. 
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2.4 Such earnings management would, according to the literature, affect the quality of financial 
statements; to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the 
Libyan commercial banks:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Earnings management affects the quality of financial 
statements 
 1 3 18 5 
Earnings management is practiced in the private listed banks. 1 4 12 7 2 
Earnings management is practiced in the private unlisted 
banks. 
 2 13 10 1 
Earnings management is practiced in the listed state-owned 
banks. 
1 5 11 8  
Earnings management is practiced in the unlisted state-
owned banks. 
1 4 15 3  
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to shareholders 
1 6 10 6 3 
Managers are managing earnings for their own benefits 1 6 9 9 1 
Earnings management enables managers to better 
communicate economic information to stakeholders 
3 8 6 8  
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to third party regulators 
1 9 6 8 1 
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to credit rating agencies 
1 8 9 6 2 
 
2.5 please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that bank managers are paying most 
attention to the following users when it comes to preparing financial statements 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Stakeholder SD D NAD A SA 
Shareholders  1 3 16 7 
Employees 1 12 6 6 2 
Current and potential costumers  4 6 15 2 
Central Bank of Libya  3 3 10 11 
Tax authority  1 7 17 1 
The Libyan Stock Market  1 8 12 5 
Corresponding banks  2 7 13 4 
Bank credit rating agencies  3 8 12 4 
Media 1 7 11 4 4 
Academia and research centres 2 6 11 6 1 
Society as a whole 2 8 13 3 1 
Other, please specify …………………………..      
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2.6 Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors motivate 
Libyan commercial bank managers to manage earnings: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Motivation Ownership SD D NAD A SA 
Management compensation 
State 1 6 7 11 2 
Private   2 4 14 5 
Job security 
State  7 7 10 3 
Private   3 4 15 3 
To avoid regulatory interventions 
State 1 7 3 13 3 
Private  1 6 3 11 4 
The desire to report smooth earnings 
State  7 8 12  
Private   5 7 13  
To influence other stakeholders 
State 1 8 7 11  
Private   9 5 9 2 
Because other Libyan banks manage earnings 
State 1 7 11 7  
Private  1 7 7 7 1 
To avoid reporting losses 
State  6 4 13 4 
Private   5 4 11 5 
To meet predetermined expectation (budgets) 
State  8 7 9 2 
Private   7 6 8 3 
To decrease tax payments 
State 1 8 8 9 1 
Private   5 4 12 4 
To influence assessment by credit rating 
agencies 
State  3 12 12  
Private   2 9 12 2 
To influence stock price 
State 1 6 7 11 2 
Private   6 8 9 2 
Other, please specify ……………………..       
 
Please comment, if you think that listed and unlisted status would influence your response to any 
of the above factors: 
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2.7 Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following areas or techniques 
may be used by Libyan commercial bank managers to manipulate reported earnings. 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Method SD D NAD A SA 
Reserves   4 3 15 4 
Revenue recognition  4 5 16 1 
Disposing of high market value assets  6 9 11 1 
Investments  3 7 14 3 
Concealing losses 1 7 6 12 1 
Use or misuse of set-aside interests113  2 11 13 1 
Accounting changes   4 10 9 2 
Foreign currency 1 10 6 9  
Manipulation of the loan loss provision 1 5 6 13 2 
Other means, please specify ………………….      
 
2.8 please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors enable Libyan 
commercial bank managers to manipulate earnings: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Factor SD D NAD A SA 
Local accounting practice 1 2 8 12 2 
Ineffective external audit function  3 3 18 3 
Poor corporate governance mechanism   6 18 3 
Poor commercial and business knowledge among users   2 22 2 
Ineffective monitoring by Central Bank of Libya  1 4 18 4 
Ineffective monitoring by Libyan Stock Market  1 8 15 3 
Ineffective monitoring by Tax authority   1 6 17 3 
Difficulty of detection by auditors  2 10 13 2 
Difficulty of detection by users  1 6 18 2 
Other, please specify …………………..      
 
2.9 To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following actions would mitigate the 
practice of earnings management:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Action SD D NAD A SA 
Adopting international accounting standards (IFRS) in practice   4 19 4 
Applying good corporate governance e.g. existence of audit 
committee, effective internal auditing… 
  4 17 6 
Educating and training of preparers  1 4 14 7 
Educating and training of auditors   1 19 7 
Educating and training of investors  2 6 16 3 
Strengthen audit regulation    2 15 10 
Strengthen oversight of financial reporting   2 17 8 
Other, please specify ……………………………      
 
                                                 
113
 Set-aside interests. Literal translation for interests that are calculated and booked as a provision rather than 
revenue because of a client bad debt risk.  
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2.10 To what extent, do you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning the 
ethics of earnings management: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Ethical behaviour means complying with law  3 3 17 3 
Ethical behaviour means thinking about the impact of 
one’s decisions on others 
 2 3 15 6 
Earnings management is ethical if practiced within the 
law  
1 7 4 13 1 
Earnings management is ethical if practiced within the 
GAAP 
1 6 4 13 2 
Earnings management affects others' interests  2 4 18 3 
Earnings management is an unethical practice 1 7 11 5 2 
 
Part 3: External Auditor 
3.1 According to Libyan regulations, only auditors who are listed with the Central Bank of Libya 
are allowed to audit Libyan commercial banks. This restriction implies that those “listed auditors” 
are qualified to undertake an effective audit for banks. To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well qualified and 
capable to audit banks 
1 8 9 5 4 
The auditor’s reports are widely relied upon when 
assessing banks’ financial performance. 
1 4 7 14 1 
Listed auditors are likely to detect and deter earnings 
management practices in Libyan commercial banks 
1 5 8 12 1 
An auditor’s ability to report on earnings management is 
compromised by audit fess 
4 7 10 5 1 
An auditor’s willingness to report earnings management 
breaches  is compromised by confliction of interest to an 
auditor’s independence 
2 5 10 9 1 
The external auditor can prevent the practice of EM 
using the power of the auditor’s report 
1 5 11 8 1 
 
3.2 Please indicate the extent by which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the shareholders 
 7 3 12 3 
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the third parties 
 5 8 11 1 
The auditor’s report is widely used by interested  
stakeholders 
 5 8 11 1 
The auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and not 
used widely in the financial decision making process. 
 11 1 12 1 
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3.3 Presumably, an auditor’s report is used by several parties when making economic decisions 
regarding financial statements. Please indicate to what extent do you agree or disagree that the 
following stakeholders place greater trust in financial statements of Libyan commercial banks as a 
result of the auditor’s report than they would otherwise do: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Users SD D NAD A SA 
shareholders  3 4 15 3 
Management 1 5 3 15 1 
Employees 1 5 10 9  
Tax department  3 6 13 2 
Current and potential customers  3 7 14 1 
The Libyan Stock Market  1 5 15 4 
Central Bank of Libya  1 4 15 5 
Corresponding banks  3 6 14 2 
Media  4 11 9 1 
Academia and research centres  3 10 10 2 
Society as a whole  4 11 10  
Other, please specify ………………      
 
Part 4:  Additional Information 
4.1 Please use the space below to make any comments about the earnings management practices 
in the Libyan Commercial Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher would like to take the opportunity to thank you for filling in the questionnaire. 
Also, if you would like to receive a summary of the research results and findings please write 
down your name and contact details. Thank you. 
 
Name  
Address  
Email  
Phone number  
Fax number  
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Appendix 7.5 
Questionnaire Responses by only Regulators 
 
Part 1 :General Information (Please respond by ticking (√) in the appropriate box) 
 
Please indicate your age 
Less than 25 years 
old 
Between 26 and 
30 years old 
Between 31 and 
40 years old 
Between 41 and 
50 years old 
Over 50 years old 
 2 8 9 1 
 
1.1 Please indicate your gender:  M (   20  )  F (    ) 
 
2. Are you professionally qualified in accountancy or finance?  Yes (    1  )  No (19   ) 
 
If yes, please indicate which of the following professional qualifications that you have: 
Professional Body  
LAAA 1 
ICAEW  
CIMA  
ACCA  
AICPA  
Other, please specify ….  
 
3. What is your highest educational qualification? 
Qualification  
Doctorate  
Master degree 4 
Bachelor 14 
Diploma 1 
Other, please specify ……… 1 
 
4. Please indicate your place of education for your highest degree 
Place  
Libya 19 
Other Arab country  
UK 1 
USA  
Other, please specify ………  
 
5. Please tick your place of work and position 
Place of Work  position 
A commercial bank   
Central Bank of Libya  
20 
 
The Libyan Stock Market   
Tax Authority   
Audit Firm   
State Audit   
Current or potential investor   
Academia and Research Centres   
Other, please specify ………   
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6. Please indicate the work experience, if any, that you have: 
Less than 5 years 2 Between 5 and 10 years 7 
Between 11 and 15 years 4 Over 15 years 6 
 
Part 2: Financial Reporting Quality and Earnings Management 
For the purpose of this questionnaire, financial reporting is defined as being of good quality when 
it provides useful information to the users of financial statements. 
2.1 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree, with the following statements 
about the quality of financial reporting in Libya. 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement  SD D NAD A SA 
Financial reporting, generally, is of good quality  10 5 4  
Financial reporting of listed companies is of good quality  4 12 3  
Financial reporting of banks generally is of good quality  5 7 7  
Financial reporting of listed banks is of good quality  5 7 6  
Financial reporting by listed banks provides relevant 
information 
 4 5 10  
Financial reporting by listed banks provides reliable 
information 
 5 6 8  
 
2.2 Are you familiar with the term “Earnings Management?”   
 Yes (   8    ) No (  7    )  
 
2.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about earning 
management: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Earnings management means reinvesting the earned profits  4 3 8 2 
Earnings management means manipulating earnings 3 4 3 6 1 
Earnings management is a bank activity which is responsible 
for planning and controlling reported income 
1 4 4 7 1 
Earnings management means Increasing or decreasing the 
reported income according to management’s desire 
 3 6 9  
Other, please specify ……………………….  
 
For the purpose of this questionnaire, “Earnings management” is defined as the manipulation of 
the externally reported income statement to alter the reported income according to 
management’s desire. [Such adjustments may take place within GAAP but in some cases they 
could be done in breach of GAAP]. Such manipulation is widely known as ‘earnings management’ 
in the professional and academic accounting literature in the US and UK. 
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2.4 Such earnings management would, according to the literature, affect the quality of financial 
statements; to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the 
Libyan commercial banks:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Earnings management affects the quality of financial 
statements 
1 1  12 4 
Earnings management is practiced in the private listed banks. 1 2 3 12  
Earnings management is practiced in the private unlisted 
banks. 
 3 6 9  
Earnings management is practiced in the listed state-owned 
banks. 
1 1 6 8  
Earnings management is practiced in the unlisted state-
owned banks. 
 4 7 7  
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to shareholders 
1 3 7 7  
Managers are managing earnings for their own benefits 1  6 10 1 
Earnings management enables managers to better 
communicate economic information to stakeholders 
 7 4 6 1 
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to third party regulators 
1 1 7 8 1 
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to credit rating agencies 
 4 5 7 2 
 
2.5 please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that bank managers are paying most 
attention to the following users when it comes to preparing financial statements 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Stakeholder SD D NAD A SA 
Shareholders  1 2 15 2 
Employees  9 8 2 1 
Current and potential costumers  4 8 7 1 
Central Bank of Libya  1 2 12 4 
Tax authority   5 13 1 
The Libyan Stock Market  2 4 13 1 
Corresponding banks  2 6 12  
Bank credit rating agencies  3 4 11 2 
Media  6 6 8  
Academia and research centres  9 4 6 1 
Society as a whole  7 8 3 2 
Other, please specify …………………………..      
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2.6 Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors motivate 
Libyan commercial bank managers to manage earnings: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Motivation Ownership SD D NAD A SA 
Management compensation 
State 1 3 4 9  
Private   4 2 11 1 
Job security 
State 1 2 2 11  
Private   4 1 11 1 
To avoid regulatory interventions 
State 1 4 5 6  
Private   1 7 9  
The desire to report smooth earnings 
State 2  3 11 1 
Private  2  4 12  
To influence other stakeholders 
State 2 1 8 5 1 
Private  1  4 12 1 
Because other Libyan banks manage earnings 
State 1 1 7 6  
Private  2  7 7 1 
To avoid reporting losses 
State 2 2 3 8 1 
Private  2 3  11 1 
To meet predetermined expectation (budgets) 
State 1 1 5 9  
Private   2 4 11  
To decrease tax payments 
State 1 3 3 10  
Private   1 1 15  
To influence assessment by credit rating 
agencies 
State 1  6 10 1 
Private    5 12 1 
To influence stock price 
State 1 2 5 7 2 
Private   1 4 11 2 
Other, please specify ……………………..       
 
Please comment, if you think that listed and unlisted status would influence your response to any 
of the above factors: 
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2.7 Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following areas or techniques 
may be used by Libyan commercial bank managers to manipulate reported earnings. 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Method SD D NAD A SA 
Reserves  1 1 1 16  
Revenue recognition  2 4 11 1 
Disposing of high market value assets 1  6 11 1 
Investments   4 14 1 
Concealing losses 1 1 6 10  
Use or misuse of set-aside interests114 1 1 9 7  
Accounting changes   4 4 10  
Foreign currency  4 7 6 1 
Manipulation of the loan loss provision 1 1 1 15  
Other means, please specify ………………….      
 
2.8 please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors enable Libyan 
commercial bank managers to manipulate earnings: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Factor SD D NAD A SA 
Local accounting practice   3 16  
Ineffective external audit function   3 12 4 
Poor corporate governance mechanism   2 14 3 
Poor commercial and business knowledge among users  1 1 16 1 
Ineffective monitoring by Central Bank of Libya  2 4 7 5 
Ineffective monitoring by Libyan Stock Market  2 5 7 5 
Ineffective monitoring by Tax authority   2 3 9 5 
Difficulty of detection by auditors  3 4 8 4 
Difficulty of detection by users  2 4 10 3 
Other, please specify …………………..      
 
2.9 To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following actions would mitigate the 
practice of earnings management:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Action SD D NAD A SA 
Adopting international accounting standards (IFRS) in practice   1 10 8 
Applying good corporate governance e.g. existence of audit 
committee, effective internal auditing… 
   12 7 
Educating and training of preparers    11 8 
Educating and training of auditors   3 8 8 
Educating and training of investors  1 5 10 3 
Strengthen audit regulation     13 6 
Strengthen oversight of financial reporting    11 8 
Other, please specify ……………………………      
 
                                                 
114
 Set-aside interests. Literal translation for interests that are calculated and booked as a provision rather than 
revenue because of a client bad debt risk.  
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2.10 To what extent, do you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning the 
ethics of earnings management: 
 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Ethical behaviour means complying with law  1 3 13 2 
Ethical behaviour means thinking about the impact of 
one’s decisions on others 
 2 5 11 1 
Earnings management is ethical if practiced within the 
law  
1 4 4 8 2 
Earnings management is ethical if practiced within the 
GAAP 
1 3 6 9  
Earnings management affects others' interests  2 3 12 2 
Earnings management is an unethical practice  6 8 5  
 
Part 3: External Auditor 
3.1 According to Libyan regulations, only auditors who are listed with the Central Bank of Libya 
are allowed to audit Libyan commercial banks. This restriction implies that those “listed auditors” 
are qualified to undertake an effective audit for banks. To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well qualified and 
capable to audit banks 
1 2 9 8  
The auditor’s reports are widely relied upon when 
assessing banks’ financial performance. 
 2 3 15  
Listed auditors are likely to detect and deter earnings 
management practices in Libyan commercial banks 
 2 7 9 2 
An auditor’s ability to report on earnings management is 
compromised by audit fess 
 3 14 3  
An auditor’s willingness to report earnings management 
breaches  is compromised by confliction of interest to an 
auditor’s independence 
 2 16 2  
The external auditor can prevent the practice of EM 
using the power of the auditor’s report 
 1 6 12  
 
3.2 Please indicate the extent by which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the shareholders 
 3 2 11 4 
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the third parties 
 2 8 7 2 
The auditor’s report is widely used by interested  
stakeholders 
 2 5 11 2 
The auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and not 
used widely in the financial decision making process. 
 11 4 5  
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3.3 Presumably, an auditor’s report is used by several parties when making economic decisions 
regarding financial statements. Please indicate to what extent do you agree or disagree that the 
following stakeholders place greater trust in financial statements of Libyan commercial banks as a 
result of the auditor’s report than they would otherwise do: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Users SD D NAD A SA 
shareholders  2 1 14 3 
Management  1 4 10 5 
Employees  1 11 6 2 
Tax department  1 6 9 4 
Current and potential customers  2 8 7 2 
The Libyan Stock Market   2 14 4 
Central Bank of Libya  1 3 11 5 
Corresponding banks   10 5 5 
Media  4 6 7 3 
Academia and research centres  2 5 10 3 
Society as a whole  4 6 8 2 
Other, please specify ………………      
 
Part 4:  Additional Information 
4.1 Please use the space below to make any comments about the earnings management practices 
in the Libyan Commercial Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher would like to take the opportunity to thank you for filling in the questionnaire. 
Also, if you would like to receive a summary of the research results and findings please write 
down your name and contact details. Thank you. 
 
Name  
Address  
Email  
Phone number  
Fax number  
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Appendix 7.6 
Questionnaire Responses by only Users 
 
Part 1 :General Information (Please respond by ticking (√) in the appropriate box) 
 
Please indicate your age 
Less than 25 years 
old 
Between 26 and 
30 years old 
Between 31 and 
40 years old 
Between 41 and 
50 years old 
Over 50 years old 
 11 10 7  
 
1.1 Please indicate your gender:  M (  19   )  F (     9) 
 
2. Are you professionally qualified in accountancy or finance?  Yes (  5    )  No (   23   ) 
 
If yes, please indicate which of the following professional qualifications that you have: 
Professional Body  
LAAA 5 
ICAEW  
CIMA  
ACCA  
AICPA  
Other, please specify ….  
 
3. What is your highest educational qualification? 
Qualification  
Diploma 3 
Bachelor degree 7 
Master degree 15 
Doctorate 3 
Other, please specify ………  
 
4. Please indicate your place of education for your highest degree 
Place  
Libya 25 
Other Arab country 2 
UK 1 
USA  
Other, please specify ………  
 
5. Please tick your place of work and position 
Place of Work  position 
A commercial bank   
Central Bank of Libya   
The Libyan Stock Market   
Tax Authority   
Audit Firm   
State Audit   
Current or potential investor   
Academia and Research Centres 15  
Other, please specify ……… 13  
 328 
6. Please indicate the work experience, if any, that you have: 
Less than 5 years 8 Between 5 and 10 years 1 
Between 11 and 15 years 5 Over 15 years 1 
 
7. Where applicable, please describe any work experience that you have had in the Libyan 
banking sector (e.g. accountant for 5 years, internal auditor for 3 years)  
 
 
 
 
Part 2: Financial Reporting Quality and Earnings Management 
For the purpose of this questionnaire, financial reporting is defined as being of good quality when 
it provides useful information to the users of financial statements. 
2.1 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree, with the following statements 
about the quality of financial reporting in Libya. 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement  SD D NAD A SA 
Financial reporting, generally, is of good quality 7 13 3 5  
Financial reporting of listed companies is of good quality 5 6 9 8  
Financial reporting of banks generally is of good quality 2 8 10 8  
Financial reporting of listed banks is of good quality 2 6 8 9 3 
Financial reporting by listed banks provides relevant 
information 
1 8 7 11 1 
Financial reporting by listed banks provides reliable 
information 
1 5 14 8  
 
2.2 Are you familiar with the term “Earnings Management?”   
 Yes (   20    ) No (    3  )  
 
2.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about earning 
management: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Earnings management means reinvesting the earned profits 5 5 6 9  
Earnings management means manipulating earnings 3 4 1 12 5 
Earnings management is a bank activity which is responsible 
for planning and controlling reported income 
5 3 5 9 2 
Earnings management means Increasing or decreasing the 
reported income according to management’s desire 
1 1 7 10 7 
Other, please specify ……………………….  
 
For the purpose of this questionnaire, “Earnings management” is defined as the manipulation of 
the externally reported income statement to alter the reported income according to 
management’s desire. [Such adjustments may take place within GAAP but in some cases they 
could be done in breach of GAAP]. Such manipulation is widely known as ‘earnings management’ 
in the professional and academic accounting literature in the US and UK. 
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2.4 Such earnings management would, according to the literature, affect the quality of financial 
statements; to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the 
Libyan commercial banks:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Earnings management affects the quality of financial 
statements 
 1  23 4 
Earnings management is practiced in the private listed banks.  5 15 6 2 
Earnings management is practiced in the private unlisted 
banks. 
 4 15 8 1 
Earnings management is practiced in the listed state-owned 
banks. 
 5 14 9  
Earnings management is practiced in the unlisted state-
owned banks. 
 5 13 8 1 
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to shareholders 
1 7 5 11 2 
Managers are managing earnings for their own benefits  6 9 10 3 
Earnings management enables managers to better 
communicate economic information to stakeholders 
3 13 5 6 1 
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to the regulators 
 5 7 13 3 
Managers are managing earnings to manipulate information 
communicated to credit rating agencies 
 6 9 9 3 
 
2.5 please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that bank managers are paying most 
attention to the following users when it comes to preparing financial statements 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Stakeholder SD D NAD A SA 
Shareholders  4 2 18 4 
Employees  10 4 12 2 
Current and potential costumers  5 5 15 2 
Central Bank of Libya   3 14 11 
Tax authority  4 2 13 9 
The Libyan Stock Market  2 6 15 5 
Corresponding banks  5 9 12 2 
Bank credit rating agencies  5 10 10 3 
Media 4 10 6 7 1 
Academia and research centres 4 12 5 7  
Society as a whole 3 13 5 7  
Other, please specify …………………………..      
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2.6 Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors motivate 
Libyan commercial bank managers to manage earnings: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Motivation Ownership SD D NAD A SA 
Management compensation 
State 1 5 4 11 5 
Private   3 7 10 6 
Job security 
State 1 4 4 12 4 
Private  1 4 7 11 4 
To avoid regulatory interventions 
State 1 3 4 16 4 
Private  1 2 8 11 4 
The desire to report smooth earnings 
State 2 2 7 13 4 
Private  2 1 7 11 4 
To influence other stakeholders 
State 2 6 7 8 5 
Private  2 4 6 7 6 
Because other Libyan banks manage earnings 
State 1 4 10 11 2 
Private  1 3 9 10 2 
To avoid reporting losses 
State 1  4 17 6 
Private  1 1 5 14 3 
To meet predetermined expectation (budgets) 
State 2 3 8 9 5 
Private  2 3 7 10 2 
To decrease tax payments 
State 1 5 7 13 2 
Private  1 1 6 12 6 
To influence assessment by credit rating 
agencies 
State  4 11 11 2 
Private   2 9 9 5 
To influence stock price 
State  5 6 12 5 
Private   4 4 10 7 
Other, please specify ……………………..       
 
Please comment, if you think that listed and unlisted status would influence your response to any 
of the above factors: 
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2.7 Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following areas or techniques 
may be used by Libyan commercial bank managers to manipulate reported earnings. 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Method SD D NAD A SA 
Reserves   2 8 15 3 
Revenue recognition  3 6 16 3 
Disposing of high market value assets  5 7 12 4 
Investments  3 5 17 3 
Concealing losses  5 4 13 6 
Use or misuse of set-aside interests115  5 11 8 4 
Accounting changes   5 5 15 3 
Foreign currency  2 11 13 2 
Manipulation of the loan loss provision 2 4 7 10 5 
Other means, please specify ………………….      
 
2.8 please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors enable Libyan 
commercial bank managers to manipulate earnings: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Factor SD D NAD A SA 
Local accounting practice 1 8 5 9 5 
Ineffective external audit function  5 1 14 8 
Poor corporate governance mechanism  3 7 8 10 
Poor commercial and business knowledge among users  5 3 9 10 
Ineffective monitoring by Central Bank of Libya  3 6 10 9 
Ineffective monitoring by Libyan Stock Market  4 5 9 10 
Ineffective monitoring by Tax authority   5 6 10 7 
Difficulty of detection by auditors 1 7 3 9 8 
Difficulty of detection by users  4 7 8 9 
Other, please specify …………………..      
 
2.9 To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following actions would mitigate the 
practice of earnings management:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Action SD D NAD A SA 
Adopting international accounting standards (IFRS) in practice   2 13 13 
Applying good corporate governance e.g. existence of audit 
committee, effective internal auditing… 
  3 9 16 
Educating and training of preparers  1 1 10 16 
Educating and training of auditors   1 10 17 
Educating and training of investors  1 4 9 14 
Strengthen audit regulation    1 7 20 
Strengthen oversight of financial reporting   2 9 17 
Other, please specify ……………………………      
 
                                                 
115
 Set-aside interests. Literal translation for interests that are calculated and booked as a provision rather than 
revenue because of a client bad debt risk.  
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2.10 To what extent, do you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning the 
ethics of earnings management: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Ethical behaviour means complying with law 1 6 2 14 5 
Ethical behaviour means thinking about the impact of 
one’s decisions on others 
  6 16 5 
Earnings management is ethical if practiced within the 
law  
 6 8 10 4 
Earnings management is ethical if practiced within the 
GAAP 
1 8 4 11 4 
Earnings management affects others' interests  2 3 20 3 
Earnings management is an unethical practice 1 7 10 5 4 
 
Part 3: External Auditor 
3.1 According to Libyan regulations, only auditors who are listed with the Central Bank of Libya 
are allowed to audit Libyan commercial banks. This restriction implies that those “listed auditors” 
are qualified to undertake an effective audit for banks. To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well qualified and 
capable to audit banks 
2 7 7 10 2 
The auditor’s report is relied upon when assessing a 
bank’s financial performance 
 3 3 17 5 
Listed auditors are likely to detect and deter earnings 
management practices in Libyan commercial banks 
1 8 7 8 4 
An auditor’s ability to report on earnings management is 
compromised by audit fess 
1 6 8 11 2 
An auditor’s willingness to report earnings management 
breaches  is compromised by confliction of interest to an 
auditor’s independence 
1 6 8 10 3 
The external auditor can prevent the practice of EM 
using the power of the auditor’s report 
 4 6 15 3 
 
3.2 Please indicate the extent by which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the shareholders 
 12 5 8 3 
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the third parties 
 10 9 7 2 
The auditor’s report is widely used by interested  
stakeholders 
 10 6 10 2 
The auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and not 
used widely in the financial decision making process 
3 10 2 10 3 
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3.3 Presumably, an auditor’s report is used by several parties when making economic decisions 
regarding financial statements. Please indicate to what extent do you agree or disagree that the 
following stakeholders place greater trust in financial statements of Libyan commercial banks as a 
result of the auditor’s report than they would otherwise do: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Users SD D NAD A SA 
shareholders 1 2 2 18 5 
Management  7 3 11 7 
Employees 1 11 4 9 3 
Tax department  7 3 10 8 
Current and potential customers 2 5 6 10 5 
The Libyan Stock Market  2 2 13 11 
Central Bank of Libya  2 3 10 13 
Corresponding banks  5 7 8 7 
Media 3 5 10 5 5 
Academia and research centres 2 7 8 6 5 
Society as a whole 4 5 10 6 3 
Other, please specify ………………      
 
Part 4:  Additional Information 
4.1 Please use the space below to make any comments about the earnings management practices 
in the Libyan Commercial Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher would like to take the opportunity to thank you for filling in the questionnaire. 
Also, if you would like to receive a summary of the research results and findings please write 
down your name and contact details. Thank you. 
 
Name  
Address  
Email  
Phone number  
Fax number  
 
